Comments on: The Army and Vietnam http://crookedtimber.org/2006/01/19/the-army-and-vietnam/ Out of the crooked timber of humanity, no straight thing was ever made Sat, 26 May 2012 21:58:23 +0000 hourly 1 http://wordpress.org/?v=3.3.2 By: Paul http://crookedtimber.org/2006/01/19/the-army-and-vietnam/comment-page-1/#comment-140303 Paul Sat, 21 Jan 2006 01:49:25 +0000 http://crookedtimber.org/2006/01/19/the-army-and-vietnam/#comment-140303 Krepinevich has written a lot on the Vietnam-Iraq conparison, notably the Foreign Affairs article but also a very detailed three part series, archived <a HREF="http://www.csbaonline.org/cgi-local/pubfind.cgi?PubCategory=Iraq&no_top" rel="nofollow">here</a>. Another excellent book on historical counterinsrugency is John Nagl's fantastically titled <a HREF="http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/detail/-/0275976955/ref=pd_rhf_p_1/103-2774269-6111058?%5Fencoding=UTF8&v=glance" rel="nofollow">"Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam."</a> