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	<title>Comments on: Paradoxes and infinity</title>
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	<link>http://crookedtimber.org/2004/05/31/paradoxes-and-infinity/</link>
	<description>Out of the crooked timber of humanity, no straight thing was ever made</description>
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		<title>By: John Quiggin</title>
		<link>http://crookedtimber.org/2004/05/31/paradoxes-and-infinity/comment-page-1/#comment-30453</link>
		<dc:creator>John Quiggin</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 02 Jun 2004 07:03:23 +0000</pubDate>
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		<description>Neat! We could also do the self-reference paradox, by observing that &quot;infinite&quot; is a finite word and therefore a paradigm instance of the class of non-self-descriptive adjectives, while &quot;finite&quot; is self-descriptive. Hence, we might as well use the words &quot;infinitistic&quot; and &quot;finitistic&quot; to describe these classes, and ask the question&lt;br&gt;&quot;Is &quot;infinitistic&quot; infinitistic?&quot;.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[	<p>Neat! We could also do the self-reference paradox, by observing that &#8220;infinite&#8221; is a finite word and therefore a paradigm instance of the class of non-self-descriptive adjectives, while &#8220;finite&#8221; is self-descriptive. Hence, we might as well use the words &#8220;infinitistic&#8221; and &#8220;finitistic&#8221; to describe these classes, and ask the question<br />
&#8220;Is &#8220;infinitistic&#8221; infinitistic?&#8221;.</p>
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		<title>By: Matt McIrvin</title>
		<link>http://crookedtimber.org/2004/05/31/paradoxes-and-infinity/comment-page-1/#comment-30452</link>
		<dc:creator>Matt McIrvin</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 02 Jun 2004 04:51:54 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://crookedtimber.org/wp/?p=1655#comment-30452</guid>
		<description>Here&#039;s a counterexample.  Consider the truth value of the following sentence:If Georg Cantor proved the uncountability of the real numbers, then this sentence is false.Now, it is an empirical fact that Georg Cantor did prove the uncountability of the real numbers, so the sentence reduces to &quot;This sentence is false&quot; and therefore has no definite truth value.  The paradox applies only to the infinite case, since Georg Cantor did not prove the uncountability of any finite set, just of the infinity of the reals.  However, the paradox manifestly has nothing to do with ill-posed statements about infinity; it&#039;s just the old Epimenides paradox with another clause tacked on.So here is a paradox depending on an empirical fact about infinity that is not resolved by anything having to do with infinity or limits.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[	<p>Here&#8217;s a counterexample.  Consider the truth value of the following sentence:If Georg Cantor proved the uncountability of the real numbers, then this sentence is false.Now, it is an empirical fact that Georg Cantor did prove the uncountability of the real numbers, so the sentence reduces to &#8220;This sentence is false&#8221; and therefore has no definite truth value.  The paradox applies only to the infinite case, since Georg Cantor did not prove the uncountability of any finite set, just of the infinity of the reals.  However, the paradox manifestly has nothing to do with ill-posed statements about infinity; it&#8217;s just the old Epimenides paradox with another clause tacked on.So here is a paradox depending on an empirical fact about infinity that is not resolved by anything having to do with infinity or limits.</p>
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		<title>By: John Quiggin</title>
		<link>http://crookedtimber.org/2004/05/31/paradoxes-and-infinity/comment-page-1/#comment-30451</link>
		<dc:creator>John Quiggin</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 01 Jun 2004 21:40:43 +0000</pubDate>
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		<description>dr, This post by &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.crookedtimber.org/archives/001873.html&quot;&gt;Brian&lt;/a&gt; gives an example of the kind of problem I&#039;m talking about, as does the paper by Elga and others cited in the post.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[	<p>dr, This post by <a href="http://www.crookedtimber.org/archives/001873.html">Brian</a> gives an example of the kind of problem I&#8217;m talking about, as does the paper by Elga and others cited in the post.</p>
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		<title>By: DR</title>
