Comments on: Cloning (3)

By: Thomas

Thomas — Mon, 24 Nov 2003 23:51:54 +0000

Brian—“It’s OK to have children who will be badly off, even I think below the standard for an adequately good life, if it’s simply a biological necessity that any child you have will be that badly off.” What could that mean, but that in a world of cloning and genetic engineering—i.e., a world where there is no ‘biological necessity that any child ..will be that badly off”—such procedures could be required (or, more precisely, the refusal to use such procedures could limit the Right to Bear)? The same concept runs through the piece I quoted above. The duty to maximise is constrained only by technology. It’s entirely contingent, as you seem to concede in your response (“no technological prospect on the horizon”). To the extent that technology changes and develops, permitting effective cloning and GE, then such procedures, to the extent they are safe and effective, will undoubtedly change the outcome of the equation you gave. One must maximize the probability of the lower of (a) an adequately good life (a more demanding standard than the ‘life worth living standard’) or (b) the best life possible for a child of that person. (b) doesn’t have any content in a GE world, does it? It constrains only in a technological sense (the best possible life science can give). The lower of (a) and (b) would always be (a), a demanding standard.

By: Chris Bertram

Chris Bertram — Mon, 24 Nov 2003 23:38:57 +0000

Just a public-service announcement: Brian has also put this post on his other blog href=”http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Philosophy/tar/Archives/002334.html” rel=”nofollow”>http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Philosophy/tar/Archives/002334.html and there are some very interesting comments from David Velleman (and replies from Brian).

By: Brian Weatherson

Brian Weatherson — Mon, 24 Nov 2003 22:11:09 +0000

Thomas, why on earth would it mean anything like that? There is literally no technological prospect on the horizon that would give us any reason to think that naturally born children will not be above whatever reasonable threshold for a decent life we put in place in the above. None whatsoever. Certainly cloning isn’t such a proposal, since the only live issue with cloning is how much it will harm the baby. GE is obviously more complicated, but the whole point of having a standard like a decent level (rather than as good as possible, as I mistakenly said) is, as Harry points out, so we quite explicitly don’t require this kind of intervention.

By: Thomas

Thomas — Mon, 24 Nov 2003 21:20:36 +0000

So, in a world of cloning and genetic engineering, those who reject cloning and genetic engineering can be legally prohibited from reproducing? That’s what this means, isn’t it?: “Having decided to exercise Right, the prospective parents have a duty to maximise the probability that the child has either (a) an adequately good life or (b) the best life possible for a child of that person/couple, whichever is the lower.” Reproductive rights absolutism? Quite to the contrary, it seems. Perhaps the reproductive rights absolutism was in service of another agenda?

By: Jonthan Goldberg

Jonthan Goldberg — Mon, 24 Nov 2003 21:07:24 +0000

I might be worthwhile in this context to recall why we have sex in the first place. My (unprofessional) understanding is that it randomizes certain immunological factors, thus conferring increased disease restance. Microorganisms are constantly evolving new attacks; the randomization provides new defenses once a generation. This was enough of an evolutionary advantage to offset the obvious advantages of asexual reproduction. So, we need to consider that, in cloning, we are likely to be inflicting a known genetic disadvantge on the cloned person. There could be externalities. In the extreme case, where all babies were cloned, disease restance might be compromised in everyone, increasing the chances of plagues or even the extermination of humanity. This last case may be negligible, but some degree of this effect might occur if cloning becomes widespread. This perhaps brings us into Categorical Imperative territory.

By: Brian Weatherson

Brian Weatherson — Mon, 24 Nov 2003 20:43:35 +0000

Harry, That’s right that I contradicted myself in the earlier post. The problem was that I was trying to do two things at once, and as usual I managed to do neither well. 1. It’s OK to have children who will be badly off, even I think below the standard for an adequately good life, if it’s simply a biological necessity that any child you have will be that badly off. 2. It’s not OK to make otherwise well off children badly off. To get what I want I could just have a disjunctive category: Responsibility – Having decided to exercise Right, the prospective parents have a duty to maximise the probability that the child has either (a) an adequately good life or (b) the best life possible for a child of that person/couple, whichever is the lower. The problem with that of course is that it looks completely undermotivated. (It also means that there is a higher standard, in some sense, put on those whose children are at grave risk of not reaching the adequate standard. That’s OK with me, I think.) What I need to do is come up with a smart way of either making that disjunctive condition look natural, or a way to reform my intuitions to match a natural theory. By the way, the Journal of Medical Ethics edition on cloning (April 1999) has a couple of reasonable papers on why the other harms that have been alleged to go along with cloning (lack of identity, unreasonable expectations etc.) are not really harms. They assume, however, something not in evidence, that we could in principle discover cloning will probably not lead to old-fashioned pain and suffering type harms without having previously done any trials of cloning on humans. If my 1 above is not right, and any child we make has to (be reasonably expected to) reach a certain adequacy standard, it might never to moral to start cloning humans. I agree by the way that I should stay out of the debates over the deaf. Those are interesting, but not exactly on topic.

