Comments on: Spreading democracy in practice http://crookedtimber.org/2004/11/29/spreading-democracy-in-practice/ Out of the crooked timber of humanity, no straight thing was ever made Sun, 12 Feb 2012 21:53:32 +0000 hourly 1 http://wordpress.org/?v=3.3.1 By: rob http://crookedtimber.org/2004/11/29/spreading-democracy-in-practice/comment-page-2/#comment-52716 rob Fri, 03 Dec 2004 10:18:07 +0000 http://crookedtimber.org/wp/?p=2590#comment-52716 Dan, I think you're right about the ideological change within the CPSU: that was the point of pointing to the rise of a generation which had grown up under Krushchev, who did really have quite a serious effect on the CPSU by denouncing the cult of personality around Stalin. I think that wouldn't have been enough though by itself: that generation needed not only the disposition to question recieved wisdoms, but a reason to do it(guns vs. butter and the unpopularity of communism), and a set of guidelines with which to do the questionning (the Helsinki accords). I know that multiple factor explanations are less than entirely satisfactory in terms of positive social science, precisely because they often can't be replicated and thus can't be tested, but at the risk of offending sociologists, political scientists and economists everywhere, I'm quite sceptical about positive social science precisely because of the prevalence of multiple factor explanations. I do have an argument for this, which runs something like 'reasons are (socially relevant) causes'; 'the causal operation of reasons cannot be subsumed under law-like generalizations'; 'if there are causal factors which cannot be subsumed under law-like generalizations, then the hope of being able to establish a set of law-like generalizations for social explanation is flawed', where reasons and the background against which they are made provide the multiple factor explanation. This isn't really relevant to the thread, though, so... Dan, I think you’re right about the ideological change within the CPSU: that was the point of pointing to the rise of a generation which had grown up under Krushchev, who did really have quite a serious effect on the CPSU by denouncing the cult of personality around Stalin. I think that wouldn’t have been enough though by itself: that generation needed not only the disposition to question recieved wisdoms, but a reason to do it(guns vs. butter and the unpopularity of communism), and a set of guidelines with which to do the questionning (the Helsinki accords). I know that multiple factor explanations are less than entirely satisfactory in terms of positive social science, precisely because they often can’t be replicated and thus can’t be tested, but at the risk of offending sociologists, political scientists and economists everywhere, I’m quite sceptical about positive social science precisely because of the prevalence of multiple factor explanations. I do have an argument for this, which runs something like ‘reasons are (socially relevant) causes’; ‘the causal operation of reasons cannot be subsumed under law-like generalizations’; ‘if there are causal factors which cannot be subsumed under law-like generalizations, then the hope of being able to establish a set of law-like generalizations for social explanation is flawed’, where reasons and the background against which they are made provide the multiple factor explanation. This isn’t really relevant to the thread, though, so…

