Comments on: Kant’s Approach to Ethics http://crookedtimber.org/2004/02/16/kants-approach-to-ethics/ Out of the crooked timber of humanity, no straight thing was ever made Mon, 13 Feb 2012 08:14:19 +0000 hourly 1 http://wordpress.org/?v=3.3.1 By: Albert Law http://crookedtimber.org/2004/02/16/kants-approach-to-ethics/comment-page-1/#comment-17868 Albert Law Thu, 19 Feb 2004 22:05:13 +0000 http://crookedtimber.org/wp/?p=1074#comment-17868 Come on Bza, can they be universalised? Come on Bza, can they be universalised?

]]> By: bob mcmanus http://crookedtimber.org/2004/02/16/kants-approach-to-ethics/comment-page-1/#comment-17867 bob mcmanus Thu, 19 Feb 2004 20:20:32 +0000 http://crookedtimber.org/wp/?p=1074#comment-17867 bza: thank you. Saved the post, will use it. Maybe try to refute it, and probably fail. Have decided that Steven Palmquist has a serious agenda in his work on Kant, and will use him more critically now. When I read the Second Critique twenty years ago, I thought Kant was just throwing religion at the end of his books to avoid censorship problems. I guess calling Kant Kierkeggaard in disguise is just as ignorant. bza: thank you. Saved the post, will use it. Maybe try to refute it, and probably fail. Have decided that Steven Palmquist has a serious agenda in his work on Kant, and will use him more critically now. When I read the Second Critique twenty years ago, I thought Kant was just throwing religion at the end of his books to avoid censorship problems. I guess calling Kant Kierkeggaard in disguise is just as ignorant.

]]> By: bza http://crookedtimber.org/2004/02/16/kants-approach-to-ethics/comment-page-1/#comment-17866 bza Thu, 19 Feb 2004 20:00:11 +0000 http://crookedtimber.org/wp/?p=1074#comment-17866 also to bob: I meant to recommend a book to you as well. Since you got into Kant though an interest in Rawls, you should definitely pick up a copy of Rawls's lectures on the history of moral philosophy. They're beautifully done, and a good guide not only to Kant but to a number of earlier moral philosophers. (And they make for a surprisingly fluent and pleasant read, in marked contrast to <i>A Theory of Justice</i>, etc.) also to bob: I meant to recommend a book to you as well. Since you got into Kant though an interest in Rawls, you should definitely pick up a copy of Rawls’s lectures on the history of moral philosophy. They’re beautifully done, and a good guide not only to Kant but to a number of earlier moral philosophers. (And they make for a surprisingly fluent and pleasant read, in marked contrast to A Theory of Justice, etc.)

