Comments on: The ‘lump of terrorism’ fallacy

By: Tom Maguire

Tom Maguire — Fri, 12 Sep 2003 18:35:43 +0000

I think the anaolgy between tghe US occupation of Iraq and the Israeli situation in Palestine is misdrawn. I have no doubt that, in Iraq, there are unreconstructed Ba’athists who want the US out, and the old order restored. However, I suspect the vast majority of Iraqis want the same thing the US wants – a sensible Iraqi government with the US gone. If my guess as to popular opinion in Iraq is correct, then our differences are hardly irreconciliable. However, the West Bank is a much different problem – there are (evidently enough) Israelis who won’t consider giving it back, and (apparently many) Palestinans who won’t consider not having it. Add to that the (seemingly plentiful) Palestinians who seek the destruction of Israel itself, and the path to peace is puzzling. That is quite different from what the US is facing in Iraq.

By: Sandwichman

Sandwichman — Thu, 11 Sep 2003 19:11:46 +0000

For background on the lump of labour fallacy, Henry Farrell links to a quote from Paul Samuelson posted on my TimeWork Web site. I like Farrell’s analogy and appreciate the link. The problem is I was quoting Samuelson in the course of debunking his version of the lump of labour fallacy. Admittedly, that context is not clear from the page on which the quote appears; one would have to backtrack two pages to encounter the context. Could it be possible, though, that the flypaper theory is indeed a fallacy even though the lump of labour is only a “faux fallacy”? Perhaps. Both fallacy claims rely on identifying and disproving an “implied assumption.” In the case of the lump of labour fallacy, I have shown that no such assumption is necessary for the success of work-sharing proposals. Many proponents of shorter work time have stated unequivocally that they make no such assumption. But then there are both “naive” and “sophisticated” arguments for work sharing and the naive arguments may well depend on at least a loose form of the fixed-amount-of-work assumption. In the case of the flypaper theory, I suspect that there are only naive arguments. After all, the so-called theory has circulated as an after the fact rationalization, only after weapons of mass destruction (i.e., not nefarious “efforts to conceal plans for a future programme”, etc.,etc.,etc…), Saddam’s links to al Qaeda and a flower-strewn welcome to the liberating occupiers have all failed to materialize. And not only is there not a “fixed amount of terrorism” as the naive version of the flypaper theory would assume, but there arguably is a politically limited amount of “flypaper”—a complication that any more sophisticated version would have to take into account. Of course, maybe when the occupation runs out of flypaper, Bremer can call in some of that Homeland Security duct tape.

By: Diana

Diana — Mon, 08 Sep 2003 17:09:08 +0000

PS according to today’s Daily Telegraph: Patrick Bishop in Baghdad writes: Two heat-seeking missiles were fired at an American military cargo plane after it took off from Baghdad airport at the weekend. The missiles exploded before they reached the C141 aircraft flying at 14,000 ft.

By: Diana

Diana — Mon, 08 Sep 2003 16:07:57 +0000

That leaves us with what exactly? The motivation to do a better job to drive out the infidel. What you have described are merely obstacles, which can always be overcome by human ingenuity.

By: andrew

andrew — Mon, 08 Sep 2003 07:40:37 +0000

…”The Al Qaeda terrorists we’re most concerned with are the more educated ones who could function easily in the West, especially those who are based in Europe, like the Hamburg cell involved in 9/11. Attracting random local cannon fodder into Iraq doesn’t help protect us from this type of person”… I agree with this statement. It’s a segmented market, guys. They are not the same types of people, they have different motivations and resources. Some who might attack b/c the Americans are convenient and pissing them off, were not going to buy a ticket to Los Angeles before we “brought the fight to them.” I can forgive the TV watchers for thinking that the War is a success as long as Muslims somewhere are dying, but book-readers should be held to higher standards.

By: linden

linden — Mon, 08 Sep 2003 07:29:58 +0000

What the Russians have done in Chechnya is simply not comparable in magnitude to the Iraq war. Russia created its problem through its awful policies. If the reconstruction could begin to approach something called competence, this type of problem probably won’t ever come into existence. I don’t think anyone has ever argued that the fly paper strategy will snuff out every single terrorist on the planet. That’s silly.

By: Pacific John

Pacific John — Mon, 08 Sep 2003 04:54:42 +0000

>All al-Qaeda has is the men who survived to reach the Pakistani Northwest Frontier Province. And years worth that trained and went back to approximately 50 countries (per Bergen). The the small arms thing, there is not a finite number in Iraq. They are cheap, available everywhere, and easy to smuggle. As seen in Somalia, even druged-out kids can figure out how to pull a trigger. Zakaria had a decent piece on the non-finite pool of terrorists. It seems the female suicide bombers in Russia are family members of dead Chechins. Say, have we killed any Iraqi civilians? I’d be sort of ticked if an army came here and killed my wife or kids.

