Comments on: No comment http://crookedtimber.org/2004/02/06/no-comment/ Out of the crooked timber of humanity, no straight thing was ever made Fri, 25 May 2012 09:36:11 +0000 hourly 1 http://wordpress.org/?v=3.3.2 By: Sebastian Holsclaw http://crookedtimber.org/2004/02/06/no-comment/comment-page-1/#comment-15986 Sebastian Holsclaw Mon, 09 Feb 2004 18:03:56 +0000 http://crookedtimber.org/wp/?p=1016#comment-15986 "How is it that verifiable disarmament and dismantling of programs is so very impossible and can’t be proven when it’s been done with great success and much acclaim in Ukraine, South Africa, Tawian, and Kazakhstan?" The fact that you don't understand the difference says more about your lack of research on the issue than it could possibly say about the hawk's arguments. Verifiable disarmament can be quite successful when the country in question wants to disarm. The track record of verifiable disarmament in even mildly resisting states is complete failure. “How is it that verifiable disarmament and dismantling of programs is so very impossible and can’t be proven when it’s been done with great success and much acclaim in Ukraine, South Africa, Tawian, and Kazakhstan?” The fact that you don’t understand the difference says more about your lack of research on the issue than it could possibly say about the hawk’s arguments. Verifiable disarmament can be quite successful when the country in question wants to disarm. The track record of verifiable disarmament in even mildly resisting states is complete failure.

