Comments on: Sadr’s sharia courts

By: dsquared

dsquared — Wed, 01 Sep 2004 03:34:49 +0000

I think Kevin is right on the subject of Shiites not being a minority, so sorry about that. I think the rest of my points stand, though; Allawi plus the coalition can’t impose their will on the Sunni triangle so I doubt that anyone else can.

By: nick

nick — Wed, 01 Sep 2004 02:06:41 +0000

In Afghanistan? Very interesting. Is this a fact, Dsquared, or just another case of you making shit up? Read RAWA (or any human rights organisation) on the ‘enforcement’ tactics during the height of the civil war in 1994—tactics that, unsurprisingly, have been used in reconquered areas since 2002.

By: kevin donoghue

kevin donoghue — Tue, 31 Aug 2004 22:19:58 +0000

D-squared, it is a bit puzzling that you say “Sistani’s Shia are a minority in Iraq.” Maybe in the sense that not all Shiites follow Sistani, but Shiites as a group have a clear majority. I agree with the gist of what you say, but my reading is that Sistani can’t dictate simply because he does not consider he has the right. As Juan Cole puts it, he is a bit like an Irish cardinal in the 1950s. There’s no doubting his power but there is good reason to believe he won’t throw it around.

By: dsquared

dsquared — Tue, 31 Aug 2004 21:58:57 +0000

Sebastian, what happened in Sudan was that the civil penal code was rewritten in accordance with one version of sharia. The Sudanese courts were civil courts imposing hudud punishments, not sharia courts (this is quite obvious from the fact that they imposed such punishments on non-Muslims; sharia courts would AFAICT in general not recognise themselves as having jurisdiction over non-Muslims in most cases). Since Sistani’s Shia are a minority in Iraq (and Sadr’s loyalists a minority within that minority), the likelihood that they could rewrite the entire penal code to their liking is small. However, what they would be much more likely to do would be to establish a parallel sharia system in the regions they control. The question I have been asking all along is; how many people is it worth killing to prevent them from doing so? I’d be particularly interested in any answers which include all projected deaths, including those of ‘combatants’.

By: Dan Hardie

Dan Hardie — Tue, 31 Aug 2004 19:49:07 +0000

I’m afraid I couldn’t understand Seb either. Look, Sebastian, I am at least as eager as you not to see the Anglo-American forces in Iraq get shot to pieces and for that reason I am criticising the current lack of a policy. I don’t think that ‘Islamist sentiment [in Iraq] is so strong that the US can’t fight it.” I do think that if the US decides to pick a fight with a large proportion of the Iraqi population over who defines the legitimacy of legal and other institutions, it will lose. This will be in part a religious struggle, but it will also be a classic nationalist struggle: who wants a bunch of foreigners proclaiming which laws can and can’t pass in one’s own country? You said, not me, that ‘the great bulk of the Iraqi public are living in a fantasy world’. I am all in favour of an Anglo-American holding campaign whilst elections are held and the beginnings of a legitimate Iraqi state constructed, but a War on Unrealistic Iraqi Beliefs is a bit much for me.

By: kevin donoghue

kevin donoghue — Tue, 31 Aug 2004 19:34:47 +0000

I see before me a sentence of approximately 70 words, with one comma, containing the word “federal.” From this I deduce that the sentence refers to something I wrote. Oddly, though, it also contains a reference to “outrage.” I don’t do outrage very often myself, but somebody here does. It seems to affect comprehension. I don’t know anyone, here or elsewhere, who holds the belief that “Islamist sentiment [in Iraq] is so strong that the US can’t fight it.” Personally I regard Iraq as one of the more secular states in the Arab world. That could change of course. If anyone other than Sebastian Holsclaw has difficulty understanding what I wrote, please let me know which bit is obscure.

By: Sebastian Holsclaw

Sebastian Holsclaw — Tue, 31 Aug 2004 19:05:54 +0000

“Furthermore, I disagree that shari courts specifically, played all that significant a role in the Sudanese civil wars. Do you disagree from knowledge or are you spouting? Because imposition of sharia law has not only been significant, but has in fact been central to the Sudanese civil wars. I presume you know about Hassan Abd Allah’s role in the Muslim Brotherhood, his work with and later fights with Nimeiri regarding the scope of sharia law being imposed in the country? The collapse of the Umma party and with it the parliamentary democracy when it was torn apart by those who on the one hand wanted more agressive imposition of sharia law, and those on the other hand who wanted sharia law lifted? Not significant? Balderdash. In the other comments, I note the trust in the Iraqi federal solution to avoid sharia problems with minorities with the simultaneous outrage at the concept that the US may be required for some time to guarantee that it isn’t ignored joined with an understanding that Islamists desire to impose sharia law throughout Iraq married to a belief that the Islamist sentiment is so strong that the US can’t fight it. I don’t know how to respond to that level of contradiction. Is the desire to impose sharia law so amazingly strong that the US doesn’t dare fight it, or is it weak enough to be contained by an untested and unsecured constitution after a quick US withdrawal?

