Comments on: Nietzsche and Gibson, Locke and Pasolini http://crookedtimber.org/2004/02/29/nietzsche-and-gibson-locke-and-pasolini/ Out of the crooked timber of humanity, no straight thing was ever made Mon, 13 Feb 2012 10:56:07 +0000 hourly 1 http://wordpress.org/?v=3.3.1 By: ginger http://crookedtimber.org/2004/02/29/nietzsche-and-gibson-locke-and-pasolini/comment-page-1/#comment-19577 ginger Wed, 03 Mar 2004 07:31:24 +0000 http://crookedtimber.org/wp/?p=1156#comment-19577 Interesting view, and nicely put. I agree on that distinction between the good (compassion) and bad (blackmail of guilt) of Christianity. ... but you shouldn't have spoiled a reference to Pasolini with the mention of that awful, awful song!! Interesting view, and nicely put. I agree on that distinction between the good (compassion) and bad (blackmail of guilt) of Christianity. … but you shouldn’t have spoiled a reference to Pasolini with the mention of that awful, awful song!!

]]> By: AAB http://crookedtimber.org/2004/02/29/nietzsche-and-gibson-locke-and-pasolini/comment-page-1/#comment-19576 AAB Mon, 01 Mar 2004 21:44:40 +0000 http://crookedtimber.org/wp/?p=1156#comment-19576 I would rather believe that we are all brothers and sisters because of our genetic similarities. I would rather do good to others for the betterment of the overall conscious existence. If the overall conscious existence is better off, I am better off too. This may sound a bit self-centered; however, religious morality is also self-centered (fear of sin and going to hell). (Not that I see anything wrong with self-centered morality.) The difference is that we have yet to see anyone who has sinned and gone to hell. I would rather believe that we are all brothers and sisters because of our genetic similarities. I would rather do good to others for the betterment of the overall conscious existence. If the overall conscious existence is better off, I am better off too. This may sound a bit self-centered; however, religious morality is also self-centered (fear of sin and going to hell). (Not that I see anything wrong with self-centered morality.) The difference is that we have yet to see anyone who has sinned and gone to hell.

]]> By: thin gruel http://crookedtimber.org/2004/02/29/nietzsche-and-gibson-locke-and-pasolini/comment-page-1/#comment-19575 thin gruel Mon, 01 Mar 2004 18:04:08 +0000 http://crookedtimber.org/wp/?p=1156#comment-19575 <i> The flaw in thin gruel’s rebuttal is the conception of morality as nothing more than an individual’s code of conduct (“my morality vs. your morality”). We’re trying to talk about foundations of civil society and human nature here. </i> It was intended as secular vs. religious morality. Many religious people consider those different. Many non religious people wouldn't know the difference. And it is therefore also obvious that religion is no foundation of civil society. But then you'll probably have to be strictly non-religious to accept that. Just as a religious worldview implies that we are ALL children of God (or at least subject to the same religious environment), a non religious worldview implies that there is no religion as a meaningfull concept. It's not that God doesn't exist, but that it has no meaning. For ALL of us. But then there is no book or organization that determines the proper non religious view. So I don't expect anyone to share my views. The flaw in thin gruel’s rebuttal is the conception of morality as nothing more than an individual’s code of conduct (“my morality vs. your morality”). We’re trying to talk about foundations of civil society and human nature here. It was intended as secular vs. religious morality. Many religious people consider those different. Many non religious people wouldn’t know the difference. And it is therefore also obvious that religion is no foundation of civil society. But then you’ll probably have to be strictly non-religious to accept that. Just as a religious worldview implies that we are ALL children of God (or at least subject to the same religious environment), a non religious worldview implies that there is no religion as a meaningfull concept. It’s not that God doesn’t exist, but that it has no meaning. For ALL of us. But then there is no book or organization that determines the proper non religious view. So I don’t expect anyone to share my views.