		<link>http://crookedtimber.org/2004/05/31/paradoxes-and-infinity/comment-page-1/#comment-30450</link>
		<dc:creator>DR</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 01 Jun 2004 18:45:34 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://crookedtimber.org/wp/?p=1655#comment-30450</guid>
		<description>&lt;i&gt;It certainly appears from the various paradoxes that, if God is capable of handing out infinite rewards and punishments (which is, I think, generally supposed by believers), it’s not valid to say that, if a given course of action is better than another in every possible case (for some partition of the possible cases), then it is definitely the best choice.&lt;/i&gt;&lt;p&gt;I&#039;ve been having an email discussion with someone on what exactly the above means.  I&#039;m on the side of &quot;nothing&quot;.  &lt;p&gt;If I have an ordered list of courses of action (which is given by your statement that &quot;a given course of action is better than another in every possible case&quot;), what is it about the fact that some of those courses result in infinite rewards/punishment that keeps me from simply performing a max() on the list?</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[	<p><i>It certainly appears from the various paradoxes that, if God is capable of handing out infinite rewards and punishments (which is, I think, generally supposed by believers), it&#8217;s not valid to say that, if a given course of action is better than another in every possible case (for some partition of the possible cases), then it is definitely the best choice.</i></p><p>I&#8217;ve been having an email discussion with someone on what exactly the above means.  I&#8217;m on the side of &#8220;nothing&#8221;.  </p><p>If I have an ordered list of courses of action (which is given by your statement that &#8220;a given course of action is better than another in every possible case&#8221;), what is it about the fact that some of those courses result in infinite rewards/punishment that keeps me from simply performing a max() on the list?</p>
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		<title>By: Dee Lacey</title>
		<link>http://crookedtimber.org/2004/05/31/paradoxes-and-infinity/comment-page-1/#comment-30449</link>
		<dc:creator>Dee Lacey</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 01 Jun 2004 16:31:11 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://crookedtimber.org/wp/?p=1655#comment-30449</guid>
		<description>Here&#039;s another musing:If the probability were evenly distributed over all positive integers, then if you take any positive integer, no matter how large: there are a finite number of integers below it, and an infinite number above it.  So the odds are .99999..... that the actual answer is higher.  This makes the answer effectively infinity....</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[	<p>Here&#8217;s another musing:If the probability were evenly distributed over all positive integers, then if you take any positive integer, no matter how large: there are a finite number of integers below it, and an infinite number above it.  So the odds are .99999&#8230;.. that the actual answer is higher.  This makes the answer effectively infinity&#8230;.</p>
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		<title>By: Dee Lacey</title>
		<link>http://crookedtimber.org/2004/05/31/paradoxes-and-infinity/comment-page-1/#comment-30448</link>
		<dc:creator>Dee Lacey</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 01 Jun 2004 16:24:10 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://crookedtimber.org/wp/?p=1655#comment-30448</guid>
		<description>Musing about the a priori probability of the age of the universe, and reasonable distribution.I think that though it does seem intuitive that the likelihood of the age of the universe being either a billion or a trillion years is about equal, it seems counter-intuitive that the likelihood of the age of the universe being between a trillion and a quadrillion years is 1000 times more likely than being between a billion and trillian.  So the real intuitive concept is that each &quot;even number&quot; is a stand-in for its order of magnitude, and that it is each order of magnitude that is equally likely, and so the probabilities actually shrink as the age grows, so it does eventually sum to 1 at the limit. </description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[	<p>Musing about the a priori probability of the age of the universe, and reasonable distribution.I think that though it does seem intuitive that the likelihood of the age of the universe being either a billion or a trillion years is about equal, it seems counter-intuitive that the likelihood of the age of the universe being between a trillion and a quadrillion years is 1000 times more likely than being between a billion and trillian.  So the real intuitive concept is that each &#8220;even number&#8221; is a stand-in for its order of magnitude, and that it is each order of magnitude that is equally likely, and so the probabilities actually shrink as the age grows, so it does eventually sum to 1 at the limit.</p>
