Comments on: You can’t con an honest man

By: Pauli

Pauli — Fri, 25 Jul 2003 12:11:05 +0000

Not sure I really understand the force-fraud distinction. Some thoughts: 1. You can generally defend yourself against force just as you can against fraud. One preys on physical weakness, the other on mental. 2. It’s not always possible to defend yourself against fraud (credit-card theft? or would the theft itself be deemed an act of force – even if committed surreptitiously/electronically?). 3. There are often ways of escaping force altogether (consider the possible different answers to “Did you spill my pint?”). 4. Force doesn’t necessarily involve violation of self-ownership (e.g. vandalism to property). 5. Fraud CAN violate self-ownership (Alder Hey?).

By: Micha Ghertner

Micha Ghertner — Fri, 25 Jul 2003 09:23:07 +0000

Chris, I was just visiting your homepage, followed the link to Imprints, and found An interview with G. A. Cohen. Very interesting guy, this Cohen. I’m going to have to read more of his work. Makes me regret not majoring in philosophy.

By: Micha Ghertner

Micha Ghertner — Fri, 25 Jul 2003 08:50:55 +0000

Chris, Your comments remind me of some of the arguments made by G.A. Cohen in Self-Ownership, Freedom, and Equality, where he responded to Nozick’s “eye-transplant egalitarianism” scenario by denying self-ownership. I’m curious if you agree with him. What are your thoughts on Nozick’s “eye-transplant egalitarianism” scenario as a justifaction for self-ownership?

By: Micha Ghertner

Micha Ghertner — Fri, 25 Jul 2003 08:38:19 +0000

"Even Nozick must acknowledge some method for settling disputes." The fact that you need something for your theory to be plausible does not mean that you are entitled to assume that it must be consistent with your theory. I've only read bits and pieces of Nozick, but from what I can gather, he based his claims for the legitimacy of minarchism primarily on the inevitable consolidation of private police and arbitration firms. Incidentally, I just spent some time yesterday reading Randy Barnett's criticism of this argument, which he wrote 25 years ago. Perhaps Nozick didn't make these points clear enough, as he was responding to Rothbard's objections to minimal government, and may have assumed that his audience already knew the background behind the discussion, but I find difficult to believe that he didn't mention anything about dispute resolution or its centrality to libertarian thinking. Regardless, even if he didn't, libertarianism doesn't stand or fall on the [im]perfections of Nozick's arguments. It just seems silly to me to claim that Nozick's theory is incompatible with the use of common law, insofar as common law is used to draw clear lines in unclear cases, as opposed to outright violating liberty claims.

By: Micha Ghertner

Micha Ghertner — Fri, 25 Jul 2003 08:23:37 +0000

Keith, Forgive me, but you are not coming off as entirely honest. Earlier in the thread, you claimed that you “used to consider myself a libertarianism[sic],” claimed that “I know quite a few libertarians, and I know what libertarianism is,” distinguished between “truly principled libertarianism” and “actual libertarianism,” among other comments that indicate that you are familiar enough with libertarianism to know that it represents a much broader concept than simply party politics. You now claim that you were only referring to members of the political party, and not others who describe their political philosophy as libertarian. This strains credulity based on your previous remarks, and it appears to me that you are simply trying to avoid the label of hypocrisy for accusing Barnett of lumping (and he is clearly guilty) and then doing the same. Whatever. Believe what you want to believe. The point about markets and regulation is that markets require an mechanism of force that exists to prevent the subversion of the market by force. This is essential and organic. It really doesn’t matter in this context whether it’s a group of Mafia dons or a government regulatory agency. The point is that in either case, regulation is not an external imposition that necessarily reduces the efficiency of the market. Instead, it’s an essential requirement for the market’s existence. Regulation is not antithetical to markets. Libertarians—at least the groups and individuals that most often and most loudly speak for libertarians and invoke libertarianism—claim otherwise. Let me repeat, in case I didn’t make myself clear earlier: No libertarians claim otherwise. None. Not even Libertarian Party members. The only people that could concievably fit into the mold you just created are absolute pacifists, and I have yet to meet an absolute pacifist who calls himself a libertarian. In other words, you are now defining “regulation” as “responding to force with force” – otherwise known as self-defense. Self-defense being a central component to libertarianism, I don’t quite see how you can claim that “most libertarians” oppose self-defense as a market mechanism.