]]> By: Jack Lecou http://crookedtimber.org/2004/02/06/no-comment/comment-page-1/#comment-15985 Jack Lecou Mon, 09 Feb 2004 11:00:53 +0000 http://crookedtimber.org/wp/?p=1016#comment-15985 <i>that Bush hasn’t invented them</i> Only tells me that he isn't <i>completely</i> insane. Or couldn't figure out how to pull it off. <i>what the war was about: the threat of Iraq arming terrorists with WMDs</i> Note that there are really two parts to this: having WMDs AND giving them to terrorists. You've got to prove both parts, or this whole motivation falls apart. <i>the attempt to buy thousand kilometer range missiles from North Korea</i> But terrorists wouldn't need missiles, would they? This was all about "imminent threats" to the US, for which you need terrorists with a van, or missiles that can fly just a wee bit further than 1000 kilometers. And interesting you should mention N. Korea... <i>They are of no significance without WMD warheads.</i> Quite. And no threat to the US in any case. <i>seed stock for botulin toxin</i> There's probably some in my kitchen too. That's why you boil everything thoroughly when you can green beans... (BTW, are ricin and botulism toxin technically biological weapons? It seems to me that they are merely chemical weapons, albeit partly produced in living factories. Surely the defining characteristic of a biological agent is that it is infectious. Smallpox certainly qualifies, and anthrax just barely, but there really isn't any way at all for a ricin victim to spread his problem to me. Yet the recent ricin thing in Washington was refered to as biological. Sigh.) Anyway, the point really isn't really whether Saddam had a few little bits and pieces here and there. He certainly had some chemical and biological stuff before, and probably any reasonable person would have guessed he still had a little something in 2002, there's no doubt he acted like someone with something to hide. The question is whether he had large enough quantities to do serious damage, whether he had the means (missiles or moving vans) to deliver them, and whether he had some motive for doing so. You have to look at all of those factors to decide what kind of risk Iraq posed, and from what I've seen it just doesn't score very high on any one of them, let alone all together. He may have had a few little piles of ricin or nerve gas around, but not enough to do much damage. He certainly had aspirations of joining the nuclear club, but the best guess then and now was that he was many years away from being able to do so. And even that figure is only if we withdrew the inspectors AND lifted the sanctions AND closed our eyes and plugged our ears for the better part of a decade. It certainly seems unlikely that he was going to be able to do much in the way of research or production while inspectors were crawling about, even if they weren't able to find dormant programs. You can just forget about being an hour away from a mushroom cloud rising over Boston. So what was the rush? He may have had some missiles that were technically in violation, but nothing that was going to come anywhere near US or British shores. Probably Israel or Saudi Arabia were in range, but they didn't seem particularly worried. That only leaves terrorist delivery. Nobody has proven even the most tenuous of connections between Saddam and Al Qaida, nevermind negotiations for the sale of a nuke. Ansar Al Islam wasn't all over Iraq, just the northern part outside Saddam's jurisdiction. Possibly he gave them a few cases of ammunition to kill Kurds with, but it was likely nothing like what Iran was giving them, and it's a far cry from weaponized smallpox. There are also Al Qaida terrorists in Pakistan, that doesn't prove Pakistan is going to give them nuclear weapons. Nor would any such connection have made much sense in the first place. It really only holds together in the minds of Fox-News-watching simple minded bitwits who think that Osama bin Laden is Evil, and Saddam Hussein is Evil, so <i>logically</i> they must meet at a ski lodge in Switzerland every year with all the other Evil leaders to exchange Evil muffin recipes and Evil stock tips. In the real world it doesn't fit anything I have read of their motivations. Saddam was a prime example of the sort of secular and repressive dictator that Al Qaida sees as holding back their earthly Islamic paradise, and I doubt they were buying his P.R. efforts (e.g., giving money to the families of Palestinian suicide bombers). If Hussein had handed Al Qaida operatives a doomsday weapon, they might have been just as likely to set the timer and drop it in the bushes on their way out of his palace. Nevermind the fact that he certainly knew he could expect retaliation from the US (and the rest of the world, for that matter). It's really difficult to see what he could possibly gain from such an attack to outweigh those risks (and I've not heard any theories from anyone else either). All in all, I estimated my risk of being killed by Iraqi WMDs at somewhere between being hit by a meteor and eaten by an alligator coming up from my toilet. I've seen nothing since to contradict that assessment. No, there is no way anyone can prove that any particular nation poses zero threat, but that's no excuse for going to war with them. (And if UN inspectors are so ineffective, how can we ever be sure that Libya has really disarmed? I guess we should invade just to be sure.) Iraq was a particularly bad call. The only sense it seems to have made was as some kind warning to others, but this was betrayed by Bush's capriciousness, and that Iraq was a relative weakling. We are unwilling (and at this point ill able to afford financially or politically) to attack countries like Iran or N. Korea which are far more likely to *actually* have serious weapons. And let's have some perspective. Terrorists are going to have to work a whole lot harder than they have been to make it onto any kind of leading causes of death list (in the US), and not one single person in the United States has ever died from a WMD attack by a third world dictator. That's not to say we shouldn't be vigilant, but intelligence is relatively cheap. Deterrence is a factor, but that still means war should be the very last resort. With Iraq it seems to have been the first. We have better things to spend our limited resources on. It is not enough just to be able say that some little good came of this mess. Every billion dollars spent on this wasteful war is a billion dollars which cannot be spent fighting hunger or disease (at home or abroad). A billion dollars in the latter two goes a lot further. <i>On top of this, it is clear that Saddam was a consistently bad decision maker, and when he made mistakes, lots of other people died.</i> Sounds like someone else I know. Maybe Saddam just had "bad intelligence" too. that Bush hasn’t invented them Only tells me that he isn’t completely insane. Or couldn’t figure out how to pull it off. what the war was about: the threat of Iraq arming terrorists with WMDs Note that there are really two parts to this: having WMDs AND giving them to terrorists. You’ve got to prove both parts, or this whole motivation falls apart. the attempt to buy thousand kilometer range missiles from North Korea But terrorists wouldn’t need missiles, would they? This was all about “imminent threats” to the US, for which you need terrorists with a van, or missiles that can fly just a wee bit further than 1000 kilometers. And interesting you should mention N. Korea… They are of no significance without WMD warheads. Quite. And no threat to the US in any case. seed stock for botulin toxin There’s probably some in my kitchen too. That’s why you boil everything thoroughly when you can green beans… (BTW, are ricin and botulism toxin technically biological weapons? It seems to me that they are merely chemical weapons, albeit partly produced in living factories. Surely the defining characteristic of a biological agent is that it is infectious. Smallpox certainly qualifies, and anthrax just barely, but there really isn’t any way at all for a ricin victim to spread his problem to me. Yet the recent ricin thing in Washington was refered to as biological. Sigh.) Anyway, the point really isn’t really whether Saddam had a few little bits and pieces here and there. He certainly had some chemical and biological stuff before, and probably any reasonable person would have guessed he still had a little something in 2002, there’s no doubt he acted like someone with something to hide. The question is whether he had large enough quantities to do serious damage, whether he had the means (missiles or moving vans) to deliver them, and whether he had some motive for doing so. You have to look at all of those factors to decide what kind of risk Iraq posed, and from what I’ve seen it just doesn’t score very high on any one of them, let alone all together. He may have had a few little piles of ricin or nerve gas around, but not enough to do much damage. He certainly had aspirations of joining the nuclear club, but the best guess then and now was that he was many years away from being able to do so. And even that figure is only if we withdrew the inspectors AND lifted the sanctions AND closed our eyes and plugged our ears for the better part of a decade. It certainly seems unlikely that he was going to be able to do much in the way of research or production while inspectors were crawling about, even if they weren’t able to find dormant programs. You can just forget about being an hour away from a mushroom cloud rising over Boston. So what was the rush? He may have had some missiles that were technically in violation, but nothing that was going to come anywhere near US or British shores. Probably Israel or Saudi Arabia were in range, but they didn’t seem particularly worried. That only leaves terrorist delivery. Nobody has proven even the most tenuous of connections between Saddam and Al Qaida, nevermind negotiations for the sale of a nuke. Ansar Al Islam wasn’t all over Iraq, just the northern part outside Saddam’s jurisdiction. Possibly he gave them a few cases of ammunition to kill Kurds with, but it was likely nothing like what Iran was giving them, and it’s a far cry from weaponized smallpox. There are also Al Qaida terrorists in Pakistan, that doesn’t prove Pakistan is going to give them nuclear weapons. Nor would any such connection have made much sense in the first place. It really only holds together in the minds of Fox-News-watching simple minded bitwits who think that Osama bin Laden is Evil, and Saddam Hussein is Evil, so logically they must meet at a ski lodge in Switzerland every year with all the other Evil leaders to exchange Evil muffin recipes and Evil stock tips. In the real world it doesn’t fit anything I have read of their motivations. Saddam was a prime example of the sort of secular and repressive dictator that Al Qaida sees as holding back their earthly Islamic paradise, and I doubt they were buying his P.R. efforts (e.g., giving money to the families of Palestinian suicide bombers). If Hussein had handed Al Qaida operatives a doomsday weapon, they might have been just as likely to set the timer and drop it in the bushes on their way out of his palace. Nevermind the fact that he certainly knew he could expect retaliation from the US (and the rest of the world, for that matter). It’s really difficult to see what he could possibly gain from such an attack to outweigh those risks (and I’ve not heard any theories from anyone else either). All in all, I estimated my risk of being killed by Iraqi WMDs at somewhere between being hit by a meteor and eaten by an alligator coming up from my toilet. I’ve seen nothing since to contradict that assessment. No, there is no way anyone can prove that any particular nation poses zero threat, but that’s no excuse for going to war with them. (And if UN inspectors are so ineffective, how can we ever be sure that Libya has really disarmed? I guess we should invade just to be sure.) Iraq was a particularly bad call. The only sense it seems to have made was as some kind warning to others, but this was betrayed by Bush’s capriciousness, and that Iraq was a relative weakling. We are unwilling (and at this point ill able to afford financially or politically) to attack countries like Iran or N. Korea which are far more likely to actually have serious weapons. And let’s have some perspective. Terrorists are going to have to work a whole lot harder than they have been to make it onto any kind of leading causes of death list (in the US), and not one single person in the United States has ever died from a WMD attack by a third world dictator. That’s not to say we shouldn’t be vigilant, but intelligence is relatively cheap. Deterrence is a factor, but that still means war should be the very last resort. With Iraq it seems to have been the first. We have better things to spend our limited resources on. It is not enough just to be able say that some little good came of this mess. Every billion dollars spent on this wasteful war is a billion dollars which cannot be spent fighting hunger or disease (at home or abroad). A billion dollars in the latter two goes a lot further. On top of this, it is clear that Saddam was a consistently bad decision maker, and when he made mistakes, lots of other people died. Sounds like someone else I know. Maybe Saddam just had “bad intelligence” too.