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		<title>By: Anarch</title>
		<link>http://crookedtimber.org/2004/05/31/paradoxes-and-infinity/comment-page-1/#comment-30447</link>
		<dc:creator>Anarch</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 01 Jun 2004 16:23:44 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://crookedtimber.org/wp/?p=1655#comment-30447</guid>
		<description>&lt;i&gt;Let me use another example: say we have an interval between 0 and 1. We fill it with N equally spaced points. Pick a real number. As N goes to infinity, one of our equally spaced points will get arbitrarily close to that real number, right? Or am I confused?&lt;/i&gt;You&#039;re correct.  The problem is that you may not be able to determine in an effective fashion &lt;i&gt;which&lt;/i&gt; of those N points will be the closest.I have to run, but here&#039;s a specific example of a real where things get weird: let K be the canonical halting problem set (i.e. the set of all n such that the nth machine halts on input n), and let x be the real whose binary expansion is the characteristic function of K.  [For example, if K = {1, 2, 4, 7, ...} then x = 0.1101001... ] Then since K is not computable, there is no computable way of specifying the digits of x -- i.e. there is no computable function f such that the nth digit of x is f(n).Now that particular x did have the property that it had computable approximations.  That is, I can find a computable sequence x_s that converges to x in the usual analytic way (by taking the canonical K_s computable approximants to K).  However, only particularly &quot;non-complex&quot; sets -- I think Delta_2 is as far as it goes -- can be approximated in this way.So take a set that&#039;s &quot;sufficiently complicated&quot; (the theory of arithmetic ought to work) and let y be the real whose binary expansion is its characteristic function.  Then y has the following two properties:1) Every individual rational approximation to y is computable, because any rational number is computable.2) There is no computable &lt;i&gt;sequence&lt;/i&gt; of rationals y_s converging to y.As I mentioned above, it turns out that there are only countable many reals which can be computably approximated, i.e. which are the limit of a computable sequence of rationals.  Most of the usual real numbers are c.e. -- in particular, any algebraic number is c.e., as well as pi, e, and so forth -- so I&#039;m not sure how much you&#039;d lose for practical applications... but in theoretical terms, almost no reals are approximable in this way.[My former officemate is writing his PhD on c.e. reals and random reals, so I can probably shag some more stuff about them if you&#039;re interested.  Although not for about six weeks :)]</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[	<p><i>Let me use another example: say we have an interval between 0 and 1. We fill it with N equally spaced points. Pick a real number. As N goes to infinity, one of our equally spaced points will get arbitrarily close to that real number, right? Or am I confused?</i>You&#8217;re correct.  The problem is that you may not be able to determine in an effective fashion <i>which</i> of those N points will be the closest.I have to run, but here&#8217;s a specific example of a real where things get weird: let K be the canonical halting problem set (i.e. the set of all n such that the nth machine halts on input n), and let x be the real whose binary expansion is the characteristic function of K.  [For example, if K = {1, 2, 4, 7, ...} then x = 0.1101001&#8230; ] Then since K is not computable, there is no computable way of specifying the digits of x&#8212;i.e. there is no computable function f such that the nth digit of x is f(n).Now that particular x did have the property that it had computable approximations.  That is, I can find a computable sequence x_s that converges to x in the usual analytic way (by taking the canonical K_s computable approximants to K).  However, only particularly &#8220;non-complex&#8221; sets&#8212;I think Delta_2 is as far as it goes&#8212;can be approximated in this way.So take a set that&#8217;s &#8220;sufficiently complicated&#8221; (the theory of arithmetic ought to work) and let y be the real whose binary expansion is its characteristic function.  