Comments on: Moral Relativism http://crookedtimber.org/2004/09/18/moral-relativism/ Out of the crooked timber of humanity, no straight thing was ever made Mon, 13 Feb 2012 05:00:09 +0000 hourly 1 http://wordpress.org/?v=3.3.1 By: Martin Bento http://crookedtimber.org/2004/09/18/moral-relativism/comment-page-2/#comment-43172 Martin Bento Wed, 22 Sep 2004 20:08:22 +0000 http://crookedtimber.org/wp/?p=2211#comment-43172 dubious, thanks. I've heard of Dennett's work, but haven't read it. The rest of what you're saying is familiar to me. dubious, thanks. I’ve heard of Dennett’s work, but haven’t read it. The rest of what you’re saying is familiar to me.

]]> By: Dubious http://crookedtimber.org/2004/09/18/moral-relativism/comment-page-2/#comment-43171 Dubious Wed, 22 Sep 2004 17:51:09 +0000 http://crookedtimber.org/wp/?p=2211#comment-43171 Martin Bento -- Check out Daniel Dennett's 'Freedom Evolves' for a fairly subtle attempt (I think a sucessful one, if not one that will ever make it to popular consciousness) to make physical determinism consistent with philosohpical freedom from an evolutionary psychological perspective. That said, it seems to me that EP has offered a fairly plausible theory of morality in that: 1)Kin-Based and Reciprocal Altruism have suvival value, even without invoking group-evolutional methods. Also, reciprocal vengeance has value, to deter aggression. 2) All agents want to have a reputation for kin-based and reciprocity (both for help and harm). The best liar is one who believes his own lies and the best way to seem good is to be good. That's why we believe our moral feelings instead of just making rational calculations as to whether a given act will be publicly witnessed and therefore impact our reputation. (Mostly) 3)Our moral feelings (obligation, shame, guilt, vengeance, compassion for the weak) are goads to get us to act out those two theories. In particular, they get us to act out those theories when it might seem (in our short-run myopic estimation) that we'd be better off by not fulfilling our obligations, by not making amends to those who we've injured, by not striking back against those who've injured us (because they might hurt us again) or by ignoring the weak (since we'd be overlooking their severe need and the the fact that they'd be really in our debt if we just gave them a little help.) Martin Bento— Check out Daniel Dennett’s ‘Freedom Evolves’ for a fairly subtle attempt (I think a sucessful one, if not one that will ever make it to popular consciousness) to make physical determinism consistent with philosohpical freedom from an evolutionary psychological perspective. That said, it seems to me that EP has offered a fairly plausible theory of morality in that: 1)Kin-Based and Reciprocal Altruism have suvival value, even without invoking group-evolutional methods. Also, reciprocal vengeance has value, to deter aggression. 2) All agents want to have a reputation for kin-based and reciprocity (both for help and harm). The best liar is one who believes his own lies and the best way to seem good is to be good. That’s why we believe our moral feelings instead of just making rational calculations as to whether a given act will be publicly witnessed and therefore impact our reputation. (Mostly) 3)Our moral feelings (obligation, shame, guilt, vengeance, compassion for the weak) are goads to get us to act out those two theories. In particular, they get us to act out those theories when it might seem (in our short-run myopic estimation) that we’d be better off by not fulfilling our obligations, by not making amends to those who we’ve injured, by not striking back against those who’ve injured us (because they might hurt us again) or by ignoring the weak (since we’d be overlooking their severe need and the the fact that they’d be really in our debt if we just gave them a little help.)

