Comments on: Rawlsian humility http://crookedtimber.org/2004/06/28/rawlsian-humility/ Out of the crooked timber of humanity, no straight thing was ever made Sun, 12 Feb 2012 13:39:03 +0000 hourly 1 http://wordpress.org/?v=3.3.1 By: vonmises http://crookedtimber.org/2004/06/28/rawlsian-humility/comment-page-1/#comment-33169 vonmises Thu, 01 Jul 2004 20:50:53 +0000 http://crookedtimber.org/wp/?p=1787#comment-33169 1. The 'obviousness' of the flaws in TofJ wasn't apparent when TofJ was published. Maybe by the time Yglesias got to Harvard and learned Rawls from one of his most influential critics (Sandel), they 'seemed' obvious, since Sandel would have led up to Rawls in that way. Not to be unfair, but because Sandel had his own points to get across. That's good undergraduate teaching. 2. I'm surprised that no one has recently gone back over Wohlstetter's work on inequalities of income. See Casual Notes on Equality and Equity (http://www.rand.org/publications/classics/wohlstetter/DL17717/DL17717.html) It would be interesting to compare Perle and Wolfowitz's game-theoretic mentor's thoughts with Rawls'. 1. The ‘obviousness’ of the flaws in TofJ wasn’t apparent when TofJ was published. Maybe by the time Yglesias got to Harvard and learned Rawls from one of his most influential critics (Sandel), they ‘seemed’ obvious, since Sandel would have led up to Rawls in that way. Not to be unfair, but because Sandel had his own points to get across. That’s good undergraduate teaching. 2. I’m surprised that no one has recently gone back over Wohlstetter’s work on inequalities of income. See Casual Notes on Equality and Equity (http://www.rand.org/publications/classics/wohlstetter/DL17717/DL17717.html) It would be interesting to compare Perle and Wolfowitz’s game-theoretic mentor’s thoughts with Rawls’.

]]> By: Luke Weiger http://crookedtimber.org/2004/06/28/rawlsian-humility/comment-page-1/#comment-33168 Luke Weiger Tue, 29 Jun 2004 21:25:22 +0000 http://crookedtimber.org/wp/?p=1787#comment-33168 "Or, take, for another example, the many assertions in undergraduate essays, that because maximin would be a poor guide to what to do in day-to-day life, it is therefore a poor rule for the parties to employ in the OP." What arguments does Rawls use to support maximin? And why deny contractors in the OP knowledge of probabilities? “Or, take, for another example, the many assertions in undergraduate essays, that because maximin would be a poor guide to what to do in day-to-day life, it is therefore a poor rule for the parties to employ in the OP.” What arguments does Rawls use to support maximin? And why deny contractors in the OP knowledge of probabilities?

]]> By: Michael Greinecker http://crookedtimber.org/2004/06/28/rawlsian-humility/comment-page-1/#comment-33167 Michael Greinecker Tue, 29 Jun 2004 13:45:25 +0000 http://crookedtimber.org/wp/?p=1787#comment-33167 Rawls may have a decision theory in which this can be derived without assuming risk averse preferences, but that doesn´t change the fact that this theory must be neccesarily at odds with mainstream decision theory. That´s why John Harsanyi,a leading game theorist and philosopher that used the veil of ignorance before Rawls, employed standard bayesian decision theory. "Is this the case? Teach me about Rawls. My impression was that the VOI did not hide all empirical information, but, for this specific example, only whether a particular rule-maker was representing a rich man or a poor one." The problem is that (using ordinary decision theory) one can get rules that lead to ex post unacceptable distributions. That means that one can reasonably make society more just after the veil was reveiled. Rawls may have a decision theory in which this can be derived without assuming risk averse preferences, but that doesn´t change the fact that this theory must be neccesarily at odds with mainstream decision theory. That´s why John Harsanyi,a leading game theorist and philosopher that used the veil of ignorance before Rawls, employed standard bayesian decision theory. “Is this the case? Teach me about Rawls. My impression was that the VOI did not hide all empirical information, but, for this specific example, only whether a particular rule-maker was representing a rich man or a poor one.” The problem is that (using ordinary decision theory) one can get rules that lead to ex post unacceptable distributions. That means that one can reasonably make society more just after the veil was reveiled.