By: omri

omri — Mon, 08 Sep 2003 03:51:32 +0000

Jon_h asks “Why would Al Qaeda be wasting the trained men in Iraq, when it has a limitless supply of tyros available to perform harassing strikes with explosives and RPGs?” Because the explosives have to be obtained and transported, as do the RPGs. Note that RPG attacks have declined to a near-rarity, probably because the local supply is exhausted and nobody is willing and able to bring more in. Bomb attacks require bringing in bomb makers from wherever they’re hiding, which is what the Rumsfeld wants. And Hamas-style attacks are useless because in Iraq AQ needs to protect the surrounding civilians and target only the soldiers (Hamas, needless to say, is not suffering from that problem). That leaves us with what exactly? Even in Afghanistan, AQ was not able to train many snipers, and that leaves us with the occasional suicidal AK-47 spray’n’pray attack. The only thing on this list that is worthwhile is to bring in bomb makers.

By: Jon H

Jon H — Mon, 08 Sep 2003 03:37:58 +0000

beldar writes: “There may have been some potential terrorists, for instance, whose main reason for outrage at the US was the basing of American forces in Saudi Arabia; that motivation to become a terrorist no longer exists” On the other hand, there are some important Shiite holy sites in Iraq. It’s not inconceivable that a Shiite group could adopt Al Qaeda tactics to drive us out of Iraq – perhaps including attacks on the mainland.

By: Jon H

Jon H — Mon, 08 Sep 2003 03:30:39 +0000

omri writes :”Keep in mind I said trained men. Al-Qaeda has only so many of those, and its ability to train more has been sharply curtailed by their loss of Afghanistan. Yes, they have a limitless supply of tyros, but they are useless.” Why would Al Qaeda be wasting the trained men in Iraq, when it has a limitless supply of tyros available to perform harassing strikes with explosives and RPGs? Given the amount of unguarded munitions in Iraq, and the amount of native Iraqi expertise, I doubt Al Qaeda would have to import anyone from Pakistan. They could probably buy the advice of an Iraqi explosives expert or ten, on a per-case basis. The Al Qaeda terrorists we’re most concerned with are the more educated ones who could function easily in the West, especially those who are based in Europe, like the Hamburg cell involved in 9/11. Attracting random local cannon fodder into Iraq doesn’t help protect us from this type of person. It helps Iraq’s neighbors, though. Our boys are getting killed so Saudi Arabia’s don’t have to.

By: Jon H

Jon H — Mon, 08 Sep 2003 03:22:45 +0000

mario writes: “the battleground has changed from the West to the Middle East, specifically Iraq.” The battleground was always primarily in the Middle East. 9/11 was exceptional. The Cole wasn’t bombed in New York harbor, was it? Embassies were bombed in Africa – Al Qaeda didn’t target buildings on the mainland.

By: fear is the mind killer

fear is the mind killer — Mon, 08 Sep 2003 01:35:48 +0000

No, I agree that Hamas has trained personnel making bombs, etc. But they are able to leverage their trained people by sending untrained volunteers to kill themselves and take a few of the enemy with them. If this catches on among Muslims, we have one bloody hell of a time ahead. As for the PA protecting Hamas, I actually find it difficult to believe the PA is protecting anyone at this point. They have been rendered impotent. (Which is part of the problem.) I think Hamas is protected by blending in among ordinary Palestinian civilians, who support them. This is classic guerilla warfare, and it seems clear that we will have a pretty long (perhaps permanent) stretch of that to look forward to in Iraq.

By: Armed Liberal

Armed Liberal — Mon, 08 Sep 2003 01:28:56 +0000

This is a pretty central question to one's response to the current conflict. For myself, I tend to think of these things as dynamic, and so look at change rate as more important than real quantity. So are we making terrorists faster than we are eliminating them? We make them when we convince otherwise uncommited people to join the other side, and raise the level of commitment for those who have already joined. We eliminate them by ... well, eliminating them on one hand, and discouraging them from joining or raising their level of commitment on the other. My guess is that our actions are triggering (at least) two contradictory responses in the candidate pool; on one hand "Wow! Those guys are serious! I'd better stay home!" and on the other, "Now I'm really getting mad!" The third variable is one I quoted John Boyd on over at WoC:Undermine guerilla cause and destroy their cohesion by demonstrating integrity and competence of government to represent and serve needs of the people - rather than exploit and impoverish them for the benefit of a greedy elite.* That's a basic action, and one we all ought to be able to support. The asterisk is Boyd's, and his footnote is priceless: *If you cannot realize such a political program, you might consider changing sides. A.L.

By: tc

tc — Mon, 08 Sep 2003 01:25:37 +0000

Didn’t the USSR try out the “flypaper” theory in Afghanistan? They killed a whole lot of Muslims, but there were always more to take their place.

By: omri

omri — Mon, 08 Sep 2003 00:56:51 +0000

Sympathy for Al-Qaeda is useless compared to admiration for Al-Qaeda. The latter declined considerably after AQ lost Afghanistan. Recall that after 9/11 pro-AQ demonstrations and recruitment shot up, and after the fall of Kandahar it declined considerably. If AQ actually pulls something off in Iraq, there will be recruits. If it fails, and is thus shown to be impotent, there will be even fewer ecruits coming as it is. And, AQ still has still not solved the problem of training recruits so they can actually do something.