]]> By: Martin Bento http://crookedtimber.org/2004/09/18/moral-relativism/comment-page-2/#comment-43170 Martin Bento Wed, 22 Sep 2004 08:58:30 +0000 http://crookedtimber.org/wp/?p=2211#comment-43170 Alex, "There are many examples of behaviors that many would consider immoral or at least not explicitly legitimized by recourse to morality that have debatable survival value - masturbation, anal sex, oral sex, excessive use of alcohol, gluttony, drug use, homosexuality." I think gluttony is easily understood as an adaptation to an unreliable food supply that is maladaptive with a reliable one. Other than that this list seems to come down to non-reproductive sex and mind-altering substances. I agree that non-reproductive sex is hard to explain on the basis of selfish genery, but I'm with the group selectionists, and population control mechanisms pose no difficulty there. As for mind alteration, it seems to exist in most cultures (perhaps the Islamic are an exception - I'm not sure if they do drugs in Saudi Arabia or have in the period of Islamic rule, other than mild mind alterants like caffeine and nicotine). Perhaps it fills a poorly understood need related to human intelligence. In most cultures, though, it seems to be contained by religion, which would seem to make it fairly neutral for survival value. In any case, morality poses a dilemma for Darwinism that other behaviors of negligible or even moderately negative survival value do not. That is because morality frequently requires behaviors directly and strongly contrary to individual self-interest, at least obvious self-interest. I know of no other factor in human behavior present so strongly across cultures that does this to anything like the same degree. I don't offhand see the relevance of your quote about face recognition. Could you clarify? "But Darwinism doesn’t dictate that selection can occur unrestricted, but within biological confines, and many psychologists and philosophers feel that e-p can make claims it can’t cash under the defense that it is coherent with Darwinian theory in the abstract (i.e. it fits a model), without first establishing that it fits all the biological requirements. " Are you saying that evolutionary psychology requires the existence of biological mechanisms that are not required by other accounts of morality (at least by other materialist accounts; obviously, it requires more than supernatural accounts)? Why would this be so? Or are you saying the EP has not given a sufficiently convincing account of how the attributes it posits would be selected for under selfish genery? "this might unfold our moral prejudices, but doesn’t really get us anywhere with a moral framework " If I understand your distinction, this is another way of saying it is descriptive of morality as an aspect of human psychology, but doesn't justify or undermine particular moral theories, save in terms of their survival value and perhaps their consistency with inborn human tendencies. "the yuck factor in acts that we objectively agree do not meet the conditions of being immoral " I don't know who the "we" is in that sentence, but I don't think there is any consensus among humanity on the "objective" conditions of what is moral. I also don't think emotion can be taken out of it because its demands are too strong. Few people can be logically argued into laying down their lives, and morality is often capable of this level of motivation. The Yuck factor is the test you linked seems primarily a case of overgeneralization. It is not hard to see why in general sex with dead animals or siblings would be taboo, and the fact that a test can posit scenarios where such are not harmful is not to me very significant. Moral reactions have to be very general because they so frequently are applied to situations with high uncertainty. For example, the test tells us a brother and sister had sex and this was not harmful to themselves or others (or it fancies it said that, though I think leaping from "guilt-free pleasure" to "not harmful" requires a number of unspoken assumptions). Were we to encounter such a situation in life, how would we know if was not harmful, if we believe such situations generally are harmful? It is something that can be specified in a test, but not known in real life, and our moral instincts are for the purpose of dealing with life, not of taking tests. Alex, “There are many examples of behaviors that many would consider immoral or at least not explicitly legitimized by recourse to morality that have debatable survival value – masturbation, anal sex, oral sex, excessive use of alcohol, gluttony, drug use, homosexuality.” I think gluttony is easily understood as an adaptation to an unreliable food supply that is maladaptive with a reliable one. Other than that this list seems to come down to non-reproductive sex and mind-altering substances. I agree that non-reproductive sex is hard to explain on the basis of selfish genery, but I’m with the group selectionists, and population control mechanisms pose no difficulty there. As for mind alteration, it seems to exist in most cultures (perhaps the Islamic are an exception – I’m not sure if they do drugs in Saudi Arabia or have in the period of Islamic rule, other than mild mind alterants like caffeine and nicotine). Perhaps it fills a poorly understood need related to human intelligence. In most cultures, though, it seems to be contained by religion, which would seem to make it fairly neutral for survival value. In any case, morality poses a dilemma for Darwinism that other behaviors of negligible or even moderately negative survival value do not. That is because morality frequently requires behaviors directly and strongly contrary to individual self-interest, at least obvious self-interest. I know of no other factor in human behavior present so strongly across cultures that does this to anything like the same degree. I don’t offhand see the relevance of your quote about face recognition. Could you clarify? “But Darwinism doesn’t dictate that selection can occur unrestricted, but within biological confines, and many psychologists and philosophers feel that e-p can make claims it can’t cash under the defense that it is coherent with Darwinian theory in the abstract (i.e. it fits a model), without first establishing that it fits all the biological requirements. ” Are you saying that evolutionary psychology requires the existence of biological mechanisms that are not required by other accounts of morality (at least by other materialist accounts; obviously, it requires more than supernatural accounts)? Why would this be so? Or are you saying the EP has not given a sufficiently convincing account of how the attributes it posits would be selected for under selfish genery? “this might unfold our moral prejudices, but doesn’t really get us anywhere with a moral framework ” If I understand your distinction, this is another way of saying it is descriptive of morality as an aspect of human psychology, but doesn’t justify or undermine particular moral theories, save in terms of their survival value and perhaps their consistency with inborn human tendencies. “the yuck factor in acts that we objectively agree do not meet the conditions of being immoral ” I don’t know who the “we” is in that sentence, but I don’t think there is any consensus among humanity on the “objective” conditions of what is moral. I also don’t think emotion can be taken out of it because its demands are too strong. Few people can be logically argued into laying down their lives, and morality is often capable of this level of motivation. The Yuck factor is the test you linked seems primarily a case of overgeneralization. It is not hard to see why in general sex with dead animals or siblings would be taboo, and the fact that a test can posit scenarios where such are not harmful is not to me very significant. Moral reactions have to be very general because they so frequently are applied to situations with high uncertainty. For example, the test tells us a brother and sister had sex and this was not harmful to themselves or others (or it fancies it said that, though I think leaping from “guilt-free pleasure” to “not harmful” requires a number of unspoken assumptions). Were we to encounter such a situation in life, how would we know if was not harmful, if we believe such situations generally are harmful? It is something that can be specified in a test, but not known in real life, and our moral instincts are for the purpose of dealing with life, not of taking tests.