]]> By: bza http://crookedtimber.org/2004/02/16/kants-approach-to-ethics/comment-page-1/#comment-17865 bza Thu, 19 Feb 2004 19:55:55 +0000 http://crookedtimber.org/wp/?p=1074#comment-17865 Warning: post contains pedantry. bob mcmanus: "Actually, Kant is very close to Kierkeggaard. Belief in God is absolutely unjustifiable, and absolutely necessary." There's the rub: what we mean by "necessary." The main discussion of this is, if I remember correctly, in the Second Critique, around 5:125 (Akademie pagination). I might as well note in passing that the convention is to refer to the three Critiques as "First Critique," etc., rather than as "Pure Reason," "Practical Reason," as you were doing. (I'm not trying to be snotty to someone engaged in self-study. I just thought you might want to know, both because it'll forestall a moment of confusion if you're talkign to an academic about this and because, people being as they are, it'll probably gain you a more serious hearing.) Anyway, in that discussion Kant says that the necessity of religious belief is not an "objective necessity," which in the context of his moral philosophy is pretty much synonymous with <i>obligation</i> (see, e.g., 4:412 in the <i>Groundwork</i>. I can't think of a cite for this in the Second Critique offhand, but there are passages; I think they're a little after 125). Instead, the necessity of religous belief is a "subjective necessity," which is the way that Kant refers to things that are results of contingent features of our make-up. (This sort of contrast between subjective and objective necessity is used in the theoretical philosophy as well. See section 19 of the B Edition Deduction in the First Critique: psychological assocation à la Hume is merely subjectively necessary, while full-blown cognitive judgment is objectively necessary. This is a different sense of objective and subjective necessity, because we're no longer talking about moral norms, but the contrast is still the same. "Objective necessity" is Kant's term for substantive correctness; "subjective necessity" characterizes that which is merely a consequence of our internal make-up and so neither correct nor incorrect.) So religious belief isn't, for Kant, anything that one <i>should</i> have, for any sense of "should." Insofar as we must have it, it's simply a consequence of our nature. This is why Kant can seem to be saying that it's merely a psychological necessity. I think that one can argue that the connection between religious belief and a moral stance isn't merely psychological (I tried to do so in my previous post), but even so one can't rescue any sense in which there's a reason why one <i>should</i>, in Kant's eyes, have a religious belief. Indeed, he denies just that. There's a further point, which makes the position of religion in Kant's system even more tenuous. In my preivous post I tried to point out--although I wasn't as explicit as I should have been--that, when one looks at the explanation Kant gives of why a moral stance leads to having religious belief, it isn't clear why that subjective necessity leads uniquely to something we would recognize as a particularly religious attitude. The suspicion is, I think, well-founded that it was only because existentialism, for example, hadn't come along yet that it could seem to Kant that a conviction that it's possible to remain moral is equivalent to a specifically <i>religious</i> attitude. Warning: post contains pedantry. bob mcmanus: “Actually, Kant is very close to Kierkeggaard. Belief in God is absolutely unjustifiable, and absolutely necessary.” There’s the rub: what we mean by “necessary.” The main discussion of this is, if I remember correctly, in the Second Critique, around 5:125 (Akademie pagination). I might as well note in passing that the convention is to refer to the three Critiques as “First Critique,” etc., rather than as “Pure Reason,” “Practical Reason,” as you were doing. (I’m not trying to be snotty to someone engaged in self-study. I just thought you might want to know, both because it’ll forestall a moment of confusion if you’re talkign to an academic about this and because, people being as they are, it’ll probably gain you a more serious hearing.) Anyway, in that discussion Kant says that the necessity of religious belief is not an “objective necessity,” which in the context of his moral philosophy is pretty much synonymous with obligation (see, e.g., 4:412 in the Groundwork. I can’t think of a cite for this in the Second Critique offhand, but there are passages; I think they’re a little after 125). Instead, the necessity of religous belief is a “subjective necessity,” which is the way that Kant refers to things that are results of contingent features of our make-up. (This sort of contrast between subjective and objective necessity is used in the theoretical philosophy as well. See section 19 of the B Edition Deduction in the First Critique: psychological assocation à la Hume is merely subjectively necessary, while full-blown cognitive judgment is objectively necessary. This is a different sense of objective and subjective necessity, because we’re no longer talking about moral norms, but the contrast is still the same. “Objective necessity” is Kant’s term for substantive correctness; “subjective necessity” characterizes that which is merely a consequence of our internal make-up and so neither correct nor incorrect.) So religious belief isn’t, for Kant, anything that one should have, for any sense of “should.” Insofar as we must have it, it’s simply a consequence of our nature. This is why Kant can seem to be saying that it’s merely a psychological necessity. I think that one can argue that the connection between religious belief and a moral stance isn’t merely psychological (I tried to do so in my previous post), but even so one can’t rescue any sense in which there’s a reason why one should, in Kant’s eyes, have a religious belief. Indeed, he denies just that. There’s a further point, which makes the position of religion in Kant’s system even more tenuous. In my preivous post I tried to point out—although I wasn’t as explicit as I should have been—that, when one looks at the explanation Kant gives of why a moral stance leads to having religious belief, it isn’t clear why that subjective necessity leads uniquely to something we would recognize as a particularly religious attitude. The suspicion is, I think, well-founded that it was only because existentialism, for example, hadn’t come along yet that it could seem to Kant that a conviction that it’s possible to remain moral is equivalent to a specifically religious attitude.

]]> By: Albert Law http://crookedtimber.org/2004/02/16/kants-approach-to-ethics/comment-page-1/#comment-17864 Albert Law Thu, 19 Feb 2004 02:28:06 +0000 http://crookedtimber.org/wp/?p=1074#comment-17864 Bza, So contraception, homosexuality and masturbation can all be universalised? This is what I want to know. I guess I expressed myself very poorly in the last two comments. Bza, So contraception, homosexuality and masturbation can all be universalised? This is what I want to know. I guess I expressed myself very poorly in the last two comments.