]]> By: bob mcmanus http://crookedtimber.org/2004/06/28/rawlsian-humility/comment-page-1/#comment-33166 bob mcmanus Tue, 29 Jun 2004 13:09:37 +0000 http://crookedtimber.org/wp/?p=1787#comment-33166 "we have discarded massively important information ... what the actual joint distribution of resources (here, wealth) and types is" Is this the case? Teach me about Rawls. My impression was that the VOI did not hide all empirical information, but, for this specific example, only whether a particular rule-maker was representing a rich man or a poor one. “we have discarded massively important information … what the actual joint distribution of resources (here, wealth) and types is” Is this the case? Teach me about Rawls. My impression was that the VOI did not hide all empirical information, but, for this specific example, only whether a particular rule-maker was representing a rich man or a poor one.

]]> By: Chris Bertram http://crookedtimber.org/2004/06/28/rawlsian-humility/comment-page-1/#comment-33165 Chris Bertram Tue, 29 Jun 2004 12:13:42 +0000 http://crookedtimber.org/wp/?p=1787#comment-33165 <i>The criticism of the decision theory employed by Rawls is valid and doesn´t look “embarrassingly ignorant”.</i> Some of the criticisms of Rawls on this point may be valid, but others are indeed "emabarrassingly ignorant." Take, for example, this very thread, where one commenter asserts: <i>... Rawls assumes that everyone must be considered as as risk-averse and pessimistic as a 19th century Russian serf.</i> This, despite Rawls's insistence that his argument does not depend on attributing some special risk-averse psychology to the parties. Or, take, for another example, the many assertions in undergraduate essays, that because maximin would be a poor guide to what to do in day-to-day life, it is _therefore_ a poor rule for the parties to employ in the OP. None of this is intended to deny, of course, that there are mistakes in ToJ, or that there are valid criticisms of Rawls's use of maximin or of his derivation of the principles in the OP. Many critics have toiled long, hard (and respectfully) at producing just such critiques. The criticism of the decision theory employed by Rawls is valid and doesn´t look “embarrassingly ignorant”. Some of the criticisms of Rawls on this point may be valid, but others are indeed “emabarrassingly ignorant.” Take, for example, this very thread, where one commenter asserts: … Rawls assumes that everyone must be considered as as risk-averse and pessimistic as a 19th century Russian serf. This, despite Rawls’s insistence that his argument does not depend on attributing some special risk-averse psychology to the parties. Or, take, for another example, the many assertions in undergraduate essays, that because maximin would be a poor guide to what to do in day-to-day life, it is therefore a poor rule for the parties to employ in the OP. None of this is intended to deny, of course, that there are mistakes in ToJ, or that there are valid criticisms of Rawls’s use of maximin or of his derivation of the principles in the OP. Many critics have toiled long, hard (and respectfully) at producing just such critiques.