]]> By: John Moore (Useful Fools) http://crookedtimber.org/2004/02/06/no-comment/comment-page-1/#comment-15984 John Moore (Useful Fools) Mon, 09 Feb 2004 05:05:30 +0000 http://crookedtimber.org/wp/?p=1016#comment-15984 Life certainly would have been easier for Bush had the huge quantities of WMD's been found. That they haven't and that Bush hasn't invented them should give some folks a clue that he sincerely believed them to be there. Also, if you only get your news from mainstream outlets, and don't look around too much (like actually reading transcripts or watching live David Kay's testimony), you would believe that nothing was found in Iraq of significance. But this is far from the case. Bush had good reason to believe that Saddam represented a WMD proliferation threat (which was what the war was about: the threat of Iraq arming terrorists with WMDs). Saddam apparently thought he had WMDs. His Generals thought they were available for combat - a number of Generals who were interrogated had heard orders to prepare to use the weapons, and when they complained that they had none, were told that their flanking divisions had them. This was monitored by US SIGINT resources. Every country in the world thought that Saddam had the weapons, although Bush critics seem to ignore this. It isn't like George and Dick and Colin went into a huddle and invented this stuff - they had humint and techint that supported their conclusions. Then there's what was found. Kay found several active missile programs, any one of which was a valid casus belli. There was development of a long range solid fuel missile, a plan to greatly increase the range of their "legal" Al Samud missile which, it turned out, already had an illegal range capability, and the attempt to buy thousand kilometer range missiles from North Korea. Now, one might ask, what would a dictator with no WMD's do with 1000 km range missiles? Answer: nothing useful. They are of no significance without WMD warheads. Kay also found significant evidence of biological warfare programs, either in progress or ready to be started, with the laboratories in secret police headquarters. He found one active program (interestingly, involving ricin) which was also a direct violation of the rules. He found seed stock for botulin toxin. The only thing NOT found was "large stockpiles" of WMDs, and an active nuclear program (although a buried uranium enrichment centrifuge and plans was turned over by a scientist who had buried it in his rose garden). However, an entire "large stockpile" could be hidden in a small house. And lets not forget the MIG jets that were found buried in the sand - found by accident because wind had unburied their tails. Because of the international market in nuclear technology (which was unmasked due to the War on Terror), Saddam probably planned to simply purchase a nuclear weapons program once the inspectors were gone and the sanctions lifted (and the sanction regime was wobbly and about to be lifted). Add to this the fact that UN inspectors NEVER found Saddam's previous large scale biological weapons program. Rather, it was revealed by Saddam's son-in-law, after which the Iraqi regime revealed the records of a vast program that had been unsuspected by the inspectors during their 4 years of searching (1991-1995). This should give pause to those here who naively believe in the divining abilities of a few hundred UN inspectors in a totalitarian country which would happily gibbet the families of any scientist who told too much. On top of this, it is clear that Saddam was a consistently bad decision maker, and when he made mistakes, lots of other people died. One of his mistakes was to attack Iran, leading to the Iran/Iraq war that killed about a million people. Another was invading Kuwait, causing Gulf War I. This guy was evil, but he wasn't too bright. This made him even more dangerous than a rational opponent, because he was more likely than most dictators to do something dumb like hand chemical or biological weapons to terrorists, who just happened to be all over the place in Iraq, including some from Al Qaeda (Ansar Al Islam). Finally, Kay stated that Iraq's WMD scientists either had established or were about to establish a market for their expertise, because Saddam's internal controls had broken down (which is one reason he didn't even know what WMDs he had or didn't have). That Saddam was a great and growing danger is just as obvious today as it was last year or the year before. That removing him was an important part of protecting the nation from devastating attacks should be obvious (especially given Libya's cave-in, which Qhadaffi told Berlusconi was because of his fear of America as a result of the toppling of Saddam). Other than those with a touchingly naive belief in the powers of UN inspectors, can anyone provide a way that we could possibly have known that Saddam didn't represent a threat and didn't have WMD's? Life certainly would have been easier for Bush had the huge quantities of WMD’s been found. That they haven’t and that Bush hasn’t invented them should give some folks a clue that he sincerely believed them to be there. Also, if you only get your news from mainstream outlets, and don’t look around too much (like actually reading transcripts or watching live David Kay’s testimony), you would believe that nothing was found in Iraq of significance. But this is far from the case. Bush had good reason to believe that Saddam represented a WMD proliferation threat (which was what the war was about: the threat of Iraq arming terrorists with WMDs). Saddam apparently thought he had WMDs. His Generals thought they were available for combat – a number of Generals who were interrogated had heard orders to prepare to use the weapons, and when they complained that they had none, were told that their flanking divisions had them. This was monitored by US SIGINT resources. Every country in the world thought that Saddam had the weapons, although Bush critics seem to ignore this. It isn’t like George and Dick and Colin went into a huddle and invented this stuff – they had humint and techint that supported their conclusions. Then there’s what was found. Kay found several active missile programs, any one of which was a valid casus belli. There was development of a long range solid fuel missile, a plan to greatly increase the range of their “legal” Al Samud missile which, it turned out, already had an illegal range capability, and the attempt to buy thousand kilometer range missiles from North Korea. Now, one might ask, what would a dictator with no WMD’s do with 1000 km range missiles? Answer: nothing useful. They are of no significance without WMD warheads. Kay also found significant evidence of biological warfare programs, either in progress or ready to be started, with the laboratories in secret police headquarters. He found one active program (interestingly, involving ricin) which was also a direct violation of the rules. He found seed stock for botulin toxin. The only thing NOT found was “large stockpiles” of WMDs, and an active nuclear program (although a buried uranium enrichment centrifuge and plans was turned over by a scientist who had buried it in his rose garden). However, an entire “large stockpile” could be hidden in a small house. And lets not forget the MIG jets that were found buried in the sand – found by accident because wind had unburied their tails. Because of the international market in nuclear technology (which was unmasked due to the War on Terror), Saddam probably planned to simply purchase a nuclear weapons program once the inspectors were gone and the sanctions lifted (and the sanction regime was wobbly and about to be lifted). Add to this the fact that UN inspectors NEVER found Saddam’s previous large scale biological weapons program. Rather, it was revealed by Saddam’s son-in-law, after which the Iraqi regime revealed the records of a vast program that had been unsuspected by the inspectors during their 4 years of searching (1991-1995). This should give pause to those here who naively believe in the divining abilities of a few hundred UN inspectors in a totalitarian country which would happily gibbet the families of any scientist who told too much. On top of this, it is clear that Saddam was a consistently bad decision maker, and when he made mistakes, lots of other people died. One of his mistakes was to attack Iran, leading to the Iran/Iraq war that killed about a million people. Another was invading Kuwait, causing Gulf War I. This guy was evil, but he wasn’t too bright. This made him even more dangerous than a rational opponent, because he was more likely than most dictators to do something dumb like hand chemical or biological weapons to terrorists, who just happened to be all over the place in Iraq, including some from Al Qaeda (Ansar Al Islam). Finally, Kay stated that Iraq’s WMD scientists either had established or were about to establish a market for their expertise, because Saddam’s internal controls had broken down (which is one reason he didn’t even know what WMDs he had or didn’t have). That Saddam was a great and growing danger is just as obvious today as it was last year or the year before. That removing him was an important part of protecting the nation from devastating attacks should be obvious (especially given Libya’s cave-in, which Qhadaffi told Berlusconi was because of his fear of America as a result of the toppling of Saddam). Other than those with a touchingly naive belief in the powers of UN inspectors, can anyone provide a way that we could possibly have known that Saddam didn’t represent a threat and didn’t have WMD’s?