]]> By: Martin Bento http://crookedtimber.org/2004/09/18/moral-relativism/comment-page-2/#comment-43169 Martin Bento Wed, 22 Sep 2004 07:29:05 +0000 http://crookedtimber.org/wp/?p=2211#comment-43169 Novakant, "I didn’t elaborate on any specific moral theories, but if you are talking moral principles/values there are some requirements that have to be met" Call them theories, principles, or requirements, you are positing the morality must be universal or it is not morality. Not all individuals or cultures that claim to have moral standards share this criterion. Therefore, you are taking a standard that is specific to a subset of humanity and claiming it must apply to all, and claiming further that entire societies, arguably the majority of human societies historically, have no moral standards whatsoever, regardless of what they believe (other than what they believe about universality) and how it affects their behavior. A theory of morality that explains only universal morality fails to explain the moral logic of the majority of the human race. "1.) They cannot be restricted to just one group but instead have to be universally applicable. If you disagree with that, then you have to claim that racists, anti-semites, genocidal dictators and whathaveyou are capable of having a coherent moral value system." I do so claim. You may differ with the premises of such value systems, but they can be as coherent in their own terms as other moral value systems. "2.) There has to be an element of free will and individual choice in our moral actions - if they are hardwired, controlled by instinct or even determined by the overarching culture/authority alone, they do not qualify as moral. " Free will is a huge issue with implications well beyond morality. However, suffice it to say, that it is not clear that free will is compatible with materialism. The basic premise of physical determinism on which science was founded excludes the possibility of free will (although quantum physics has problematized this somewhat). If morality requires free will, then morality would seem to have no foundation for those who accept the scientific worldview. If you want to insist on free will, you can either reject the scientific worldview, or show how it can be made consistent with free will. The only path I know to the latter would be the work of Roger Penrose, who suggests that quantum indeterminacy has effects on human decision-making. Whether "quantum indeterminacy" is really the same as, or can be a cause of, what we mean by "free will" is a whole other and quite difficult question. However, few other scientists seem to think that Penrose is right in this, so that whole line of inquiry may be a blind alley, leaving the dilemma unresolved. Regardless of whether free will exists however, and regardless therefore of whether morality has an ontological foundation beyond that of other human beliefs that may have no referent external to human mind, people do perceive that they have moral standards, and this perception does seem to be one of the determinants of people's behavior. Therefore, morality can be examined as an aspect of human behavior regardless of whether the perceived moral choices are "real" in the sense of being determined by the free will of the individual, just as one can examine people's beliefs in God without requiring that God exist. This is how evolutionary psychology examines them and why it is descriptive, not proscriptive. Novakant, “I didn’t elaborate on any specific moral theories, but if you are talking moral principles/values there are some requirements that have to be met” Call them theories, principles, or requirements, you are positing the morality must be universal or it is not morality. Not all individuals or cultures that claim to have moral standards share this criterion. Therefore, you are taking a standard that is specific to a subset of humanity and claiming it must apply to all, and claiming further that entire societies, arguably the majority of human societies historically, have no moral standards whatsoever, regardless of what they believe (other than what they believe about universality) and how it affects their behavior. A theory of morality that explains only universal morality fails to explain the moral logic of the majority of the human race. “1.) They cannot be restricted to just one group but instead have to be universally applicable. If you disagree with that, then you have to claim that racists, anti-semites, genocidal dictators and whathaveyou are capable of having a coherent moral value system.” I do so claim. You may differ with the premises of such value systems, but they can be as coherent in their own terms as other moral value systems. “2.) There has to be an element of free will and individual choice in our moral actions – if they are hardwired, controlled by instinct or even determined by the overarching culture/authority alone, they do not qualify as moral. ” Free will is a huge issue with implications well beyond morality. However, suffice it to say, that it is not clear that free will is compatible with materialism. The basic premise of physical determinism on which science was founded excludes the possibility of free will (although quantum physics has problematized this somewhat). If morality requires free will, then morality would seem to have no foundation for those who accept the scientific worldview. If you want to insist on free will, you can either reject the scientific worldview, or show how it can be made consistent with free will. The only path I know to the latter would be the work of Roger Penrose, who suggests that quantum indeterminacy has effects on human decision-making. Whether “quantum indeterminacy” is really the same as, or can be a cause of, what we mean by “free will” is a whole other and quite difficult question. However, few other scientists seem to think that Penrose is right in this, so that whole line of inquiry may be a blind alley, leaving the dilemma unresolved. Regardless of whether free will exists however, and regardless therefore of whether morality has an ontological foundation beyond that of other human beliefs that may have no referent external to human mind, people do perceive that they have moral standards, and this perception does seem to be one of the determinants of people’s behavior. Therefore, morality can be examined as an aspect of human behavior regardless of whether the perceived moral choices are “real” in the sense of being determined by the free will of the individual, just as one can examine people’s beliefs in God without requiring that God exist. This is how evolutionary psychology examines them and why it is descriptive, not proscriptive.