]]> By: Steve Carr http://crookedtimber.org/2004/02/29/nietzsche-and-gibson-locke-and-pasolini/comment-page-1/#comment-19574 Steve Carr Mon, 01 Mar 2004 15:08:43 +0000 http://crookedtimber.org/wp/?p=1156#comment-19574 A trivial point, but: whatever you think of the Gibson film, don't download it from bittorrent and watch it at home. Not because you'll be immoral, but because this is a film that should be seen on the big screen. A trivial point, but: whatever you think of the Gibson film, don’t download it from bittorrent and watch it at home. Not because you’ll be immoral, but because this is a film that should be seen on the big screen.

]]> By: Andrew Chen http://crookedtimber.org/2004/02/29/nietzsche-and-gibson-locke-and-pasolini/comment-page-1/#comment-19573 Andrew Chen Mon, 01 Mar 2004 13:38:05 +0000 http://crookedtimber.org/wp/?p=1156#comment-19573 The flaw in thin gruel's rebuttal is the conception of morality as nothing more than an individual's code of conduct ("my morality vs. your morality"). We're trying to talk about foundations of civil society and human nature here. Really enjoying these religion threads, in particular how quickly the conversation has gotten away from stereotyped caricatures of religious people to addressing fundamental concerns. Still missing the breadth of empirical experiences from genuine religious believers notwithstanding the welcome and needed contributions of russell arben fox. The flaw in thin gruel’s rebuttal is the conception of morality as nothing more than an individual’s code of conduct (“my morality vs. your morality”). We’re trying to talk about foundations of civil society and human nature here. Really enjoying these religion threads, in particular how quickly the conversation has gotten away from stereotyped caricatures of religious people to addressing fundamental concerns. Still missing the breadth of empirical experiences from genuine religious believers notwithstanding the welcome and needed contributions of russell arben fox.

]]> By: Chris Bertram http://crookedtimber.org/2004/02/29/nietzsche-and-gibson-locke-and-pasolini/comment-page-1/#comment-19572 Chris Bertram Mon, 01 Mar 2004 13:25:42 +0000 http://crookedtimber.org/wp/?p=1156#comment-19572 _So my morality is a thin gruel and yours is exactly what?_ Since I'm not a religious believer, mine too, So my morality is a thin gruel and yours is exactly what? Since I’m not a religious believer, mine too,

]]> By: thin gruel http://crookedtimber.org/2004/02/29/nietzsche-and-gibson-locke-and-pasolini/comment-page-1/#comment-19571 thin gruel Mon, 01 Mar 2004 12:18:08 +0000 http://crookedtimber.org/wp/?p=1156#comment-19571 <i> I haven’t seen Gibson’s film yet (since it doesn’t open in the UK for another month) </i> It's widely available on the internet, so it is more a case of morality that is preventing you from seeing it. <i> Secular morality is a thin gruel compared to the notion that, as children of God, we are to think of ourselves as brothers and sisters. </i> So my morality is a thin gruel and yours is exactly what? I always compare claims of moral superiority to those claims of genetic superiority. Makes me feel morally superior. (you may apply formal logic to this argument) I haven’t seen Gibson’s film yet (since it doesn’t open in the UK for another month) It’s widely available on the internet, so it is more a case of morality that is preventing you from seeing it. Secular morality is a thin gruel compared to the notion that, as children of God, we are to think of ourselves as brothers and sisters. So my morality is a thin gruel and yours is exactly what? I always compare claims of moral superiority to those claims of genetic superiority. Makes me feel morally superior. (you may apply formal logic to this argument)