]]> By: Jack Lecou http://crookedtimber.org/2004/02/06/no-comment/comment-page-1/#comment-15983 Jack Lecou Mon, 09 Feb 2004 03:07:23 +0000 http://crookedtimber.org/wp/?p=1016#comment-15983 Hmm. Perhaps the third sentence is better phrased as "Most people who say the world is a better place neglect the fact that we also spent a couple of hundred billion dollars on tank rounds and padded Haliburton contracts, not to mention the lives of soldiers." Hmm. Perhaps the third sentence is better phrased as “Most people who say the world is a better place neglect the fact that we also spent a couple of hundred billion dollars on tank rounds and padded Haliburton contracts, not to mention the lives of soldiers.”

]]> By: Jack Lecou http://crookedtimber.org/2004/02/06/no-comment/comment-page-1/#comment-15982 Jack Lecou Mon, 09 Feb 2004 03:04:01 +0000 http://crookedtimber.org/wp/?p=1016#comment-15982 Almost certainly Iraq is better off without Saddam (probably even if he ends up being replaced by religious populists). But removal of Saddam is only half of the equation. Most people seem to forget that we also spent a couple of hundred billion dollars on tank rounds and padded Haliburton contracts, not to mention the lives of soldiers. One simply cannot say that the world is a better place without considering these opportunity costs. The question is not merely whether Iraq is better off, but whether there existed another place or people that would have benefited even more from such an expenditure, and whether there was some more efficient method to achieve our goals beyond a massive invasion and poorly planned occupation. I think the answer to both those questions has to be an unqualified yes. asg: Perhaps it will amuse you even more to note that there are in fact at least two ways to discredit the threat of force. As you point out, one would be to make it apparent that you are not actually willing to use force. However, there is another way that is at least as damaging. The stated aim of the Bush administration was to enforce the UN resolution(s) and remove the threat posed by Saddam's supposed weapon stockpiles (well, one of their aims, they are a bit slippery on the subject). Contrary to this Newsweek article or Bush's statements on 14 July, Saddam had, in fact, allowed inspectors in, and, as others have pointed out, these inspectors had no complaints about the degree of cooperation. It would not have hurt US credibility in the least to back off a bit and wait for the outcome, certainly any further foot dragging from the Iraqis would rightfully trigger an invasion (possibly one with UN approval). Instead, when Iraqi cooperation began to become apparent, the administration changed their story entirely and began to make noise about regime change (the one demand which Saddam could obviously never agree to). The inspectors were told to leave (by the US, not Iraq), and shortly thereafter the attack was launched. It was pretty clear that the US wanted war very badly, and on a tight schedule. No matter how high the Iraqis jumped, Bush & Co. would just set the bar higher. It is this sequence of events which ruins US credibility even more surely than inaction. Instead of "do what we say OR we'll invade", we have "do what we say AND we'll invade". Where is the diplomacy in that? Almost certainly Iraq is better off without Saddam (probably even if he ends up being replaced by religious populists). But removal of Saddam is only half of the equation. Most people seem to forget that we also spent a couple of hundred billion dollars on tank rounds and padded Haliburton contracts, not to mention the lives of soldiers. One simply cannot say that the world is a better place without considering these opportunity costs. The question is not merely whether Iraq is better off, but whether there existed another place or people that would have benefited even more from such an expenditure, and whether there was some more efficient method to achieve our goals beyond a massive invasion and poorly planned occupation. I think the answer to both those questions has to be an unqualified yes. asg: Perhaps it will amuse you even more to note that there are in fact at least two ways to discredit the threat of force. As you point out, one would be to make it apparent that you are not actually willing to use force. However, there is another way that is at least as damaging. The stated aim of the Bush administration was to enforce the UN resolution(s) and remove the threat posed by Saddam’s supposed weapon stockpiles (well, one of their aims, they are a bit slippery on the subject). Contrary to this Newsweek article or Bush’s statements on 14 July, Saddam had, in fact, allowed inspectors in, and, as others have pointed out, these inspectors had no complaints about the degree of cooperation. It would not have hurt US credibility in the least to back off a bit and wait for the outcome, certainly any further foot dragging from the Iraqis would rightfully trigger an invasion (possibly one with UN approval). Instead, when Iraqi cooperation began to become apparent, the administration changed their story entirely and began to make noise about regime change (the one demand which Saddam could obviously never agree to). The inspectors were told to leave (by the US, not Iraq), and shortly thereafter the attack was launched. It was pretty clear that the US wanted war very badly, and on a tight schedule. No matter how high the Iraqis jumped, Bush & Co. would just set the bar higher. It is this sequence of events which ruins US credibility even more surely than inaction. Instead of “do what we say OR we’ll invade”, we have “do what we say AND we’ll invade”. Where is the diplomacy in that?