By: Keith M Ellis

Keith M Ellis — Mon, 24 Nov 2003 20:09:23 +0000

I would urge anyone interested in the issue of Deaf culture, cochlear implants, and all related to read Oliver Sacks's, Seeing Voices, before they comment. Most people are profoundly ignorant on this topic, in my experience.

By: harry

harry — Mon, 24 Nov 2003 19:55:01 +0000

First thing: the deaf are unusual in a very specific way. There is masive disagreement among the profoundly deaf concerning the appropriateness of various medical intervenetions desinged to allwo their children to hear. This sometimes gets reported as a debate about ‘culture’ (the parents claiming a right, which I deny any parent has, to impose their culture on their child). But in fact that’s a misreporting—these interventions have only modest prospects of success, and there’s an opportunity cost in terms of the children’s ability to learn how to sign. The deaf are the only impaired group among whom many realy and apparently sincerely say that they would rather have their impairment than not other things being equal. So, here’s an argument the lesbian couple could make: 1) the child will be raised by us, and will have a closer more intimate relationship with us if deaf than if not deaf, so in that way his life will be a better one and 2) given that so many of the deaf embrace deafness as the first best state we don’t think his life will be worse in other respects. I’m not endorsing the argument, and find the issue perplexing, but offer it so as to steer you away from the deaf example and toward more straightforward ones. Second: I would modify Responsibility. Your interpretation of it ‘in such a way that it didn’t put any requirements on ordinary prospective mothers that are not met by the overwhelming bulk of mothers nowadays’ is already a modification of the way you state it earlier I think; people favour their own interests over those of their propsective fetuses and children in all sorts of ways (and that’s ok, in my view—could send you my paper arguing this vis-a-vis born children if you like)—but in doing so they are (legitimately) refraining from ‘bring(ing) about the best child they can’. Furthermore, in refraining from, for example, seeking ante-natal care that would maximise their child’s chances for high lifetime expected earnings, or whatever, parents are not doing anything wrong—because there is, in fact, a moral prohibition on seeking to maximise your child’s prospects for competitive benefits (which is why, among other things, its ok to prohibit elite private schools). I sort of think you want to modify it to something like the following: Responsibility to Bear Decently – Everyone who exercises the first right has a moral (and perhaps legal) obligation to refrain from activities either in pursuit of conception or after conception that have a reasonably high probability that the resultant child will suffer serious physical or cognitive impairments. This, I think, allows for the deaf parents to do what they did IF we regard deafness as not being a serious impairment; but rules out many other things. OK, I’ve looked at it again, and my rendering of it is not quite right. What I am aiming for (on your behalf) is some sort of adequacy constraint—one is required to pursue the conception of a child with propsects for an adequately good life (which might be quite a bit better than a life merely worth living).

By: Antoni Jaume

Antoni Jaume — Mon, 24 Nov 2003 18:36:39 +0000

I still think that cloning is only interesting if one subscribes to racist values. DSW

By: Ayjay

Ayjay — Mon, 24 Nov 2003 17:04:25 +0000

Regarding Keith’s comment about Paul: rather than get into the exegetical questions, which, as Keith suggests, are quite interesting, I will just note that we haven’t heard a lot from Paul in the recent arguments over cloning. One could also cite St. Jerome, and (in most of his moods) St. Augustine among those Christians deeply suspicious of sex, but in his post Brian was clearly referring to people engaged in today’s debates, as was I in my response.