]]> By: john c. halasz http://crookedtimber.org/2004/02/29/nietzsche-and-gibson-locke-and-pasolini/comment-page-1/#comment-19570 john c. halasz Mon, 01 Mar 2004 00:12:47 +0000 http://crookedtimber.org/wp/?p=1156#comment-19570 As to the issue of a wholely secular basis of morality and ethics, such ethics are usually conceived on the basis of the notion of personal autonomy. Now autonomy, in various guises, is a notion that permeates modern Western culture and I think it is important to recognize that the ideal of autonomy has its origins, at least in the historical sense, in Greek metaphysics. Metaphysics begins in the recognition of the sheer transcendence of being, beyond anything one can say or do about it, that is, the independence of the world and its availability and amenability to a rational implicature that structures our understanding of it. But for there to be such an understanding, there must be one who understands and thus, reflexively, as it were, such a rational knower takes on the independence of the independent world that is known, rising above enmeshment in particularities and separating himself from the world by standing over against it. Such a rational knower is a superior soul, in contrast to the demotic mythically-enmeshed man, who remains tied to the world and sacrifices himself to it. But in such separation, there is trauma, as well,- (together with those Platonic impassibilities)- and "autonomy", literally self-law, amounts to an effort to deal with and compensate for this trauma. (Much of what is extreme in Plato amounts to animadversions against this trauma.) Transferred onto the domain of ethics, the emphasis falls on human action and action is defined as voluntary or "free" precisely insofar as it masters and controls causality, which, of course, requires self-mastery as well. The goal of ethics becomes the preservation of this freedom defined as autonomy at all costs. Now it is an unexpungible and irremissible fact that each person is existentially separate from each and every other person. Equally, as a language-bearing being, each human being is "free" and exists fundamentally in relation to at least some other such persons. And from this follows that all human action is directly or indirectly interaction. I take it that the matter of ethics concerns not just the permissibility of our actions, but our relations with other similarly separate persons as others. From this perspective, it is questionable whether the notion of autonomy is not an ideologization of the existential fact of separateness, one that perhaps blinds us to the relation to the other that is at stake in the ethical matter. Now ethical norms, being counterfactuals, by definition do not "exist". But, insofar as they are relevant, I think that they are anchored at the level of recognitions between persons- or failures of recognition. And this level, whether or not it is deemed "real", is not amenable to objectifying modes and methods of thinking. And in this I think one can see something of the failure of projects of rational, systematic, meta-ethically grounded ethical theories. Kantian ethics is not just formalistic, but legalistic, as well. It is as if it takes the stand-point of a third party judging a matter between two disputing parties. And it is based on a postulation of an abstract, purely intellectual respect for the other, for the "abstract" humanity in each human being. ("Treat no man as a mere means to an end, but *also* as an end in himself.") I think it is fair to say that such an abstract respect may lead to quite other conclusions or prescriptions than a concrete encounter and recognition of the other in his vulnerability. (We all want hold others morally accountable and "take them to task". I think this is part of the reason Nietzsche shifted the ground to the "will-to-power".) The attempt to extend the reign of autonomy to the entire ultimate "kingdom of ends" may in fact preclude actual recognition and the kind of accountability and responsibility that it avails. (I realize there is much more to Kant than this, especially his crucial recognition of the "de-ontic" nature of morality, but I hope I have not bowlderized him too badly.) Which would return us to the question of whether we do, in fact, draw much of our moral/ethical conceptions, in all their bewildering inconsistency, from inherited traditions, especially religious ones. I am reminded again what a devilishly sharp thinker Nietzsche was, (though I find people who endlessly quote him unoriginal, since he obviously wrote to be quoted and read at length he tends to become tiresomely vitriolic). As for him being especially dangerous, though I think he would have taken that as a compliment, I think Nietzsche needs to be read in relation to Kant, as polemically blurting out all those half-truths that are repressed in the overweening, four-square conception of reason constructed by Kant. (The "will-to-power" is the synthetic unity of apperception, the "uebermensch", who overcomes "man", is the transcendental ego, and "eternal recurrance" is the categorical imperative gone beserk.) The "death of God" does not just refer to the decline of religion, but also to the concommitant loss of the logical forms of unity that the (transcendental) ego imposes on the world. In this, he poses the deeper challenge. As for Christianity itself and what sort of "redemption" it offers, I thought that the core notion of Christian religion was the imitation of Christ, with the understanding that this was also an impossible injunction, since the fellow was said to be divine, after all. In this, the figure of Jesus Christ could be compared with the Buddha, though with a conception of the world that was somewhat different in its complexion and implicature. In particular, the believer/adherent attains "redemption" from the corruption, guilt and suffering of the world only by passing through it rather than passing out of it. As to the issue of a wholely secular basis of morality and ethics, such ethics are usually conceived on the basis of the notion of personal autonomy. Now autonomy, in various guises, is a notion that permeates modern Western culture and I think it is important to recognize that the ideal of autonomy has its origins, at least in the historical sense, in Greek metaphysics. Metaphysics begins in the recognition of the sheer transcendence of being, beyond anything one can say or do about it, that is, the independence of the world and its availability and amenability to a rational implicature that structures our understanding of it. But for there to be such an understanding, there must be one who understands and thus, reflexively, as it were, such a rational knower takes on the independence of the independent world that is known, rising above enmeshment in particularities and separating himself from the world by standing over against it. Such a rational knower is a superior soul, in contrast to the demotic mythically-enmeshed man, who remains tied to the world and sacrifices himself to it. But in such separation, there is trauma, as well,- (together with those Platonic impassibilities)- and “autonomy”, literally self-law, amounts to an effort to deal with and compensate for this trauma. (Much of what is extreme in Plato amounts to animadversions against this trauma.) Transferred onto the domain of ethics, the emphasis falls on human action and action is defined as voluntary or “free” precisely insofar as it masters and controls causality, which, of course, requires self-mastery as well. The goal of ethics becomes the preservation of this freedom defined as autonomy at all costs. Now it is an unexpungible and irremissible fact that each person is existentially separate from each and every other person. Equally, as a language-bearing being, each human being is “free” and exists fundamentally in relation to at least some other such persons. And from this follows that all human action is directly or indirectly interaction. I take it that the matter of ethics concerns not just the permissibility of our actions, but our relations with other similarly separate persons as others. From this perspective, it is questionable whether the notion of autonomy is not an ideologization of the existential fact of separateness, one that perhaps blinds us to the relation to the other that is at stake in the ethical matter. Now ethical norms, being counterfactuals, by definition do not “exist”. But, insofar as they are relevant, I think that they are anchored at the level of recognitions between persons- or failures of recognition. And this level, whether or not it is deemed “real”, is not amenable to objectifying modes and methods of thinking. And in this I think one can see something of the failure of projects of rational, systematic, meta-ethically grounded ethical theories. Kantian ethics is not just formalistic, but legalistic, as well. It is as if it takes the stand-point of a third party judging a matter between two disputing parties. And it is based on a postulation of an abstract, purely intellectual respect for the other, for the “abstract” humanity in each human being. (“Treat no man as a mere means to an end, but also as an end in himself.”) I think it is fair to say that such an abstract respect may lead to quite other conclusions or prescriptions than a concrete encounter and recognition of the other in his vulnerability. (We all want hold others morally accountable and “take them to task”. I think this is part of the reason Nietzsche shifted the ground to the “will-to-power”.) The attempt to extend the reign of autonomy to the entire ultimate “kingdom of ends” may in fact preclude actual recognition and the kind of accountability and responsibility that it avails. (I realize there is much more to Kant than this, especially his crucial recognition of the “de-ontic” nature of morality, but I hope I have not bowlderized him too badly.) Which would return us to the question of whether we do, in fact, draw much of our moral/ethical conceptions, in all their bewildering inconsistency, from inherited traditions, especially religious ones. I am reminded again what a devilishly sharp thinker Nietzsche was, (though I find people who endlessly quote him unoriginal, since he obviously wrote to be quoted and read at length he tends to become tiresomely vitriolic). As for him being especially dangerous, though I think he would have taken that as a compliment, I think Nietzsche needs to be read in relation to Kant, as polemically blurting out all those half-truths that are repressed in the overweening, four-square conception of reason constructed by Kant. (The “will-to-power” is the synthetic unity of apperception, the “uebermensch”, who overcomes “man”, is the transcendental ego, and “eternal recurrance” is the categorical imperative gone beserk.) The “death of God” does not just refer to the decline of religion, but also to the concommitant loss of the logical forms of unity that the (transcendental) ego imposes on the world. In this, he poses the deeper challenge. As for Christianity itself and what sort of “redemption” it offers, I thought that the core notion of Christian religion was the imitation of Christ, with the understanding that this was also an impossible injunction, since the fellow was said to be divine, after all. In this, the figure of Jesus Christ could be compared with the Buddha, though with a conception of the world that was somewhat different in its complexion and implicature. In particular, the believer/adherent attains “redemption” from the corruption, guilt and suffering of the world only by passing through it rather than passing out of it.

