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	<title>Comments on: The EU and democracy promotion</title>
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	<link>http://crookedtimber.org/2005/02/03/the-eu-and-democracy-promotion/</link>
	<description>Out of the crooked timber of humanity, no straight thing was ever made</description>
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		<title>By: ogmb</title>
		<link>http://crookedtimber.org/2005/02/03/the-eu-and-democracy-promotion/comment-page-1/#comment-59693</link>
		<dc:creator>ogmb</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 03 Feb 2005 23:21:28 +0000</pubDate>
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		<description>&lt;b&gt;henry:&lt;/b&gt; &lt;i&gt;But the Ostpolitik had a quite specific political rationale, and was aimed at promoting democracy, even if it did so softly-softly.&lt;/i&gt;I would claim that democratic regimes have principally the same goals when engaging authoritarian regimes, namely:1. Improve current living conditions under authoritarian rule, both socially and economically.2. Pave way for a transition to a democratic regime sooner rather than later.3. Minimize the human cost of the transition (Promote non-violent means of transition).4. Provide support for a new democratic regime to allow it to take hold and provide tangible benefits to its citizens quickly and lastingly.The problem is that those goals tend to be mutually exclusive, and policies can only be devised to stress some at the cost of others. For instance the GWB policy re: Iraq clearly stressed 2 (instant regime change) over 3 (non-violent regime change), and faltered because it did not plan for point 4 (quick tangible improvements). A policy that stresses 1 quite possibly endangers 2 (provides legitimacy to the authoritarian ruler) and 4 (if life under authoritarian rule is better the perceived improvement will be less pronounced, think &lt;i&gt;Ostalgie&lt;/i&gt;) and can be attacked on those grounds. But it&#039;s the opposite to an embargo policy which ignores 1 to promote 2 and 4. But you name a recent case of an embargo policy that was successful. Cuba, Balkan, Iraq all exacted a high human toll and did nothing to direct popular anger at the dictator -- quite to the contrary. So yes, I see the current EU policy as very much in the tradition of the &lt;i&gt;Kniefall&lt;/i&gt; and the German &lt;i&gt;Annäherungspolitik&lt;/i&gt; and as an alternative to the Bush Doctrine. </description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[	<p><b>henry:</b> <i>But the Ostpolitik had a quite specific political rationale, and was aimed at promoting democracy, even if it did so softly-softly.</i>I would claim that democratic regimes have principally the same goals when engaging authoritarian regimes, namely:1. Improve current living conditions under authoritarian rule, both socially and economically.2. Pave way for a transition to a democratic regime sooner rather than later.3. Minimize the human cost of the transition (Promote non-violent means of transition).4. Provide support for a new democratic regime to allow it to take hold and provide tangible benefits to its citizens quickly and lastingly.The problem is that those goals tend to be mutually exclusive, and policies can only be devised to stress some at the cost of others. For instance the <span class="caps">GWB</span> policy re: Iraq clearly stressed 2 (instant regime change) over 3 (non-violent regime change), and faltered because it did not plan for point 4 (quick tangible improvements). A policy that stresses 1 quite possibly endangers 2 (provides legitimacy to the authoritarian ruler) and 4 (if life under authoritarian rule is better the perceived improvement will be less pronounced, think <i>Ostalgie</i>) and can be attacked on those grounds. But it&#8217;s the opposite to an embargo policy which ignores 1 to promote 2 and 4. But you name a recent case of an embargo policy that was successful. Cuba, Balkan, Iraq all exacted a high human toll and did nothing to direct popular anger at the dictator&#8212;quite to the contrary. So yes, I see the current EU policy as very much in the tradition of the <i>Kniefall</i> and the German <i>Ann&#228;herungspolitik</i> and as an alternative to the Bush Doctrine.</p>
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		<title>By: giles</title>
		<link>http://crookedtimber.org/2005/02/03/the-eu-and-democracy-promotion/comment-page-1/#comment-59692</link>
		<dc:creator>giles</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 03 Feb 2005 22:59:37 +0000</pubDate>
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		<description>5) The EU is in a recession, 5 million unemployed in Germany etc.  Beggars cant be chosers</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[	<p>5) The EU is in a recession, 5 million unemployed in Germany etc.  Beggars cant be chosers</p>
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		<title>By: Maynard Handley</title>
		<link>http://crookedtimber.org/2005/02/03/the-eu-and-democracy-promotion/comment-page-1/#comment-59691</link>
		<dc:creator>Maynard Handley</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 03 Feb 2005 20:34:13 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://crookedtimber.org/wp/?p=2829#comment-59691</guid>