]]> By: John Quiggin http://crookedtimber.org/2004/02/06/no-comment/comment-page-1/#comment-15981 John Quiggin Sun, 08 Feb 2004 20:31:38 +0000 http://crookedtimber.org/wp/?p=1016#comment-15981 <blockquote>Am I the only one who remembers hearing Blix, after the war got rolling, on NPR talking about how he was sure the US would find WMD and that if he had only been given more time, he would have found them too?</blockquote>I suspect you are the only one who remembers this. I don't get NPR, butI don't recall Blix saying anything so incautious. Do you have a link?
Am I the only one who remembers hearing Blix, after the war got rolling, on NPR talking about how he was sure the US would find WMD and that if he had only been given more time, he would have found them too?
I suspect you are the only one who remembers this. I don’t get NPR, butI don’t recall Blix saying anything so incautious. Do you have a link?

]]> By: Statist Pig http://crookedtimber.org/2004/02/06/no-comment/comment-page-1/#comment-15980 Statist Pig Sun, 08 Feb 2004 11:28:10 +0000 http://crookedtimber.org/wp/?p=1016#comment-15980 <i> He appears to have gambled that letting other states in the region think he still had the banned weapons was worth the risk of war with the US, and imagined that if pushed to the wall he could convince the US that the weapons were destroyed. This turned out to be a bad bet. Did anyone really find this claim plausible at the time?</i> Am I the only one who remembers hearing Blix, after the war got rolling, on NPR talking about how he was sure the US would find WMD and that if he had only been given more time, he would have found them too? Or the fact that the Greens in Germany were on the ropes because they had been outed for lying about intelligence that was conclusive for the existance of WMDs? No one has discussed that the big winner in the entire "no WMDs" is the German Green government that was about to collapse under the weight of frauds it had committed and has been saved by discovering that the lies it told were true after all. I'd note that Saddam had 500k troops in defense on rough terrain. Typically, defense gives you a force modifier of x3 and rough terrain of x2. For a successful invasion under normal analysis, Saddam could feel certain that the U.S. would need about three million combat troops on the ground. Of course there were issues of troop quality, of weather (and when the U.S. could launch a war, there was a narrowing window) and his desire to have people believe that he actually had WMDs and to keep WMD programs going, no matter how circumscribed. I'll note that for the most part a WMD program is not worth the cost. If he had just had a LAW (light anti-tank weapon) program he would have destabilized the region much more. Imagine Hamas with LAWs instead of morters and rockets. LAW snipers instead of suicide bombers. Of course he had a failure of strategic planning as well as everything else ... Ms. Clinton is probably still kicking herself over the interview she gave when everyone still thought WMDs would be found. Yes, it helped sell her book, but if she had just waited six months she could have been on the side of all the posters here who feel that it was obvious there were no WMDs. Of course the Clintons did not have access to the quality of intelligence that Bush used. And Pigs fly. Do you really believe that the Clintons had less of the truth that Bush? Or that Bush the younger mislead them? Sigh. Or that the CIA's track record was so good that this time they had the guts to believe they were right when they had been wrong so many times before? Anyway, I hope the leader of the free press movement in Egypt was right when he spoke this week on NPR on how he invasion of Iraq was such a good thing. (Yes, you get much better perspectives on NPR than in the right wing press, especially the shock from the interviewers). Of course he is just an Egyptian and an Arabist. Not a good ol' American who knows what is best for the region (does anyone here really believe that either the American Right or Left really knows? Any better than the did about WMDs?). Crooked Timber indeed. grin. He appears to have gambled that letting other states in the region think he still had the banned weapons was worth the risk of war with the US, and imagined that if pushed to the wall he could convince the US that the weapons were destroyed. This turned out to be a bad bet. Did anyone really find this claim plausible at the time? Am I the only one who remembers hearing Blix, after the war got rolling, on NPR talking about how he was sure the US would find WMD and that if he had only been given more time, he would have found them too? Or the fact that the Greens in Germany were on the ropes because they had been outed for lying about intelligence that was conclusive for the existance of WMDs? No one has discussed that the big winner in the entire “no WMDs” is the German Green government that was about to collapse under the weight of frauds it had committed and has been saved by discovering that the lies it told were true after all. I’d note that Saddam had 500k troops in defense on rough terrain. Typically, defense gives you a force modifier of x3 and rough terrain of x2. For a successful invasion under normal analysis, Saddam could feel certain that the U.S. would need about three million combat troops on the ground. Of course there were issues of troop quality, of weather (and when the U.S. could launch a war, there was a narrowing window) and his desire to have people believe that he actually had WMDs and to keep WMD programs going, no matter how circumscribed. I’ll note that for the most part a WMD program is not worth the cost. If he had just had a LAW (light anti-tank weapon) program he would have destabilized the region much more. Imagine Hamas with LAWs instead of morters and rockets. LAW snipers instead of suicide bombers. Of course he had a failure of strategic planning as well as everything else … Ms. Clinton is probably still kicking herself over the interview she gave when everyone still thought WMDs would be found. Yes, it helped sell her book, but if she had just waited six months she could have been on the side of all the posters here who feel that it was obvious there were no WMDs. Of course the Clintons did not have access to the quality of intelligence that Bush used. And Pigs fly. Do you really believe that the Clintons had less of the truth that Bush? Or that Bush the younger mislead them? Sigh. Or that the CIA’s track record was so good that this time they had the guts to believe they were right when they had been wrong so many times before? Anyway, I hope the leader of the free press movement in Egypt was right when he spoke this week on NPR on how he invasion of Iraq was such a good thing. (Yes, you get much better perspectives on NPR than in the right wing press, especially the shock from the interviewers). Of course he is just an Egyptian and an Arabist. Not a good ol’ American who knows what is best for the region (does anyone here really believe that either the American Right or Left really knows? Any better than the did about WMDs?). Crooked Timber indeed. grin.

