Comments on: Singer vs Bush

By: Dave

Dave — Fri, 13 Feb 2004 15:00:13 +0000

Why do intelligent people even treat Peter Singer as a peer? At what point do someone’s utterances become so outrageous that the person is treated like that “special” relative no one really wants to sit next to at the family reunion. In my opinion the man is a loon. The fact he is a professor at a very prestigious university is embarrassing. Anyone who has spent that much intellectual capital trying to mitigate the social constraints regarding sex with animals is so far beyond the pale he is irrelevant. The man is like David Blaine. Singer has put himself in a box of self-inflicted silliness; where are the masses throwing rocks and hurling the deserved insults? Read a few issues of the Atlantic Monthly is you want reasoned critiques of the President….

By: Dave

Dave — Fri, 13 Feb 2004 14:59:44 +0000

By: cbk

cbk — Thu, 12 Feb 2004 17:34:58 +0000

Certainly one is far more than their DNA. But one begins with their DNA, their single egg, the bases for the reproductions of cells that become a fully formed human being. We are MORE than our DNA, but we were never less than that origin. I still say the existance of DNA, human DNA, makes one human. Just as chimp DNA makes one chimp. There’s nothing hard about framing morality in this manner. It simply means that killing babies, either fully formed or not fully formed, is killing babies. There are many arguments to allow it or disallow it. That hardly contradicts the fact that combined chromosomes define a creature within its species as a member of that species. Any attempt to reduce a fetus to a small and insignificant lump denies the fact that that lump contains all that is necessary to be classified as a human being, even though not fully formed. CBK

By: Nix

Nix — Thu, 12 Feb 2004 11:29:13 +0000

I don’t see my `defining feature’ as being `unique, individual human DNA’. That’s kind of hard: I’m one half of a pair of identical twins, and the twin died shortly after birth. Yet I don’t consider myself half-dead. If you consider yourself to be your DNA, then obviously you would have no objection to the replacement of your head with a large bag of crystallised cbk’s-DNA. After all, there’s more DNA in there than there is in your head as presently constituted. It’s a fallacy that DNA is in some way `guiding’ or `controlling’ in moral matters—- when it’s really the mind/brain that counts—- just as it’s a classic fallacy that humans replicate (do they? I’m not a copy of either of my parents). The genotype is not the phenotype: you are more than your DNA.

By: bad Jim

bad Jim — Thu, 12 Feb 2004 09:28:20 +0000

As an habitual carnivore, the concept of not eating anything with a face was something I used to keep in the back of my head. A visit to northern Spain and weeks of feasting on seafood decalibrated my sensitivities, and upon consulting my Seafood Watch afterwards I realized that the appalled attention my fellow travelers applied to my avid appetite for the cheeks of a monkfish were not merely squeamish.

By: cbk

cbk — Wed, 11 Feb 2004 17:17:30 +0000

—-If you’re an individualist about morality, and you don’t believe every sperm is sacred, then you have to find a feature the individual picks up between being a disconnect sperm/egg and being a baby that makes a significant moral difference. Singer believes that there is one moral difference in that time – the onset of sentience – but he doesn’t think sentience alone is sufficient to make it wrong to kill, provided that in so doing you are minimising pain.—- See, this is why the argument jumps so, because it is framed erroneously. This atheist sees the defining “feature” of a human being is unique, individual human DNA. That occurs when sperm connects with egg. They are not disconnected sperm and egg, they are connected chromosomes. Connected human chromosomes. Connected, reproducing, unique, individual, human chromosomes. CBK

By: mc

mc — Wed, 11 Feb 2004 15:44:15 +0000

I don’t think it is—I’m pretty solidly pro-choice—but I worry that abortion might be genocide. On the other hand, I’m not sure that infanticide is murder, either. The status of infants as fully human seems unclear to me and I don’t think either my intuition or conventional wisdom are reliable guides to deciding this matter. Well, Keith, thankfully for everyone :) there’s such a thing as legal definitions and human rights standards that define very clearly a person as a human being from the very moment of birth to the moment of death. You’re 1 day old, no, 1 second old, then you’re a person with the very same human rights as a 25 or 45 or 75 year old. No matter what illnesses or disabilities you may have. The rest is all abstract speculation, good for challenging philosophical arguments and heated academic debates (and for publishers ;) ), but – thankfully again – not ever standing a chance of changing those (almost) universally accepted standards and legal definitions. (“Almost” referring to the fact in many countries, the basic idea that say, women and children are also individuals fully entitled to their own rights is not yet accepted)

By: Keith M Ellis

Keith M Ellis — Wed, 11 Feb 2004 14:09:03 +0000

“Yes, some cultures practice infanticide, just as some practice female circumcision, slavery, and genocide. Most people still wouldn’t feel the need to rethink their opinion on those issues in the event that some extremely clever man defends them.—Donald Johnson

