Comments on: Sistani rules, OK ?

By: Frans Groenendijk

Frans Groenendijk — Tue, 31 Aug 2004 23:59:23 +0000

“Oh. And I think a key thing to remember is that any Iraq who appears to be acceptable to America will not be legitimate in the eyes of the Iraqi people. I hope somebody in the WH understands this. At one point I thought that was why they were discrediting Chalabi. And why I said Sistani might be working with the Americans here. Sadr is no huge threat, Holsclaw, he is just a thug. If someone can gain legitimacy by defying America in letting Sadr go, it might be worth it.” Completely agree with Bob B here but I am afraid this (the bold sentence I mean) is wishful thinking. And I don’t want to imply that the one now in the WH is unable to understand this: my worry is on the shortage on all sides to to at least trying to understand the opponents Nice post BTW as a whole. I tried to write something similar on my own blog but this is much better. I lack the time and the necessary linguistic skills. I am trying to elicit a comment on the position of Al-Sistani from the Dutch minister of foreign affairs (the Netherlands is now chair of the EU). In vain to this date.

By: John Quiggin

John Quiggin — Fri, 27 Aug 2004 20:57:49 +0000

“John, one concern I have is that Sunnis and Kurds, and secular urbanites will pitch a fit and declare a Shi’ite Islamist government illegitimate.” praktike, I’m concerned about this too, and mentioned it in my first post on Sistani, linked above. My main response is that this is the best option, not necessarily a good one. Reasons for some optimism: (i) The Kurds will, in the end, settle for the status quo of effective autonomy (ii) At this point, it’s possible to see Sunni groups supporting Sistani on grounds of anti-American nationalism (iii) the urban secularists don’t have enough power, or alternative options, to do anything

By: Dan Simon

Dan Simon — Fri, 27 Aug 2004 19:15:16 +0000

Jack: 1) “Why do you think the list of Islamic radicals is so long?” (implicitly attributing the problem to American military interventions against them) is far more of a “radical oversimplification” than anything I said. Why was the list of KKK radicals in the Southern US in the 1950’s so long? Did Northern military and police intervention lengthen or shorten that list? 2) My understanding is that Moqtada al-Sadr is hardly “one of [Saddam Hussein’s] most persistent enemies”. His father may have been, but the son’s prominence appears to be relatively recent, and centers on his efforts at overtaking (or eliminating) his own post-Saddam rivals. 3) I didn’t articulate good reasons for attacking Sadr’s militia because I thought the reasons were utterly self-evident. The man is vehement in his anti-Western, anti-American, totalitarian-theocratic rhetoric, and has exhorted his fellow Iraqis to kill Americans at every opportunity. He is also attempting a violent takeover of Iraq, with the obvious intent of molding the country according to his anti-American, anti-Western, totalitarian-theocratic vision. Is the rationale for stopping him really that hard to see? 4) I mean no disrespect to Shiite Muslims, but I think it’s fair to say that a shrine that has spent thirty-odd years under Ba’athist rule, and is now occupied by gun-toting Sadrist maniacs, deserves to be described as “godforsaken”.

By: praktike

praktike — Fri, 27 Aug 2004 15:06:33 +0000

John, one concern I have is that Sunnis and Kurds, and secular urbanites will pitch a fit and declare a Shi’ite Islamist government illegitimate. What do you think?

By: kevin donoghue

kevin donoghue — Fri, 27 Aug 2004 09:52:12 +0000

“But if I’d posted twice as often on Swift boats and the Alabama National Guard, no-one would have thought it odd.” I would. Consider it a compliment. For the likes of Instapundit to keep strumming away on the same chord is nothing unusual – what else can these guys do? But you have things to say on a range of issues (and I’m still puzzled as to why you take such a gloomy view of the US current account deficit). Of course Najaf is important and the gist of what you say is sound; but look at Sebastian Holsclaw’s comment to see how the debate is progressing. I will elaborate on this in a comment to the latest post on Najaf (by Chris) when I have a minute. Perhaps I am becoming obsessed.

By: Jack

Jack — Fri, 27 Aug 2004 09:23:43 +0000

I’m sure one day it’ll be correct, and blowing some anti-Western fanatic and his minions to smithereens in some godforsaken corner of the Middle East will turn out to be a bad idea. dan s., Just because you havent been blown up doesn’t mean that it’s been a good idea. Why do you think the list of Islamic radicals is so long? Also I think you are creating a straw man by ignoring the rather obvious differences between these situations and also displaying the radical oversimplification that makes these situations so hard to handle. Without going into too much detail, we went into Iraq to liberate it from Saddam right? So why are we fighting one of his most persistent enemies outside the most holy temple of the Shia? Is this going to help the progressive cause in Iran? Surely blowing people to smithereens is always a bad idea. Now sometimes there may be a countervailing good that would come from it but in this case I think your (not uncommon) inability to articulate a reason for doing so speaks volumes. I also find it depressing that you don’t feel embarassed to call one of the most holy shrines in Islam “godforsaken”.