]]> By: trust me http://crookedtimber.org/2004/02/06/no-comment/comment-page-1/#comment-15979 trust me Sun, 08 Feb 2004 06:16:56 +0000 http://crookedtimber.org/wp/?p=1016#comment-15979 Someone described the issue of trust. The fact that there was no trust between Irak and the US was two sided. Around 1995/96 the CIA started to 'use' the inspections to gain information about the security and location of Saddam. And although paranoid, Saddam was right that there were many inside and outside the US government that wanted to advance various coup d'etat schemes. So he requested that the inspections stayed out of his palaces and his personal living quarters. The UN made a deal that they would make requests regarding inspections of those sites a day in advance. Only at the last moment this deal was torn, and a spot inspection was refused by a local commander at such a site. This was almost immediately followed by withdrawal of the inspection team and a bombardment of various military installations. At that moment neither the US nor the UK thought that WMD's were worth a full scale war. But from then on regime change became an official policy of the US. What I don't understand is reasoning of those who think that Saddam Hussein could have avoided a war by fulfilling al the requests of the UN. There were many arguments that should have made Saddam suspicious: - It was a stated US policy to get rid of Saddam. - UN inspections had been used by the CIA to gain information about the whereabouts of Saddam. - the US had already authorized war BEFORE going to the UN - Many US officials had openly stated that there would be war anyhow (Cheney et al.) - the argument that if you move your troops to that region and the leave without using them is bad for the image of the US, is an argument especially well understood by Saddam. - and last the US didn't take those inspections very serious. A simple example: Powell said the aluminium tubes where for a nuclear program. The UN said no, Powell said well I'm right anyhow. In the end Saddam cooperated with the UN but without trusting either the UN or the US. And in my view rightfully so. This leaves aside the fact that Saddams handling of the conflict was completely pointless. He had lost even before the war. And no sane person could ever justify his 'fighting' of this war. But then it was what the US wanted, war. So they got it. Someone described the issue of trust. The fact that there was no trust between Irak and the US was two sided. Around 1995/96 the CIA started to ‘use’ the inspections to gain information about the security and location of Saddam. And although paranoid, Saddam was right that there were many inside and outside the US government that wanted to advance various coup d’etat schemes. So he requested that the inspections stayed out of his palaces and his personal living quarters. The UN made a deal that they would make requests regarding inspections of those sites a day in advance. Only at the last moment this deal was torn, and a spot inspection was refused by a local commander at such a site. This was almost immediately followed by withdrawal of the inspection team and a bombardment of various military installations. At that moment neither the US nor the UK thought that WMD’s were worth a full scale war. But from then on regime change became an official policy of the US. What I don’t understand is reasoning of those who think that Saddam Hussein could have avoided a war by fulfilling al the requests of the UN. There were many arguments that should have made Saddam suspicious: – It was a stated US policy to get rid of Saddam. – UN inspections had been used by the CIA to gain information about the whereabouts of Saddam. – the US had already authorized war BEFORE going to the UN – Many US officials had openly stated that there would be war anyhow (Cheney et al.) – the argument that if you move your troops to that region and the leave without using them is bad for the image of the US, is an argument especially well understood by Saddam. – and last the US didn’t take those inspections very serious. A simple example: Powell said the aluminium tubes where for a nuclear program. The UN said no, Powell said well I’m right anyhow. In the end Saddam cooperated with the UN but without trusting either the UN or the US. And in my view rightfully so. This leaves aside the fact that Saddams handling of the conflict was completely pointless. He had lost even before the war. And no sane person could ever justify his ‘fighting’ of this war. But then it was what the US wanted, war. So they got it.

]]> By: Anarch http://crookedtimber.org/2004/02/06/no-comment/comment-page-1/#comment-15978 Anarch Sat, 07 Feb 2004 21:10:21 +0000 http://crookedtimber.org/wp/?p=1016#comment-15978 <i>It is to say that the conditions placed on Iraq seem, in retrospect, calculated to back Saddam into a corner.</i> In retrospect? I was saying it at the time, no hindsight necessary. What's more, the reason I ultimately ending up supporting the war (in the last two weeks or so before the actual invasion) was that Bush had carefully backed the US into a corner, too; after banging our drums so loudly, we had to follow through with an invasion lest we lose all credibility with other despotic regimes. It really was the world's most psychotic game of Chicken. It is to say that the conditions placed on Iraq seem, in retrospect, calculated to back Saddam into a corner. In retrospect? I was saying it at the time, no hindsight necessary. What’s more, the reason I ultimately ending up supporting the war (in the last two weeks or so before the actual invasion) was that Bush had carefully backed the US into a corner, too; after banging our drums so loudly, we had to follow through with an invasion lest we lose all credibility with other despotic regimes. It really was the world’s most psychotic game of Chicken.

]]> By: roger http://crookedtimber.org/2004/02/06/no-comment/comment-page-1/#comment-15977 roger Sat, 07 Feb 2004 20:26:39 +0000 http://crookedtimber.org/wp/?p=1016#comment-15977 The commenter who wrote: "So was the US supposed to keep 300,000 servicepeople on the Kuwait border for ever?" is making more of a point than perhaps he knows. With the Bush administration committing itself unilaterally to that extent, they had every reason not to want Blix to give Saddam H. "a clean bill of health." There was no way they would have accepted it. The build-up to the war had to make Americans accept the preliminary build-up of forces, so that the WMD, while useful as a rhetorical excuse, would be an issue that could not, in any way, be responded to by Saddam. Similarly, the rhetoric of Cheney and Rumsfeld was aimed not at strong-arming our allies into supporting us, but in alienating our allies so that, basically, we could do things our own way. Contrast the kind of diplomacy put in by Bush I to bring France and Germany into the coalition with the lack of effort to do so by Bush II, plus the politicizing (ie demonizing) of Europe to create a jingo vote in the States. The great thing about this maneuver is that, even afterwards, the Bush lie that Saddam wouldn't let the inspectors in can be minimized. After all, with 300,000 soldiers on his borders, maybe he would have cheated even if he'd let them in a last time -- since, of course, by that time a rational poltician would know that there was no way the U.S. would amass that force without using it. Saddam was just delusional enough to take the Bush administration's ostensible conditions for not invading seriously. But that was, clearly, a delusion. The Bush team put together a very brilliant ploy, basically aimed at a domestic audience, to do what they were going to do anyway. Now they are going to go through a wonderfully Nixonian "limited hang-out." It is that simple. The commenter who wrote: “So was the US supposed to keep 300,000 servicepeople on the Kuwait border for ever?” is making more of a point than perhaps he knows. With the Bush administration committing itself unilaterally to that extent, they had every reason not to want Blix to give Saddam H. “a clean bill of health.” There was no way they would have accepted it. The build-up to the war had to make Americans accept the preliminary build-up of forces, so that the WMD, while useful as a rhetorical excuse, would be an issue that could not, in any way, be responded to by Saddam. Similarly, the rhetoric of Cheney and Rumsfeld was aimed not at strong-arming our allies into supporting us, but in alienating our allies so that, basically, we could do things our own way. Contrast the kind of diplomacy put in by Bush I to bring France and Germany into the coalition with the lack of effort to do so by Bush II, plus the politicizing (ie demonizing) of Europe to create a jingo vote in the States. The great thing about this maneuver is that, even afterwards, the Bush lie that Saddam wouldn’t let the inspectors in can be minimized. After all, with 300,000 soldiers on his borders, maybe he would have cheated even if he’d let them in a last time—since, of course, by that time a rational poltician would know that there was no way the U.S. would amass that force without using it. Saddam was just delusional enough to take the Bush administration’s ostensible conditions for not invading seriously. But that was, clearly, a delusion. The Bush team put together a very brilliant ploy, basically aimed at a domestic audience, to do what they were going to do anyway. Now they are going to go through a wonderfully Nixonian “limited hang-out.” It is that simple.

