Comments on: Paper tigers ?

By: Boffo

Boffo — Tue, 23 Nov 2004 14:21:16 +0000

I know but a little about Chinese politics, so my comments are based only on what I know of Indonesian. My impression, however, is that there are important differences. The problems for Golkar ran deeper than East Timor and Irian. Let’s not forget, for example, that Ambon—the site of some of the worst violence over the last decade—was also the center of an independence movement in the 1950s which Sukarno crushed (with a little help from the U.S.). And of course there is Aceh, which has been a troublemaker since the early days of the Dutch colony. Ethnic and religious tensions have always burbled just below the surface throughout the country, and those tensions more than the corruption helped drive Suharto from power. It is in this respect that Indonesia is at best a loose metaphor for China. (And, I think, Indonesia’s situation has parallels with the Soviet Union’s in the 1980s.) Indonesia benefited from adopting a politically neutral national language, but the national ideology (Pancasila) was really just a useful tool to suppress dissent against the Javanese majority. The government coupled that with the policy of Transmigrasi, which relocated poor Javanese to the outlying islands (not just the obvious troublemakers like Timor and Irian), a source of much tension and violence late in the Suharto regime. Then, of course, there was the role of religion. The government had always had a difficult relationship with Islam, usure how to manage growing pockets of fundamentalism. You are correct that the ideology was moribund by the end of the regime. For years it had been propped up by vague anti-Communism, which on the ground was really just a proxy for anti-Chinese sentiment. So, when it all collapsed it was expressed in violence targeted at the ethnic Chinese, the Christians (often they were also Chinese), and in some places against the Javanese migrants. I’m not sure how this parallels China, but my sense is that with the exception of the Tibetans and, say, the Uighur, ethnic and religious tensions play a much smaller role there than they did/do in Indonesia. Finally, to follow on what Jeff just posted, the Indonesian military also followed the “rule of avoidance” and Suharto was also careful to rotate regional military leaders so that none became too comfortable. On the other hand, as I understand it local government was managed locally, so civil institutional structures did not follow this pattern. More importantly, Golkar was seen as a mainly Javanese and secular institution, with only limited power distributed to other ethnicities. I’m happy to be shown wrong on any of the above; I’m not a specialist on Indonesian politics. My knowledge comes mainly from having lived there for a time (late in the Suharto regime).

By: Jeff

Jeff — Tue, 23 Nov 2004 11:15:26 +0000

I agree with the skeptics who’ve posted so far. The Chinese Communist Party isn’t going anywhere—which is not to say that it won’t give up its monopoly on power eventually. It will, but on a schedule chosen by the Party itself, not forced on it by an external crisis. (Shameless plug for my blog: I posted a long entry on this topic a few days ago.) A couple of minor or not-so-minor points: a) The reference to military involvement in business is out of date. Jiang Zemin ordered the People’s Liberation Army (and the police, and the secret service) to give up all their commercial activities back in 1998. And to forestall the inevitable question: yes, they actually obeyed the order. b) I think one important area where the Soviet/Chinese analogy breaks down is in the area of regional personnel policy. In the USSR, the Party secretaries of individual republics were often allowed to remain in the same position for decades. During the Brezhnev era this turned into a corrupt and semi-federalized system in which regional Party bosses were allowed to run their own rackets undisturbed (like the cotton mafia in Uzbekistan) so long as they met Moscow’s production targets. This is one reason that even in Central Asia, where there was almost no popular support for independence among the local Muslims, the individual republics nevertheless became independent in 1991. What’s more, they’ve stayed independent, even though the tangled boundaries Stalin drew in this region make it a ridiculously awkward arrangement. Who benefits from having five separate Muslim states? Obvious answer: the existing Communist Party bureaucracy in each republic, which more or less remained intact and was handed even greater opportunities for rent-seeking. China is different. In the old days the emperors had something called the “rule of avoidance,” which stipulated that no governor could serve in his native province. This was meant as a simple policy to guard against corruption. The Chinese web of social obligations is so strong that no one holding political power in his home region could be expected to avoid doing favors for his extended family and friends. But the rule of avoidance also eliminates any incentive for regional leaders to support greater devolution, much less independence. The Communists were smart enough to keep the system, so regional governors and Party secretaries (if they’re good) typically get rotated from province to province before getting some sort of plum job in Beijing. Hu Jintao, for example, used to be Party secretary in the TAR: a tough and politically sensitive job, almost certainly assigned as a test to see if he had the chops to run the whole country. Do you think Hu would have supported Tibetan independence if it had suddenly become an option while he was in charge? Not likely. More random thoughts from Shanghai…

By: Doug Muir

Doug Muir — Tue, 23 Nov 2004 08:03:11 +0000

John, I don’t know if I know more or not… and, as I’ve said, I would love to be wrong about this. (Just like I’d love to be wrong about what I think is going to happen in Ukraine. Velvet Revolution II: not.) The Tibetan claim on all of historic Tibet is a big, big problem. Imagine if Latvia had claimed a big chunk of adjacent Belarussian and Russian territory. To have any hope at all, the Tibetans would have to give it up. But for internal reasons, that’s unlikely to happen any time soon. Doug M.