By: Brian Weatherson

Brian Weatherson — Mon, 24 Nov 2003 16:15:34 +0000

A few points on Harry’s nice post. First, I really should remember that while getting it wrong is OK, and being insulting is OK, getting it wrong while being insulting is not OK. My apologies, again. Having criminal liability for this kind of act is contrary to the proposal I’m running with. That’s a tough case though, and maybe I should qualify my stance. Since, as I noted in the post, I really am getting close to my own form of ‘repugnance argument’ it’s a bit hard to be sure where I really want to stand. Let me make one distinction though that could be valuable. What I find most disturbing about the case Harry mentions is not bringing up a child that one knows will be deaf. It is rather the conscious effort to make a child be born deaf, when this isn’t necessary at all for the bringing up of the child. What I really believe is some combination of the following two principles. Right To Bear – Everyone (and perhaps every couple) has a legal (and perhaps moral) right to bear children, where this is biologically possible and it is reasonably certain that the resultant child will have a life worth living. This includes a right to bear children that are not genetically or biologically related to a third party. Responsibility to Bear Decently – Everyone who exercises the first right has a moral (and perhaps legal) obligation to bring about the best child they can, within reasonable expectations. Right to Bear doesn’t entail right to assistance in bearing, though I think in most cases involving exercise of the right, providing assistance is legally (and perhaps morally) permissible. Here’s how those two principles would judge certain important cases. First case – lesbian couple want to have child produced by cloning from a cell from one partner, and the egg of the other, with the egg donor gestating the child. This would be acceptable, provided cloning was well enough understood that we could be reasonably certain that the child will have a life worth living. (I don’t think we’re at that stage yet, and we might not be for a long time, but I think we could reach it in the near future.) Second case – the case Harry raises. The couple would violate ‘Responsibility’ and hence could be liable for damages. Third case – The Non-Identity cases raised by Parfit, Kavka, Dworkin, Brock and others. Again the behaviour in question violates ‘Resposibility’ and so is immoral and possibly illegal. Fourth case – X and Y have a genetic disease that means that any child they have will have some disability that is severe, but not so severe as to prevent the child from having a life worth living. In that case having the best child they could have would be allowed under Right, even if the child suffered just the same disabilities as the children in the second and third cases. I’m splitting hairs here, and by backing Responsibility, I am backing down from the purity of the reproductive rights absolutism I was toying with earlier. But at least as legal judgments I think all four cases turn out the right way here. By the way, I’d interpret Responsibility in such a way that it didn’t put any requirements on ordinary prospective mothers that are not met by the overwhelming bulk of mothers nowadays. So moderate alcohol consumption during pregnancy, even if it led to a sub-optimal child, would be (legally) acceptable, while sustained excessive consumption might not be. As a rule I’m very hesitant to be a male putting down rules on what women can and can’t do during pregnancy, so I’d want to draw this one very carefully. But I think planning to make your child deaf is a clear violation of Responsibility even if that is construed very weakly.

By: enthymeme

enthymeme — Mon, 24 Nov 2003 16:02:39 +0000

Markus, Western armed forces have “super soldiers” eh? While China has a freako “mutant” army eh? Asshat.

By: Chris Bertram

Chris Bertram — Mon, 24 Nov 2003 15:50:20 +0000

Cloning gives us the chance for the goodness of life without the badness of sex…. That’s something close to the theme of Michel Houellebecq’s Les Particules Elementaires !

By: Keith M Ellis

Keith M Ellis — Mon, 24 Nov 2003 15:23:50 +0000

“I’d be interested to know who these ‘Christian conservatives’ are who think sex is bad.” Paul? There is substantial difference of opinion on this; but within Paul’s writings there’s much to be found of this attitude.

By: harry

harry — Mon, 24 Nov 2003 15:21:23 +0000

Ayjay is right about sex and Christians in my experience too—there’s now a substantial Christian self-help literature on the joys of sex within marriage, and as long as it is within marriage many if not most evangelical protetants think that recreational sex is fine and indeed some woulld say sacred. Unlike the RCs for example. The only exception is if a child is deliberately cloned from a person with a genetic disease. While this is a possibility, it is really rather unlikely. It would be a rather monstrous parent who would do such a thing Doesn’t anyone remember the case a year or so ago of a profoundly deaf lesbian couple (in the US) who did everything they could to ensure that the biological child of one of them would also be profoundly deaf—and succeeded? I was living in the UK at the time, and there was huge publicity about it. Baroness Emma Nicholson (herself deaf) weighed in particularly strongly, saying that the child should be able to bring a wrongful life suit against the parents, implying (it seemd to me) that the child would have been better off never to have been born. It is an interesting case because, while I think Nicholson was wrong, I think there is a case for thinking that deliberately trying to conceive children with particular genetic impairments is wrong—and perhaps that it should be illegal; just as I think that there’s a case for trying to prevent pregnant women from recklessly damaging the fetus they carry and, for that matter, for prohibiting various kinds of abuse and neglect of (born) children. (That (born) is not supposed to imply that there are any children who are unborn—its just a clarification). Am I contadicting your suggestion that: Criminalising conception and birth is not something we should be in the business of, even if we can quite properly make judgments about the morality of different acts of conception and birth.? One other clarification—profound deafness seems quite different to me form all other genetically-caused impariments, so I don’t mean to apply my tentative principle to the particular case of this couple. (I can go into reasons why deafness is different if you want, but it doesn’t seem germane to your argument here).