]]> By: gay sex http://crookedtimber.org/2004/09/18/moral-relativism/comment-page-2/#comment-43168 gay sex Wed, 22 Sep 2004 06:31:30 +0000 http://crookedtimber.org/wp/?p=2211#comment-43168 Found your site through blogspot and wanted to say hi Found your site through blogspot and wanted to say hi

]]> By: Dubious http://crookedtimber.org/2004/09/18/moral-relativism/comment-page-2/#comment-43167 Dubious Wed, 22 Sep 2004 00:46:30 +0000 http://crookedtimber.org/wp/?p=2211#comment-43167 To get back to the original point of the thread... Again, all these posts illustrate precisely what conservatives are aiming at. In political discourse for the general public, no one talks metaethics. Moral nihilism, moral skepticism, emotivism, objectivism, etc. are not things people in the non-academic world are much concerned about. Worse, if you bring them up, people will begin to doubt your deep heartfelt commitment to your moral principles. You could rightly say that 'no serious thinker' would think that intellectually entertaining metaethical discussions indicates anything at all about how deep our commitments to our principles run. But people don't see it that way. Someone who is willing to ask these questions is dangerously freethinking in most people's minds, I think. "If they need an explanation as to why murder is wrong, they're either out-of-touch ivory tower types or somehow trying to subvert the notion that murder is wrong." Arguably, the right is damaged by not having the strong representation in the Academy to derive strong intellectual underpinnings for its viewpoints. Undeniable, the left is damaged by the fact that many leftist intellectuals are as politically tone-deaf as religious fanatics. Living in isolated ideological communes (e.g. Anthro or Sociology depts), they spend most of their time quibbling over small points like whether the transubstantiation... err, over whether female circumcision should be tolerated (to avoid cultural imperialism) or stamped out (to promote feminism). To get back to the original point of the thread… Again, all these posts illustrate precisely what conservatives are aiming at. In political discourse for the general public, no one talks metaethics. Moral nihilism, moral skepticism, emotivism, objectivism, etc. are not things people in the non-academic world are much concerned about. Worse, if you bring them up, people will begin to doubt your deep heartfelt commitment to your moral principles. You could rightly say that ‘no serious thinker’ would think that intellectually entertaining metaethical discussions indicates anything at all about how deep our commitments to our principles run. But people don’t see it that way. Someone who is willing to ask these questions is dangerously freethinking in most people’s minds, I think. “If they need an explanation as to why murder is wrong, they’re either out-of-touch ivory tower types or somehow trying to subvert the notion that murder is wrong.” Arguably, the right is damaged by not having the strong representation in the Academy to derive strong intellectual underpinnings for its viewpoints. Undeniable, the left is damaged by the fact that many leftist intellectuals are as politically tone-deaf as religious fanatics. Living in isolated ideological communes (e.g. Anthro or Sociology depts), they spend most of their time quibbling over small points like whether the transubstantiation… err, over whether female circumcision should be tolerated (to avoid cultural imperialism) or stamped out (to promote feminism).

