“As Fabius put it in November, what kind of constitution runs to 500 pages?”

The one of Alabama?

DSW

They wanted more territory and were very willing to take advantage of the fact that some of their neighbours had been through the bloodiest war in history to get it.

But even if they did, they still wouldn’t be spending if they feared their job might be gone tomorrow.

I don’t know about France and Italy, but overdafts, instalment loans, credit cards, and many other kinds of consumer credit have been freely available in Germany for as long as I can remember, Roger.

Here’s the heart of Hutton’s case:
“A more obvious explanation stares European governments in the face, but nobody dares to act. The heart of British consumer spending growth is the withdrawal of equity from our houses; now that the housing market is slowing down, predictably there is a slowdown in spending. But the apparatus that supports equity withdrawal in Britain – a high-transaction housing market, low stamp duty, financial institutions ready to offer 100 per cent mortgages, the ‘Tesco approach’ to loan finance and even the concept of the overdraft – is completely absent in France, Germany and Italy. They retain the rules that we used to have in the Fifties and Sixties, and because liquidity in the housing market is so poor (transaction costs in all three countries exceed 10 per cent of the value of the property), lenders are more risk-averse.”

Outside of that particular factor, Hutton’s larger point is that this is a typical Keynesian crisis of overproduction and underconsumption. Unfortunately, the EU economic mandarins don’t see it like that, and are obsessed with keeping national deficits down and the specter of inflation.

I’m quite psyched by the non, actually. Jospin, d’Estaing, Chirac, a sort of evil three muskateers—were bucked. As Fabius put it in November, what kind of constitution runs to 500 pages? Now, if the PS has any sense left, they will put a final stake in the heart of Jospin and his associates and make a real play for power, based on the obvious feeling, in France, that the place should be a nation, plus a determination to accomodate the needs of a social democracy with the needs of a growth oriented economy. The latter formula does entail freeing up the credit market to some extent, and probably reflating, but not the assimilation of American style inequality.

But then let me turn to what I found most interesting in the opinion piece, its use of language.

Morgan claims that “Without the EU, Europeans can kiss goodbye to security and prosperity.” This makes security and prosperity lovers or perhaps relatives. (Yes, the claim is dubious. too.)

Farther down we learn that Europeans have “slipped their moorings from reality”. (I’ll let those more in touch with nautical matters decode that, if possible.)

Next we come to my favorite, the “security blanket – moth-holed and threadbare, though it is – of nationalism”. Those who know a little history will be struck by Morgan’s claim that nationalism is a security blanket, something to comfort toddlers. Others, like me, will wonder who the moths are in this metaphor, and why the Europeans did not protect the blanket with mothballs.

Then we learn that “European enlargement” offers Central and Eastern Europe a “life-line into the modern democratic world”. Without the enlargment, then these nations would drown in, well, I am not sure what they would drow in.

But I shouldn’t have all the fun here. I’ll leave “recipe”, “trumpets”, and “antidote” for the rest of you to play with.

Am I being unfair here? Should I take Morgan’s arguments more seriously? I don’t think so. Consider, for example Morgan’s belief that security and prosperity” are central goals for everyone. It should be possible, even at such narrow places at the Harvard Government department, to find a few who would disagree on their universality. And at least a few besides me must have noticed Morgan’s acceptance of low birth rates in Europe as something impossible to change.

Morgan and I do agree on one point: The thinking on much of the European left is not impressive. And that is unfortunate.

I have not yet been to Lodz, but to Marseille, to some of the many devastated and dying parts of East Germany, and to truly poor areas, eg Lesotho in Southern Africa, rural Iran, rural China. And let me tell you, there’s no “winning” this competition. But there is a reminder of the politico-economic question underlying the EU Constitution: Poverty or Resistance. Do you want a neoliberalised, deregulated Europe where corporatist crusaders run rampant and call it freedom? The answer to which the French just gave – and I would have too, if Berlin had not just ratified it.

Central Europe’s still blessed with a middle/lower-middle class, but things on the continent are changing fast. Here’s but one illustration: A growing number of young German academics, scientists and physicians are leaving the country: No jobs or low-pay jobs, growing academic chaos, rising costs and no long-term stability or prospects. So we go overseas. Take medicine: Young Czech and Polish doctors are coming in to take on the poorly paid “House positions” that German hospitals create (as they are loathe to pay the sums for Federal regulated jobs). For my East European friends these are still good jobs with a variety of rewards. For Germans they don’t even pay the rent. This is what’s happening right now: A kind of “poverty-adjustment” as Alphonse van Worden and others on Long Sunday (www.long-sunday.net) have already pointed out.

So comparing poverty is not the point. The point is to resist the redistribution of wealth and power that only makes things worse – and to come up with an intelligent alternative.

The American Constitution originally, by contrast, was about structure, and was designed primarily to ensure that “who does what” and “how is it decided” was clear and acceptable to the component states. Compromises (like the Senate, the Electoral College, and the 3/5 rule) were adopted so that the decision-making process would be tolerable to all the component states. (Admittedly, the experiment was only partly successful; eventually, the powerful part of the nation attacked the weaker part, and used its military power to force a change in policy and structure that was to its advantage.)

What’s with Lodz? I hear that Eastern Germans now go to Poland looking for work, so how bad could it be?

2.National governments really don’t make the interesting decisions any more. Voter interest is low and there is precious little to choos between the parties. However they use Brussels as as scapegoat despite being behind many of its worst excesses, the council of ministers for example.

3. Being a hyperpower has never done anyone much good. People don’t like you, the chippy pick fights with you and you get caught wearing the emperor’s new clothes.

4. There has been remarkably little debate about individual issues within the constitution. The problem with it being such a large sweeping document is that most of the things that people say about it are true. It does, as far as I can tell, tidy up a lot of existing treaties. It also does new stuff. Surely there ought to be three documents—a shorter constitution, a clean up of the existing treaties and new measures.

5. Whose idea was it to get valery Giscard D’Estaing to write the thing?

6. More power to the parliament!

Um, like who? Fidel Castro? Have you talked to any French people lately? More here:

http://www.long-sunday.net/long_sunday/