So, what does it have to do with the ‘Left’? That was purely anti-communist (i.e. ‘Right’) plan that failed spectacularly, blew up in their face.

For a disaster to really amplify, you have to have a fucked up feedback system. The Bush administration’s ardent supporters, up to that time, had often talked dreamily of the new Afghanistan that the U.S. was going to hatch—a regular Golden Egg of prosperity. After the $0.00 proposal, there was absolutely 0.00 outrage. There were no editorials in National Review, no scathing posts on Instapundit, no sermons from George Will. That is because the Bush constituency has absolutely no principles except to support whatever the Bush administration does next. To look for principles, or standards among them is pointless.

That is when I’d date the realization that we were being driven into a disastrous vanity project by an alcoholic frat boy.

You’re making my case for me: the ‘modern’ Left would have come up with reasons not to use force even against Hitler. Come September of 1939, it would probably have discovered that the Polish government was so imperfect that there wasn’t a bit of difference between Poland and Germany, certainly nothing worth going to war over….

Apparently because the INC had led them to believe (mistakenly) that there was broad-based Shiite support for Chalabi and it would be relatively easy to raise and train another army to support him. (That belief was dashed almost immediately, which was one reason why the Americans were left holding the security bag on their own.) Also because the exile supporters on whom they based much of what can loosely be called their “planning” convinced them that de-Baathification was an absolute condition for securing Shiite support. Thing is, on the second score the INC may in fact not have been wrong, which if true would mean that the Coalition walked willingly into a Catch-22 situation.

And sorry, but the “all the good done by Saddam’s ouster” line wore thin a long time ago.

First, if there was a turn towards relativism on the left, it happened during the 70s and 80s, and has since, to a large extent, swung back. Pomo relativism has relatively little credence outside of English and ‘*** studies’ departments, and even there the focus on activism and politically engaged scholarship belies at least a willingness to impose values (culturally relative or not) on others.

Second, as the post noted, classical Marxism has questionable bona fides as a universalist moral theory. In the early 20th centure, Marxism was often presented as an empirical, rather than a normative, theory, making descriptive claims about the inevitable course of history. Normative claims were treated in a deflationary matter as ‘ideology’ or ‘false consciousness’- hence the skepticism, mentioned above, about rights-language. (I’m no Marx expert- does that sound about right to people?)

Third, the past four decade or so have seen an explosion of thinking about the normative underpinnings of egalitarian liberalism (a position I take to be on ‘the Left’)- thinking that is by no means relativistic. Thinkers like John Rawls have, I think, been just as or more influential, though perhaps in more subtle ways, then Pomo relativist thinkers (whoever they are supposed to be).

How this relates to Iraq, I’m not sure, but I agree with the post and the many comments that Left opposition cannot be understood merely in terms of an ‘anything goes’ relativism. Hardly anyone seriously holds that position, and those that do would be hard pressed to justify strong moral claims about the legitimacy the of military action in Iraq.

That’s the catch—there already was a Northern Alliance in Afghanistan. In Iraq there was the Iraqi Army, but the Americans immediately declared it disbanded, and attempted to handle internal security themselves for quite some time, with no armed local allies and only perfunctory efforts to organize them. That was a mistake, but it should ultimately be correctable, and it certainly doesn’t undo all the good done by the ouster of Saddam Hussein.

You can probably find out yourself. Did the governments of the post-Civil War American South have a “military” infiltrated by viciously competing ethnic factions spiraling toward another civil war? Was the Yankee military straining itself to the point of exhaustion in a largely failed attempt to ensure security, and did it sustain thousands of casualties over the course of two years in the process? For that matter, did anybody in fact make the argument you’re projecting back into that time?

Somehow, I suspect the answer to all of the above questions is “no.” But at least this is a change from the usual “there was an insurgency in post-WWII Germany, too!” BS that arises in this context, so points for originality.

Had they then quickly established a local provisional government, reconstituted the Iraqi army and police to support it, set the stage for elections, and (mostly) gotten out, leaving behind a rump force to support and encourage a quasi-democratic, pro-Western regime, we’d all be looking back on the Iraq campaign as a spectacularly successful one.

In fact they did move pretty quickly to do all of these things; it’s just that the Afghan model failed much more swiftly, spectularly and obviously in Iraq than it is in Afghanistan. To the extent that there was a plan, it appears to have been to sweep the Baathists out (as was done with the Taliban), replace them with a “reconstituted” Shiite force (cf. the Northern Alliance), install Ahmed Chalabi in the Hamid Karzai role, hold a few cosmetic elections and draw down American forces in preparation for the next glorious campaign while their proxy made sure that Iraqi oil policy favoured Washington. But it wasn’t that simple; hence the ensuing flailing, excuse-making and defining-down of “mission accomplished.”

Let’s say this is true. So, then, Herr Schmitler who’d replaced Hitler in 1936 – is he a liberal, pacifist and judeophil?

Not to mention that, of course, the British, French and Americans were the ones nurturing and supporting the Nazi regime in Germany in the first place – anticipating and hoping that it’ll do ‘drang nach osten’.

He’s back! (Alan Partridge voice) ‘Jurassic Park!’

Why would resistance to remilitarization of the Rhineland cause downfall of Hitler in 1936?

The German military at that time was hollow. If the French had pushed back, the Germans could have done nothing to stop them, an outcome Hitler could not have survived. Speer remarks on it in Inside the Third Reich, IIRC.

It ended shortly after it began, with Saddam Hussein toppled and the US in effective control of the country. Had they then quickly established a local provisional government, reconstituted the Iraqi army and police to support it, set the stage for elections, and (mostly) gotten out, leaving behind a rump force to support and encourage a quasi-democratic, pro-Western regime, we’d all be looking back on the Iraq campaign as a spectacularly successful one. After all, that’s how most people now see the Afghan campaign, despite a comparable ongoing insurgency there.

Instead, the US neglected these important steps for a couple of years, as it concentrated on building schools, repairing bridges and fine-tuning an imagined future Iraqi democracy. Various insurgent groups took advantage of the power vaccuum, and we’ve seen the result.

Fortunately, though, the US seems back on track—it’s vastly toned down the “reconstruction” nonsense, and is concentrating on quickly establishing a (n elected) local provisional government, reconstituting the Iraqi army and police to support it, and (mostly) getting out, leaving behind a rump force to support and encourage a quasi-democratic, pro-Western regime. Hopefully, this Iraqization/Afghanistanization of the conflict is nearing completion.

It’s especially nice to have this on a thread about alleged relativist tendencies on the Left.

Was? tell us how it ends, future man, because here in 2006, it’s still going on.