Nor do I think that many readers of this blog would regard “encouraging conflict between the West and ‘Islam’” as a good reason for going to war, whereas “throwing off the foreign oppressor” or “stopping the US government from funding opressive dictatorships” are rather more morally defensible reasons for going to war.

So I still think that the targetting of civilians in this case cannot be regarded as morally justifiable.

Terrorism was escalating well before George Bush was elected, and September 11 happened before the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, so I don’t think we can so confidently blame the growth in the industry on Bush and Blair. Of course we can’t prove the counter-factual, but the pattern was already established.

The bombings in London have in fact greatly aided western governments in justifying their failed strategy in Iraq and are, from the point of view of campaigning for the withdrawel of troops counterproductive. From the point of view of an ideology which wishes to see conflict between the west and something called ‘Islam’ they are of course highly successful. Its doubtful that Bin Laden in his wildest fantasies envisaged that his wishes would be fulfilled as they have been by Bush and Blair in such a short period of time, and given the obvious idiocy and short-sightedness of western politicians terrorism in the west is clearly a very successful, rational and effective means of pursuing the kind of ideology associated with Al-Qaida.

Thanks to Bush and Blair its a growth industry and we can expect more of the same.

Its also important to understand what Al Qaida is. It is not an organisation with a global hierarchical structure. It is an ideology embraced by various groups in different contexts (I here follow the arguments of Jason Burke which seem to me the best explanatory model. “Al Qaida in Iraq” is actually headed by someone who is politically a rival of Bin Laden). That ideology is immensely strengthened by the presence of American troops.

Arguments that Sunni’s ‘had power’ in Iraq are grotesquely overstated and are basically propaganda attempting to draw an equivilance between those areas strongly resisting the occupation and Saddam Hussain (where attempts to draw an equivilance with Al Qaida fail). They also dramatically understate the importance of local networks of power in both the south and the north on which Saddam relied for his power.

Falluja was a centre of resistance to Saddam Hussain and this resistance was centred on the mosque. Its worth remembering that even the Ba’athist regime was not capable of ensuring that it had a monopoly of armed force in any area of the country even at its most coherent. At its most incoherent (after 1991) it was forced to depend on the collaberation of various informal networks drawn from all sections of Iraqi society.

There is a great danger that US arguments about the connection between Sunni Muslims and the Ba’athist regime will be used to justify ethnic cleansing (already happening in many parts of the country) and that self proclaimed liberals will actually support this in the name of avenging the crimes of the Ba’athists. It is important at the outset to demythologise this view of the Iraqi State.

Communal conflict in Iraq has never been central to its modern history. This is rightly stressed by many Iraqi’s who point to the lack of symmetry between patterns of marriage, occupation, and power and confessional status. Tribal identities cut across these and were always more important in the excercise of power. However such arguments fail to understand that communal conflict is never ‘natural’. Its a response to changing conditions. And the coalition have created conditions were these divisions can emerge. They have hence become a clear and present danger. The ideology of communal division is one of the few things permitting the continued presence of coalition troops (a key moment was Al Sadr’s breaking solidarity with Falluja despite assurences to the contrary under pressure from Sistani who effectively rescued the coalition from its own blunders).

There is a minority of secular middle class Iraqi’s who like the idea of foreign rule to keep the unwashed away from power and see some form of facade democracy as their best bet. In the colonial days they supported the monarchy, a section of them came to identify with Ba’athism, and today large numbers have switched over to the occupation. They are the ones who appear on Newsnight mouthing platitudes from Fox News.

They are democrats by default. As is Iraq’s ‘democracy’. Iraq has no sovereignty (sovereign is he who decides the exception) and for that reason the real battle for power is unfolding outside of consitutional structures. No serious decision about sovereignty is ever going to flow from the constitutional arrangements devised by the Occupation.

I would ask you both to explain the scenes beside the British jeep in Basra and what they signify.

The that the Sunni support for Al Qaida exists says nothing about general support for Al Qaida or hatred of foreign troop presence. The Sunni’s where in charge before the invasion. They are really the only group who lost power as a result of the war. Al Qaida’s stance on religious matters makes them a defacto enemy of the Shites. The expected result of a forced US / British withdrawl is a cival war. The Sunni faction supported by foreign fights, Sudi money, and Al Qaida. The Shites supported by Iran. The Kurds supported by the US. The Sunni faction would have no choice but to give Al Qaida some sort of power due to the need for Al Qaida support.