]]> By: Dan Simon http://crookedtimber.org/2004/11/29/spreading-democracy-in-practice/comment-page-2/#comment-52715 Dan Simon Thu, 02 Dec 2004 21:28:46 +0000 http://crookedtimber.org/wp/?p=2590#comment-52715 Rob: The "agglomeration of many little factors" explanation is terribly unsatisfying, intellectually--which doesn't mean it's necessarily false, of course. One problem with it is that we don't know where to stop--do we include Raisa Gorbachev's love of Western shopping sprees? Yeltsin's drinking? Another problem is that once the list gets too long, we can no longer hope to compare this set of events with other comparable ones, to try to gauge the importance of each factor--given enough factors, there simply won't be any comparable sets of events anymore. A point in the "diffuse causes" theory's favor, on the other hand, is the fact that there was a coup in 1991--one that, had it been launched, say, three years earlier, could very well have succeeded. Hence, we can think of the collapse of the Soviet Union as having been a matter of the Politburo's hardliners having failed to react quickly enough to stave off the collapse. It somehow seems easier to attribute such a delay--as opposed to some kind of grand, revolutionary change--to numerous small obstacles acting in concert. (Note, however, that such causes are far more likely to be internal to the Soviet Union--even to the CPSU itself--than external. Personally, I don't think nearly enough attention in this discussion has been devoted to the remarkable cultural and ideological sea change that must have occurred <i>within</i> the CPSU, in order for a Gorbachev to have been able to rise to power and push his reforms virtually unhindered during the late 1980's.) In any event, I appreciate your comments, and look forward to further interesting discussions on this fascinating topic. Rob: The “agglomeration of many little factors” explanation is terribly unsatisfying, intellectually—which doesn’t mean it’s necessarily false, of course. One problem with it is that we don’t know where to stop—do we include Raisa Gorbachev’s love of Western shopping sprees? Yeltsin’s drinking? Another problem is that once the list gets too long, we can no longer hope to compare this set of events with other comparable ones, to try to gauge the importance of each factor—given enough factors, there simply won’t be any comparable sets of events anymore. A point in the “diffuse causes” theory’s favor, on the other hand, is the fact that there was a coup in 1991—one that, had it been launched, say, three years earlier, could very well have succeeded. Hence, we can think of the collapse of the Soviet Union as having been a matter of the Politburo’s hardliners having failed to react quickly enough to stave off the collapse. It somehow seems easier to attribute such a delay—as opposed to some kind of grand, revolutionary change—to numerous small obstacles acting in concert. (Note, however, that such causes are far more likely to be internal to the Soviet Union—even to the CPSU itself—than external. Personally, I don’t think nearly enough attention in this discussion has been devoted to the remarkable cultural and ideological sea change that must have occurred within the CPSU, in order for a Gorbachev to have been able to rise to power and push his reforms virtually unhindered during the late 1980’s.) In any event, I appreciate your comments, and look forward to further interesting discussions on this fascinating topic.

]]> By: rob http://crookedtimber.org/2004/11/29/spreading-democracy-in-practice/comment-page-2/#comment-52714 rob Thu, 02 Dec 2004 19:38:13 +0000 http://crookedtimber.org/wp/?p=2590#comment-52714 Dan Simon, in a typical wishy-washy liberal manner, I think that attributing the fall of communism to any one explanatory factor is wrong. Undoubtedly you're right to say that Reagan's arms build-up (and Carter's for that matter) could not have by themselves caused the fall of communism: they could have just bit the bullet and made their people poorer. Equally, a public commitment to a human rights declaration doesn't have to mean anything to an autocracy: just look who's signed up to the UN Charter. Clearly, Gorbachev alone couldn't have undermined a social system which was relatively strongly embedded in the society in question, while to say that it was the failure of communism to expand, and to hold its own, looks a bit odd too: no new countries became communist between 1919 and 1945-6, while a communist revolution was defeated in Germany. All four of these factors working together could have significant effects though, especially when combined with the rise of a relatively young generation of communists who'd cut their political teeth under the comparatively liberal rule of Kruschev, which legitimated the criticism of communist ideology (remember Kruschev's denunciation of Stalin?). Then you get a) the guns or butter dilemma b) a willingness to question recieved doctrine c) ostensible commitment to some kind of social-democratic alternative d) the apparent unpopularity of communism, and hey presto, Gorbachev (and his cohorts) reforms undermibne communism from within. What this says about the success of the OSCE/CSCE I don't know: perhaps better cases are the former Soviet Republics, where I think it served as a useful institutional vehicle for Western Europe to support democracy (in some cases). Dan Simon, in a typical wishy-washy liberal manner, I think that attributing the fall of communism to any one explanatory factor is wrong. Undoubtedly you’re right to say that Reagan’s arms build-up (and Carter’s for that matter) could not have by themselves caused the fall of communism: they could have just bit the bullet and made their people poorer. Equally, a public commitment to a human rights declaration doesn’t have to mean anything to an autocracy: just look who’s signed up to the UN Charter. Clearly, Gorbachev alone couldn’t have undermined a social system which was relatively strongly embedded in the society in question, while to say that it was the failure of communism to expand, and to hold its own, looks a bit odd too: no new countries became communist between 1919 and 1945-6, while a communist revolution was defeated in Germany. All four of these factors working together could have significant effects though, especially when combined with the rise of a relatively young generation of communists who’d cut their political teeth under the comparatively liberal rule of Kruschev, which legitimated the criticism of communist ideology (remember Kruschev’s denunciation of Stalin?). Then you get a) the guns or butter dilemma b) a willingness to question recieved doctrine c) ostensible commitment to some kind of social-democratic alternative d) the apparent unpopularity of communism, and hey presto, Gorbachev (and his cohorts) reforms undermibne communism from within. What this says about the success of the OSCE/CSCE I don’t know: perhaps better cases are the former Soviet Republics, where I think it served as a useful institutional vehicle for Western Europe to support democracy (in some cases).