		<description>&lt;b&gt;“in many societies, is not a good ruler but the chaos and bloodshed of large parts of Africa. Thus it seems to me that the best thing the EU can do in most places is to do what it can to hasten the rise of the middle class”&lt;/b&gt;&lt;i&gt;And how exactly does tolerating rulers like Sani Abacha, Mobutu Sese Seko or Robert Mugabe help to foster the rise of a middle class?&lt;/i&gt;And what would you have them do instead? Yes, all options suck. That doesn&#039;t change the fact that there&#039;s no obvious reason to believe that aggressive opposition would have improved things. Mobutu Sese Seko is gone and Zaire/Congo is not obviously better off now. Sani Abacha is gone and while Nigeria is better off, the change is not particularly dramatic.So let&#039;s consider Robert Mugabe --- what do you want the EU to do? Perhaps, if the EU were South Africa they could shut off his power. Perhaps the EU could declare him, his ministers and their wives personae non gratae and have them all buying their goodies in Asia rather than Paris. But beyond that, the simple fact is that if one doesn&#039;t want to get involved with real violence --- arming the opposition by dropping weapons in western Mozambique, one doesn&#039;t have much power over nasty regimes.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[	<p><b>&#8220;in many societies, is not a good ruler but the chaos and bloodshed of large parts of Africa. Thus it seems to me that the best thing the EU can do in most places is to do what it can to hasten the rise of the middle class&#8221;</b><i>And how exactly does tolerating rulers like Sani Abacha, Mobutu Sese Seko or Robert Mugabe help to foster the rise of a middle class?</i>And what would you have them do instead? Yes, all options suck. That doesn&#8217;t change the fact that there&#8217;s no obvious reason to believe that aggressive opposition would have improved things. Mobutu Sese Seko is gone and Zaire/Congo is not obviously better off now. Sani Abacha is gone and while Nigeria is better off, the change is not particularly dramatic.So let&#8217;s consider Robert Mugabe&#8212;- what do you want the EU to do? Perhaps, if the EU were South Africa they could shut off his power. Perhaps the EU could declare him, his ministers and their wives personae non gratae and have them all buying their goodies in Asia rather than Paris. But beyond that, the simple fact is that if one doesn&#8217;t want to get involved with real violence&#8212;- arming the opposition by dropping weapons in western Mozambique, one doesn&#8217;t have much power over nasty regimes.</p>
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		<title>By: ws1</title>
		<link>http://crookedtimber.org/2005/02/03/the-eu-and-democracy-promotion/comment-page-1/#comment-59690</link>
		<dc:creator>ws1</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 03 Feb 2005 20:08:32 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://crookedtimber.org/wp/?p=2829#comment-59690</guid>
		<description>abb1 is absolutely right. Can anybody say with a straight face that the US interventions around the world since 1898, and especially since 1945, have been to promote &quot;democracy&quot;in these places? It is national security, or national interest that has driven all these wars America fought, and all the regimes that America installed. Although some of these countries did become (or from the begining have been) democracies, that was never the objective of the wars. The US has never hesitated in toppling a democratically elected government just because it was a democracy. The increasingly loud noise about promoting democracy (actually it is not even democracy, it&#039;s &quot;freedom&quot; as defined by the US and the US alone)was a very recent thing: much later than the invation of Iraq: after the original pretext of WMD blew up, and after no connection was found between Iraq and bin Laden. I am not saying the US can&#039;t approach international affairs with only its own interest in sight. Quite the opposite, it has every right to choose its tools (or weapons) to deal with other countries. But that&#039;s exactly what the EU is doing with Cuba, Iran, and China: based on its own interest. I don&#039;t undersatnd why the EU has to take the same approach as the US to promote its own interest, as long as national (or regional) interest is the motive. In the end, whether Cuba (or Iran or China or Chile) has a democratically elected government is a much weaker predictor of US policy toward the country than whether it has a government that&#039;s frendly to the US. Just look at the recent and close-to-home examples of Braizil and Venezuela.    </description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[	<p>abb1 is absolutely right. Can anybody say with a straight face that the US interventions around the world since 1898, and especially since 1945, have been to promote &#8220;democracy&#8221;in these places? It is national security, or national interest that has driven all these wars America fought, and all the regimes that America installed. Although some of these countries did become (or from the begining have been) democracies, that was never the objective of the wars. The US has never hesitated in toppling a democratically elected government just because it was a democracy. The increasingly loud noise about promoting democracy (actually it is not even democracy, it&#8217;s &#8220;freedom&#8221; as defined by the US and the US alone)was