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	<title>Comments on: The expected utility of voting</title>
	<atom:link href="http://crookedtimber.org/2005/04/16/the-expected-utility-of-voting/feed/" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml" />
	<link>http://crookedtimber.org/2005/04/16/the-expected-utility-of-voting/</link>
	<description>Out of the crooked timber of humanity, no straight thing was ever made</description>
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		<title>By: Andrew Gelman</title>
		<link>http://crookedtimber.org/2005/04/16/the-expected-utility-of-voting/comment-page-1/#comment-68643</link>
		<dc:creator>Andrew Gelman</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 20 Apr 2005 15:10:31 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://crookedtimber.org/2005/04/16/the-expected-utility-of-voting/#comment-68643</guid>
		<description>Thanks for the plug.  In brief:  we understand voting as a rational act, given that a voter is voting to benefit not just himself or herself, but also the country (or the world) at large. (This &quot;social&quot; motivation is in fact consistent with opinion polls, which find, for example, that voting decisions are better predicted by views on the economy as a whole than by personal financial situations.)

This rational social motivation can have implications not only on whether to vote, but also on which candidates you will choose to vote for.

We discuss further here:  http://tinyurl.com/84xos</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[	<p>Thanks for the plug.  In brief:  we understand voting as a rational act, given that a voter is voting to benefit not just himself or herself, but also the country (or the world) at large. (This &#8220;social&#8221; motivation is in fact consistent with opinion polls, which find, for example, that voting decisions are better predicted by views on the economy as a whole than by personal financial situations.)</p>

	<p>This rational social motivation can have implications not only on whether to vote, but also on which candidates you will choose to vote for.</p>

	<p>We discuss further here:  <a href="http://tinyurl.com/84xos" rel="nofollow">http://tinyurl.com/84xos</a></p>
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		<title>By: Michael Otsuka</title>
		<link>http://crookedtimber.org/2005/04/16/the-expected-utility-of-voting/comment-page-1/#comment-68598</link>
		<dc:creator>Michael Otsuka</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 20 Apr 2005 11:11:27 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://crookedtimber.org/2005/04/16/the-expected-utility-of-voting/#comment-68598</guid>
		<description>_Shouldn’t answers be tied to actual behavior._

It depends on the question, and it&#039;s not clear from your post which question you had in mind.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[	<p><em>Shouldn&#8217;t answers be tied to actual behavior.</em></p>

	<p>It depends on the question, and it&#8217;s not clear from your post which question you had in mind.</p>
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		<title>By: km</title>
		<link>http://crookedtimber.org/2005/04/16/the-expected-utility-of-voting/comment-page-1/#comment-68386</link>
		<dc:creator>km</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 19 Apr 2005 16:52:33 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://crookedtimber.org/2005/04/16/the-expected-utility-of-voting/#comment-68386</guid>
		<description>Sorry to keep harping on the 1/n business, but I don&#039;t see how their assumption that the difference is of distribution f(d), *independent* of the number of voters, is all that reasonable.

If I were conjuring a model, I&#039;d probably end up with something like a binomial model with n trials where the parameter is chosen according some distribution. Unless the parameter is exactly 1/2, then the chance of being a decider is exponential in n.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[	<p>Sorry to keep harping on the 1/n business, but I don&#8217;t see how their assumption that the difference is of distribution f(d), <strong>independent</strong> of the number of voters, is all that reasonable.</p>

	<p>If I were conjuring a model, I&#8217;d probably end up with something like a binomial model with n trials where the parameter is chosen according some distribution. Unless the parameter is exactly 1/2, then the chance of being a decider is exponential in n.</p>
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		<title>By: Justin</title>
		<link>http://crookedtimber.org/2005/04/16/the-expected-utility-of-voting/comment-page-1/#comment-68112</link>
		<dc:creator>Justin</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sun, 17 Apr 2005 16:55:02 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://crookedtimber.org/2005/04/16/the-expected-utility-of-voting/#comment-68112</guid>
		<description>Shouldn&#039;t answers be tied to actual behavior.  Socially, we know that certain people will vote no matter what, out of a sense of obligation, out of a sense of participating in the democratic process, etc.  In other words, if Schumpeter is correct, in order to continue the ruse that democracy really provides choice.