]]> By: rob http://crookedtimber.org/2004/11/29/spreading-democracy-in-practice/comment-page-2/#comment-52713 rob Thu, 02 Dec 2004 19:37:15 +0000 http://crookedtimber.org/wp/?p=2590#comment-52713 Dan Simon, in a typical wishy-washy liberal manner, I think that attributing the fall of communism to any one explanatory factor is wrong. Undoubtedly you're right to say that Reagan's arms build-up (and Carter's for that matter) could not have by themselves caused the fall of communism: they could have just bit the bullet and made their people poorer. Equally, a public commitment to a human rights declaration doesn't have to mean anything to an autocracy: just look who's signed up to the UN Charter. Clearly, Gorbachev alone couldn't have undermined a social system which was relatively strongly embedded in the society in question, while to say that it was the failure of communism to expand, and to hold its own, looks a bit odd too: no new countries became communist between 1919 and 1945-6, while a communist revolution was defeated in Germany. All four of these factors working together could have significant effects though, especially when combined with the rise of a relatively young generation of communists who'd cut their political teeth under the comparatively liberal rule of Kruschev, which legitimated the criticism of communist ideology (remember Kruschev's denunciation of Stalin?). Then you get a) the guns or butter dilemma b) a willingness to question recieved doctrine c) ostensible commitment to some kind of social-democratic alternative d) the apparent unpopularity of communism, and hey presto, Gorbachev (and his cohorts) reforms undermibne communism from within. What this says about the success of the OSCE/CSCE I don't know: perhaps better cases are the former Soviet Republics, where I think it served as a useful institutional vehicle for Western Europe to support democracy (in some cases). Dan Simon, in a typical wishy-washy liberal manner, I think that attributing the fall of communism to any one explanatory factor is wrong. Undoubtedly you’re right to say that Reagan’s arms build-up (and Carter’s for that matter) could not have by themselves caused the fall of communism: they could have just bit the bullet and made their people poorer. Equally, a public commitment to a human rights declaration doesn’t have to mean anything to an autocracy: just look who’s signed up to the UN Charter. Clearly, Gorbachev alone couldn’t have undermined a social system which was relatively strongly embedded in the society in question, while to say that it was the failure of communism to expand, and to hold its own, looks a bit odd too: no new countries became communist between 1919 and 1945-6, while a communist revolution was defeated in Germany. All four of these factors working together could have significant effects though, especially when combined with the rise of a relatively young generation of communists who’d cut their political teeth under the comparatively liberal rule of Kruschev, which legitimated the criticism of communist ideology (remember Kruschev’s denunciation of Stalin?). Then you get a) the guns or butter dilemma b) a willingness to question recieved doctrine c) ostensible commitment to some kind of social-democratic alternative d) the apparent unpopularity of communism, and hey presto, Gorbachev (and his cohorts) reforms undermibne communism from within. What this says about the success of the OSCE/CSCE I don’t know: perhaps better cases are the former Soviet Republics, where I think it served as a useful institutional vehicle for Western Europe to support democracy (in some cases).