]]> By: John Quiggin http://crookedtimber.org/2004/02/29/nietzsche-and-gibson-locke-and-pasolini/comment-page-1/#comment-19569 John Quiggin Sun, 29 Feb 2004 22:30:22 +0000 http://crookedtimber.org/wp/?p=1156#comment-19569 <blockquote>The really interesting questions - whether or not N’s answers were “wrong and dangerous”, as you put it - concern whether certain key features of our moral framework (basic equality, evil, guilt, moral responsibility, blame) make sense once they are detached from the religious belief-systems and culture that gave rise to them. And are those features of our moral framework actually good or are they harmful?</blockquote>It seems to me that, with the crucial exception of basic equality, these features of our moral framework are pretty much hardwired, and certainly that Judaeo-Christian societies have no monopoly on guilt, blame and moral responsibility. So, we're left with basic equality, which is (to me) at the core of Nietzche's concerns. Obviously, there's a logical basis for tying this to Christianity in the sense that everyone has an immortal soul more important than any earthly rank or status, and this is backed up by much in the life and words of Jesus (as recorded). Equally obviously, this didn't cause serious problems for Christian monarchies and aristocracies and their associated churches any time between the conversion of Constantine and the Enlightenment. I'd argue that the rise of egalitarianism led to an increased stress on the egalitarian component of Christianity, notably in things like the anti-slavery movement, and that Nietzsche was reacting against this from an essentially pro-slavery viewpoint. But I think he got cause and effect the wrong way around in suggesting that the idea of equality was derived from Christianity and that the decline of faith posed fundamental difficulties for egalitarian morality.
The really interesting questions – whether or not N’s answers were “wrong and dangerous”, as you put it – concern whether certain key features of our moral framework (basic equality, evil, guilt, moral responsibility, blame) make sense once they are detached from the religious belief-systems and culture that gave rise to them. And are those features of our moral framework actually good or are they harmful?
It seems to me that, with the crucial exception of basic equality, these features of our moral framework are pretty much hardwired, and certainly that Judaeo-Christian societies have no monopoly on guilt, blame and moral responsibility. So, we’re left with basic equality, which is (to me) at the core of Nietzche’s concerns. Obviously, there’s a logical basis for tying this to Christianity in the sense that everyone has an immortal soul more important than any earthly rank or status, and this is backed up by much in the life and words of Jesus (as recorded). Equally obviously, this didn’t cause serious problems for Christian monarchies and aristocracies and their associated churches any time between the conversion of Constantine and the Enlightenment. I’d argue that the rise of egalitarianism led to an increased stress on the egalitarian component of Christianity, notably in things like the anti-slavery movement, and that Nietzsche was reacting against this from an essentially pro-slavery viewpoint. But I think he got cause and effect the wrong way around in suggesting that the idea of equality was derived from Christianity and that the decline of faith posed fundamental difficulties for egalitarian morality.