By: Chris Bertram

Chris Bertram — Fri, 25 Jul 2003 08:22:11 +0000

Micha: “the alternative to self-ownership is slavery…”. If that were so, it would certainly be a powerful reason to favour self-ownership….

By: dsquared

dsquared — Fri, 25 Jul 2003 07:58:31 +0000

>.What “the modern conservative” has to do with discussions on libertarianism escapes me It always does ... >>Even Nozick must acknowledge some method for settling disputes. The fact that you need something for your theory to be plausible does not mean that you are entitled to assume that it must be consistent with your theory.

By: Keith M Ellis

Keith M Ellis — Fri, 25 Jul 2003 07:15:11 +0000

Micha, I didn’t lump “Objectivists, Chicago-school economists, Austrian economists, paleo-libertarians, anarcho-capitalists, minarchists” together. You did, implicitly, by assuming that when I refer to “libertarians” I am referring to all these groups. I had in mind Americans that primarily self-identify their political afficilation as “Libertarian”. Is that an artifically narrow definition of “libertarian”? I don’t think so. I recognize that this is an academic blog hosted outside the US. But the US is the current spiritual home of libertarianism, the SW US is its center, and the Internet has been its preferred medium. If you don’t want this variety of libertarians to be the public face of libertarianism, then I suggest you organize some like-minded people and speak up. Because, as a practical matter, these Libertarians are the public face of libertarianism and it is therefore fair to generalize about libertarianism on that basis. The point about markets and regulation is that markets require an mechanism of force that exists to prevent the subversion of the market by force. This is essential and organic. It really doesn’t matter in this context whether it’s a group of Mafia dons or a government regulatory agency. The point is that in either case, regulation is not an external imposition that necessarily reduces the efficiency of the market. Instead, it’s an essential requirement for the market’s existence. Regulation is not antithetical to markets. Libertarians—at least the groups and individuals that most often and most loudly speak for libertarians and invoke libertarianism—claim otherwise.

By: Micha Ghertner

Micha Ghertner — Fri, 25 Jul 2003 03:22:23 +0000

what I actually meant was ‘regulation’ in David’s broad sense. If that is the case, then your original claim that “[libertarians] simply refuse to recognize that markets can’t exist without regulation” is completely meaningless. Which libertarians are guilty of this? If you had instead been referring to state regulation, at least your comment would have made sense, insofar as many libertarians, myself included, believe that markets can exist without a state to regulate them. But if you were simply referring to intra-market regulation, such as private mafia bosses killing each other for failure to honor a contract, how could you possibly accuse libertarians of denying that this is the case? Further, as I mentioned in one of the Barnett threads, you are guilty of the same hypocrisy of which you accuse Barnett: you are lumping all libertarians under the label of fools. In your own words, “physician, heal thyself.” At any rate, thanks for providing an example of the libertarian habit of thought that mysteriously distinguishes between “government” and everything that acts like government. “Government” is what you say it is; and because it’s government, its usually wrong. Convenient, that. It’s an example of how libertarianism is reactive, not constructive. Yawn. I’m not really interested in debating the proper definition of government with you. If you believe that competitive, market produced police and arbitration sources constitute government, I couldn’t care less. I would just like to point out, again, that you are doing the exact same “lumping” of which you accuse Barnett. And yet you attempt to justify this lumpage, ignoring the diverse and often-times incompatible branches of libertarians. Granted, they may be small in number (relative to modern liberals and conservatives), but it is simply ignorant to lump Objectivists, Chicago-school economists, Austrian economists, paleo-libertarians, anarcho-capitalists, minarchists, etc, etc. Earlier, you claimed to be a libertarian in a past life, so you should know that all libertarians do not hold the same views, and you should not try to justify your hasty generalization through feigned ignorance.