]]> By: abb1 http://crookedtimber.org/2004/09/18/moral-relativism/comment-page-2/#comment-43166 abb1 Tue, 21 Sep 2004 21:57:38 +0000 http://crookedtimber.org/wp/?p=2211#comment-43166 <i>If you disagree with that, then you have to claim that racists, anti-semites, genocidal dictators and whathaveyou are capable of having a coherent moral value system.</i> And why not? Moral proposition: "individuals of my tribe (however defined) are much more precious than other individuals" is very common. First 1000 US casualties in Iraq is a big event, while Iraqi casualties aren't even counted. It's called patriotism, and it's a laudable moral value. How far is it from racism and anti-semitism? If you disagree with that, then you have to claim that racists, anti-semites, genocidal dictators and whathaveyou are capable of having a coherent moral value system. And why not? Moral proposition: “individuals of my tribe (however defined) are much more precious than other individuals” is very common. First 1000 US casualties in Iraq is a big event, while Iraqi casualties aren’t even counted. It’s called patriotism, and it’s a laudable moral value. How far is it from racism and anti-semitism?

]]> By: novakant http://crookedtimber.org/2004/09/18/moral-relativism/comment-page-2/#comment-43165 novakant Tue, 21 Sep 2004 15:04:37 +0000 http://crookedtimber.org/wp/?p=2211#comment-43165 "We are trying to explain morality as such here. (...) What you are doing is taking your particular moral theories and holding that any account of morality must justify them." I didn't elaborate on any specific moral theories, but if you are talking moral principles/values there are some requirements that have to be met: 1.) They cannot be restricted to just one group but instead have to be universally applicable. If you disagree with that, then you have to claim that racists, anti-semites, genocidal dictators and whathaveyou are capable of having a coherent moral value system. 2.) There has to be an element of free will and individual choice in our moral actions - if they are hardwired, controlled by instinct or even determined by the overarching culture/authority alone, they do not qualify as moral. Kant may have overplayed this card a bit, but he hit a crucial point. If you deny this, then your idea of morality is stuck at preconventional and conventional level in the Kohlberg scheme. “We are trying to explain morality as such here. (…) What you are doing is taking your particular moral theories and holding that any account of morality must justify them.” I didn’t elaborate on any specific moral theories, but if you are talking moral principles/values there are some requirements that have to be met: 1.) They cannot be restricted to just one group but instead have to be universally applicable. If you disagree with that, then you have to claim that racists, anti-semites, genocidal dictators and whathaveyou are capable of having a coherent moral value system. 2.) There has to be an element of free will and individual choice in our moral actions – if they are hardwired, controlled by instinct or even determined by the overarching culture/authority alone, they do not qualify as moral. Kant may have overplayed this card a bit, but he hit a crucial point. If you deny this, then your idea of morality is stuck at preconventional and conventional level in the Kohlberg scheme.