]]> By: Chris Bertram http://crookedtimber.org/2004/02/29/nietzsche-and-gibson-locke-and-pasolini/comment-page-1/#comment-19568 Chris Bertram Sun, 29 Feb 2004 21:28:53 +0000 http://crookedtimber.org/wp/?p=1156#comment-19568 John, I find your remarks far too dismissive. Of course professed Christians do all kinds of bad things. Most US politicians claim to be believers but that doesn't seem to make much difference to their behaviour. At least this makes British politicians better on one dimension - fewer of them are hypocrites. The really interesting questions - whether or not N's answers were "wrong and dangerous", as you put it - concern whether certain key features of our moral framework (basic equality, evil, guilt, moral responsibility, blame) make sense once they are detached from the religious belief-systems and culture that gave rise to them. And are those features of our moral framework actually good or are they harmful? Pressing us to think about those questions and pointing to the fact that others (such as the Greeks) have lived with moral frameworks that lack those features seems to me to be an important thing to have done. As for the corrosive effects of rational calculation - agree with you there. John, I find your remarks far too dismissive. Of course professed Christians do all kinds of bad things. Most US politicians claim to be believers but that doesn’t seem to make much difference to their behaviour. At least this makes British politicians better on one dimension – fewer of them are hypocrites. The really interesting questions – whether or not N’s answers were “wrong and dangerous”, as you put it – concern whether certain key features of our moral framework (basic equality, evil, guilt, moral responsibility, blame) make sense once they are detached from the religious belief-systems and culture that gave rise to them. And are those features of our moral framework actually good or are they harmful? Pressing us to think about those questions and pointing to the fact that others (such as the Greeks) have lived with moral frameworks that lack those features seems to me to be an important thing to have done. As for the corrosive effects of rational calculation – agree with you there.