]]> By: bob mcmanus http://crookedtimber.org/2004/02/16/kants-approach-to-ethics/comment-page-1/#comment-17863 bob mcmanus Thu, 19 Feb 2004 01:17:41 +0000 http://crookedtimber.org/wp/?p=1074#comment-17863 "I for one find that to be a rather watery sort of religious belief, but the closer you look at Kant’s arguments here," Actually, Kant is very close to Kierkeggaard. Belief in God is absolutely unjustifiable, and absolutely necessary “I for one find that to be a rather watery sort of religious belief, but the closer you look at Kant’s arguments here,” Actually, Kant is very close to Kierkeggaard. Belief in God is absolutely unjustifiable, and absolutely necessary

]]> By: bza http://crookedtimber.org/2004/02/16/kants-approach-to-ethics/comment-page-1/#comment-17862 bza Thu, 19 Feb 2004 00:26:07 +0000 http://crookedtimber.org/wp/?p=1074#comment-17862 albert law: As a general matter, I don't see any problem, by Kantian lights, with contraception, homosexuality, or masturbation. jeremy pierce: As you note, Kant doesn't think religion should ground our judgments about the rightness or wrongness of specific acts. He also says that the existence or non-existence of God is irrelevant to the existence of basic moral principles. He further says that our <i>obligation</i> to be moral is independent of religion. So what function does religion have in Kant's system, given that it's unrelated to the existence of moral norms or their bindingness on us? Only the following, very restricted role (and here things become very obscure): Religious faith is supposed to explain how one can remain moral no matter how adverse, as a result of circumstance, the results of remaning moral seem to be. At first glance, this looks like a depiction of religion as a mere psychological necessity, which shouldn't please the theistically inclined. But I think that that's probably not quite the right reading. Note that such "ethical faith" is, for Kant, a form of belief that is not supposed to inform our thinking about the world except insofar as it helps us be moral. It's not the reason one is moral, and it shouldn't serve as a basis for holding any other beliefs. Nevertheless it's supposed to be necessarily bound up with the disposition to act morally. The only plausible way to read this, as far as I can see, is to see such religious belief as something like the way in which a moral agent articulates their determination to be moral, which articulation helps preserve a moral disposition. I for one find that to be a rather watery sort of religious belief, but the closer you look at Kant's arguments here, the more the religous belief he describes looks like a way of giving metaphorical expression to an intrinsically non-religious moral mindset. albert law: As a general matter, I don’t see any problem, by Kantian lights, with contraception, homosexuality, or masturbation. jeremy pierce: As you note, Kant doesn’t think religion should ground our judgments about the rightness or wrongness of specific acts. He also says that the existence or non-existence of God is irrelevant to the existence of basic moral principles. He further says that our obligation to be moral is independent of religion. So what function does religion have in Kant’s system, given that it’s unrelated to the existence of moral norms or their bindingness on us? Only the following, very restricted role (and here things become very obscure): Religious faith is supposed to explain how one can remain moral no matter how adverse, as a result of circumstance, the results of remaning moral seem to be. At first glance, this looks like a depiction of religion as a mere psychological necessity, which shouldn’t please the theistically inclined. But I think that that’s probably not quite the right reading. Note that such “ethical faith” is, for Kant, a form of belief that is not supposed to inform our thinking about the world except insofar as it helps us be moral. It’s not the reason one is moral, and it shouldn’t serve as a basis for holding any other beliefs. Nevertheless it’s supposed to be necessarily bound up with the disposition to act morally. The only plausible way to read this, as far as I can see, is to see such religious belief as something like the way in which a moral agent articulates their determination to be moral, which articulation helps preserve a moral disposition. I for one find that to be a rather watery sort of religious belief, but the closer you look at Kant’s arguments here, the more the religous belief he describes looks like a way of giving metaphorical expression to an intrinsically non-religious moral mindset.

