Comments on: Happiness is a Warm Book

By: Jeff R.

Jeff R. — Thu, 23 Jun 2005 16:15:33 +0000

Doesn’t the conflation of utility with happiness leave one with no solid ground on which to exclude immoral/other-regarding preferences from a utilitarian calculation? I mean, surely it can’t be denied that a bigot is made unhappy when the group he hates is made equal to him…

By: Matt

Matt — Thu, 23 Jun 2005 14:31:25 +0000

D said,
“The position is no more straightforwardly false than utilitarianism generally.”

Sounds good to me- this might be one of those cases where your Modus Ponens is my Modus Tollens.

By: D

Thu, 23 Jun 2005 14:15:23 +0000

Accepting an experientialist account of happiness, and assuming that after proper reflection we would all choose accordingly need not be “straightforwardly false” or “survive by loading so much covert content into “proper” as to be thoroughly misleading.” I won’t defend the position – I’m no utilitarian – but it is probably what underlies much of what makes utilitarianism so plausible to so many. It requires a substantive argument that only experiences should matter in ideal reasoning (and that actual preferences to the contrary reflect irrationality), but such arguments are available. The position is no more straightforwardly false than utilitarianism generally.

By: engels

engels — Thu, 23 Jun 2005 12:31:06 +0000

Happiness or its cognates aren’t observable, but to some extent preferences are, a distinction which moves the debate from armchair theorizing to the possibility of research in the marketplace.

Actually I don’t think that’s obvious. I think this is one of Layard’s points: that the idea of measuring happiness has scientific credibility. The cognates of happiness are stable throughout the world, you can get meaningful data by asking people how happy they are and these “observations” are increasingly being given a solid theoretical basis in neuroscience.

By: abb1

abb1 — Thu, 23 Jun 2005 10:26:59 +0000

Well, at least one of the points here seems to be to undermine the idea that ‘selfishness’ is the basis of morality. And once you interpret altruism as a form of selfishness, this whole concept becomes meaningless. Or maybe I’m just confused.

By: bad Jim

bad Jim — Thu, 23 Jun 2005 10:03:40 +0000

Clearly that’s the point our host intended. Happiness or its cognates aren’t observable, but to some extent preferences are, a distinction which moves the debate from armchair theorizing to the possibility of research in the marketplace.

By: abb1

abb1 — Thu, 23 Jun 2005 09:47:42 +0000

If people choose different kinds of experiences, or even things that don’t maximise their own chances for good experiences (as when people take life-endangering jobs so as to provide goods for their children) they are getting what they choose, but not maximising utility as Bentham saw it.

One could argue that when people ‘take life-endangering jobs so as to provide goods for their children’ they do it to maximise their happiness (advantage, pleasure, etc.) by attaining peace of mind they’ve been lacking.

Even someone who (with enough information, after sufficient deliberation, etc.) chooses to voluntarily end his/her life for the sake of her children (or whatever) – sill, it could be argued that this person is driven by the desire to avoid anticipated future mental suffering.

Why couldn’t this be interpreted as ‘maximising utility as Bentham saw it’?

Although I have to agree that defining ‘happiness’ as ‘whatever I choose to do’ makes the whole thing kinda meaningless.

By: nic

nic — Thu, 23 Jun 2005 09:01:54 +0000

(2) A good society is one in which as much of what people would choose for themselves … is attained, taking care that when there is a tradeoff between one person’s preferences and another’s, each one counts equally.

There are other interesting illustations of the differences. Bentham wasn’t just concerned about people. A distinctive part of his thought is his concern about the suffering of animals. By Brad’s account, if people are cruel to animals, so long as they choose to do so then that’s fine. Bentham wouldn’t think of that as a good society.

By: Chris Bertram

Chris Bertram — Thu, 23 Jun 2005 06:51:51 +0000

if he accepts an experientialist account of happiness, and assumes that after proper reflection we would all choose accordingly.

Which would either be straightforwardly false or would survive by loading so much covert content into “proper” as to be thoroughly misleading.

By: D

Thu, 23 Jun 2005 05:28:33 +0000

I think Brad may be giving in too quickly. I won’t try to defend Layard. Without reading his book I can’t say whether or not the criticism is waranted. Brad would be right if he accepts an experientialist account of happiness, and assumes that after proper reflection we would all choose accordingly. Maybe Brad just isn’t ready to take on that position.

By: Brad DeLong

Brad DeLong — Thu, 23 Jun 2005 04:35:41 +0000

Touche…