Terrorism makes sense from the point of view of someone determined to change a government’s policies and who lacks the military force to carry out a conventional strategy. However, I do not think it requires killing civilians.

Consider the impact if the 19 hijackers 9/11 had instead set fire to themselves on the steps of the American Capitol building. Or if the 7/7 suicide bombers had set fire to themselves in front of Big Ben? (Or chosen some other, graphic, but less painfully horrible way of killing themselves). Or a continual stream of one person a day killing themselves in opposition to US/UK government policies, in significant locations but varying locations to reduce the chances of the police being able to stop them.

While the media impact would probably not be as great per single event, I cannot see the desire for revenge evoked being anywhere near as strong, which would be a plus in terms of getting the government to change its policies sooner rather than later.

Of course that sort of terrorism would not work in all countries. If a member of the French resistance had tried that, the Nazis would have just buried them and not allowed any mention of it in the newspapers. But occupied-France was a completely different media situation to the modern world.

So I cannot see how the actions of suicidal bombers in opposing US/UK government polices are morally justifiable despite the lack of military methods. A simpler policy of committing only sucide is available.

What are the distinctive features of that network that would prevent an afghanistan-style regime, with foreign fighters organised by al qaeda providing essential muscle to the sunni leadership in what would presumably still be an ongoing civil war?

soru

All the evidence suggests that the Al Qaida types are largely from outside Iraq, and all the evidence suggests that insofar as they are tolerated at all, they are tolerated only because of the presence of the British and the US (I doubt for example that the youths celebrating beside the bombed out British military vehicle in Basra were celebrating the ideology of Al Qaida for rather obvious reasons).

The argument relies on the complete denial of any agency at all to Iraqi’s, profound ignorence of Iraqi society and the political ideologies that exist within it, and the reproduction of unthought propaganda as fact. Much like the whole venture in fact. Do you really imagine that the Shi’a in southern Iraq would allow “Al Qaida in Iraq’ to take power following the withdrawel of US and British troops?

Do you seriously imagine that the whole network of informal power which has always been an important part of governance in the Post-Colonial Iraqi state and the players associated with it would allow Al Qaida to come to power?

The problem is that no one is a) willing to risk their neck in a situation where the British and Americans are still there or b) going to take any government seriously which only exists by virtue of the presence of the British and Americans. The endless bloodbath is going to continue, not to protect democracy in Iraq (which will not be the outcome of this present process), but to ensure that the US or Britain don’t look humiliated.

And for Iraqi’s that is NOT a price worth paying. Before you go on about the elections held remember that those voters were promised that the election would lead to a speedy exit by the coalition. The pictures around that burning jeep in Basra in a part of the country were the insurgency probably has least support (outside Kurdistan which does’nt really count given the fact that it had not been under Saddam’s rule for a decade prior to the invasion) speaks volumes.

If it was carried out by Zarqawi types then that means that people hate the occupation so much they’ll cheer anyway. If it was carried out by Shi’a militia’s….well its hard to know which is worse from the point of view of the occupation.

But I see thats two many facts. People are having a MORAL discussion.

I am also not clear on who exactly are these individuals who verbally support the bombers and what you mean by the bombers being in charge. Actual bombers are usually dead, they kill themselves.

Are you talking about the individuals who support ending the war/occupation? I can’t speak for all of them, but I guess the thinking here is that ending the war/occupation is a matter of much greater importance than who’s going to be in charge afterwards. The idea is that national independence is the highest priority and internal power struggle is, perhaps, the remote second. This is not unusual.

abb1 – Logic would dictate that when fighting a superior force one at least maintian the appearance of fighting a limited war. Also, the point wasn’t that the bombers want to be in charge. The point was that there are individuals who verbally support the bombers even though they do not want them to be in charge.

But that would be true with any kind of resistance to superior force. By this logic, vastly superior force must always be appeased, whatever it wants. That is, of course, the concept advocated by all superior forces.

As to the justification of the bombers cause. They want to be in charge. Every thing else is incidental. The bombers have stated that they want to be in charge.

Of course they do, who would disagree with that? That’s the goal of any anti-colonial resistance. Including the American revolution.

As to the justification of the bombers cause. They want to be in charge. Every thing else is incidental. The bombers have stated that they want to be in charge. That simpithizers who disagree with their cause ignore this fact is truely strange.