]]> By: Adam Rice http://crookedtimber.org/2004/02/16/kants-approach-to-ethics/comment-page-1/#comment-17861 Adam Rice Thu, 19 Feb 2004 00:10:05 +0000 http://crookedtimber.org/wp/?p=1074#comment-17861 This is all fascinating. Not sure where to start. On universalizability: Does this necessarily mean "would work if everybody did it" or can it mean "would work if anybody did it?" It's an important distinction. On contraception: If you already have two kids and have done your bit for posterity, how could any Kantian say that contraception in your case would be immoral? Taking the contraception=bad notion to the extreme requires us to imagine that not only contraception but abstention is bad, and that failing to have as many children as biologically possible is bad. Whereas I think many reasonable people might say the opposite. Jeremy writes <blockquote>If you kill someone, then you’re in effect giving permission to kill you.</blockquote>This strikes me as half-right, but the other half is a doozy. To give the death penalty to a killer on this logic lowers you to his level. This is not "do unto others as ye would be done", this is "do unto others as they have done" This is all fascinating. Not sure where to start. On universalizability: Does this necessarily mean “would work if everybody did it” or can it mean “would work if anybody did it?” It’s an important distinction. On contraception: If you already have two kids and have done your bit for posterity, how could any Kantian say that contraception in your case would be immoral? Taking the contraception=bad notion to the extreme requires us to imagine that not only contraception but abstention is bad, and that failing to have as many children as biologically possible is bad. Whereas I think many reasonable people might say the opposite. Jeremy writes
If you kill someone, then you’re in effect giving permission to kill you.
This strikes me as half-right, but the other half is a doozy. To give the death penalty to a killer on this logic lowers you to his level. This is not “do unto others as ye would be done”, this is “do unto others as they have done”

]]> By: Albert Law http://crookedtimber.org/2004/02/16/kants-approach-to-ethics/comment-page-1/#comment-17860 Albert Law Thu, 19 Feb 2004 00:02:05 +0000 http://crookedtimber.org/wp/?p=1074#comment-17860 Pressler, What about the person who just doesn't want to have children or who could provide a child with a stable home without defects and be able to support them but prefers working on his/her career right now? What about homosexuality and masturbation? Pressler, What about the person who just doesn’t want to have children or who could provide a child with a stable home without defects and be able to support them but prefers working on his/her career right now? What about homosexuality and masturbation?

]]> By: charlotte pressler http://crookedtimber.org/2004/02/16/kants-approach-to-ethics/comment-page-1/#comment-17859 charlotte pressler Wed, 18 Feb 2004 23:17:21 +0000 http://crookedtimber.org/wp/?p=1074#comment-17859 albert law writes, re Kant & contraception: "It’s the intention that matters and the intention is 'not to have children'. Whether it’s 'not to have children right now/right here' doesn’t matter." But this formulation is not fine-grained enough to serve as a statement of the maxim of the person using contraception. This might be better stated as: "not to have children until I can provide them with a stable home"; "not to have children unless I can support them adequately"; or "not to have children if I have good reason to believe any child I bear/beget will suffer catastrophically from birth defects" -- and surely all of these maxims are universalizable. Nor would their universalizability prevent persons in better circumstances from forgoing contraception and having children. My versions do take into account the particular circumstances of the individual using contraception. But so does one of Kant's best-known examples, from the _Metaphysics of Morals_. Kant writes: "A [person] finds in himself a talent which could, by means of some cultivation, make him in many respects a useful man. But he finds himself in comfortable circumstances, and prefers indulgence in pleasure to troubling himself with broadening and improving his fortunate natural gifts. Now, however, let him ask whether his maxim of neglecting his gifts ... agrees also with what is called duty .... He cannot possibly will that this should become a universal law of nature..." Crucially, Kant's example depends on the man in question having "fortunate natural gifts," a circumstance by no means universal, as well as on the maxim that all the faculties of a rational being should be developed. What is required by Kantian universalizability, then, is not that all people should act alike, whatever their circumstances, but that anyone in my circumstances would be justified in acting on the same maxim that I do. The maxim of a person using contraception might well meet that standard. albert law writes, re Kant & contraception: “It’s the intention that matters and the intention is ‘not to have children’. Whether it’s ‘not to have children right now/right here’ doesn’t matter.” But this formulation is not fine-grained enough to serve as a statement of the maxim of the person using contraception. This might be better stated as: “not to have children until I can provide them with a stable home”; “not to have children unless I can support them adequately”; or “not to have children if I have good reason to believe any child I bear/beget will suffer catastrophically from birth defects”—and surely all of these maxims are universalizable. Nor would their universalizability prevent persons in better circumstances from forgoing contraception and having children. My versions do take into account the particular circumstances of the individual using contraception. But so does one of Kant’s best-known examples, from the Metaphysics of Morals. Kant writes: “A [person] finds in himself a talent which could, by means of some cultivation, make him in many respects a useful man. But he finds himself in comfortable circumstances, and prefers indulgence in pleasure to troubling himself with broadening and improving his fortunate natural gifts. Now, however, let him ask whether his maxim of neglecting his gifts … agrees also with what is called duty …. He cannot possibly will that this should become a universal law of nature…” Crucially, Kant’s example depends on the man in question having “fortunate natural gifts,” a circumstance by no means universal, as well as on the maxim that all the faculties of a rational being should be developed. What is required by Kantian universalizability, then, is not that all people should act alike, whatever their circumstances, but that anyone in my circumstances would be justified in acting on the same maxim that I do. The maxim of a person using contraception might well meet that standard.