a very recent thing: much later than the invation of Iraq: after the original pretext of <span class="caps">WMD</span> blew up, and after no connection was found between Iraq and bin Laden. I am not saying the US can&#8217;t approach international affairs with only its own interest in sight. Quite the opposite, it has every right to choose its tools (or weapons) to deal with other countries. But that&#8217;s exactly what the EU is doing with Cuba, Iran, and China: based on its own interest. I don&#8217;t undersatnd why the EU has to take the same approach as the US to promote its own interest, as long as national (or regional) interest is the motive. In the end, whether Cuba (or Iran or China or Chile) has a democratically elected government is a much weaker predictor of US policy toward the country than whether it has a government that&#8217;s frendly to the US. Just look at the recent and close-to-home examples of Braizil and Venezuela.</p>
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		<title>By: Tracy</title>
		<link>http://crookedtimber.org/2005/02/03/the-eu-and-democracy-promotion/comment-page-1/#comment-59689</link>
		<dc:creator>Tracy</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 03 Feb 2005 19:38:12 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://crookedtimber.org/wp/?p=2829#comment-59689</guid>
		<description>I go for (1).  Why on earth do people expect democratic countries to have a consistent government policy (or goals, or whatever) across a number of different areas?  One of the main points of democracy is to stop one person being able to get their way all the time.  Instead we have a bunch of people who get some of their way some of the time.  And a lot of trading going on - &quot;I&#039;ll vote for your pet project if you vote for mine&quot; - &quot;Okay, let&#039;s split the difference and get the Budget passed sometime this year&quot; - &quot;well, doing policy y does conflict with policy x, but it does mean that we&#039;ll get Kelly&#039;s support on policy z&quot;.  It&#039;s hard enough for one person to be consistent, let alone a whole government.  And let&#039;s face it, the most fervent supporters of the EU would not call it a structure designed with the sole purpose of allowing one strong man to impose his view on the whole continent.   </description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[	<p>I go for (1).  Why on earth do people expect democratic countries to have a consistent government policy (or goals, or whatever) across a number of different areas?  One of the main points of democracy is to stop one person being able to get their way all the time.  Instead we have a bunch of people who get some of their way some of the time.  And a lot of trading going on &#8211; &#8220;I&#8217;ll vote for your pet project if you vote for mine&#8221; &#8211; &#8220;Okay, let&#8217;s split the difference and get the Budget passed sometime this year&#8221; &#8211; &#8220;well, doing policy y does conflict with policy x, but it does mean that we&#8217;ll get Kelly&#8217;s support on policy z&#8221;.  It&#8217;s hard enough for one person to be consistent, let alone a whole government.  And let&#8217;s face it, the most fervent supporters of the EU would not call it a structure designed with the sole purpose of allowing one strong man to impose his view on the whole continent.</p>
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		<title>By: abb1</title>
		<link>http://crookedtimber.org/2005/02/03/the-eu-and-democracy-promotion/comment-page-1/#comment-59688</link>
		<dc:creator>abb1</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 03 Feb 2005 17:36:17 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://crookedtimber.org/wp/?p=2829#comment-59688</guid>
		<description>God, this is so silly. None of this has anthing to do with any &#039;democracy promotion&#039; or any human rights, especially the West trying to pull down the Soviet empire. How can anyone take this crap seriously? NGOs can promote democracy and human rights abroad, not national governments; never, it&#039;s just crazy talk...</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[	<p>God, this is so silly. None of this has anthing to do with any &#8216;democracy promotion&#8217; or any human rights, especially the West trying to pull down the Soviet empire. How can anyone take this crap seriously? NGOs can promote democracy and human rights abroad, not national governments; never, it&#8217;s just crazy talk&#8230;</p>
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		<title>By: John Davies</title>
		<link>http://crookedtimber.org/2005/02/03/the-eu-and-democracy-promotion/comment-page-1/#comment-59687</link>
		<dc:creator>John Davies</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 03 Feb 2005 17:25:08 +0000</pubDate>
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		<description>(5) They know that the US is going to do all the hard work and prefer to sit on their hands and criticize from the sidelines.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[	<p>(5) They know that the US is going to do all the hard work and prefer to sit on their hands and criticize from the sidelines.</p>
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		<title>By: Antoni Jaume</title>
		<link>http://crookedtimber.org/2005/02/03/the-eu-and-democracy-promotion/comment-page-1/#comment-59686</link>