]]> By: Alex Fradera http://crookedtimber.org/2004/09/18/moral-relativism/comment-page-2/#comment-43164 Alex Fradera Tue, 21 Sep 2004 12:52:24 +0000 http://crookedtimber.org/wp/?p=2211#comment-43164 There are many examples of behaviors that many would consider immoral or at least not explicitly legitimized by recourse to morality that have debatable survival value - masturbation, anal sex, oral sex, excessive use of alcohol, gluttony, drug use, homosexuality. I'm not sure that isolating those cultural phenomena that can be considered moral, suggesting they are detrimental to survival and concluding they must be the product of a single, powerful, selected-for process which constitutes morality is going to hold. I know evolutionary psychology can be very exciting but really, the bars it has jumped are not as impressive as we sometimes think. Even phenomena as deep as face perception - face perception! - can be challenged as being an authentic product of phylogenetic construction. I’ll give you a quote from Cecelia Heyes’ paper “Four routes of cognitive evolution”: <blockquote> Just as natural selection tends to be conservative with respect to respiratory pigments (e.g., hemoglobin) and revisionist with respect to respiratory structures (e.g., skin, gills and lungs), it is likely that some properties of behavior-control systems are more susceptible than others to phylogenetic change and therefore that they show greater variation across species and in the course of development…. this article [if correct] ..implies that phylogenetic construction is rare and that natural selection is generally conservative with respect to cognitive mechanisms. (p724, Psychological Review vol 110(4), 2003)</blockquote> You don’t need to be an antiDarwinist to hold evolutionary psychology arguments with skepticism. No-one counters the obvious claim that the brain has structure, and this is not what the evo-psychs do – where they are distinctive is in their interest in how increasingly specific cognitive mechanisms might be wired in. But Darwinism doesn’t dictate that selection can occur unrestricted, but within biological confines, and many psychologists and philosophers feel that e-p can make claims it can’t cash under the defense that it is coherent with Darwinian theory in the abstract (i.e. it fits a model), without first establishing that it fits all the biological requirements. That said, there is plenty of moral psych research and some of it – e.g. social contract stuff of Cosmides – seems pretty good to me. But I think the point still stands – that this might unfold our moral prejudices, but doesn’t really get us anywhere with a moral framework. In fact, those who are interested in it see it as a problem to be overcome in morality (the yuck factor in acts that we objectively agree do not meet the conditions of being immoral), rather than any kind of foundation. Check out http://www.philosophersmag.com/bw/games/taboo.htm for a fun look at this. There are many examples of behaviors that many would consider immoral or at least not explicitly legitimized by recourse to morality that have debatable survival value – masturbation, anal sex, oral sex, excessive use of alcohol, gluttony, drug use, homosexuality. I’m not sure that isolating those cultural phenomena that can be considered moral, suggesting they are detrimental to survival and concluding they must be the product of a single, powerful, selected-for process which constitutes morality is going to hold. I know evolutionary psychology can be very exciting but really, the bars it has jumped are not as impressive as we sometimes think. Even phenomena as deep as face perception – face perception! – can be challenged as being an authentic product of phylogenetic construction. I’ll give you a quote from Cecelia Heyes’ paper “Four routes of cognitive evolution”:
Just as natural selection tends to be conservative with respect to respiratory pigments (e.g., hemoglobin) and revisionist with respect to respiratory structures (e.g., skin, gills and lungs), it is likely that some properties of behavior-control systems are more susceptible than others to phylogenetic change and therefore that they show greater variation across species and in the course of development…. this article [if correct] ..implies that phylogenetic construction is rare and that natural selection is generally conservative with respect to cognitive mechanisms. (p724, Psychological Review vol 110(4), 2003)
You don’t need to be an antiDarwinist to hold evolutionary psychology arguments with skepticism. No-one counters the obvious claim that the brain has structure, and this is not what the evo-psychs do – where they are distinctive is in their interest in how increasingly specific cognitive mechanisms might be wired in. But Darwinism doesn’t dictate that selection can occur unrestricted, but within biological confines, and many psychologists and philosophers feel that e-p can make claims it can’t cash under the defense that it is coherent with Darwinian theory in the abstract (i.e. it fits a model), without first establishing that it fits all the biological requirements. That said, there is plenty of moral psych research and some of it – e.g. social contract stuff of Cosmides – seems pretty good to me. But I think the point still stands – that this might unfold our moral prejudices, but doesn’t really get us anywhere with a moral framework. In fact, those who are interested in it see it as a problem to be overcome in morality (the yuck factor in acts that we objectively agree do not meet the conditions of being immoral), rather than any kind of foundation. Check out http://www.philosophersmag.com/bw/games/taboo.htm for a fun look at this.

]]> By: Martin Bento http://crookedtimber.org/2004/09/18/moral-relativism/comment-page-2/#comment-43163 Martin Bento Tue, 21 Sep 2004 04:30:59 +0000 http://crookedtimber.org/wp/?p=2211#comment-43163 "The Nazis had a very strong group morality which manifested itself negatively against other groups " I could by all rights invoke Godwin here, but I think that meme is virulent, so I'll pass. “The Nazis had a very strong group morality which manifested itself negatively against other groups ” I could by all rights invoke Godwin here, but I think that meme is virulent, so I’ll pass.

]]> By: Martin Bento http://crookedtimber.org/2004/09/18/moral-relativism/comment-page-2/#comment-43162 Martin Bento Tue, 21 Sep 2004 04:23:23 +0000 http://crookedtimber.org/wp/?p=2211#comment-43162 "The Nazis had a very strong group morality which manifested itself negatively against other groups " I could by all rights invoke Godwin here, but I think that meme is virulent, so I'll pass. “The Nazis had a very strong group morality which manifested itself negatively against other groups ” I could by all rights invoke Godwin here, but I think that meme is virulent, so I’ll pass.