By: naomi

naomi — Tue, 31 Aug 2004 18:56:08 +0000

I really hate to insist, but it should be noted that shariah per se is simply Islamic law, law according to Islamic principles. Sharia courts are religious courts applying those principles. There are shariah courts everywhere there are mosques and religious Muslim communities. Those officially recognised, not just in Arab states but also in countries like Canada, or, again, Israel, are indeed those where the application of sharia is limited to family law matters such as marriage, divorce, parental rights, inheritance, etc.. They do not supersede national laws. They coexist with secular courts, in a secular law environment. In other words, they are somehow similar the Vatican Rota (except the Vatican Rota only regulates marriages and annulments, not inheritance). It’s a bit early now to say, but if it turns out that there will be a majority consensus to have some form of sharia law in Iraq, that kind of sharia court system, which is the most common one, would be the model, not its extreme, dictatorial forms. I mean, you don’t really have to find the concept of religious courts particularly attractive to realise it takes a big extra step to go from there to stoning adulterers or victims of rape in Taliban-like fashion, or even Saudi Arabia-style executions and mutilations. It also takes a big extra step to get to ethnic conflict and massacres. I remember some debate over which degree of recognition sharia was to be given in the new Afghan constitution, but I don’t know how that was resolved.

By: Dan Hardie

Dan Hardie — Tue, 31 Aug 2004 18:25:36 +0000

Sebastian, my objections to the Najaf operation start with the fact that – in some accounts, including those provided by official USMC sources- the decision to go after Sadr after some of his thugs tried a drive-by shooting in Najaf was taken by a USMC Lt Col who did not refer his decision up the chain of command- no damn way to run a military operation- and goes on to the almost certain bloody unsuccess of any operation where the insurgents could either take cover in the third holiest shrine of Shia Islam (Najaf) or go to ground amidst 2 million civilians in an uncharted urban waste land (Sadr City). It’s nice that your reply to me has such a reasonable tone, but the bulk of your replies to Quiggin and Dsquared have, frankly, been screaming rants. I can quote if you want, but frankly it would just be better if you would start from the assumption that people to your left may not actually be motivated by mere anti-Americanism, to the exclusion of concern for, say, their own country’s interests or for the lives of their uniformed compatriots. As for the general problem of Sharia law- non-Muslims in Iraq, whether urban secularists or Christians, are very much minorities. Any attempt to ‘go too far’ and impose over-strict Sharia law on a resentful majority, or large minority, will indeed lead to some kind of civil war. But ‘going too far’ or ‘over-strict Sharia law’ are terms which will have to be defined by the Iraqis, not by us: their country, not ours. Iranian sharia allows for the execution of rape victims, and women who lose their virginity; Pakistani ‘tribal custom law’in the NWFP has included the equally disgusting practice of gang-raping women as a punishment, although Islamabad has recently tried some kind of crackdown; Malaysian sharia, although I wouldn’t want to live there myself, does not hang rape victims or allow gang rape. The Iraqis themselves will have to determine what kind of law they want. As to your belief that you know better than ‘the great bulk of the Iraqi public (who) are living in a fantasy world’ well maybe you do and maybe they are, but you can only dictate to them if you are prepared to fight a guerrilla war against a larger section of the population than are already fighting. Really- is that a good idea? In my view the one thing that will deter the thuggish demagogue Sadr is being outgunned by a majority of his own compatriots. (I know that January elections are the current US policy and I pray that policy will not be abandoned. There are good reasons to think that Bremer did not institute elections earlier because it was obvious that Chalabi would lose them.) To judge from recent events, what will not deter him is the prospect of having to fight US troops in Sadr City: try finding an American soldier who relishes the idea of a street fight in a slum populated by 2 million Shi’ite Iraqis.

By: kevin donoghue

kevin donoghue — Tue, 31 Aug 2004 18:10:22 +0000

Sebastian Holsclaw: in an effort to get a better idea of your viewpoint I took a look at Obsidian Wings, where you spelled it out a bit further: America should “guarantee [the Iraqi] Constitution for the first decade or two until it has become a part of their national character.” Practically speaking that means being prepared to interfere in Iraqi politics even after the Iraqis have a government which they and the world at large (likely including most Americans) consider legitimate. It is inconceivable that Iraqis would tolerate that, in the year 2014 never mind 2024, and quite unlikely that Americans would push it. Sharia may be causing problems in Malaysia but I don’t see too many Americans calling for intervention. The “decade or two” timescale is too long to make sense for America and far too short to change the “national character” of Iraqis, which is pretty well set; the Ottoman Empire didn’t change it. I cannot see that D-squared’s approach, to the extent that he has spelled it out, is all that scary. In a federal system Sunnis, Kurds and Shiites will have some latitude as to how far each province wants to go towards sharia law. Sistani is not pushing for anything that looks very radical to me. Al-Sadr is another matter but his share of the vote isn’t likely to give him practical constitution-changing power; nor is his militia strong enough to stand up to a legitimate government.