Then y has the following two properties:1) Every individual rational approximation to y is computable, because any rational number is computable.2) There is no computable <i>sequence</i> of rationals y_s converging to y.As I mentioned above, it turns out that there are only countable many reals which can be computably approximated, i.e. which are the limit of a computable sequence of rationals.  Most of the usual real numbers are c.e.&#8212;in particular, any algebraic number is c.e., as well as pi, e, and so forth&#8212;so I&#8217;m not sure how much you&#8217;d lose for practical applications&#8230; but in theoretical terms, almost no reals are approximable in this way.[My former officemate is writing his PhD on c.e. reals and random reals, so I can probably shag some more stuff about them if you&#8217;re interested.  Although not for about six weeks :)]</p>
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		<title>By: armando</title>
		<link>http://crookedtimber.org/2004/05/31/paradoxes-and-infinity/comment-page-1/#comment-30446</link>
		<dc:creator>armando</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 01 Jun 2004 16:10:08 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://crookedtimber.org/wp/?p=1655#comment-30446</guid>
		<description>Bill, That infinity is a tricky fellow. For instance, this&lt;i&gt;As N goes to infinity, one of our equally spaced points will get arbitrarily close to that real number, right?&lt;/i&gt;rather begs the question of what a real number is. Seriously, it is not a priori obvious that allowing all possible sequences - even ones which are non-computable - is valid. I mean, describing a real which is given by a non-computable sequence is...tricky. And yet the  standard construction of the reals says that &quot;most&quot; reals are exactly of this form. </description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[	<p>Bill, That infinity is a tricky fellow. For instance, this<i>As N goes to infinity, one of our equally spaced points will get arbitrarily close to that real number, right?</i>rather begs the question of what a real number is. Seriously, it is not a priori obvious that allowing all possible sequences &#8211; even ones which are non-computable &#8211; is valid. I mean, describing a real which is given by a non-computable sequence is&#8230;tricky. And yet the  standard construction of the reals says that &#8220;most&#8221; reals are exactly of this form.</p>
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		<title>By: Bill Carone</title>
		<link>http://crookedtimber.org/2004/05/31/paradoxes-and-infinity/comment-page-1/#comment-30445</link>
		<dc:creator>Bill Carone</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 01 Jun 2004 16:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://crookedtimber.org/wp/?p=1655#comment-30445</guid>
		<description>Armando,&quot;I think you are making the same point as before, Bill, that we should be careful not to treat the infinite sloppily. But, if that is John&#8217;s point, it is rather a weak one since I don&#8217;t think there is anyone who disagrees.&quot;Did you look at the Elga et al. paper John cited? They seem to think they are on to something, so they would disagree that they are being sloppy. However, if you look at all their problems using limits, you get non-paradoxical results. This is why I am making my point ad nauseum (that and to collect possible counterexamples to think about).&quot;More precisely, if you allow the infinite obtained by a suitable limit, I am not sure that you exclude anything except the contradictory.&quot;That&#039;s all I ask for :-) All I&#039;m trying to do is to argue against people using &quot;sloppy&quot; infinity-type paradoxes to support statements like &quot;The indifference principle/the sure-thing principle/dominance arguments/etc. lead to paradox, so we should scrap them.&quot;</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[	<p>Armando,&#8220;I think you are making the same point as before, Bill, that we should be careful not to treat the infinite sloppily. But, if that is John&#8217;s point, it is rather a weak one since I don&#8217;t think there is anyone who disagrees.&#8221;Did you look at the Elga et al. paper John cited? They seem to think they are on to something, so they would disagree that they are being sloppy. However, if you look at all their problems using limits, you get non-paradoxical results. This is why I am making my point ad nauseum (that and to collect possible counterexamples to think about).&#8220;More precisely, if you allow the infinite obtained by a suitable limit, I am not sure that you exclude anything except the contradictory.&#8221;That&#8217;s all I ask for :-) All I&#8217;m trying to do is to argue against people using &#8220;sloppy&#8221; infinity-type paradoxes to support statements like &#8220;The indifference principle/the sure-thing principle/dominance arguments/etc. lead to paradox, so we should scrap them.&#8221; </p>