By: Keith M Ellis

Keith M Ellis — Fri, 25 Jul 2003 02:31:35 +0000

“Daniel, the clear implication of what Keith meant when he used the word ‘regulation’ was government regulation.” Was it? Perhaps because government is normally the working context of discussing these issues. However, I can say with some authority what I actually meant….and what I actually meant was ‘regulation’ in David’s broad sense. At any rate, thanks for providing an example of the libertarian habit of thought that mysteriously distinguishes between “government” and everything that acts like government. “Government” is what you say it is; and because it’s government, its usually wrong. Convenient, that. It’s an example of how libertarianism is reactive, not constructive. As to the objection you make in another thread about my characterization of libertarians and libertarianism, the problem is that unlike Barnett’s “Left”, libertarians do not represent a broad subset of the population. Self-identified Libertarians are a tiny subset of the population, they are more homogenous than the general population, they are more localized and their discourse is more localized. At some level of distinction, generalizations are not only more appropriate, they’re necessary. Barnett could, after all, generalize with much greater justification about Trotskyites or followers of Pat Buchanon. To do so is certainly far more valid than generalizing about the “Left” and the “Right”. Furthermore, I don’t villify libertarians nor see them as very relevant to the political process and thus my generalization is not serving the dubious purpose that Barnett’s are.

By: Micha Ghertner

Micha Ghertner — Thu, 24 Jul 2003 23:49:19 +0000

True enough. As I said, most (perhaps all) moral arguments do come down to intuition in a certain sense. However, I think there is a difference between basing one’s objections to force on “nastiness” and basing it on self-ownership. In terms of self-ownership, it is more than simply a feeling that individuals own themselves; it is recognizing that the alternative to self-ownership is slavery. I think most people don’t object to nastiness, per se, depending on the situation, but would object to slavery in all cases. (To which someone should respond: what constitutes slavery? My intuition right now is telling me that arguing about the derivation of ethics with a professional philosopher is probably not the best use of my comparative advantage. I think I’ll go play some video games :P

By: Chris Bertram

Chris Bertram — Thu, 24 Jul 2003 23:23:34 +0000

Micha:“Libertarians try to avoid (although not always successfully) relying on simple intuitions to justify their moral arguments. For the most part, libertarians oppose the use of force not simply because it is “nasty”, but because it violates individuals’ self-ownership, the most fundamental right.” And self-ownership as a fundamental right is justified by …. simple intuitions.