If economics wants to continue to be viewed as a serious field, it should not only attempt to find answers to paradoxes it cannot explain that are no longer paradoxically but also actually connected to the real reasons things happen.  OTherwise economics becomes nothing more than an irrelevant game of consistency-with-false-premise.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[	<p>Shouldn&#8217;t answers be tied to actual behavior.  Socially, we know that certain people will vote no matter what, out of a sense of obligation, out of a sense of participating in the democratic process, etc.  In other words, if Schumpeter is correct, in order to continue the ruse that democracy really provides choice.</p>

	<p>If economics wants to continue to be viewed as a serious field, it should not only attempt to find answers to paradoxes it cannot explain that are no longer paradoxically but also actually connected to the real reasons things happen.  OTherwise economics becomes nothing more than an irrelevant game of consistency-with-false-premise.</p>
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		<title>By: John Quiggin</title>
		<link>http://crookedtimber.org/2005/04/16/the-expected-utility-of-voting/comment-page-1/#comment-68100</link>
		<dc:creator>John Quiggin</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sun, 17 Apr 2005 09:15:12 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://crookedtimber.org/2005/04/16/the-expected-utility-of-voting/#comment-68100</guid>
		<description>
I wouldn&#039;t like to push a claim of full rationality here, but I think the correlation between turnout and perceived difference goes the right way. For example, IIRC, turnout rose in the US in 2004 after a long period of decline, which would match our shared perception of party differences.

Again, I think you have to include social duty to vote as a partial explanation. But this works fine as against egoistic or expressive voting. Suppose you think the preservation of parliamentary democracy in Britain is worth 5 billion pounds, and assume for simplicity that 100 per cent turnout would guarantee this, while zero turnout would mean no democracy. Then, while there may be some nonlinearity somewhere in the scale, that yields an average social benefit of 100 pounds from voting as opposed to non-voting. </description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[
	<p>I wouldn&#8217;t like to push a claim of full rationality here, but I think the correlation between turnout and perceived difference goes the right way. For example, <span class="caps">IIRC</span>, turnout rose in the US in 2004 after a long period of decline, which would match our shared perception of party differences.</p>

	<p>Again, I think you have to include social duty to vote as a partial explanation. But this works fine as against egoistic or expressive voting. Suppose you think the preservation of parliamentary democracy in Britain is worth 5 billion pounds, and assume for simplicity that 100 per cent turnout would guarantee this, while zero turnout would mean no democracy. Then, while there may be some nonlinearity somewhere in the scale, that yields an average social benefit of 100 pounds from voting as opposed to non-voting.</p>
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		<title>By: Chris</title>
		<link>http://crookedtimber.org/2005/04/16/the-expected-utility-of-voting/comment-page-1/#comment-68099</link>
		<dc:creator>Chris</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sun, 17 Apr 2005 07:57:04 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://crookedtimber.org/2005/04/16/the-expected-utility-of-voting/#comment-68099</guid>
		<description>Nice paper.

I think I mused in one of the comments threads about whether the expected social benefit of party A rather than party B winning could normally be rationally justified as large enough (given uncertainties about how things will turn out etc.). With some elections I&#039;m willing to grant that it could (Bush-Kerry?). But what about two-party systems where the parties really have converged because of competition for our old friend the median voter? I guess this model should predict lower turnouts in those cases, but my hunch is (based on not looking at any data whatsoever) that this isn&#039;t what actually happens in elections answering that description.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[	<p>Nice paper.</p>

	<p>I think I mused in one of the comments threads about whether the expected social benefit of party A rather than party B winning could normally be rationally justified as large enough (given uncertainties about how things will turn out etc.). With some elections I&#8217;m willing to grant that it could (Bush-Kerry?). But what about two-party systems where the parties really have converged because of competition for our old friend the median voter? I guess this model should predict lower turnouts in those cases, but my hunch is (based on not looking at any data whatsoever) that this isn&#8217;t what actually happens in elections answering that description.</p>
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		<title>By: Michael Otsuka</title>
		<link>http://crookedtimber.org/2005/04/16/the-expected-utility-of-voting/comment-page-1/#comment-68078</link>
		<dc:creator>Michael Otsuka</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sat, 16 Apr 2005 23:24:47 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://crookedtimber.org/2005/04/16/the-expected-utility-of-voting/#comment-68078</guid>
		<description>Thanks for the post and the link!</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[	<p>Thanks for the post and the link!</p>
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