		<dc:creator>Antoni Jaume</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 03 Feb 2005 16:39:19 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://crookedtimber.org/wp/?p=2829#comment-59686</guid>
		<description>&quot;[...] old imperial prestige questions (Spain on Cuba)[...]&quot;is a silly sentence. Spaniards care about Cuba for very personal motives,  since a lot still have family living there. DSW</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[	<p>&#8220;[...] old imperial prestige questions (Spain on Cuba)[...]&#8221;is a silly sentence. Spaniards care about Cuba for very personal motives,  since a lot still have family living there. <span class="caps">DSW</span></p>
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		<title>By: Henry</title>
		<link>http://crookedtimber.org/2005/02/03/the-eu-and-democracy-promotion/comment-page-1/#comment-59685</link>
		<dc:creator>Henry</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 03 Feb 2005 16:04:27 +0000</pubDate>
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		<description>bq. the many occasions where hardliners (rightfully?) accused the Bundesregierung of pandering to the SED regimeogmb - I&#039;m not sure if I agree with your analogy here. As far as I can tell, you&#039;re arguing that the Ostpolitik worked in helping to topple C.E. Europe Communist regimes - I&#039;m absolutely in agreement. But the Ostpolitik had a quite specific political rationale, and was aimed at promoting democracy, even if it did so softly-softly. I&#039;m not sure that some of the current policies (viz. China, Iran) have any such aim.If the foreign ministers may be backing down on Cuba, this is very good news (and almost certainly in part attributable to Havel).</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[	<blockquote>the many occasions where hardliners (rightfully?) accused the Bundesregierung of pandering to the <span class="caps">SED</span> regimeogmb &#8211; I&#8217;m not sure if I agree with your analogy here. As far as I can tell, you&#8217;re arguing that the Ostpolitik worked in helping to topple C.E. Europe Communist regimes &#8211; I&#8217;m absolutely in agreement. But the Ostpolitik had a quite specific political rationale, and was aimed at promoting democracy, even if it did so softly-softly. I&#8217;m not sure that some of the current policies (viz. China, Iran) have any such aim.If the foreign ministers may be backing down on Cuba, this is very good news (and almost certainly in part attributable to Havel).</blockquote>
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		<title>By: remi</title>
		<link>http://crookedtimber.org/2005/02/03/the-eu-and-democracy-promotion/comment-page-1/#comment-59666</link>
		<dc:creator>remi</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 03 Feb 2005 15:21:15 +0000</pubDate>
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		<description>Boycotts do not work. They just lend more legitimacy current governement and help the rise of nastionalitic sentiment among the population.Avoiding official contact is good, let trade do the job.Its a medium term solution for sure. Embargo are offective but only over the very long term.The only reason we have embargo on Cuba is for internal policies. Cuban vote in florida is important. But we can&#039;t push it too hard. Look at the backflash that happened after the most stupid stringent where put in place last year.  </description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[	<p>Boycotts do not work. They just lend more legitimacy current governement and help the rise of nastionalitic sentiment among the population.Avoiding official contact is good, let trade do the job.Its a medium term solution for sure. Embargo are offective but only over the very long term.The only reason we have embargo on Cuba is for internal policies. Cuban vote in florida is important. But we can&#8217;t push it too hard. Look at the backflash that happened after the most stupid stringent where put in place last year.</p>
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		<title>By: Luc</title>
		<link>http://crookedtimber.org/2005/02/03/the-eu-and-democracy-promotion/comment-page-1/#comment-59684</link>
		<dc:creator>Luc</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 03 Feb 2005 14:19:55 +0000</pubDate>
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		<description>(4) a continuation of current policies.The EU hardly ever uses a confrontational style in international relations.With the exception of economic issues, the EU hasn&#039;t even got the political tools for it.Boycotts can be useful to achieve certain political goals, but to sell them as democracy promotion is overstating it more than just a little.If the target is democracy promotion, then the only credible option is maintaining relations with a country. If the target is a specific cause, like the treatment of protestors, or dissidents, yes then a boycott of some sorts can have an effect. But that effect has largely faded in the China and Cuba case.Thus, if one assumes that boycotts of all sorts are not effective tools in democracy promotion, the EU policy almost explains itself.This is not to state that selling arms to China, not inviting Cuban dissidents, or negotiating with Iran over nuclear issues is democracy promotion. It isn&#039;t.