By: BigMatt

BigMatt — Tue, 23 Nov 2004 06:28:12 +0000

As a resident of the PRC, I find the prospect for another democratic uprising here highly doubtful. Han nationalism has grown by leaps and bounds. However, economic liberalization seems to be having an effect: many Chinese living in Guangdong were furious at an attempt of a CCP officer to promote his daughter’s film by asking his constituents to see it. Not a major story of course, but a sign that more Chinese are beginning to take their role as consumers seriously, especially in the wealthier coastal regions.

By: alf

alf — Tue, 23 Nov 2004 05:48:09 +0000

China has had a fairly major revolution every 15 – 25 years for the past century and a half. The chinese people aren’t afraid to cause trouble if they feel they aren’t getting what they deserve. I see no reason to be confident in the current leadership. They havn’t faced any major difficulties and there is no one with the authority of a Deng Xiaoping to deal with a tian’anmen like situation. If the american economy takes a dive, China dosn’t have the internal demand to support itself and the future would not look very bright. The CCP would probably resort to uber nationalism, invade Taiwan further devestating the economy. After that who knows what would happen.

By: John Emerson

John Emerson — Tue, 23 Nov 2004 00:00:55 +0000

That’s news to me, but then I wasn’t paying attention. Except when invading Timor or massacreing Chinese, Indonesia seems to have flown under the radar. In the talk about development, I think I’ve heard something or another about 20 othe third world countries, but not Indonesia.

By: John Quiggin

John Quiggin — Mon, 22 Nov 2004 23:01:32 +0000

Doug, I’ll decline the bet, since you’re clearly better-informed than I am, and in any case the payoff is in future US dollars, an asset I try to avoid. But I will say, although I didn’t spell it out, that my conjecture is only with respect to the TAR. Any irredentist claims for historical Tibet will go nowhere. But, if I’m reading you correctly, the TAR is very like Latvia, where ethnic Latvians formed only a third of the population of Riga at the time of independence, though they were a majority in the country as a whole. Or if you prefer Moldova as an analogy, that’s fine.

By: John Quiggin

John Quiggin — Mon, 22 Nov 2004 22:47:49 +0000

"Suharto’s Indonesia was terribly corrupt, inefficient and economically unsuccessful." Prior to the 1997 crisis, Indonesia managed 7 per cent annual growth for 25 years or so. Here's one source In other words, until the crisis, Suharto's Indonesia was terribly corrupt, inefficient and economically successful, just like China.

By: George

George — Mon, 22 Nov 2004 22:29:04 +0000

Interesting thread, wish I had time to read it through, but quickly: John Holbo, you may be interested in a TNR article from sometime in the last 2-3 months that dealt with the severe environmental degradation wrought by China’s economic growth, and its potential political implications. (Short version: stronger regional authorities, weaker central power.)

By: George

George — Mon, 22 Nov 2004 21:32:53 +0000

By: John Emerson

John Emerson — Mon, 22 Nov 2004 20:15:56 +0000

Suharto’s Indonesia was terribly corrupt, inefficient and economically unsuccessful. China seems to be very successful in its labor-contractor role. As a big American reditor, they also have tremendous leverage, and I have read that they are using their Ameican dollars to increase their presence in SE Asia, C. Asia, and Latin America. I don’t think that there’s a ghost of a chance that China’s actionsin Tibet will ever meet significant international resistance. I’m not even confident about Taiwan, when the chips are down. One of the things I feared at the beginning of the Iraq war was that China would take advantage when America was tied down, and I think that they are setting the stage now. I think that the Chinese leaders are watching the Singapore model with the aim of being a successful technocratic dictatorship. Modernization and economic liberalization without democracy. They seem to be doing a good job of it. The increasing gap between rich and poor is an enormous problem. I could see the richer areas splitting off, or trying to. China frequently fragments in 2-20 smaller nations. I think that disunity was often a good thing, and that European disunity has been a European advantage, but very very few Chinese agree with me on that.