By: dsquared

dsquared — Tue, 31 Aug 2004 17:42:12 +0000

Factually, there has been little or no violence between Sunnis and Shias since the liberation, and factually, there is no material anti-sharia armed movement. Therefore I suggest that the danger of this “civil war” is exaggerated. Furthermore, I disagree that shari courts specifically, played all that significant a role in the Sudanese civil wars.

By: Sebastian Holsclaw

Sebastian Holsclaw — Tue, 31 Aug 2004 17:17:33 +0000

Could I ask what has happened to turn you into someone hurling abuse and accusations of ‘moral equivalence’ at people disturbed by the rather visible lack of strategy in the current US campaign in Iraq?

Thanks for noticing the affirmative action post. I’m not accusing all people disturbed by the rather visible lack of strategy in Najaf. I’m disturbed by the direction that they think the strategy ought to go. I’m specifically pointing out issues with d-squared’s proposed approach. He repeatedly accused me of being unattentive to the bloody possibilities of my proposed approach while repeatedly (and to this moment) ignoring (at least publically) the near-certain bloody nature of his approach. He has repeatedly suggested that I don’t follow my proposal through to logical conclusions, but across multiple posts on the topic he ignores the ramifications of Sadr ascendant, or the ramifications of sharia law imposed on Kurds and Sunni practioners of Islam. There is ample historical evidence on the topic, we don’t have to guess. The civil wars in the Sudan centered on the topic and it remains crucial to the genocide that is going on now. The abuses in Afghanistan were related. Iran may be the best case scenario—which shouldn’t be comforting to anyone who cares about human rights or anyone who worries about Islamist terrorism. The best he comes up with in response is a quick mention of Malaysia. And it was good that he mentioned it only quickly because a slightly longer look at the issue there wouldn’t be encouraging for his argument. Malaysia isn’t currently undergoing civil war, but the sharia issue is causing major and sometimes violent problems.

By: Dan Hardie

Dan Hardie — Tue, 31 Aug 2004 10:01:47 +0000

‘an epidemic of drunken rape’ ‘In Afghanistan? Very interesting. Is this a fact, Dsquared, or just another case of you making shit up?’ He’s not making things up- try reading Ahmed Rashid’s ‘Taliban’ for numerous examples of how early Taliban commanders, starting with Mullah Omar, got the support of locals by using armed force against, er, drunken rapists. ‘Hannah’ sneers at Dsquared for purportedly peddling the idea that the Taliban were out to protect Afghan women: actually, Hannah, a lot of the rape going on was of young boys. So nice attempt at labelling Dsquared a man with weird views on women, but better luck next time. Sebastian Holsclaw: your post on ‘Red State’ on the affirmative action question was one of the best things I have read in the blogosphere on any subject- I say that not merely because I agreed with so many of its conclusions but because of the way it explored the questions. Could I ask what has happened to turn you into someone hurling abuse and accusations of ‘moral equivalence’ at people disturbed by the rather visible lack of strategy in the current US campaign in Iraq? And- given that on an earlier thread I spelled out my own objections to the Najaf operation- would you accuse me of moral or other forms of cowardice? And have you read the weekend’s NYT article spelling out how US forces have basically had to withdraw from large chunks of Western Iraq, including Ramadi, capital of Al Anbar province, in the face of Sunni guerrilla attacks? Any response, or are the reporters who wrote the story cowards, moral equivalence types, etc?

By: Jason McCullough

Jason McCullough — Tue, 31 Aug 2004 00:47:07 +0000

“And in your version we don’t maintain a military presence and that allows Sadr to maintain a level of repression which ensures that large numbers of civilians get butchered whether or not they decide to become combatants. And that is fantastic in an ‘aren’t my hands so clean’ fashion. You continue to accuse me of failing to deal with the consequences of my ideas, but you consistently refuse to deal with the likelihood of even bloodier civil war is the 65% Shia population attempts to enforce sharia law against the Kurds and the Sunnis.” Did Britain have a moral responsibility to intervene and stop the US civil war to prevent the possiblity of future civilian casualties?

By: Harry (of the Place)

Harry (of the Place) — Tue, 31 Aug 2004 00:30:45 +0000

Perhaps Sebastian could learn something from reading this link