By: Dan Simon

Dan Simon — Fri, 27 Aug 2004 03:01:54 +0000

As the pointless bloodbath….drags on….face-saving compromise….has been the only possible outcome all along, apart from the disastrous option of an assault….the biggest losers have been the unfortunate [local] people…Dozens have been killed, hundreds wounded and thousands left homeless. From all the reports, they (correctly) place part of the blame for this on [the local radical] but even more on [the pro-Western] forces….All of this because someone….decided that this would be a good time to eliminate [the local radical] and his militia. The other big losers are the [pro-Western] forces….The [local] world has been outraged by the fighting….[pro-Western] forces are still boasting about the hundreds of [local radicals] they have killed. Perhaps they haven’t noticed that the people they have killed (mostly unemployed young men who have gained nothing from the [presence of pro-Western forces]) all have brothers and cousins, bound in honour to avenge them, not to mention friends eager to share in their glory…. [The local radical] has also lost ground on balance….Still he defied the Americans for weeks on end, and looks likely to live to tell the tale. Among his core constituency this will count as a win…. _ Hmm, where have I heard all this before? Al Qaeda/the Taliban in Afghanistan (and later in Western Pakistan)? Saddam Hussein in Iraq? Arafat in Ramallah? Just about every Hamas/Islamic Jihad “militant” who survived a missile strike in Gaza? It all just sounds so….familiar, somehow…. I’m sure one day it’ll be correct, and blowing some anti-Western fanatic and his minions to smithereens in some godforsaken corner of the Middle East will turn out to be a bad idea. I’m just not sure I want to bet on this time being the first….

By: John Quiggin

John Quiggin — Thu, 26 Aug 2004 23:58:05 +0000

“Four posts[1] on al-Sadr: it’s getting to be an obsession isn’t it?” I felt the danger of being seen as obsessive, and have deliberately avoided posting on the topic unless I thought I had something new (new for me that is, not necessarily strikingly original) to say. But if I’d posted twice as often on Swift boats and the Alabama National Guard, no-one would have thought it odd. Even in the blogosphere, there is, it seems, a consensus about what is news and what is not. fn1. In three weeks

By: seth edenbaum

seth edenbaum — Thu, 26 Aug 2004 23:04:11 +0000

The wild wild web. http://www.sistani.org/html/eng/

By: Steve

Steve — Thu, 26 Aug 2004 22:46:46 +0000

Of the other parties, the biggest losers have been the unfortunate people of Najaf. Dozens have been killed, hundreds wounded and thousands left homeless. The fact that there are actually people in Najaf—that is, people who have nothing to do with either side in this ongoing bloodbath—is entirely absent from American media coverage. It’s only on the BBC that I’ve heard the slightest mention of civilian casulaties; every American source is restricting itself to Coalition forces and Sadr’s militia. Kinda reminds me of the invasion last year—if you limited yourself to American news sources you could easily come to the conclusion that the entire country of Iraq consisted of sand, oil wells, deserted buildings, and Saddam Hussein.

By: abb1

abb1 — Thu, 26 Aug 2004 19:08:24 +0000

that’s “he wants power for himself”, of course.

By: Motoko

Motoko — Thu, 26 Aug 2004 18:55:08 +0000

This Time article, pointed out by Juan Cole, seems like a good overview of the whole Najaf situation.

By: abb1

abb1 — Thu, 26 Aug 2004 18:48:23 +0000

Sadr wants power for himself and the US out. There is no doubt that he wants the US out, but I haven’t seen any evidence that him wants power for himself. What if, perhaps, he is just an Iraqi patriot—you know, like Joan D’Ark? There are many people over in Iraq who look like they want power for themselves: Allawi and Chalabi for example. I don’t see them attacking US troops: that would be the most counterintuitive way to gain power.

By: Dan Hardie

Dan Hardie — Thu, 26 Aug 2004 18:44:32 +0000

Cheers, Nick- very useful references.

By: nick

nick — Thu, 26 Aug 2004 18:17:35 +0000

The report didn’t say what level commander made the decisions, though: Major General in charge of a division? Lower than that? A USMC Colonel at most, and, judging from the write-up, possibly even a Lieutenant Colonel. The 11th Marine Expeditionary Unit arrived in Iraq in July to provide supply and support in and around Najaf. It was the MEU which acted on the request of the governor of Najaf—a guy shipped in from Dearborn, Michigan last year—and it’s the Lt. Col. in charge of the Battalion Landing Team who explains what decisions were made. The reports of ad hoc tactical decisions by the Marines also make this op-ed by one of the 11th MEU majors in Najaf seem rather, um, problematic: When critics of the war say their advocacy is on behalf of those of us risking our lives here, it’s a type of false patriotism. I believe that when Americans say they “support our troops,” it should include supporting our mission, not just sending us care packages. They don’t have to believe in the cause as I do; but they should not denigrate it. That only aids the enemy in defeating us strategically. No, mate: ‘turn[ing] a firefight with al-Sadr’s forces on Aug. 5 into a eight-day pitched battle without the approval of the Pentagon or senior Iraqi officials’ is what defeats you strategically. Nice one.