http://crookedtimber.org/2003/10/31/libertarianism-without-inequality-3/ Out of the crooked timber of humanity, no straight thing was ever made Sat, 21 Nov 2009 10:51:43 -0800 http://wordpress.org/?v=2.8.6 hourly 1 http://crookedtimber.org/2003/10/31/libertarianism-without-inequality-3/comment-page-1/#comment-7145 Michael Otsuka Sat, 01 Nov 2003 01:24:12 +0000 http://crookedtimber.org/wp/?p=512#comment-7145 I would describe the justification of punishment which I endorse in Chapter 3 as fundamentally rights-based rather than consequentialist, since the right to punish is derived from a right of self-protection rather than an imperative to maximize the good. This justification is, I think, more rights-based than retributivism, which is desert-based. Regarding Chris’s main quibble: First, I note that ‘I am by no means convinced that taxation of the unjust must be regarded as punitive. Such taxation might instead be regarded as similar to the non-punitive taxation of luxury items or cigarettes and alcohol. It might be regarded as a schedule of fees that attach extra costs to certain choices that individuals might make.... In order to highlight the difference between taxation of the unjust and punishment, we might leave our punitive practices intact and then assess the tax as an additional obligation of the convicted criminal whose magnitude does not correspond to the gravity of his crime but is rather assessed as a fixed lump sum or a fixed percentage of his wealth or income.’ (Ch. 2, pp. 50-1, n. 13) Second, I concede that, if taxation of the unjust must be regarded as punitive, then the justification of punishment which I endorse in Chapter 3 probably places upper limits on the amount of revenue which may be raised via taxation of the unjust. (See Ch 2, p. 52, n. 17.) But, having conceded this, I conclude: ‘Even if the revenues raised within these limits are not sufficient to meet all of the claims of the disabled for assistance, and universal taxation must be imposed in order to make up the difference and meet these claims, any partial replacement of universal taxation with the taxation of the unjust would be a move in the direction of a more voluntary welfare state than the welfare state of traditional liberal-egalitarian theory -- a welfare state, that is, that approaches that point at which it is sufficiently voluntary that even a libertarian could not object to its realization.’ (Ch. 2, pp. 52-3.) I would describe the justification of punishment which I endorse in Chapter 3 as fundamentally rights-based rather than consequentialist, since the right to punish is derived from a right of self-protection rather than an imperative to maximize the good. This justification is, I think, more rights-based than retributivism, which is desert-based. Regarding Chris’s main quibble: First, I note that ‘I am by no means convinced that taxation of the unjust must be regarded as punitive. Such taxation might instead be regarded as similar to the non-punitive taxation of luxury items or cigarettes and alcohol. It might be regarded as a schedule of fees that attach extra costs to certain choices that individuals might make…. In order to highlight the difference between taxation of the unjust and punishment, we might leave our punitive practices intact and then assess the tax as an additional obligation of the convicted criminal whose magnitude does not correspond to the gravity of his crime but is rather assessed as a fixed lump sum or a fixed percentage of his wealth or income.’ (Ch. 2, pp. 50-1, n. 13) Second, I concede that, if taxation of the unjust must be regarded as punitive, then the justification of punishment which I endorse in Chapter 3 probably places upper limits on the amount of revenue which may be raised via taxation of the unjust. (See Ch 2, p. 52, n. 17.) But, having conceded this, I conclude: ‘Even if the revenues raised within these limits are not sufficient to meet all of the claims of the disabled for assistance, and universal taxation must be imposed in order to make up the difference and meet these claims, any partial replacement of universal taxation with the taxation of the unjust would be a move in the direction of a more voluntary welfare state than the welfare state of traditional liberal-egalitarian theory—a welfare state, that is, that approaches that point at which it is sufficiently voluntary that even a libertarian could not object to its realization.’ (Ch. 2, pp. 52-3.)

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