By: Micha Ghertner

Micha Ghertner — Thu, 24 Jul 2003 21:33:24 +0000

Daniel, the clear implication of what Keith meant when he used the word “regulation” was government regulation. If you want to split hairs and pretend that he meant something else, by all means do so, but I’m not really interested in that line of argument. Keith, I’m aware of the fact that absolutist libertarianism is more extreme than pragmatic libertarianism, but neither advocates the status quo, as you claimed. I don’t think it is helpful to accuse libertarians of being foolish, any more than it is helpful to accuse socialists of being evil, godless thieves who want to destroy all things sacred. Invariably, at the end of these discussions on libertarianism, Mr. Davies will most likely quote John Kenneth Galbraith, as he frequently does, claiming that “The modern conservative is engaged in one of man’s oldest exercises in moral philosophy; that is, the search for a superior moral justification for selfishness.” What “the modern conservative” has to do with discussions on libertarianism escapes me, as does the usefulness of ad hominem that can so easily be countered by replacing the words “conservative” and “selfishness” with “social democrat” and “theft,” respectively. Markets can’t properly function in the presence of force, explicit or implicit. They need a regulatory Leviathan to reduce or eliminate such force. Professors David Friedman, Bruce Benson, and Randy Barnett, among others, have challenged this assertion. Benson, in particular, in his book, The Enterprise of Law, has shown ample empirical evidence for market-produced law and law enforcement. Now, to return to Davies’ original post, which until now I have not had time to respond: Davies claims that, “The prohibition on force is easy to understand. The prohibition on force is easy to understand. Force is nasty; it harms people directly and interferes with their liberty.” This is true, but it doesn’t tell the whole story. Libertarians try to avoid (although not always successfully) relying on simple intuitions to justify their moral arguments. For the most part, libertarians oppose the use of force not simply because it is “nasty”, but because it violates individuals’ self-ownership, the most fundamental right. If one wishes to poke holes into libertarianism, the best place to do it is when we try to move from self-ownership to ownership of physical property. However, once this maneuver is granted, justifying the argument against fraud is simple: it is identical to theft. The right to own property includes the right to transfer that ownership through the use of mutually agreed upon (voluntary) contractual relations. When two parties enter into such a contract, they both receive rights to the ownership of what the other person agrees to trade them, and at the same time, they create positive obligations on themselves to give up the rights to their own property. By committing fraud, the guilty party has violated the contract, violated his obligation to uphold his side of the bargain, and violated the property rights of the other party. Essentially, the fraudulent party stole the property of the other party. Now, one can certainly press libertarians further on this issue. How are we to decide what constitutes fraud? Where do we draw the line between actual fraud and free speech? The recent Nike commercial speech case demonstrates this problem perfectly. Earlier in this thread, Davies claimed that reliance on common law is incompatible with Nozick’s contractarianism. I don’t believe this is the case. Even Nozick must acknowledge some method for settling disputes. How do we decide whether Nike committed fraud or simply exercized its constitutional right to free speech? Minarchists would have no problem agreeing that a government court should answer this question. Anarcho-capitalists would prefer private arbitration firms, but either way, both courts are going to be relying on some common law. It is simply more efficient to base decisions on the outcomes of previous cases, and for the most part, libertarians have no problem with courts using common law to adjudicate these difficult questions of where to draw the line.

By: Loren

Loren — Thu, 24 Jul 2003 20:52:58 +0000

so, motivated by my morning radio listening habits, and vaguely a propos of this thread (i.e. libertarian concerns over fraud, Nozick’s thoughts about why making people pay for state protection, to put it very roughly, isn’t on a moral par with forced labor): what do people think of the use of private protective associations—er, I mean, professional security forces—to secure peace, order, and good government in trouble spots like Liberia or the Congo?

By: Keith M Ellis

Keith M Ellis — Thu, 24 Jul 2003 20:22:55 +0000

Mischa, the difference between truly principled libertarianism and the status quo is much greater then the difference between actual libertarianism and the status quo. It is in the latter that the differences between conservatism and libertarianism lie. I hate to break it to you, but I used to consider myself a libertarianism (in my younger days, when it’s excusable to be very foolish), I know quite a few libertarians, and I know what libertarianism is. Yeah, I’m aware that many liberals confuse conservatism with libertarianism, but I don’t. Outside the US what we’re calling “libertarians” are rare, and within the US—particularly in the more liberal areas of the country—libertarians are rare. But, as a said, that’s certainly not the case here in Texas. Most libertarians I know are of the techno-libertarian variety, probably because I’m in Austin. And what Daniel said. Markets can’t properly function in the presence of force, explicit or implicit. They need a regulatory Leviathan to reduce or eliminate such force. When markets naturally arise, regulatory mechanisms also naturally arise, not unlike government. It can be informal, just as rudimentary government is. The illegal drug markets have their own regulatory mechanisms. I would imagine, although I’ve not studied this, that any descriptive, anthropological economics would demonstrate this over and over again.