]]> By: John Quiggin http://crookedtimber.org/2004/02/29/nietzsche-and-gibson-locke-and-pasolini/comment-page-1/#comment-19567 John Quiggin Sun, 29 Feb 2004 20:19:52 +0000 http://crookedtimber.org/wp/?p=1156#comment-19567 jdsm begins with the big empirical question. Is it true that Christians (defined in a non question-begging way) are more likely to love their neighbours and so on than unbelievers or believers in religions that don't make this a central tenet? My impression [based mainly on aggregate comparisons over time] is that they are not and that the decay of religious belief hasn't had much effect on people's general morality, as opposed to particular taboos (sex with the wrong person, Sabbath-breaking etc). As a result, I have no sympathy at all with Nietzsche. It seems to me that he was addressing a non-problem (the death of God) and coming up with wrong and dangerous answers. On the other hand, it's clear to me that a certain style of rational calculation, encouraged, for example, by the study of economics, is dangerous to morality in the way that people worried about in the 19th century. In my limited experience, professed Christians are just as vulnerable to the corrosive effects of this kind of rationalism as anyone else. But some styles of Christianity would probably guard against it. jdsm begins with the big empirical question. Is it true that Christians (defined in a non question-begging way) are more likely to love their neighbours and so on than unbelievers or believers in religions that don’t make this a central tenet? My impression [based mainly on aggregate comparisons over time] is that they are not and that the decay of religious belief hasn’t had much effect on people’s general morality, as opposed to particular taboos (sex with the wrong person, Sabbath-breaking etc). As a result, I have no sympathy at all with Nietzsche. It seems to me that he was addressing a non-problem (the death of God) and coming up with wrong and dangerous answers. On the other hand, it’s clear to me that a certain style of rational calculation, encouraged, for example, by the study of economics, is dangerous to morality in the way that people worried about in the 19th century. In my limited experience, professed Christians are just as vulnerable to the corrosive effects of this kind of rationalism as anyone else. But some styles of Christianity would probably guard against it.