]]> By: Dan Hardie http://crookedtimber.org/2004/11/29/spreading-democracy-in-practice/comment-page-2/#comment-52712 Dan Hardie Thu, 02 Dec 2004 19:37:09 +0000 http://crookedtimber.org/wp/?p=2590#comment-52712 'I’d therefore hope that my skepticism would be taken, in this light, as a welcome contribution, rather than as a threat—as some here unfortunately seem to perceive it to be.' Dan, your 'threatening' 'skepticism' is neither threatening nor skeptical. You asked 'can anyone point to a single democratization that clearly would have been less successful in the absence of OSCE intervention?' Henry replied that Vaclav Havel had pointed to such a democratisation; you stated, on no evidence at all, that Havel might have been lying, concluding that if this was conveniently the case, your argument would then be entirely true. Stop flattering yourself that you are seen as a 'threat': you are seen as a damn fool. ‘I’d therefore hope that my skepticism would be taken, in this light, as a welcome contribution, rather than as a threat—as some here unfortunately seem to perceive it to be.’ Dan, your ‘threatening’ ‘skepticism’ is neither threatening nor skeptical. You asked ‘can anyone point to a single democratization that clearly would have been less successful in the absence of OSCE intervention?’ Henry replied that Vaclav Havel had pointed to such a democratisation; you stated, on no evidence at all, that Havel might have been lying, concluding that if this was conveniently the case, your argument would then be entirely true. Stop flattering yourself that you are seen as a ‘threat’: you are seen as a damn fool.

]]> By: Dan Simon http://crookedtimber.org/2004/11/29/spreading-democracy-in-practice/comment-page-2/#comment-52711 Dan Simon Thu, 02 Dec 2004 18:56:12 +0000 http://crookedtimber.org/wp/?p=2590#comment-52711 For the record, I'm deeply skeptical of the theory that Reagan's arms build-up and bellicose rhetoric were decisive in bringing about the collapse of the Soviet Union, and I have <a href="http://icouldbewrong.blogspot.com/2004_06_01_icouldbewrong_archive.html#108702950322677883">said as much before, publicly</a>. I strongly doubt that any diplomatic nods in the direction of this theory by the likes of Walesa or Havel would change my mind. For that matter, it's not at all clear that either of these two gentlemen are likely to have particularly good insight into the causes of the demise of their adversaries. Both were brave, admirable, visionary men, to be sure. But they were preceded by numerous dissidents, each one no less brave, admirable or visionary, who ended up spending their lives rotting away in prisons or in one or another sort of exile for their troubles. The crucial differences between their circumstances--or even those of Havel and Walesa in, say, 1975--and those of Havel and Walesa in 1989 may not even have been visible to those men at the time, let alone conspicuous enough for them to observe and recognize as such. The mystery of why certain established tyrannies suddenly collapse at certain times, and why certain fledgling democracies endure at certain times--while others do not--is far too important to bury in partisan bickering. If I subject the theories I see to the vigorous challenge of empirical plausibility, it's not to promote my own ideologically-driven wishful thinking, but rather in the hope that a nugget of truth may be found after the rubble of bias has been blasted away. I'd therefore hope that my skepticism would be taken, in this light, as a welcome contribution, rather than as a threat--as some here unfortunately seem to perceive it to be. For the record, I’m deeply skeptical of the theory that Reagan’s arms build-up and bellicose rhetoric were decisive in bringing about the collapse of the Soviet Union, and I have said as much before, publicly. I strongly doubt that any diplomatic nods in the direction of this theory by the likes of Walesa or Havel would change my mind. For that matter, it’s not at all clear that either of these two gentlemen are likely to have particularly good insight into the causes of the demise of their adversaries. Both were brave, admirable, visionary men, to be sure. But they were preceded by numerous dissidents, each one no less brave, admirable or visionary, who ended up spending their lives rotting away in prisons or in one or another sort of exile for their troubles. The crucial differences between their circumstances—or even those of Havel and Walesa in, say, 1975—and those of Havel and Walesa in 1989 may not even have been visible to those men at the time, let alone conspicuous enough for them to observe and recognize as such. The mystery of why certain established tyrannies suddenly collapse at certain times, and why certain fledgling democracies endure at certain times—while others do not—is far too important to bury in partisan bickering. If I subject the theories I see to the vigorous challenge of empirical plausibility, it’s not to promote my own ideologically-driven wishful thinking, but rather in the hope that a nugget of truth may be found after the rubble of bias has been blasted away. I’d therefore hope that my skepticism would be taken, in this light, as a welcome contribution, rather than as a threat—as some here unfortunately seem to perceive it to be.