]]> By: Michael Greinecker http://crookedtimber.org/2004/06/28/rawlsian-humility/comment-page-1/#comment-33164 Michael Greinecker Tue, 29 Jun 2004 11:24:07 +0000 http://crookedtimber.org/wp/?p=1787#comment-33164 matt: "I don’t know the story you refer to, and your reference could be taken in different ways, but I worry that you’re suggesting something Rawls distinctly warns against, namely, that the OP argument is something that is to be applied in one’s day to day life. It’s not. It’s a device for evaluating institutions, not something to applied day to day or case to case. (This is even more true of the difference principle, and a common source of confusion.)" While it is correct that Rawls draws such a line, one can argue that this line makes little sense. The basic point of G.A. Cohens <a href="http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/detail/-/0674006933/qid=1088485069/sr=8-1/ref=sr_8_xs_ap_i1_xgl14/103-5868789-4268601?v=glance&s=books&n=507846">If You're an Egalitarian, How Come You're So Rich?</a> is exactly that one cannot consistently have just institutions without ethically just people. I think Cohen is pretty convincing. harry: The criticism of the decision theory employed by Rawls is valid and doesn´t look "embarrassingly ignorant". Changing the assumption of infinitely risk aversity even slightly can lead to justyfying some very inegalitarian results. John Roemer has a nice paper on it: <a href="http://pantheon.yale.edu/~jer39/veil.pdf">Egalitarianism against the veil of ignorance</a>. The rather technical paper (it´s written for an economics audience) also contains one of the most powerful critiques of the whole "veil of ignorance"-approach:<blockquote>There is a cost and a benefit to using the veil of ignorance. We often mention the benefit, seldom the cost. Truth be told, it would be better to make decisions ex post, that is, after we know which preference orders and welfare functions are associated with which social positions (that is, after the birth lottery has occurred). The problem with making distributional decisions ex post is one of maintaining objectivity: how can we be sure that the decision makers, if they are drawn from the society in question, are not simply making recommendations from self-interest? The benefit of the veil -of - ignorance construct is that it forces objectivity, or impartiality. But the cost is that we must make decisions with a great handicap – we have discarded massively important information that is available to us in the real world, namely, what the actual joint distribution of resources (here, wealth) and types is. The veil-of-ignorance approach asks us how we would allocate resources if we did not know that actual distribution. But would it not be better to think about the problem of distribution (now, redistribution) knowing what the actual distribution is, if we could otherwise maintain impartiality?</blockquote> matt: “I don’t know the story you refer to, and your reference could be taken in different ways, but I worry that you’re suggesting something Rawls distinctly warns against, namely, that the OP argument is something that is to be applied in one’s day to day life. It’s not. It’s a device for evaluating institutions, not something to applied day to day or case to case. (This is even more true of the difference principle, and a common source of confusion.)” While it is correct that Rawls draws such a line, one can argue that this line makes little sense. The basic point of G.A. Cohens If You’re an Egalitarian, How Come You’re So Rich? is exactly that one cannot consistently have just institutions without ethically just people. I think Cohen is pretty convincing. harry: The criticism of the decision theory employed by Rawls is valid and doesn´t look “embarrassingly ignorant”. Changing the assumption of infinitely risk aversity even slightly can lead to justyfying some very inegalitarian results. John Roemer has a nice paper on it: Egalitarianism against the veil of ignorance. The rather technical paper (it´s written for an economics audience) also contains one of the most powerful critiques of the whole “veil of ignorance”-approach:
There is a cost and a benefit to using the veil of ignorance. We often mention the benefit, seldom the cost. Truth be told, it would be better to make decisions ex post, that is, after we know which preference orders and welfare functions are associated with which social positions (that is, after the birth lottery has occurred). The problem with making distributional decisions ex post is one of maintaining objectivity: how can we be sure that the decision makers, if they are drawn from the society in question, are not simply making recommendations from self-interest? The benefit of the veil of – ignorance construct is that it forces objectivity, or impartiality. But the cost is that we must make decisions with a great handicap – we have discarded massively important information that is available to us in the real world, namely, what the actual joint distribution of resources (here, wealth) and types is. The veilof-ignorance approach asks us how we would allocate resources if we did not know that actual distribution. But would it not be better to think about the problem of distribution (now, redistribution) knowing what the actual distribution is, if we could otherwise maintain impartiality?

]]> By: S Frug http://crookedtimber.org/2004/06/28/rawlsian-humility/comment-page-1/#comment-33163 S Frug Tue, 29 Jun 2004 06:38:17 +0000 http://crookedtimber.org/wp/?p=1787#comment-33163 Q: the English for "avant la lettre refutation" might be "anticipatory refutation". Q: the English for “avant la lettre refutation” might be “anticipatory refutation”.

]]> By: S Frug http://crookedtimber.org/2004/06/28/rawlsian-humility/comment-page-1/#comment-33162 S Frug Tue, 29 Jun 2004 06:37:28 +0000 http://crookedtimber.org/wp/?p=1787#comment-33162 Q: the English for "avant la lettre refutation" might be "anticipatry refutation". Q: the English for “avant la lettre refutation” might be “anticipatry refutation”.

]]> By: Ralph Wedgwood http://crookedtimber.org/2004/06/28/rawlsian-humility/comment-page-1/#comment-33161 Ralph Wedgwood Tue, 29 Jun 2004 02:18:26 +0000 http://crookedtimber.org/wp/?p=1787#comment-33161 Surely we all know perfectly well that the fact that an undergraduate can (with some prodding from their tutor) spot a fallacy in a work of philosophy does nothing whatsoever to show that it is not a work of unsurpassed genius. Otherwise, why would we ever bother teaching Plato, Hobbes, Hume, Kant or Mill -- or, for that matter, Rawls? Surely we all know perfectly well that the fact that an undergraduate can (with some prodding from their tutor) spot a fallacy in a work of philosophy does nothing whatsoever to show that it is not a work of unsurpassed genius. Otherwise, why would we ever bother teaching Plato, Hobbes, Hume, Kant or Mill—or, for that matter, Rawls?