]]> By: Albert Law http://crookedtimber.org/2004/02/16/kants-approach-to-ethics/comment-page-1/#comment-17858 Albert Law Wed, 18 Feb 2004 22:05:06 +0000 http://crookedtimber.org/wp/?p=1074#comment-17858 Jeremy, "It’s funny to me that someone would form a prior commitment to the idea that the death penalty is immoral and therefore judge a moral viewpoint in terms of whether it allows a death penalty. How can you have the prior moral commitment if you don’t have a prior moral view?" I'm on the fence about the death penalty. "The trick is to make your description of the action more specific." It's the intention that matters and the intention is "not to have children". Whether it's "not to have children right now/right here" doesn't matter. "The basic idea is to retain Kant’s universalizability while denying his absolutism." Something can be universal without being absolute? English isn't my first language but I'd still like you to tel me the fundamental difference there is between something that is universal and something that is absolute. Merriam-Webster gives me equivalent definitions. Thanks for the death penalty explanation. "Lying is too general". Don't you mean "too categorical"? BZA, "If you think instead that it’s “p” that is false, then you aren’t disagreeing with Kant over the principle of his system; you’re disagreeing instead with his judgment about what falls under that principle." Do you think that masturbation/contraception/homosexuality can be universalised? Do you think they fall under his principle? Jeremy, “It’s funny to me that someone would form a prior commitment to the idea that the death penalty is immoral and therefore judge a moral viewpoint in terms of whether it allows a death penalty. How can you have the prior moral commitment if you don’t have a prior moral view?” I’m on the fence about the death penalty. “The trick is to make your description of the action more specific.” It’s the intention that matters and the intention is “not to have children”. Whether it’s “not to have children right now/right here” doesn’t matter. “The basic idea is to retain Kant’s universalizability while denying his absolutism.” Something can be universal without being absolute? English isn’t my first language but I’d still like you to tel me the fundamental difference there is between something that is universal and something that is absolute. Merriam-Webster gives me equivalent definitions. Thanks for the death penalty explanation. “Lying is too general”. Don’t you mean “too categorical”? BZA, “If you think instead that it’s “p” that is false, then you aren’t disagreeing with Kant over the principle of his system; you’re disagreeing instead with his judgment about what falls under that principle.” Do you think that masturbation/contraception/homosexuality can be universalised? Do you think they fall under his principle?

]]> By: Jeremy Pierce http://crookedtimber.org/2004/02/16/kants-approach-to-ethics/comment-page-1/#comment-17857 Jeremy Pierce Wed, 18 Feb 2004 19:33:40 +0000 http://crookedtimber.org/wp/?p=1074#comment-17857 Albert: On the contraception issue, a latter day Kantian might say the same thing many say about lying to save some innocent's life. The basic idea is to retain Kant's universalizability while denying his absolutism. The trick is to make your description of the action more specific. Lying is too general. Lying to save an innocent vs. lying to protect your own public image are two very different actions, and they should be evaluated differently. Contraception might be broken down similarly, though I'm quite sure my way of doing it wouldn't be the same as that of most other people. Of course, this assumes that contraception is sometimes wrong, which I'm willing to grant but most people won't. I'm not sure how a Kantian who doesn't grant that would solve it. I'd have to think about that more. Albert: On the contraception issue, a latter day Kantian might say the same thing many say about lying to save some innocent’s life. The basic idea is to retain Kant’s universalizability while denying his absolutism. The trick is to make your description of the action more specific. Lying is too general. Lying to save an innocent vs. lying to protect your own public image are two very different actions, and they should be evaluated differently. Contraception might be broken down similarly, though I’m quite sure my way of doing it wouldn’t be the same as that of most other people. Of course, this assumes that contraception is sometimes wrong, which I’m willing to grant but most people won’t. I’m not sure how a Kantian who doesn’t grant that would solve it. I’d have to think about that more.