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[	<p>(4) a continuation of current policies.The EU hardly ever uses a confrontational style in international relations.With the exception of economic issues, the EU hasn&#8217;t even got the political tools for it.Boycotts can be useful to achieve certain political goals, but to sell them as democracy promotion is overstating it more than just a little.If the target is democracy promotion, then the only credible option is maintaining relations with a country. If the target is a specific cause, like the treatment of protestors, or dissidents, yes then a boycott of some sorts can have an effect. But that effect has largely faded in the China and Cuba case.Thus, if one assumes that boycotts of all sorts are not effective tools in democracy promotion, the EU policy almost explains itself.This is not to state that selling arms to China, not inviting Cuban dissidents, or negotiating with Iran over nuclear issues is democracy promotion. It isn&#8217;t.</p>
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		<title>By: Doug</title>
		<link>http://crookedtimber.org/2005/02/03/the-eu-and-democracy-promotion/comment-page-1/#comment-59683</link>
		<dc:creator>Doug</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 03 Feb 2005 13:39:14 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://crookedtimber.org/wp/?p=2829#comment-59683</guid>
		<description>Except that &lt;i&gt;Annäherung&lt;/i&gt; may well have lent more apparent legitimacy to Honnecker &amp;Co than was necessary. The communist regimes did not fall West to East back in 1989. Poland&#039;s change came well before the GDR&#039;s.An EU that is ignoring Havel on how to deal with dissidents and repressive regimes is an EU that is not using its resources effectively.I&#039;m going to plump for (1), based on the view of EU policy being generally the policy of the most interested member state. There are rare exceptions where the CFSP actually is common. Generally, however, policy is driven by either a single member state or a small coalition of member states. Thus Adamkus and Kwasniewski in Kiev. Thus earlier Denmark, Sweden and Finland taking the lead on Baltic integration. Examples multiply.EU policy on democracy promotion, such as it is, does not seem strong enough to trump commercial interests (French arms to China) or old imperial prestige questions (Spain on Cuba), let alone common security questions (Iran).Iran does seem an example of a common foreign policy (though not one run out of Solana&#039;s office), but one where the long-term security of a democratic Iran is subordinated to the hoped-for short- and medium-term gains of a non-nuclear Iran.Keeping 1940s technology away from 21st century states is not an easy task, and there are certainly valid disagreements on how to go about it.Explanation (1) is also more parsimonious from the point of view of people making day-to-day decisions in the EU governments, and in Brussels. Changing the &lt;i&gt;raison d&#039;etre&lt;/i&gt; and balancing the US are both second-order items; that is, neither can be done directly. On the other hand, putting sales above human rights in China relations can be done directly. Any larger effects come inductively. Unless and until someone can ride herd on what the small initiatives add up to, (2) and (3) remain unlikely as conscious effects. The national governments by definition can&#039;t do this, and I don&#039;t think that Solana&#039;s office has the resources or the clout to do it. (Not that foreign policy incoherence is a problem unique to the EU.)</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[	<p>Except that <i>Ann&#228;herung</i> may well have lent more apparent legitimacy to Honnecker &#038;Co than was necessary. The communist regimes did not fall West to East back in 1989. Poland&#8217;s change came well before the <span class="caps">GDR</span>&#8217;s.An EU that is ignoring Havel on how to deal with dissidents and repressive regimes is an EU that is not using its resources effectively.I&#8217;m going to plump for (1), based on the view of EU policy being generally the policy of the most interested member state. There are rare exceptions where the <span class="caps">CFSP</span> actually is common. Generally, however, policy is driven by either a single member state or a small coalition of member states. Thus Adamkus and Kwasniewski in Kiev. Thus earlier Denmark, Sweden and Finland taking the lead on Baltic integration. Examples multiply.EU policy on democracy promotion, such as it is, does not seem strong enough to trump commercial interests (French arms to China) or old imperial prestige questions (Spain on Cuba), let alone common security questions (Iran).Iran does seem an example of a common foreign policy (though not one run out of Solana&#8217;s office), but one where the long-term security of a democratic Iran is subordinated to the hoped-for short- and medium-term gains of a non-nuclear Iran.Keeping 1940s technology away from 21st century states is not an easy task, and there are certainly valid disagreements on how to go about it.Explanation (1) is also more parsimonious from the point of view of people making day-to-day decisions in the EU governments, and in Brussels. Changing the <i>raison d&#8217;etre</i> and balancing the US are both second-order items; that is, neither can be done directly. On the other hand, putting sales above human rights in China relations can be done directly. Any larger effects come inductively. Unless and until someone can ride herd on what the small initiatives add up to, (2) and (3) remain unlikely as conscious effects. The national governments by definition can&#8217;t do this, and I don&#8217;t think that Solana&#8217;s office has the resources or the clout to do it. (Not that foreign policy incoherence is a problem unique to the EU.)</p>