Yes, and within those cultures most people don’t feel the need to rethink their opinion on those issues when some extremely clever man attackes them. Slavery could include the captivity of primates[1]; male circumcision could be compared to “female circumcision”[2]; and genocide could include abortion[3]. These are all quite contrary to current American opinion and most people dismiss without consideration arguments making these claims. The “laugh test” is a very unreliable test for a moral argument because history has demonstrated that a good deal of moral intuition is culturally determined. Leon Kass thinks otherwise, but I think he’s wrong. I am not persuaded that it is manifest that infanticide is a horror because, well, our culture says it is and, hey, we’re enlightened, aren’t we? I agree that the liberal tradition is one of expanding recognition of essential individual rights and, yes, to contract them offends my personal sensibilities. But I really can’t imagine a more unconvincing argument than the one you make above. Conventional wisdom is not an argument. So why did I mention that other cultures have found infanticide acceptable? Not that I think that says anything one way or another about its moral status. Rather, my point was that to dismiss Singer’s argument about infanticide as “unthinkable” is simply incorrect, since history demonstrates that infanticide has not only been thinkable, but conventional. fn1. And I think it will, in time. fn2. “Female circumcision” is a misleading term, because the larger portion of female genital mutiliations include clitorectomy and removal of the labia minora. A friend of mine who is an activist against male circumcision did not realize this and thought that male circumcision was more closely comparable to FGM than it is. Still, male circumcision is itself genital mutilation as the foreskin is now understood to be closer to an organ than an inert piece of flesh. Thus, I don’t equate MGM with FGM, but I do think that it is unacceptable, convention be damned. fn3. Obviously, a significant minority of the American public claims to believe that abortion is equivalent to genocide. If true, I find it disapointing that they’re not blowing up all the abortion clinics. My point is that a serious argument can be and is made that abortion is genocide, but our culture for the most part disregards this argument. As it happens, I don’t think it is—I’m pretty solidly pro-choice—but I worry that abortion might be genocide. On the other hand, I’m not sure that infanticide is murder, either. The status of infants as fully human seems unclear to me and I don’t think either my intuition or conventional wisdom are reliable guides to deciding this matter.

By: Donald Johnson

Donald Johnson — Wed, 11 Feb 2004 13:22:35 +0000

The last two sentences in my previous post weren’t very clear. I was sorry someone with Chomsky-like views on foreign policy is also associated with a defense of infanticide. Maybe Singer secretly enjoys being on the fringe of every issue. It’s rare that I find myself in agreement with Sebastian Holsclaw, given what I can remember of his positions in other posts I’ve read. What’s the temperature in hell today? I suppose I’m in some slight disagreement with him even here. Zeno’s paradoxes, as I understand, really are deep, even if wrong and it was worthwhile for philosophers and mathematicians to think deeply about the convergence of infinite series and so forth. So maybe there’s something to be learned from pointing out the flaws in Singer’s arguments. But no one needed to take Zeno’s conclusions seriously because there was no independent evidence that we were all being deceived in some way. And Singer’s arguments should receive the same treatment. Yes, some cultures practice infanticide, just as some practice female circumcision, slavery, and genocide. Most people still wouldn’t feel the need to rethink their opinion on those issues in the event that some extremely clever man defends them. But maybe something could be learned from dismantling his argument.

By: Sebastian Holsclaw

Sebastian Holsclaw — Wed, 11 Feb 2004 08:30:54 +0000

“He makes some deeply counter-intuitive and counter-cultural arguments; and he does so in a very analytical manner that, I suspect, just pisses people off more.” Actually I think the main reason anyone listens to him at all is because many in academia have the deeply silly belief that a really counter-intuitive argument must mean you have a really deep argument. Some self-deceptions are so complicated that only a really smart person could sustain them. I find that impressive only in the way that a train wreck is impressive. Peter Singer has quite a few of them. The same could be said for piling on. Our culture has the perverse idea that if enough people that you don’t like say something is wrong, there must really be something to it. The truth of something is technically independent of how many people say it is wrong. BTW I don’t think Singer has ever really explained why his system should help animal rights. He debases human rights enough to make it seem as if animals wouldn’t be particularly lucky to be treated the same.

By: Keith M Ellis

Keith M Ellis — Wed, 11 Feb 2004 07:44:16 +0000

I appreciate Brian’s thoughts on Singer because I was getting a little tired of the piling-on here in the comments. My very, very strong sense is that the people that deeply dislike Singer do so because his conclusions clash so violently with their sensibilities. He makes some deeply counter-intuitive and counter-cultural arguments; and he does so in a very analytical manner that, I suspect, just pisses people off more. I don’t agree with the outrage about infanticide. It has been acceptable in some cultures, and it’s not at all clear to me that infants are fully human in the sense that’s relevant to this discussion. It especially disturbs me that a strong pro-choice position favors the legality of late-term abortions but, I daresay, many of those same people find infanticide abhorrent. People strongly dislike Singer for his animal rights positions. Here, too, a lot of the criticism seems to me to be motivated by an outrage that he’s deeply violating cultural norms. He’s a smart man and a pretty rigorous thinker; and it’s revealing to me that people would mistakenly assume that his fellow philosophers would find him an embarassment. I’m a utilitarian, but I’m also deeply influenced by complexity theory. The latter moderates the former—I’m skeptical of a “utilitarian moral theory of everything”, so to speak, since I think that we likely can only determine utility for an appropriate level of description of a system and certainly not for the whole of it.