]]> By: Jeremy Pierce http://crookedtimber.org/2004/02/16/kants-approach-to-ethics/comment-page-1/#comment-17856 Jeremy Pierce Wed, 18 Feb 2004 19:24:55 +0000 http://crookedtimber.org/wp/?p=1074#comment-17856 <i>How do maxims that we usually think of as having nothing to do with morality fit in? Is it impermissible for me to act on the maxim “leave early to avoid traffic,” merely because it isn’t universalizable?</i> Kant just says these are maxims with absolutely no moral value. That doesn't mean they have no value whatsoever. They have value in pursuing other ends. That's why he calls them hypothetical imperatives. They genuinely are valuable to you in pursuing your other ends, but they're not of moral value (i.e. valuable in themselves). <i>What about Kant’s emphasis on good will? I’m surprised not to see it here — do you think it’s detachable from the main points of his moral philosophy? (I’m thinking of his claim that there’s no moral worth in doing one’s duty out of inclination.)</i> That's an independent issue from what this post discusses. One is the proper motivation for doing an action, in terms of which you can evaluate whether someone has done a morally worthy action. If the motivation is wrong, then the action has no moral value (though it may have value). The other is which actions are the ones that are morally right, whether done from the right reasons or for other reasons. Either way, the action is right. Motivation just determines whether your doing it has moral value. Its being the right action isn't sufficient for that. How do maxims that we usually think of as having nothing to do with morality fit in? Is it impermissible for me to act on the maxim “leave early to avoid traffic,” merely because it isn’t universalizable? Kant just says these are maxims with absolutely no moral value. That doesn’t mean they have no value whatsoever. They have value in pursuing other ends. That’s why he calls them hypothetical imperatives. They genuinely are valuable to you in pursuing your other ends, but they’re not of moral value (i.e. valuable in themselves). What about Kant’s emphasis on good will? I’m surprised not to see it here — do you think it’s detachable from the main points of his moral philosophy? (I’m thinking of his claim that there’s no moral worth in doing one’s duty out of inclination.) That’s an independent issue from what this post discusses. One is the proper motivation for doing an action, in terms of which you can evaluate whether someone has done a morally worthy action. If the motivation is wrong, then the action has no moral value (though it may have value). The other is which actions are the ones that are morally right, whether done from the right reasons or for other reasons. Either way, the action is right. Motivation just determines whether your doing it has moral value. Its being the right action isn’t sufficient for that.

]]> By: Jeremy Pierce http://crookedtimber.org/2004/02/16/kants-approach-to-ethics/comment-page-1/#comment-17855 Jeremy Pierce Wed, 18 Feb 2004 19:18:32 +0000 http://crookedtimber.org/wp/?p=1074#comment-17855 On the God/religion question, I think it's misleadiong to say that Kant denies religion as a basis for morality. He thinks morality provides a transcendental argument for God, but the reason he thinks that is because he thinks morality makes no sense unless its basis is God. So God is the basis for morality. Religion isn't the way to find out which particular acts are right or wrong, but that doesn't mean God isn't the basis of morality. On the God/religion question, I think it’s misleadiong to say that Kant denies religion as a basis for morality. He thinks morality provides a transcendental argument for God, but the reason he thinks that is because he thinks morality makes no sense unless its basis is God. So God is the basis for morality. Religion isn’t the way to find out which particular acts are right or wrong, but that doesn’t mean God isn’t the basis of morality.