]]> By: abb1 http://crookedtimber.org/2004/11/29/spreading-democracy-in-practice/comment-page-2/#comment-52710 abb1 Thu, 02 Dec 2004 18:36:18 +0000 http://crookedtimber.org/wp/?p=2590#comment-52710 Can't find anything about Walesa praising any 'military buildup'. Or Havel. Can’t find anything about Walesa praising any ‘military buildup’. Or Havel.

]]> By: Sebastian Holsclaw http://crookedtimber.org/2004/11/29/spreading-democracy-in-practice/comment-page-2/#comment-52709 Sebastian Holsclaw Thu, 02 Dec 2004 15:41:16 +0000 http://crookedtimber.org/wp/?p=2590#comment-52709 I'm willing to trust Havel when he says that the OSCE is useful. I'm also willing to trust Havel and Walesa when they say that Reagan's military buildup and blunt confrontation with the USSR was vital to their efforts. Which leaves us in kind of a 'both' place. I’m willing to trust Havel when he says that the OSCE is useful. I’m also willing to trust Havel and Walesa when they say that Reagan’s military buildup and blunt confrontation with the USSR was vital to their efforts. Which leaves us in kind of a ‘both’ place.

]]> By: Dan Hardie http://crookedtimber.org/2004/11/29/spreading-democracy-in-practice/comment-page-2/#comment-52708 Dan Hardie Thu, 02 Dec 2004 13:16:24 +0000 http://crookedtimber.org/wp/?p=2590#comment-52708 Shorter Dan Simon: If Vaclav Havel is a liar, then when he says the OSCE is of great help to establishing democracies he means the precise reverse, proving my case exactly. In future, all statements supporting any argument which I dislike will henceforward be treated as the reverse of the truth, particularly if they come from noted liars and supporters of dictatorship, such as Vaclav Havel. (NB: This assumption of dishonesty will not apply to statements by sources noted for their truthfulness, including especially spokesmen for the George W. Bush administration.) Shorter Dan Simon: If Vaclav Havel is a liar, then when he says the OSCE is of great help to establishing democracies he means the precise reverse, proving my case exactly. In future, all statements supporting any argument which I dislike will henceforward be treated as the reverse of the truth, particularly if they come from noted liars and supporters of dictatorship, such as Vaclav Havel. (NB: This assumption of dishonesty will not apply to statements by sources noted for their truthfulness, including especially spokesmen for the George W. Bush administration.)

]]> By: Doug http://crookedtimber.org/2004/11/29/spreading-democracy-in-practice/comment-page-2/#comment-52707 Doug Thu, 02 Dec 2004 10:54:04 +0000 http://crookedtimber.org/wp/?p=2590#comment-52707 Henry, I've skipped a lot of the Iraq back and forth, so your pardon if I'm repeating things addressed there. One of the key items in the democratization/transition debate has been the influence of the neighborhood. That is, democratic neighbors increase the chance of a successful transition; non-democratic neighbors diminish it. The causality is another argument altogether, but the statistical correlation is a pretty good one. Two things follow for the discussion here. First, Ukraine is bound to be better off than Iraq. One example is the role of Ukraine's other nations: mediation from Poland, support from Slovakia. Contrast that with Iraq's neighbors (an assortment of despotisms) and their actions. Second, starting a neighborhood down the democratic path is a hard problem, and one about which a productive discussion could be had. Henry, I’ve skipped a lot of the Iraq back and forth, so your pardon if I’m repeating things addressed there. One of the key items in the democratization/transition debate has been the influence of the neighborhood. That is, democratic neighbors increase the chance of a successful transition; non-democratic neighbors diminish it. The causality is another argument altogether, but the statistical correlation is a pretty good one. Two things follow for the discussion here. First, Ukraine is bound to be better off than Iraq. One example is the role of Ukraine’s other nations: mediation from Poland, support from Slovakia. Contrast that with Iraq’s neighbors (an assortment of despotisms) and their actions. Second, starting a neighborhood down the democratic path is a hard problem, and one about which a productive discussion could be had.