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		<title>By: markus</title>
		<link>http://crookedtimber.org/2005/02/03/the-eu-and-democracy-promotion/comment-page-1/#comment-59682</link>
		<dc:creator>markus</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 03 Feb 2005 12:54:40 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://crookedtimber.org/wp/?p=2829#comment-59682</guid>
		<description>mostly what Maynard Handley  said.In Germany the concept is sold as &quot;change by approach&quot; (as opposed to &quot;change by opposition&quot;), born from the realisation that carrots and sticks work best if you are on somewhat friendly terms with the one they are applied to.A hostile regime will not appreciate small diplomatic guestures, you can more or less only threaten sanctions or war. If a tyrant has given up all hope of earning some international respect, he&#039;s unlikely to agree to small reforms in exchange for a little more recognition.That said, the concept is of course dubious and economic self-interest obviously plays a role in all foreign policy. Right now I think it might work well if the US continues to play the bad cop to Europe&#039;s good cop, though I hasten to add that while I believe the US has that role by (Bush&#039;s) choice it is of course not a usefull long-term strategy to loose goodwill towards the US in exchange for goodwill towards the EU and thus have the US pick up the bill and at the very least the important role of the &quot;bad cop&quot; in the grand scheme of things is underappreciated and underacknowledged.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[	<p>mostly what Maynard Handley  said.In Germany the concept is sold as &#8220;change by approach&#8221; (as opposed to &#8220;change by opposition&#8221;), born from the realisation that carrots and sticks work best if you are on somewhat friendly terms with the one they are applied to.A hostile regime will not appreciate small diplomatic guestures, you can more or less only threaten sanctions or war. If a tyrant has given up all hope of earning some international respect, he&#8217;s unlikely to agree to small reforms in exchange for a little more recognition.That said, the concept is of course dubious and economic self-interest obviously plays a role in all foreign policy. Right now I think it might work well if the US continues to play the bad cop to Europe&#8217;s good cop, though I hasten to add that while I believe the US has that role by (Bush&#8217;s) choice it is of course not a usefull long-term strategy to loose goodwill towards the US in exchange for goodwill towards the EU and thus have the US pick up the bill and at the very least the important role of the &#8220;bad cop&#8221; in the grand scheme of things is underappreciated and underacknowledged.</p>
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		<title>By: Abiola Lapite</title>
		<link>http://crookedtimber.org/2005/02/03/the-eu-and-democracy-promotion/comment-page-1/#comment-59681</link>
		<dc:creator>Abiola Lapite</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 03 Feb 2005 11:55:12 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://crookedtimber.org/wp/?p=2829#comment-59681</guid>
		<description>&lt;em&gt;&quot;in many societies, is not a good ruler but the chaos and bloodshed of large parts of Africa. Thus it seems to me that the best thing the EU can do in most places is to do what it can to hasten the rise of the middle class&quot;&lt;/em&gt;And how exactly does tolerating rulers like Sani Abacha, Mobutu Sese Seko or Robert Mugabe help to foster the rise of a middle class?</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[	<p><em>&#8220;in many societies, is not a good ruler but the chaos and bloodshed of large parts of Africa. Thus it seems to me that the best thing the EU can do in most places is to do what it can to hasten the rise of the middle class&#8221;</em>And how exactly does tolerating rulers like Sani Abacha, Mobutu Sese Seko or Robert Mugabe help to foster the rise of a middle class?</p>
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		<title>By: Austroblogger</title>
		<link>http://crookedtimber.org/2005/02/03/the-eu-and-democracy-promotion/comment-page-1/#comment-59680</link>
		<dc:creator>Austroblogger</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 03 Feb 2005 11:38:55 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://crookedtimber.org/wp/?p=2829#comment-59680</guid>
		<description>As a matter of interest, the piece in this morning&#039;s german language &quot;Die Presse&quot; stated that the EU foreign minister simultaneously voted to strengthen contacts with opposition groups.... </description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[	<p>As a matter of interest, the piece in this morning&#8217;s german language &#8220;Die Presse&#8221; stated that the EU foreign minister simultaneously voted to strengthen contacts with opposition groups&#8230;.</p>
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