By: Will Wilkinson

Will Wilkinson — Wed, 11 Feb 2004 06:48:48 +0000

If you’re an individualist about morality, and you don’t believe every sperm is sacred, then you have to find a feature the individual picks up between being a disconnect sperm/egg and being a baby that makes a significant moral difference. Singer believes that there is one moral difference in that time – the onset of sentience – but he doesn’t think sentience alone is sufficient to make it wrong to kill, provided that in so doing you are minimising pain. Not sure what you mean about ‘individualist’ here, Brian. Probably the most common way of being an individualist about morality is to hold that moral reasons are grounded in the desires/goals/projects of the individual person. Or that value is always agent-relative, i.e., is always value for somebody or other rather than just value, period. But just about all contractarians, say, are individualist in this sense. Libertarian contractarians just think suitably situated rational choosers would prefer a small, limited state. It’s not clear this has anything much to do with the infanticide issue. Anyway, I don’t see the problem for moral individualism. Suppose most normally developed people just happen to have an intense aversion to infanticide, would be morally outraged if others were to kill babies, and so forth. So there arises a generally recognized moral norm that proscribes infanticide. For most people, their natural sentiments will provide sufficient reason to refrain. For others, socialization will suffice to provide a reason. And for still others, the prevalence of the norm, and the jealousy of its enforcement, ensures that it won’t be in their interest to do it, and so they won’t have a reason to do it. Why, on a moral individualist account, does the BABY need to pick up any properties at all other than the relational property of being the subject of certain norm-supporting moral emotions?

By: Brian Weatherson

Brian Weatherson — Wed, 11 Feb 2004 04:43:59 +0000

Jim, my impression is that he tends to arouse fairly extreme reactions, far more so than any other philosopher I know. His reputation is not as bad as you might think for a few reasons. One, we’re less inclined to judge other philosophers by how much we like their conclusions than we could be. Robert Nozick, for instance, was very widely admired throughout the profession (and quite rightly so) even though there are very adherents to any of his views. This isn’t to say we never let views about conclusions colour views of people, but we’re not as bad as some caricatured version of the profession. Second, the views on infanticide are really a very small part of what Singer is known for. Ask any philosopher what is most notable about Singer and they’ll say his work on animal rights, which has a central part in one of the most important stories in contemporary philosophy. Even within bioethics, they’ll probably just as likely cite his support for voluntary euthanasia as his arguments for the permissibility of infanticide. Singer’s own work is less important in the story here, but again it’s something where philosophers have had a role in a big and ongoing change in social values. Obviously not everyone likes Singer. There’s a fair bit of institutional opposition to utilitarianism in various parts, and that rubs off on him. But it doesn’t account for all of the feelings he arouses, which as I said can be fairly extreme. I think senoma’s point that it’s hard to say why membership in a community should count as morally relevant is a good one. It’s a variant really of the argument Singer ends up giving against birth being morally relevant. I’d need to be a much better ethicist to give a thorough answer here. Again though, I think this is why Singer’s arguments are valuable. Finding alternative answers and justifying them is hard work, and it’s just the kind of hard work you need to do to come up with a plausible theory of value. For what it’s worth, I do think dogs are moral agents. I suspect they have future-directed preferences, i.e. goals, though this is an empirical question. And I suspect that’s sufficient (though unlike Singer I’d question whether it is necessary) for moral agency. They certainly have some moral standing – it’s immoral to prevent a dog getting any water in a way that it isn’t immoral to prevent a plant getting water. But whether they have higher moral standing that that is tricky.

By: robin green

robin green — Wed, 11 Feb 2004 03:56:36 +0000

My view is that whether or not Singer is right in some abstract and asocial and therefore unrealistic sense, he neglects to consider that due to the strong, quasi-universal social belief in the immorality or at least disgustingness of infanticide, people in society generally would have way more justifiable cause to feel wronged if the state allowed infanticide to happen with impunity, than any one severely disabled person would have justifiable cause to feel wronged by their parents not killing them after birth (or any one parent of such a child would have just cause to feel wronged by not being allowed to kill them). Although Singer briefly alludes to the social context as a practical explanation of the disconnect between his theory of infanticide and reality, he fails – I think – to fully pick up on the extent to which the social context is a first-order morally-relevant clincher, not just a practical sociological explanation. One might counter that with the objection that during times of slavery, the moral beliefs of slaveholders should not be taken into consideration when judging slavery immoral. However, with slavery, I think the arguments of the slaveholders are overriden by the moral urgency of abolishing slavery – whereas with the frankly quite marginal cases Singer talks about, it is hard to see that the changes in “utility metric” that he predicts outweigh the social opprobium on infanticide.

By: Jim Miller

Jim Miller — Wed, 11 Feb 2004 02:33:55 +0000

Just out of curiosity, Brian, what do most philosphers think of Singer? I don’t need a long answer, but I have wondered for years whether many in his field didn’t find him more than a bit embarrassing. I don’t expect you to explain how much higher your own opinion is, since that isn’t always good for own’s career, but if you do, that would be interesting, too.