]]> By: Martin Bento http://crookedtimber.org/2004/09/18/moral-relativism/comment-page-2/#comment-43161 Martin Bento Tue, 21 Sep 2004 03:56:38 +0000 http://crookedtimber.org/wp/?p=2211#comment-43161 gareth, "controversial" may not equal "subjective", but if you believe that something is true, there is the question of why you believe it. If you believe it because of reason, you should be able to convince others who accept the arbitration of reason. If moral ideas remain controversial among people who accept and correctly apply reason, then there is some dimension to them that must have a basis other than reason. Yet, attempts to treat morality as something other than an arbitrary cultural artifact, attempts to justify morality, seem to fall straight into tautology, as in this discussion. I think it is clear that people differ about principles. Osama bin Laden and I have moral principles that differ radically in their goals, their standards of judgment, their logic, and many other respects. I don't think it is just a question of application; we seek different things, and have different ideas of what is "right". gareth, “controversial” may not equal “subjective”, but if you believe that something is true, there is the question of why you believe it. If you believe it because of reason, you should be able to convince others who accept the arbitration of reason. If moral ideas remain controversial among people who accept and correctly apply reason, then there is some dimension to them that must have a basis other than reason. Yet, attempts to treat morality as something other than an arbitrary cultural artifact, attempts to justify morality, seem to fall straight into tautology, as in this discussion. I think it is clear that people differ about principles. Osama bin Laden and I have moral principles that differ radically in their goals, their standards of judgment, their logic, and many other respects. I don’t think it is just a question of application; we seek different things, and have different ideas of what is “right”.

]]> By: Martin Bento http://crookedtimber.org/2004/09/18/moral-relativism/comment-page-2/#comment-43160 Martin Bento Tue, 21 Sep 2004 03:33:21 +0000 http://crookedtimber.org/wp/?p=2211#comment-43160 "But here one has to ask why the same couldn’t be said for immoral behaviour which is just as widely obeserved across cultures and can be equally complex." Sure, but the evolutionary advantage of immoral behavior, at least of the most serious kinds, is usually obvious - rape increases your progeny, murder eliminates competitors, theft increases resources. It is the refraining from these things that requires explication. "That aside, the form of morality at the group level you mention can be utterly immoral when judged by the standards of modern moral theory, which require that people abstract from just this group level and hold the same principles universally for every member of mankind." We are trying to explain morality as such here. It is clear that morality exists as a factor in human thinking and behavior. I have asserted that it exists in some form in all cultures, and no one here seems to dispute this. Any theory of morality as such, however, has to apply to all moral systems. It cannot be restricted to one that is specifically modern, and far from universal among modern (or postmodern, if you like) people. What you are doing is taking your particular moral theories and holding that any account of morality must justify them. This is no more legitimate that it would be for a fundamentalist Christian to insist that any general theory of morality must justify a prohibition against gay marriage. You may, of course, feel that your morality is "true" morality, but, frankly, so does everyone else. If a society held that its ruler should defend the weak in the society against exploitation by the strong, would you call that a moral position? “But here one has to ask why the same couldn’t be said for immoral behaviour which is just as widely obeserved across cultures and can be equally complex.” Sure, but the evolutionary advantage of immoral behavior, at least of the most serious kinds, is usually obvious – rape increases your progeny, murder eliminates competitors, theft increases resources. It is the refraining from these things that requires explication. “That aside, the form of morality at the group level you mention can be utterly immoral when judged by the standards of modern moral theory, which require that people abstract from just this group level and hold the same principles universally for every member of mankind.” We are trying to explain morality as such here. It is clear that morality exists as a factor in human thinking and behavior. I have asserted that it exists in some form in all cultures, and no one here seems to dispute this. Any theory of morality as such, however, has to apply to all moral systems. It cannot be restricted to one that is specifically modern, and far from universal among modern (or postmodern, if you like) people. What you are doing is taking your particular moral theories and holding that any account of morality must justify them. This is no more legitimate that it would be for a fundamentalist Christian to insist that any general theory of morality must justify a prohibition against gay marriage. You may, of course, feel that your morality is “true” morality, but, frankly, so does everyone else. If a society held that its ruler should defend the weak in the society against exploitation by the strong, would you call that a moral position?