]]> By: q http://crookedtimber.org/2004/06/28/rawlsian-humility/comment-page-1/#comment-33160 q Tue, 29 Jun 2004 01:46:35 +0000 http://crookedtimber.org/wp/?p=1787#comment-33160 What is the English for an "avant la lettre refutation"? What is the English for an “avant la lettre refutation”?

]]> By: Chris Bertram http://crookedtimber.org/2004/06/28/rawlsian-humility/comment-page-1/#comment-33159 Chris Bertram Mon, 28 Jun 2004 23:44:20 +0000 http://crookedtimber.org/wp/?p=1787#comment-33159 Matthew, basically, what Matt said in his comment immediately below your 2nd one. "Undergraduate sneers" was, btw, my characterization of my own marginal notes made as an an undergraduate. I wouldn't have picked up on your comments, coming, as they do, at the end of a post on something else, if Brad DeLong hadn't picked them up and run with them. But he did. Matthew, basically, what Matt said in his comment immediately below your 2nd one. “Undergraduate sneers” was, btw, my characterization of my own marginal notes made as an an undergraduate. I wouldn’t have picked up on your comments, coming, as they do, at the end of a post on something else, if Brad DeLong hadn’t picked them up and run with them. But he did.

]]> By: bob mcmanus http://crookedtimber.org/2004/06/28/rawlsian-humility/comment-page-1/#comment-33158 bob mcmanus Mon, 28 Jun 2004 23:04:28 +0000 http://crookedtimber.org/wp/?p=1787#comment-33158 This comment contains audacious assertions and subtle intentional errors designed to make me world-famous, and a category on Jeopardy. This comment contains audacious assertions and subtle intentional errors designed to make me world-famous, and a category on Jeopardy.

]]> By: SqueakyRat http://crookedtimber.org/2004/06/28/rawlsian-humility/comment-page-1/#comment-33157 SqueakyRat Mon, 28 Jun 2004 22:25:47 +0000 http://crookedtimber.org/wp/?p=1787#comment-33157 Jesus, Leo, did you fall asleep with you forehead on the mouse? Jesus, Leo, did you fall asleep with you forehead on the mouse?

]]> By: Leo Casey http://crookedtimber.org/2004/06/28/rawlsian-humility/comment-page-1/#comment-33156 Leo Casey Mon, 28 Jun 2004 22:21:15 +0000 http://crookedtimber.org/wp/?p=1787#comment-33156 The problem with Brad DeLong is the narrow economists' conceit, such that the notion that a concept might be metaphorical serves as an instant disqualification of its seriousness. The answer is simple: yes, it is in important ways metaphorical, and so what... There isn't a central concept in the history of economics proper, starting with the invisible hand, that doesn't have a metaphorical component. The problem is that narrow economists just don't think about these matters often enough to realize that they are waist deep in the Big Muddy with the rest of us. The problem with Brad DeLong is the narrow economists’ conceit, such that the notion that a concept might be metaphorical serves as an instant disqualification of its seriousness. The answer is simple: yes, it is in important ways metaphorical, and so what… There isn’t a central concept in the history of economics proper, starting with the invisible hand, that doesn’t have a metaphorical component. The problem is that narrow economists just don’t think about these matters often enough to realize that they are waist deep in the Big Muddy with the rest of us.

]]> By: Leo Casey http://crookedtimber.org/2004/06/28/rawlsian-humility/comment-page-1/#comment-33155 Leo Casey Mon, 28 Jun 2004 22:17:25 +0000 http://crookedtimber.org/wp/?p=1787#comment-33155 The problem with Brad DeLong is the narrow economists' conceit, such that the notion that a concept might be metaphorical serves as an instant disqualification of its seriousness. The answer is simple: yes, it is in important ways metaphorical, and so what... There isn't a central concept in the history of economics proper, starting with the invisible hand, that doesn't have a metaphorical component. The problem is that narrow economists just don't think about these matters often enough to realize that they are waist deep in the Big Muddy with the rest of us. The problem with Brad DeLong is the narrow economists’ conceit, such that the notion that a concept might be metaphorical serves as an instant disqualification of its seriousness. The answer is simple: yes, it is in important ways metaphorical, and so what… There isn’t a central concept in the history of economics proper, starting with the invisible hand, that doesn’t have a metaphorical component. The problem is that narrow economists just don’t think about these matters often enough to realize that they are waist deep in the Big Muddy with the rest of us.

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