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		<title>By: q</title>
		<link>http://crookedtimber.org/2004/05/31/paradoxes-and-infinity/comment-page-1/#comment-30444</link>
		<dc:creator>q</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 01 Jun 2004 15:53:09 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://crookedtimber.org/wp/?p=1655#comment-30444</guid>
		<description>_Any property that depends inherently on infinite sets and limits, such as the continuity of a function, can never be verified or falsified by empirical data. Since we are finite, any result that is true for all finite n is true for us._JQ-Can you clarify this statement?  What do you mean by &quot;verified by empirical data&quot;?  A finite dataset has an infinite number of solutions.  Don&#039;t we use Occams Razor to choose the best one?  Sometimes the best one involves a concept of infinity.Intrumentalist Q.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[	<p><em>Any property that depends inherently on infinite sets and limits, such as the continuity of a function, can never be verified or falsified by empirical data. Since we are finite, any result that is true for all finite n is true for us.</em>JQ-Can you clarify this statement?  What do you mean by &#8220;verified by empirical data&#8221;?  A finite dataset has an infinite number of solutions.  Don&#8217;t we use Occams Razor to choose the best one?  Sometimes the best one involves a concept of infinity.Intrumentalist Q.</p>
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		<title>By: Bill Carone</title>
		<link>http://crookedtimber.org/2004/05/31/paradoxes-and-infinity/comment-page-1/#comment-30443</link>
		<dc:creator>Bill Carone</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 01 Jun 2004 15:43:25 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://crookedtimber.org/wp/?p=1655#comment-30443</guid>
		<description>Anarch,&quot;[One trivial example: compute lim_{m, n \to \infty} m/n. It&#8217;s not that mathematics &#8220;doesn&#8217;t give an answer&#8221;, it&#8217;s that the limit simply doesn&#8217;t exist.]&quot;My &quot;mathematics doesn&#039;t give an answer&quot; is a glib way of saying that the limit doesn&#039;t exist. It is as if our model is telling us &quot;No way, pal. I ain&#039;t touching that.&quot;&quot;Real numbers can be represented as limits of numbers with finite decimal expansions&quot;All I mean is that, e.g. pi/4 = 1 - 1/3 + 1/5 - 1/7 + ... Pi is also equal to the limit of this series: 3, 3.1, 3.14, 3.141, 3.1415 ... I&#039;m not sure what you mean by &quot;not definable in a finitistic fashion.&quot;Let me use another example: say we have an interval between 0 and 1. We fill it with N equally spaced points. Pick a real number. As N goes to infinity, one of our equally spaced points will get arbitrarily close to that real number, right? Or am I confused?PS I would like to see more  counterexamples, no matter how useful :-) Thanks!</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[	<p>Anarch,&#8220;[One trivial example: compute lim_{m, n to infty} m/n. It&#8217;s not that mathematics &#8220;doesn&#8217;t give an answer&#8221;, it&#8217;s that the limit simply doesn&#8217;t exist.]&#8221;My &#8220;mathematics doesn&#8217;t give an answer&#8221; is a glib way of saying that the limit doesn&#8217;t exist. It is as if our model is telling us &#8220;No way, pal. I ain&#8217;t touching that.&#8221;&#8220;Real numbers can be represented as limits of numbers with finite decimal expansions&#8221;All I mean is that, e.g. pi/4 = 1 &#8211; 1/3 + 1/5 &#8211; 1/7 + &#8230; Pi is also equal to the limit of this series: 3, 3.1, 3.14, 3.141, 3.1415 &#8230; I&#8217;m not sure what you mean by &#8220;not definable in a finitistic fashion.&#8221;Let me use another example: say we have an interval between 0 and 1. We fill it with N equally spaced points. Pick a real number. As N goes to infinity, one of our equally spaced points will get arbitrarily close to that real number, right? Or am I confused?<span class="caps">PS I</span> would like to see more  counterexamples, no matter how useful :-) Thanks!</p>
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		<title>By: Anarch</title>
		<link>http://crookedtimber.org/2004/05/31/paradoxes-and-infinity/comment-page-1/#comment-30442</link>
		<dc:creator>Anarch</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 01 Jun 2004 15:25:40 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://crookedtimber.org/wp/?p=1655#comment-30442</guid>