]]> By: Jeremy Pierce http://crookedtimber.org/2004/02/16/kants-approach-to-ethics/comment-page-1/#comment-17854 Jeremy Pierce Wed, 18 Feb 2004 19:15:39 +0000 http://crookedtimber.org/wp/?p=1074#comment-17854 <i>What would Kant think of counter-intelligence operations where one intelligence service tries to mislead another intelligence service?</i> He'd say they're immoral. Lying is always wrong, even to protect the innocent from a murderer. He makes this quite explicit. There are ways to change his system to prevent this, but it's a serious change to the system. <i>Also, how did Kant come to say that the death penalty is justified? I heard about that and it rather puzzled me.</i> Contrary to bza's suggestion, I think this does flow right out of the fundamental principles of Kant's theory. It also happens that Kant's justification for the death penalty is the primary one most of its proponents have. The basic idea is that when you do something you're in effect indicating that you believe that's one of the permissible acts. If you lie, then you're in effect giving permission for others to lie to you. If you kill someone, then you're in effect giving permission to kill you. An alternate way to make the same point is that you give up your right to life by killing someone. That doesn't guarantee the death penalty, but it permits it. What requires the death penalty is the requirement not to treat people as a means to an end but as ends in themselves. To punish a murderer on a utilitarian basis is necessarily treating the person as a means to an end -- increased happiness. That's always wrong, on Kant's view. Trying to improve or protect society or reform a criminal is always going to be wrong. Trying to reform a criminal is even worse, because it doesn't respect the fact that the person made the choice to approve of that particular action and wouldn't want us to change them to be different. Retribution is the only justification for punishment that makes sense on Kant's view. You can punish someone only if they deserve it and only because they deserve it. No other reason for punishment is adequate. Why would someone deserve death? What other punishment is equal to the crime? Well, the crime is the most significant way someone can mistreat someone in terms of means-to-end disrespect for dignity. Robbing someone of life itself is therefore the worst crime against a person. In these cases, the punishment should fit the crime, Kant says. It's funny to me that someone would form a prior commitment to the idea that the death penalty is immoral and therefore judge a moral viewpoint in terms of whether it allows a death penalty. How can you have the prior moral commitment if you don't have a prior moral view? Evaluating Kant's view based how it conflicts with some other view's conclusion is just confusion about what's going on here. What would Kant think of counter-intelligence operations where one intelligence service tries to mislead another intelligence service? He’d say they’re immoral. Lying is always wrong, even to protect the innocent from a murderer. He makes this quite explicit. There are ways to change his system to prevent this, but it’s a serious change to the system. Also, how did Kant come to say that the death penalty is justified? I heard about that and it rather puzzled me. Contrary to bza’s suggestion, I think this does flow right out of the fundamental principles of Kant’s theory. It also happens that Kant’s justification for the death penalty is the primary one most of its proponents have. The basic idea is that when you do something you’re in effect indicating that you believe that’s one of the permissible acts. If you lie, then you’re in effect giving permission for others to lie to you. If you kill someone, then you’re in effect giving permission to kill you. An alternate way to make the same point is that you give up your right to life by killing someone. That doesn’t guarantee the death penalty, but it permits it. What requires the death penalty is the requirement not to treat people as a means to an end but as ends in themselves. To punish a murderer on a utilitarian basis is necessarily treating the person as a means to an end—increased happiness. That’s always wrong, on Kant’s view. Trying to improve or protect society or reform a criminal is always going to be wrong. Trying to reform a criminal is even worse, because it doesn’t respect the fact that the person made the choice to approve of that particular action and wouldn’t want us to change them to be different. Retribution is the only justification for punishment that makes sense on Kant’s view. You can punish someone only if they deserve it and only because they deserve it. No other reason for punishment is adequate. Why would someone deserve death? What other punishment is equal to the crime? Well, the crime is the most significant way someone can mistreat someone in terms of means-to-end disrespect for dignity. Robbing someone of life itself is therefore the worst crime against a person. In these cases, the punishment should fit the crime, Kant says. It’s funny to me that someone would form a prior commitment to the idea that the death penalty is immoral and therefore judge a moral viewpoint in terms of whether it allows a death penalty. How can you have the prior moral commitment if you don’t have a prior moral view? Evaluating Kant’s view based how it conflicts with some other view’s conclusion is just confusion about what’s going on here.

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