]]> By: George http://crookedtimber.org/2004/11/29/spreading-democracy-in-practice/comment-page-2/#comment-52706 George Thu, 02 Dec 2004 00:39:31 +0000 http://crookedtimber.org/wp/?p=2590#comment-52706 <i>When Czechoslovak President, Vaclav Havel, a man who one year earlier stood in a Prague jail because of his political beliefs, stood at the Paris Summit and endorsed CSCE as instrumental in bringing about his country's Velvet Revolution, no one could doubt his qualifications for making such a judgment or his sincerity.</i> Obviously false: Dan Simon can doubt his sincerity. I can't say with any authority whether the OSCE is effective or not, or how much. But the Havel example (if accurately conveyed here) seems pretty clearly to meet the minimal standard of contradicting "the “null hypothesis” that the OSCE is completely ineffectual". Side note: I had to dig a bit to discover that the OSCE was called the CSCE prior to 1994. Presumably everybody reads all linked documents in full before commenting (coff), but you might make that clear for your nonexpert readers. When Czechoslovak President, Vaclav Havel, a man who one year earlier stood in a Prague jail because of his political beliefs, stood at the Paris Summit and endorsed CSCE as instrumental in bringing about his country’s Velvet Revolution, no one could doubt his qualifications for making such a judgment or his sincerity. Obviously false: Dan Simon can doubt his sincerity. I can’t say with any authority whether the OSCE is effective or not, or how much. But the Havel example (if accurately conveyed here) seems pretty clearly to meet the minimal standard of contradicting “the “null hypothesis” that the OSCE is completely ineffectual”. Side note: I had to dig a bit to discover that the OSCE was called the CSCE prior to 1994. Presumably everybody reads all linked documents in full before commenting (coff), but you might make that clear for your nonexpert readers.

]]> By: Dan Simon http://crookedtimber.org/2004/11/29/spreading-democracy-in-practice/comment-page-2/#comment-52705 Dan Simon Thu, 02 Dec 2004 00:20:01 +0000 http://crookedtimber.org/wp/?p=2590#comment-52705 Okay, Henry, let's explore this a bit further. Suppose, for a moment--just for the sake of argument, mind you--that the CSCE had been of absolutely no use whatsoever to Vaclav Havel or any of the other leaders of pro-democracy movements in Eastern Europe. Do you believe, in that case, that Vaclav Havel, having been invited to address a CSCE summit in Paris, would not have paid at least some kind of lip service to the professed goals of the organization whose members--important heads of state of countries in a position to help Havel's newly freed land--he was addressing? Would he really be so stubborn as to refrain from such a basic gesture of generosity and goodwill (not to mention good politics)? I'm afraid you'll have to provide a bit more evidence than that to convince me. Okay, Henry, let’s explore this a bit further. Suppose, for a moment—just for the sake of argument, mind you—that the CSCE had been of absolutely no use whatsoever to Vaclav Havel or any of the other leaders of pro-democracy movements in Eastern Europe. Do you believe, in that case, that Vaclav Havel, having been invited to address a CSCE summit in Paris, would not have paid at least some kind of lip service to the professed goals of the organization whose members—important heads of state of countries in a position to help Havel’s newly freed land—he was addressing? Would he really be so stubborn as to refrain from such a basic gesture of generosity and goodwill (not to mention good politics)? I’m afraid you’ll have to provide a bit more evidence than that to convince me.