		<description>Blecch.  Mistakenly hit post instead of preview.  Let me try that &quot;crucially important point&quot; again...If you&#039;re being truly careful about dealing with infinitary objects, saying that &quot;Real numbers can be represented as limits of numbers with finite decimal expansions&quot; doesn&#039;t actually work, since the (infinite) sequence of approximants might not be definable in a finitistic way.  In fact, the collection of &quot;computable reals&quot; is countable, so in some very strong sense almost no real can be specified in this fashion.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[	<p>Blecch.  Mistakenly hit post instead of preview.  Let me try that &#8220;crucially important point&#8221; again&#8230;If you&#8217;re being truly careful about dealing with infinitary objects, saying that &#8220;Real numbers can be represented as limits of numbers with finite decimal expansions&#8221; doesn&#8217;t actually work, since the (infinite) sequence of approximants might not be definable in a finitistic way.  In fact, the collection of &#8220;computable reals&#8221; is countable, so in some very strong sense almost no real can be specified in this fashion.</p>
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		<title>By: Anarch</title>
		<link>http://crookedtimber.org/2004/05/31/paradoxes-and-infinity/comment-page-1/#comment-30441</link>
		<dc:creator>Anarch</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 01 Jun 2004 10:11:22 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://crookedtimber.org/wp/?p=1655#comment-30441</guid>
		<description>&lt;b&gt;kenny easwaran&lt;/b&gt;:  &lt;i&gt;This sounds a lot like a version of the Lowenheim-Skolem-Tarski theorem, which says that if a first-order theory has arbitrarily large finite models, then it has infinite models.&lt;/i&gt;FWIW, I&#039;d consider that a direct application of Compactness rather than LST, but YMMV.&lt;b&gt;Bill Carone&lt;/b&gt;: &lt;i&gt;Counterexamples would be welcome: a useful infinite calculation that can’t or shouldn’t be modelled as a limit.&lt;/i&gt;Well, the above paradox works for one -- unless you alter the problem to specify joint limiting behavior. As I mentioned on a previous thread I have a bunch of counterexamples, for appropriate definitions of &quot;useful&quot; of course :)[One trivial example: compute lim_{m, n \to \infty} m/n.  It&#039;s not that mathematics &quot;doesn&#039;t give an answer&quot;, it&#039;s that the limit simply doesn&#039;t exist.]Also, one other crucially important point: if you&#039;re truly trying to be careful about dealing with infinitary objects, saying that &quot;Real numbers can be represented as limits of numbers with finite decimal expansions&quot; isn&#039;t actually correct, since the sequence of approximants might not be definable in a finitistic fashion.  In fact, you can show that the collection of reals &quot;effectively specifiable&quot; in this manner is countable; so in some very strong sense almost no real is given in this matter.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[	<p><b>kenny easwaran</b>:  <i>This sounds a lot like a version of the Lowenheim-Skolem-Tarski theorem, which says that if a first-order theory has arbitrarily large finite models, then it has infinite models.</i><span class="caps">FWIW</span>, I&#8217;d consider that a direct application of Compactness rather than <span class="caps">LST</span>, but <span class="caps">YMMV</span>.<b>Bill Carone</b>: <i>Counterexamples would be welcome: a useful infinite calculation that can&#8217;t or shouldn&#8217;t be modelled as a limit.</i>Well, the above paradox works for one&#8212;unless you alter the problem to specify joint limiting behavior. As I mentioned on a previous thread I have a bunch of counterexamples, for appropriate definitions of &#8220;useful&#8221; of course :)[One trivial example: compute lim_{m, n to infty} m/n.  It&#8217;s not that mathematics &#8220;doesn&#8217;t give an answer&#8221;, it&#8217;s that the limit simply doesn&#8217;t exist.]Also, one other crucially important point: if you&#8217;re truly trying to be careful about dealing with infinitary objects, saying that &#8220;Real numbers can be represented as limits of numbers with finite decimal expansions&#8221; isn&#8217;t actually correct, since the sequence of approximants might not be definable in a finitistic fashion.  In fact, you can show that the collection of reals &#8220;effectively specifiable&#8221; in this manner is countable; so in some very strong sense almost no real is given in this matter.</p>
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		<title>By: Anarch</title>
		<link>http://crookedtimber.org/2004/05/31/paradoxes-and-infinity/comment-page-1/#comment-30440</link>
		<dc:creator>Anarch</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 01 Jun 2004 09:59:16 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://crookedtimber.org/wp/?p=1655#comment-30440</guid>