]]> By: james http://crookedtimber.org/2004/02/06/no-comment/comment-page-1/#comment-15976 james Sat, 07 Feb 2004 16:52:56 +0000 http://crookedtimber.org/wp/?p=1016#comment-15976 Barry, But from the viewpoint of the inspectors and indeed that of Resolution 1441 which sent them back in it wasn't a matter of proving a negative i.e. that Iraq had a "clean bill of health" as regards WMD. It was a case of accounting for WMD which had supposedly been previously established to exist by previous inspectors. Therefore contrasting analogy was often made with South Africa who decided to give up its nuke program and had this verified. In Blix's reports he made frequent reference to the thousands of litres of anthrax etc. which were "unaccounted for". To his great credit he always stressed that the failure of Iraq to account for these stocks didn't mean they actually still existed - a distinction whose importance is now abundantly obvious. (Incidentally I wholly agree that Blix was more credible than Powell - unsurprising since the latter was making a case for war, whereas Blix was just doing a professional job in very difficult circumstances). Mind you, as I understand it those stockpiles would have been wholly useless anyway because they would have degraded so much since they were produced. Barry, But from the viewpoint of the inspectors and indeed that of Resolution 1441 which sent them back in it wasn’t a matter of proving a negative i.e. that Iraq had a “clean bill of health” as regards WMD. It was a case of accounting for WMD which had supposedly been previously established to exist by previous inspectors. Therefore contrasting analogy was often made with South Africa who decided to give up its nuke program and had this verified. In Blix’s reports he made frequent reference to the thousands of litres of anthrax etc. which were “unaccounted for”. To his great credit he always stressed that the failure of Iraq to account for these stocks didn’t mean they actually still existed – a distinction whose importance is now abundantly obvious. (Incidentally I wholly agree that Blix was more credible than Powell – unsurprising since the latter was making a case for war, whereas Blix was just doing a professional job in very difficult circumstances). Mind you, as I understand it those stockpiles would have been wholly useless anyway because they would have degraded so much since they were produced.

]]> By: gowingz http://crookedtimber.org/2004/02/06/no-comment/comment-page-1/#comment-15975 gowingz Sat, 07 Feb 2004 16:31:14 +0000 http://crookedtimber.org/wp/?p=1016#comment-15975 At the risk of stating the obvious, I would point out that the US and the allies presented Iraq with a set of choices that no sovereign state would agree to, including the US... This is not to say inspections haven't worked elsewhere, in differing situations (unless I'm forgetting about the hundreds of thousands of troops the US stationed on the Zimbabwean border to ensure South African "transparency" during those inspections). It is to say that the conditions placed on Iraq seem, in retrospect, calculated to back Saddam into a corner. This is not to say Saddam was a good leader, or made good choices for his people- he was a murdering thug (and OUR murdering thug at that, pre-1990)... Rather than capitulate to the demands of the "infidels" of the international community (we must remember the good dictator's latter-day embracing of radical Islamism), Saddam decided to take his chances as a defiant "pan-Arabist", a strategy that succeeded only in bringing further poverty, war, occupation, and his downfall. But did anyone think that he would allow his top WEAPONS scientists and their families out of the country? Did anyone ever think the guy would reveal his most secret weapons programs to the states that had just defeated his country in a war? In retrospect, these conditions look kinda ridiculous. I'm not saying that it was "wrong", morally, to make these demands of Saddam's government. I am simply saying that we probably knew in 1991 that he'd never accede to these demands, and anyone over the last decade who claimed to think he would do anything much differently than he did is either a fool or a thespian. It is especially irksome to hear people criticize the UN as toothless and in the same breath condemn Saddam for his "non-compliance". Assuming he didn't comply, what state would accede to the demands of an organization with no power to enforce those demands? At the risk of stating the obvious, I would point out that the US and the allies presented Iraq with a set of choices that no sovereign state would agree to, including the US… This is not to say inspections haven’t worked elsewhere, in differing situations (unless I’m forgetting about the hundreds of thousands of troops the US stationed on the Zimbabwean border to ensure South African “transparency” during those inspections). It is to say that the conditions placed on Iraq seem, in retrospect, calculated to back Saddam into a corner. This is not to say Saddam was a good leader, or made good choices for his people- he was a murdering thug (and OUR murdering thug at that, pre-1990)… Rather than capitulate to the demands of the “infidels” of the international community (we must remember the good dictator’s latter-day embracing of radical Islamism), Saddam decided to take his chances as a defiant “pan-Arabist”, a strategy that succeeded only in bringing further poverty, war, occupation, and his downfall. But did anyone think that he would allow his top WEAPONS scientists and their families out of the country? Did anyone ever think the guy would reveal his most secret weapons programs to the states that had just defeated his country in a war? In retrospect, these conditions look kinda ridiculous. I’m not saying that it was “wrong”, morally, to make these demands of Saddam’s government. I am simply saying that we probably knew in 1991 that he’d never accede to these demands, and anyone over the last decade who claimed to think he would do anything much differently than he did is either a fool or a thespian. It is especially irksome to hear people criticize the UN as toothless and in the same breath condemn Saddam for his “non-compliance”. Assuming he didn’t comply, what state would accede to the demands of an organization with no power to enforce those demands?