]]> By: Gareth http://crookedtimber.org/2004/09/18/moral-relativism/comment-page-2/#comment-43159 Gareth Tue, 21 Sep 2004 01:28:58 +0000 http://crookedtimber.org/wp/?p=2211#comment-43159 Martin: Psychology, including evolutionary psychology, can in principle, explain moral beliefs. But it cannot provide grounds for thinking those beliefs are true. In fact, I understand that some EPers have theorized that Aristotlean physics is "hard wired" into us, but Aristotlean physics is wrong. If EPers are right, and the belief that adultery by (or with) a wife is worse that adultery by a husband with an unmarried woman is evolutionarily favoured, it doesn't mean that it is correct, just that it is hard to change. Martin & abb1: "Controversial" does not equal "subjective." Say that three times every morning. Anyway, it isn't clear that moral controversy is because people disagree about principles (at a suitable level of abstraction), but because they disagree about application of those principles. Martin: Psychology, including evolutionary psychology, can in principle, explain moral beliefs. But it cannot provide grounds for thinking those beliefs are true. In fact, I understand that some EPers have theorized that Aristotlean physics is “hard wired” into us, but Aristotlean physics is wrong. If EPers are right, and the belief that adultery by (or with) a wife is worse that adultery by a husband with an unmarried woman is evolutionarily favoured, it doesn’t mean that it is correct, just that it is hard to change. Martin & abb1: “Controversial” does not equal “subjective.” Say that three times every morning. Anyway, it isn’t clear that moral controversy is because people disagree about principles (at a suitable level of abstraction), but because they disagree about application of those principles.

]]> By: novakant http://crookedtimber.org/2004/09/18/moral-relativism/comment-page-2/#comment-43158 novakant Tue, 21 Sep 2004 00:28:55 +0000 http://crookedtimber.org/wp/?p=2211#comment-43158 OK I'll take a whack at it. In a post further up you claim that all human behaviour is the product of the evolutionary process and as such must be either noise or have some survival value and that since moral behaviour is a complex, ubiquitous and transcultural phenomenon it must have some survival value. But here one has to ask why the same couldn't be said for immoral behaviour which is just as widely obeserved across cultures and can be equally complex. That aside, the form of morality at the group level you mention can be utterly immoral when judged by the standards of modern moral theory, which require that people abstract from just this group level and hold the same principles universally for every member of mankind. The Nazis had a very strong group morality which manifested itself negatively against other groups and the same goes for the Hutu and Tutsi - this is an animalistic form of morality which obviously has nothing to do with what we understand by the word. Evolutionary principles like group survival and expansionism are probably rather hardwired in our brains, but it is exactly overcoming these instincts what defines a moral human being in the emphatic sense. I therefore cannot see how one could possibly derive morality from the evolutionary process. I think morality arose because our brains developed a bit of extra capacity, which gaves us the opportunity to communicate via signs, to reflect upon our actions and to imagine different possible worlds. It's a product of human culture and language, dependent on a cognitive space we describe as "free will". Sure, we somehow "evolved" as human beings to this stage, but it seems to me that cultural phenomena are far too complex to be explained via a recourse to evolutionary processes. OK I’ll take a whack at it. In a post further up you claim that all human behaviour is the product of the evolutionary process and as such must be either noise or have some survival value and that since moral behaviour is a complex, ubiquitous and transcultural phenomenon it must have some survival value. But here one has to ask why the same couldn’t be said for immoral behaviour which is just as widely obeserved across cultures and can be equally complex. That aside, the form of morality at the group level you mention can be utterly immoral when judged by the standards of modern moral theory, which require that people abstract from just this group level and hold the same principles universally for every member of mankind. The Nazis had a very strong group morality which manifested itself negatively against other groups and the same goes for the Hutu and Tutsi – this is an animalistic form of morality which obviously has nothing to do with what we understand by the word. Evolutionary principles like group survival and expansionism are probably rather hardwired in our brains, but it is exactly overcoming these instincts what defines a moral human being in the emphatic sense. I therefore cannot see how one could possibly derive morality from the evolutionary process. I think morality arose because our brains developed a bit of extra capacity, which gaves us the opportunity to communicate via signs, to reflect upon our actions and to imagine different possible worlds. It’s a product of human culture and language, dependent on a cognitive space we describe as “free will”. Sure, we somehow “evolved” as human beings to this stage, but it seems to me that cultural phenomena are far too complex to be explained via a recourse to evolutionary processes.

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