		<description>[Warning: long and technical.]&lt;b&gt;Bill Carone&lt;/b&gt;: &lt;i&gt;You do need to use an infinite set to describe all possibile arbitrary finite magnitudes...&lt;/i&gt;If you mean you need an infinite object in the metatheory then yes, I completely agree; but then again, I don&#039;t know any system of logic that disallows infinite objects in the metatheory so I don&#039;t think that&#039;s the contentious issue.If you mean you need infinite objects in the theory then I think you&#039;re wrong.  Following along Matt Weiner&#039;s argument above, you can work as follows:&lt;ul&gt;  &lt;li&gt; Define an effective model of the field of the rationals with less than and (perhaps unnecessarily) a predicate for the integers, i.e. a computable model of (Q; 0, 1, +, x, -, &lt;, N) &lt;/li&gt;&lt;p&gt;  &lt;li&gt; We can then define a computable function on that model that I&#039;ll call d(t), for decay, as follows.  Define d(n) = 1/2^n then extend to the rationals via the enumeration of Q and (dyadic) interpolation.  For example, if d(2/3) = 2/3, d(3/4) = 1/5 and the next rational in the enumeration of Q is 7/10, then set d(7/10) = (1/2) [2/3 + 1/5] = 13/30. Note that d(t) is a strictly decreasing computable function on Q that is O(2^-n).&lt;/li&gt;&lt;p&gt;  &lt;li&gt; In a similar way, we can define payoff functions f and g, with the appropriate limiting behaviors; for example, we could set f = 1/d and g = f - 1.  These are, again, computable functions. &lt;/li&gt;&lt;p&gt;  &lt;li&gt; The next step is a little tricky, but still manageable.  We&#039;d like to define the integral of these functions over Q in a finitistic fashion.  There are two ways of approaching this:Method 1: Since f, g and d are all strictly monotonic, they have unique continuous extensions f*, g*, d* to the reals (either by Dedekind cuts or a Urysohn-style argument).  Since these extensions are continuous, they are locally integrable -- and note, in particular, that d* is integrable over the entire real line (being O(2^-n)) and that f*d* and g*d* have infinite integrals over R.Method 2: We define the &quot;integral&quot; of a function h over the interval [a, b], a &amp; b rational, as follows.  Let {x_1, ..., x_n} be a finite -- and thus computable -- sequence of rationals between a and b.  Let L(h, {x_1, ... x_n}) be the usual lower Riemann sum associated with that partition; by the usual theorems on lower Riemann sums there is a well-defined limit alpha over R.  Since we&#039;re working over Q, however, alpha won&#039;t necessarily exist in our model.  We can, however, define a predicate &quot;e-integral&quot; E(z, e) as follows:E(z, e) iff every sequence {x_1,...,x_n} has a (definable) refinement {y_1,...,y_n} with &#124; L(h, {y_1,...,y_n}) - z &#124; &lt; e.This is a definable predicate over PA, although no longer a computable one.&lt;/li&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;li&gt; Via a similar limiting trick (i.e. up to a fudge factor of e) we can define integrals over all of Q.  That is, a function h is integrable over all of Q if there is a N such that given any sequence xbar, L(h, xbar) &lt;= N; and, in that case, we can define the e-integral over all of Q as above.&lt;/li&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;li&gt; Finally, with all that under our belt, we can set up the appropriate paradoxes as before.  Since fd and gd have infinite integrals over Q, we can (with finitely many parameters, if need be) prove the claim that, given any actual value of f relative to the distribution d, the expectation of g relative to the distribution d strictly exceeds that value -- and is, indeed, infinite.&lt;/li&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;In short: we can set up the whole paradox definably in PA, without any need for recourse to infinite objects in the theory.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[	<p>[Warning: long and technical.]<b>Bill Carone</b>: <i>You do need to use an infinite set to describe all possibile arbitrary finite magnitudes&#8230;</i>If you mean you need an infinite object in the metatheory then yes, I completely agree; but then again, I don&#8217;t know any system of logic that disallows infinite objects in the metatheory so I don&#8217;t think that&#8217;s the contentious issue.If you mean you need infinite objects in the theory then I think you&#8217;re wrong.  Following along Matt Weiner&#8217;s argument above, you can work as follows:<ul>  <li> Define an effective model of the field of the rationals with less than and (perhaps unnecessarily) a predicate for the integers, i.e. a computable model of (Q; 0, 1, +, x, -, < , N) </li><p>  <li> We can then define a computable function on that model that I&#8217;ll call d(t), for decay, as follows.  