]]> By: John http://crookedtimber.org/2004/02/06/no-comment/comment-page-1/#comment-15974 John Sat, 07 Feb 2004 13:42:07 +0000 http://crookedtimber.org/wp/?p=1016#comment-15974 Saddam sent Lebanese emmisaries to negotiate with Bush prior to the war, and Bush refused to meet with them. This was reported a couple months ago, but has disappeared from the discussion. This fact, along with the limited willingness of Saddam to allow U.N. inspections, suggests that military action was not necessary. Even if it was expensive to ship troops to Iraq and mass them on the border, it was much cheaper in blood and treasure to let them wait that to invade and have to pick up the pieces. Saddam sent Lebanese emmisaries to negotiate with Bush prior to the war, and Bush refused to meet with them. This was reported a couple months ago, but has disappeared from the discussion. This fact, along with the limited willingness of Saddam to allow U.N. inspections, suggests that military action was not necessary. Even if it was expensive to ship troops to Iraq and mass them on the border, it was much cheaper in blood and treasure to let them wait that to invade and have to pick up the pieces.

]]> By: Another Andrew http://crookedtimber.org/2004/02/06/no-comment/comment-page-1/#comment-15973 Another Andrew Sat, 07 Feb 2004 12:52:54 +0000 http://crookedtimber.org/wp/?p=1016#comment-15973 How do we know that Ukraine, Libya, S Africa etc have no WMD hidden? One can't help the thought that the reason is that there is no reason for the US to say they haven't. Otherwise they would be in the awkward position of trying to prove an absence. How do we know that Ukraine, Libya, S Africa etc have no WMD hidden? One can’t help the thought that the reason is that there is no reason for the US to say they haven’t. Otherwise they would be in the awkward position of trying to prove an absence.

]]> By: andrew http://crookedtimber.org/2004/02/06/no-comment/comment-page-1/#comment-15972 andrew Sat, 07 Feb 2004 08:04:27 +0000 http://crookedtimber.org/wp/?p=1016#comment-15972 I doubt the efficacy of commenting, because the goalposts are constantly being moved to discussions of rape rooms, or UN ineffectiveness, or philosophical explorations of what it is to "know" something, but... ..."since Hussein certainly didn’t let his scientists be interviewed outside the country, and didn’t let inspectors rummage through his palaces"... "remember that Saddam wasn’t all cooperation; even after letting the the inspectors in, he stalled and stonewalled and obstructed for the longest time possible" "A guy who allows his sons to pick women to rape and murder certainly can’t be expected to allow the UN to come in and actually look around." <a href="http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2003/02/14/iraq/main540681.shtml">Here's Hans:</a> "The inspections have taken place throughout Iraq at industrial sites, ammunition depots, research centers, universities, <b>presidential sites</b>, mobile laboratories, private houses, missile production facilities, military camps and agricultural sites" "The most important point to make is that access has been provided to all sites we have wanted to inspect and with one exception it has been prompt" "we note that access to sites has so far been without problems, including those that have never been declared or inspected as well as two presidential sites and private residences." Nu'uh is not an argument. This doesn't mean that there weren't still outstanding disarmament issues (unaccounted for chem. stockpiles from before 1991, and interviews). The Iraqis said they would allow all requested interviews, but the interviewees were balking. They all wanted to be able to record them, or to do it in the presence of the Iraqi minders. Could mean Saddam wasn't allowing them, or it might mean the scientists were scared poopless. Here's a different tact: Everyone who confidently asserts that Saddam wasn't complying (Blix said he was on process, not on substance) I'd ask, what <i>wasn't</i> he doing? There were tons of late 80's VX gas unaccounted for. Iraq said they destroyed it, provided a list of 80 witnesses to the destruction. Chemical analysis of the soil at the site was inconclusive. There's no telling. But what else? Saddam wasn't bluffing (obstructing even though he had nothing). He claimed to have no weapons. He was basically telling the truth, it turns out. I doubt the efficacy of commenting, because the goalposts are constantly being moved to discussions of rape rooms, or UN ineffectiveness, or philosophical explorations of what it is to “know” something, but… …”since Hussein certainly didn’t let his scientists be interviewed outside the country, and didn’t let inspectors rummage through his palaces”… “remember that Saddam wasn’t all cooperation; even after letting the the inspectors in, he stalled and stonewalled and obstructed for the longest time possible” “A guy who allows his sons to pick women to rape and murder certainly can’t be expected to allow the UN to come in and actually look around.” Here’s Hans: “The inspections have taken place throughout Iraq at industrial sites, ammunition depots, research centers, universities, presidential sites, mobile laboratories, private houses, missile production facilities, military camps and agricultural sites” “The most important point to make is that access has been provided to all sites we have wanted to inspect and with one exception it has been prompt” “we note that access to sites has so far been without problems, including those that have never been declared or inspected as well as two presidential sites and private residences.” Nu’uh is not an argument. This doesn’t mean that there weren’t still outstanding disarmament issues (unaccounted for chem. stockpiles from before 1991, and interviews). The Iraqis said they would allow all requested interviews, but the interviewees were balking. They all wanted to be able to record them, or to do it in the presence of the Iraqi minders. Could mean Saddam wasn’t allowing them, or it might mean the scientists were scared poopless. Here’s a different tact: Everyone who confidently asserts that Saddam wasn’t complying (Blix said he was on process, not on substance) I’d ask, what wasn’t he doing? There were tons of late 80’s VX gas unaccounted for. Iraq said they destroyed it, provided a list of 80 witnesses to the destruction. Chemical analysis of the soil at the site was inconclusive. There’s no telling. But what else? Saddam wasn’t bluffing (obstructing even though he had nothing). He claimed to have no weapons. He was basically telling the truth, it turns out.

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