]]> By: Ophelia Benson http://crookedtimber.org/2004/02/29/nietzsche-and-gibson-locke-and-pasolini/comment-page-1/#comment-19566 Ophelia Benson Sun, 29 Feb 2004 18:48:28 +0000 http://crookedtimber.org/wp/?p=1156#comment-19566 "Great post and discussion, and the second time in as many weeks I’ve sat down at the computer with a lecture to write, procrastinated by logging on to CT, and found a post about the exact topic I need to write a lecture about!" Yeah, same here - not a lecture to write, but a bit of writing to write. All the more helpful in disagreeing with me in particular, and on a point I was just rolling up my sleeves to concede anyway. I agree with Chris that it's the motivation that's the difference. I think secular morality is in fact vastly better at thinking about moral issues, but I can't pretend it's as good at motivating it. But on the other hand, of course, religion is also good at motivating horrible morality. One would need an awful lot of data and means of analyzing it to figure out how it all balances out. Does religion motivate more compassion and generosity than cruelty and oppression? Or vice versa. I sure don't know. “Great post and discussion, and the second time in as many weeks I’ve sat down at the computer with a lecture to write, procrastinated by logging on to CT, and found a post about the exact topic I need to write a lecture about!” Yeah, same here – not a lecture to write, but a bit of writing to write. All the more helpful in disagreeing with me in particular, and on a point I was just rolling up my sleeves to concede anyway. I agree with Chris that it’s the motivation that’s the difference. I think secular morality is in fact vastly better at thinking about moral issues, but I can’t pretend it’s as good at motivating it. But on the other hand, of course, religion is also good at motivating horrible morality. One would need an awful lot of data and means of analyzing it to figure out how it all balances out. Does religion motivate more compassion and generosity than cruelty and oppression? Or vice versa. I sure don’t know.

]]> By: DJW http://crookedtimber.org/2004/02/29/nietzsche-and-gibson-locke-and-pasolini/comment-page-1/#comment-19565 DJW Sun, 29 Feb 2004 18:15:19 +0000 http://crookedtimber.org/wp/?p=1156#comment-19565 Jimmy, that is the standard line, but like Chris B (and Jeremy Waldron) I've never found it terribly satisfying or convincing. That's one place our reason can take us, but it's certainly not the only one--it depends a great deal on which premises we're starting from and paying attention to, which again brings us back to the religion question. Great post and discussion, and the second time in as many weeks I've sat down at the computer with a lecture to write, procrastinated by logging on to CT, and found a post about the exact topic I need to write a lecture about! (Last week it was The German Ideology) So thanks for helping me keep my focus and giving me ideas. Jimmy, that is the standard line, but like Chris B (and Jeremy Waldron) I’ve never found it terribly satisfying or convincing. That’s one place our reason can take us, but it’s certainly not the only one—it depends a great deal on which premises we’re starting from and paying attention to, which again brings us back to the religion question. Great post and discussion, and the second time in as many weeks I’ve sat down at the computer with a lecture to write, procrastinated by logging on to CT, and found a post about the exact topic I need to write a lecture about! (Last week it was The German Ideology) So thanks for helping me keep my focus and giving me ideas.

]]> By: Russell Arben Fox http://crookedtimber.org/2004/02/29/nietzsche-and-gibson-locke-and-pasolini/comment-page-1/#comment-19564 Russell Arben Fox Sun, 29 Feb 2004 18:07:48 +0000 http://crookedtimber.org/wp/?p=1156#comment-19564 Keef, Having not seen The Passion, I've no intention of defending Gibson's movie. I don't know what its real (or unintended) message is. But there's a lot loaded into what it means to "communicate" a message. How does that parent say "I love you and enjoy your company"? Through words and deeds. Which words and deeds? Ones made without sacrifice, without cost? That communicates convenience, not love. To the extent that certain versions of the Christian story emphasize a kind of finger-pointing, blood-on-one's-own-hands fault-finding ("look what I made God have to go through for me!")--a recognition which is in actuality quite self-centered--so much the worse for such versions. (Martyrdom can also be a species of pride.) But the message itself involves no such finger-pointing; it makes one cognizant of the costs involved in fully loving, fully reconciling oneself to another human being, without making those costs into a resentful weapon to beat oneself or others with. If Steve's right (and I fully concur with his second point re: Nietzsche, by the way), then it appears Gibson shows a fair number of people in the movie who don't take the suffering of Jesus as a rebuke or a burden; instead, they just suffer and serve along with Him. It is that kind of humility, I think, which is necessary for the more "rational" moral or ethical message of commonality to take hold. I sincerely question the degree one could exist without the other. Keef, Having not seen The Passion, I’ve no intention of defending Gibson’s movie. I don’t know what its real (or unintended) message is. But there’s a lot loaded into what it means to “communicate” a message. How does that parent say “I love you and enjoy your company”? Through words and deeds. Which words and deeds? Ones made without sacrifice, without cost? That communicates convenience, not love. To the extent that certain versions of the Christian story emphasize a kind of finger-pointing, blood-on-one’s-own-hands fault-finding (“look what I made God have to go through for me!”)—a recognition which is in actuality quite self-centered—so much the worse for such versions. (Martyrdom can also be a species of pride.) But the message itself involves no such finger-pointing; it makes one cognizant of the costs involved in fully loving, fully reconciling oneself to another human being, without making those costs into a resentful weapon to beat oneself or others with. If Steve’s right (and I fully concur with his second point re: Nietzsche, by the way), then it appears Gibson shows a fair number of people in the movie who don’t take the suffering of Jesus as a rebuke or a burden; instead, they just suffer and serve along with Him. It is that kind of humility, I think, which is necessary for the more “rational” moral or ethical message of commonality to take hold. I sincerely question the degree one could exist without the other.