By: Doug Muir

Doug Muir — Mon, 22 Nov 2004 20:11:59 +0000

I’ll make you a bet, John. Every New Year’s Day that passes without an independent, sovereign Tibet, you pay me $50. On the day that Tibet becomes independent, I’ll pay you $1,000. The bet goes on until one of us calls it off. What think you? Doug M.

By: Doug Muir

Doug Muir — Mon, 22 Nov 2004 20:08:01 +0000

John, it’s still a very weak analogy. as of 1989 (the relevant date), the Latvian proportion was 52 per cent, which is not a lot different from the Tibetan situation. The Latvians were still by far the biggest group, since the other 48% was split between Russians, Belorussians, Ukrainians, and various minor groups. The Ukrainians, in particular, showed a high degree of willingness to either go home or “Latvianize”—that’s why there are so few of them there today. Probably more important: the Baltic States were by far the most prosperous part of the old Soviet Union. The Latts, Estonians, etc., had been richer and far more free than their Soviet neighbors before 1940, and even in the 1980s they still were better off by almost any measures. So they considered themselves superior to the Russians and other Slavs. As a result, assimilation in the Baltic States was by no means a one-way street. “Creole” Russians born there tended to be bilingual, and to join the locals in looking down at the backwards folk to the east. Hence the supermajority vote for independence—a great many Russians had come to feel more in common with their new land than their old one. I submit that this is unlikely to be the case in Tibet. (Compare and contrast to Moldova, where neither the Russians nor the native Romanians considered the native culture to be superior. Russians and Ukrainians viewed Moldova as a pleasant but rustic backwater. The Moldovans came to adopt this attitude, complete with accompanying cultural cringe. Which goes a long way to explain why Moldova’s post-1991 history has been much less happy than Latvia’s.) And then of course, Latvia had been, for 20 years, a legally recognized sovereign nation. This is fairly major point. It means no Tibetan independence without a complete collapse of the country into utter chaos. Think Yugoslavia, or Ethiopia-Eritrea. Furthermore, Tibet’s mineral wealth would make it a prize worth fighting for by any side. When one talks about the elites scrambling to loot… well, Tibet would be part of what they’d be looting. Oh, and: Tibet is a big place, and Chinese immigration has not been distributed smoothly. In the Tibetan Autonomous Region (TAR), Han Chinese are still a minority. And if you omit Lhasa, the capital, they’re a fairly small minority—about 15-20%%. Good, right? Except: the flip side of this is that in Tibet /outside/ the TAR, the Han Chinese are an even bigger majority—60-80%. So, if you’re talking about Tibetan independence, realistically the only part where it’s remotely plausible is the TAR. This notwithstanding the fact that the Dalai Lama claims all of “historic Tibet”, an area roughly three times bigger. And they’d have to deal with the fact that their capital city is 2 to 1 Chinese. The Han population consists, as far as I can tell, mostly of first generation migrants including lots of army and government officials. There was an “indigenous” Han population in Old Tibet, numbering between 5% and 10% of the population. They’re still there. Modern Han migration, sure. Just a trickle under Mao, followed by a flood after 1980. But today about half the Han population is creole—Tibetan-born. Children, yah, but also a lot of young adults. They’re not going to leave unless someone makes them. Do I have to point out that there’s abundant precedent for this? Outer Mongolia, for instance, was majority Mongolian as recenty as the 1920s. It’s 90+% Han Chinese now. As regards Indonesia, I think East Timor is a closer parallel than Irian Jaya. John. Do you know how many Indonesians were living in East Timor in 1998? No comparison. Finally, the Dalai Lama is a huge asset The Dalai Lama is no spring chicken. His successor… will need some time to grow into the job. Literally. It’s very sad to think that he probably won’t live to see a free Tibet. But it’s the smart way to bet. Doug M.

By: junius ponds

junius ponds — Mon, 22 Nov 2004 19:50:36 +0000

I’m sure much of the (perceived) legitimacy of the CCP is due to its emphasis on orderly development. It seems that the nouveau riche coastal areas will forgive the slow pace or even absence of political liberalization so long as the CCP is fulfilling its role as guarantor of order and manager of economic expansion. The interior cities and rural areas seem restive but can’t offer more than weak and sporadic protest. Chinese nationals I’ve talked to are generally supportive of the CCP, and their support seems due to these two reasons. When the subject of Colombia came up, one Chinese physics professor remarked, with satisfaction, on how easily the Party would crush any nascent insurgency.

By: linca

linca — Mon, 22 Nov 2004 19:38:51 +0000

A factor in former Soviet republics independance is that the local CP was led by members of the “titular” minority : Latvia leaders were Latvians, Abkhazia leaders were Abkhazs. Which cetrainly helps in getting independence. Is there any such thing in China?