]]> By: Henry http://crookedtimber.org/2004/11/29/spreading-democracy-in-practice/comment-page-2/#comment-52704 Henry Wed, 01 Dec 2004 22:05:44 +0000 http://crookedtimber.org/wp/?p=2590#comment-52704 bq. Can anyone make a serious argument against the “null hypothesis” that the OSCE is completely ineffectual? Yes. "Vaclav Havel":http://www.crvp.org/book/Series04/IVA-7/chapter_vii.htm. Can anyone make a serious argument against the “null hypothesis” that the OSCE is completely ineffectual? Yes. Vaclav Havel href=”http://www.crvp.org/book/Series04/IVA-7/chapter_vii.htm” rel=”nofollow”>http://www.crvp.org/book/Series04/IVA-7/chapter_vii.htm. ]]> By: abb1 http://crookedtimber.org/2004/11/29/spreading-democracy-in-practice/comment-page-1/#comment-52703 abb1 Wed, 01 Dec 2004 20:38:53 +0000 http://crookedtimber.org/wp/?p=2590#comment-52703 Oops. Apparently it does, indeed, have something to do with the outside actors, "democracy promoters"; according to Katrina vanden Heuvel: <blockquote> As Ian Traynor reports in The Guardian, "...while the gains of the orange-bedecked 'chestnut revolution' are Ukraine's, the campaign is an American creation, a sophisticated and brilliantly conceived exercise in Western branding and mass marketing that, in four countries and four years, has been used to try to salvage rigged elections and topple unsavory regimes...Funded and organized by the US government, deploying US consultancies, pollsters, the two big American parties and US non-government organizations...the operation--engineering democracy through the ballot box and civil disobedience--is now so slick that the methods have matured into a template for winning other people's elections." <br /><br /> It was even US funding that organized and paid for key exit polls; those gave the opposition candidate Viktor Yuschenko an 11-point lead and set the stage for charges of vote fraud. </blockquote> Nothing is what it seems anymore, everything is phony, dammit. <br /><br /> Oops. Apparently it does, indeed, have something to do with the outside actors, “democracy promoters”; according to Katrina vanden Heuvel:
As Ian Traynor reports in The Guardian, “…while the gains of the orange-bedecked ‘chestnut revolution’ are Ukraine’s, the campaign is an American creation, a sophisticated and brilliantly conceived exercise in Western branding and mass marketing that, in four countries and four years, has been used to try to salvage rigged elections and topple unsavory regimes…Funded and organized by the US government, deploying US consultancies, pollsters, the two big American parties and US non-government organizations…the operation—engineering democracy through the ballot box and civil disobedience—is now so slick that the methods have matured into a template for winning other people’s elections.”

It was even US funding that organized and paid for key exit polls; those gave the opposition candidate Viktor Yuschenko an 11-point lead and set the stage for charges of vote fraud.
Nothing is what it seems anymore, everything is phony, dammit.

]]> By: Dan Simon http://crookedtimber.org/2004/11/29/spreading-democracy-in-practice/comment-page-1/#comment-52702 Dan Simon Wed, 01 Dec 2004 20:23:29 +0000 http://crookedtimber.org/wp/?p=2590#comment-52702 As I've <a href="http://icouldbewrong.blogspot.com/2004_02_01_icouldbewrong_archive.html#107639962189890883">pointed out</a> before, the problem with the theory that the OSCE approach is a valuable tool for promoting democracy is that it seems to work best when lots of other factors are also at work vigorously contributing to the establishment of democratic rule. In other words, if the OSCE were a medical treatment, one would be hard-pressed to avoid the conclusion that it is a mere placebo, loudly claiming credit for democratic successes that would have been achieved regardless, and keeping silent about the dead patients that it never had a hope of saving. Can anyone make a serious argument against the "null hypothesis" that the OSCE is completely ineffectual? That is, can anyone point to a single democratization that clearly would have been less successful in the absence of OSCE intervention? (Complaints from anti-democratic forces don't count as evidence for the OSCE's effectiveness, nor do kudos from leaders of democratic movements, unless you're prepared to concede the much greater effectiveness of America's bellicose rhetoric and military assertiveness--both of which have received far more authoritarians' brickbats and democratizers' plaudits than the OSCE ever did.) As I’ve pointed out before, the problem with the theory that the OSCE approach is a valuable tool for promoting democracy is that it seems to work best when lots of other factors are also at work vigorously contributing to the establishment of democratic rule. In other words, if the OSCE were a medical treatment, one would be hard-pressed to avoid the conclusion that it is a mere placebo, loudly claiming credit for democratic successes that would have been achieved regardless, and keeping silent about the dead patients that it never had a hope of saving. Can anyone make a serious argument against the “null hypothesis” that the OSCE is completely ineffectual? That is, can anyone point to a single democratization that clearly would have been less successful in the absence of OSCE intervention? (Complaints from anti-democratic forces don’t count as evidence for the OSCE’s effectiveness, nor do kudos from leaders of democratic movements, unless you’re prepared to concede the much greater effectiveness of America’s bellicose rhetoric and military assertiveness—both of which have received far more authoritarians’ brickbats and democratizers’ plaudits than the OSCE ever did.)

]]>