]]> By: Russell Arben Fox http://crookedtimber.org/2004/02/29/nietzsche-and-gibson-locke-and-pasolini/comment-page-1/#comment-19563 Russell Arben Fox Sun, 29 Feb 2004 18:07:21 +0000 http://crookedtimber.org/wp/?p=1156#comment-19563 Keef, Having not seen The Passion, I've no intention of defending Gibson's movie. I don't know what its real (or unintended) message is. But there's a lot loaded into what it means to "communicate" a message. How does that parent say "I love you and enjoy your company"? Through words and deeds. Which words and deeds? Ones made without sacrifice, without cost? That communicates convenience, not love. To the extent that certain versions of the Christian story emphasize a kind of finger-pointing, blood-on-one's-own-hands fault-finding ("look what I made God have to go through for me!")--a recognition which is in actuality quite self-centered--so much the worse for such versions. (Martyrdom can also be a species of pride.) But the message itself involves no such finger-pointing; it makes one cognizant of the costs involved in fully loving, fully reconciling oneself to another human being, without making those costs into a resentful weapon to beat oneself or others with. If Steve's right (and I fully concur with his second point re: Nietzsche, by the way), then it appears Gibson shows a fair number of people in the movie who don't take the suffering of Jesus as a rebuke or a burden; instead, they just suffer and serve along with Him. It is that kind of humility, I think, which is necessary for the more "rational" moral or ethical message of commonality to take hold. I sincerely question the degree one could exist without the other. Keef, Having not seen The Passion, I’ve no intention of defending Gibson’s movie. I don’t know what its real (or unintended) message is. But there’s a lot loaded into what it means to “communicate” a message. How does that parent say “I love you and enjoy your company”? Through words and deeds. Which words and deeds? Ones made without sacrifice, without cost? That communicates convenience, not love. To the extent that certain versions of the Christian story emphasize a kind of finger-pointing, blood-on-one’s-own-hands fault-finding (“look what I made God have to go through for me!”)—a recognition which is in actuality quite self-centered—so much the worse for such versions. (Martyrdom can also be a species of pride.) But the message itself involves no such finger-pointing; it makes one cognizant of the costs involved in fully loving, fully reconciling oneself to another human being, without making those costs into a resentful weapon to beat oneself or others with. If Steve’s right (and I fully concur with his second point re: Nietzsche, by the way), then it appears Gibson shows a fair number of people in the movie who don’t take the suffering of Jesus as a rebuke or a burden; instead, they just suffer and serve along with Him. It is that kind of humility, I think, which is necessary for the more “rational” moral or ethical message of commonality to take hold. I sincerely question the degree one could exist without the other.

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