Comments on: Other-regarding preferences

By: Brett Bellmore

Brett Bellmore — Sat, 20 Dec 2003 14:48:03 +0000

This claim that marriage is (largely) within the private sphere isn’t terrifically plausible. “Shacking up” is clearly within the private sphere, but those aspects of marriage which differ from shacking up are rather conspicuously of the public sphere. Which has nothing to do with my policy preference, that any number of competent adults of whatever gender and/or consanguity should be able to enter into a marriage. Forget the pets, they’re not competent to make such decisions… I only bring this up because it seemed the issue was just tossed in as a way of smuggling in the viewpoinnt without debate.

By: Jon Mandle

Jon Mandle — Sat, 20 Dec 2003 13:53:31 +0000

I’m not sure there’s a self-referential paradox until you reach the point at which there are no ground-level preferences at all. But there’s something else odd about Matt’s position. He says: “Of course my preferences count to [sic], so I’ll keep trying to argue folks out of their position and into the one I like.” But exactly how is he going to try to “argue folks out of their position”? One possibility is that he will simply state his own preference. This is hardly an argument, but a restatement of the problem, at least when others have contrary preferences. Another possibility is to hope that simply citing non-normative facts (as opposed to preferences) will convince others to change their preferences. Maybe their preferences are based on factual errors. But maybe not. In the case we’re talking about, someone admits that their preference is “irrational” – they just think that homosexuality is “icky”. The problem is that limiting argument to the citing of one’s own preferences and non-normative facts is a terribly impoverished basis for argument. But as soon as we allow in other considerations, we have cleared the ground to evaluate which preferences should count in the first place.

By: P.M.Lawrence

P.M.Lawrence — Sat, 20 Dec 2003 10:07:34 +0000

Rv. Agnos has touched on one of the three points of incompleteness in democracy, that it cannot of itself and through itself define “we, the people”. The other two are that it can only transmit values and cannot of itself justify anything – though one special case works out as though it did – and that it is vulnerable to manufactured results and agenda control by selective editing and repeated attempts, e.g. consulting the Danes repeatedly about Europe until it came right (sorry, “until the people were ready”). That also looks like what Australian Republicans will try to push through their schemes – repeated attempts until it comes right, regardless of whether circumstances justify any further voting yet. One point I want to bring out about all this self regarding circular stuff is something I’ve noticed among the politically correct. Practically always they are objecting on behalf of some hypothetical person, pre-emptively, and assuming that this straw man necessarily overrides an actual person’t expressed wish. They take the derivative things even further than they should, and blot out any actual interests. I’ve come across this when Australian republicans attempted to censor information about politically incorrect Republicans I wanted to tell the public about.

By: Jed Harris

Jed Harris — Sat, 20 Dec 2003 05:21:39 +0000

This aversion to circularity is very unrealistic. There are good ways to resolve circular dependencies—Google, recent bayesian networks, social models, etc. use them very effectively. Altruistic preferences need not “end up in a complete mess” with the sort of multiple counting you describe; the problem is in your counting, not the preferences. More importantly, your reluctance to follow up the circularity misses a real phenomenon. When all the members of a group are strongly other-regarding—think of the typical group trying to decide where to go to lunch at a conference—the circular dependence can’t be resolved. Eventually someone has to express a preference of their own (however weak) to break the symmetry. Thus the case you mention—a household of perfect altruists—is a problem, but not a “mess”—it can’t be resolved, and in fact it models real situations that we all experience.

By: decon

decon — Fri, 19 Dec 2003 22:15:30 +0000

I’m having a bit of a problem following your arguement. I think you need a better defined example to illustrate the theory. How are the problems that arise when the preferences of Iranians, Kuwatis, etc… are considered any different from the problems that arise when the preferences of Sunnis, Shiites, Ba’aathists, etc… are considered? Are you trying to define away all divergent interests among the “insiders” before dealing with the “altruistic” interests of the outsiders? Why?

By: Rv. Agnos

Rv. Agnos — Fri, 19 Dec 2003 22:12:48 +0000

John, There is a way to view Matt’s viewpoint as not paradoxical at all and therefore that it should be taken into account. Isn’t “I want what the Iraqis want” just another way of saying “I believe that the Iraqis are the appropriate people to judge”? Others may think, “I want what the International Community wants,” or in other words, “The whole world, not one nation should judge.” That is a different viewpoint, and will lead to different results. Omitting both viewpoints will leave unanswerable the preliminary question of who judges, since everyone who thinks one or the other will have their opinions dismissed. Preliminary to “What is the Public Preference” is the question “Who is the Public.” Matt is merely identifying who the appropriate public is.