Define d(n) = 1/2<sup>n then extend to the rationals via the enumeration of Q and (dyadic) interpolation.  For example, if d(2/3) = 2/3, d(3/4) = 1/5 and the next rational in the enumeration of Q is 7/10, then set d(7/10) = (1/2) [2/3 + 1/5] = 13/30. Note that d(t) is a strictly decreasing computable function on Q that is O(2</sup>-n).</li></p><p>  <li> In a similar way, we can define payoff functions f and g, with the appropriate limiting behaviors; for example, we could set f = 1/d and g = f &#8211; 1.  These are, again, computable functions. </li></p><p>  <li> The next step is a little tricky, but still manageable.  We&#8217;d like to define the integral of these functions over Q in a finitistic fashion.  There are two ways of approaching this:Method 1: Since f, g and d are all strictly monotonic, they have unique continuous extensions f*, g*, d* to the reals (either by Dedekind cuts or a Urysohn-style argument).  Since these extensions are continuous, they are locally integrable&#8212;and note, in particular, that d* is integrable over the entire real line (being O(2^-n)) and that f*d* and g*d* have infinite integrals over R.Method 2: We define the &#8220;integral&#8221; of a function h over the interval [a, b], a &#038; b rational, as follows.  Let {x_1, &#8230;, x_n} be a finite&#8212;and thus computable&#8212;sequence of rationals between a and b.  Let L(h, {x_1, &#8230; x_n}) be the usual lower Riemann sum associated with that partition; by the usual theorems on lower Riemann sums there is a well-defined limit alpha over R.  Since we&#8217;re working over Q, however, alpha won&#8217;t necessarily exist in our model.  We can, however, define a predicate &#8220;e-integral&#8221; E(z, e) as follows:E(z, e) iff every sequence {x_1,&#8230;,x_n} has a (definable) refinement {y_1,&#8230;,y_n} with | L(h, {y_1,&#8230;,y_n}) &#8211; z | < e.This is a definable predicate over PA, although no longer a computable one.</li><p><li> Via a similar limiting trick (i.e. up to a fudge factor of e) we can define integrals over all of Q.  That is, a function h is integrable over all of Q if there is a N such that given any sequence xbar, L(h, xbar) < = N; and, in that case, we can define the e-integral over all of Q as above.</li><p><li> Finally, with all that under our belt, we can set up the appropriate paradoxes as before.  Since fd and gd have infinite integrals over Q, we can (with finitely many parameters, if need be) prove the claim that, given any actual value of f relative to the distribution d, the expectation of g relative to the distribution d strictly exceeds that value&#8212;and is, indeed, infinite.</li></p><p></p></li></p></li></p></li></ul></p>In short: we can set up the whole paradox definably in PA, without any need for recourse to infinite objects in the theory.
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		<title>By: armando</title>
		<link>http://crookedtimber.org/2004/05/31/paradoxes-and-infinity/comment-page-1/#comment-30439</link>
		<dc:creator>armando</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 01 Jun 2004 09:58:01 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://crookedtimber.org/wp/?p=1655#comment-30439</guid>
		<description>&lt;i&gt;I don’t think there is any problem with this “kind” of infinity, one that is the result of a limiting procedure. Such a limiting procedure cannot produce one of John’s strict reversals, right? I therefore don’t think this is a counterexample to John’s point.&lt;/i&gt;I think you are making the same point as before, Bill, that we should be careful not to treat the infinite sloppily. But, if that is John&#039;s point, it is rather a weak one since I don&#039;t think there is anyone who disagrees. More precisely, if you allow the infinite obtained by a suitable limit, I am not sure that you exclude anything except the contradictory. But what about the paradoxes that are mathematically careful, like Banach-Tarski?</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[	<p><i>I don&#8217;t think there is any problem with this &#8220;kind&#8221; of infinity, one that is the result of a limiting procedure. Such a limiting procedure cannot produce one of John&#8217;s strict reversals, right? I therefore don&#8217;t think this is a counterexample to John&#8217;s point.</i>I think you are making the same point as before, Bill, that we should be careful not to treat the infinite sloppily. But, if that is John&#8217;s point, it is rather a weak one since I don&#8217;t think there is anyone who disagrees. More precisely, if you allow the infinite obtained by a suitable limit, I am not sure that you exclude anything except the contradictory. But what about the paradoxes that are mathematically careful, like Banach-Tarski?</p>
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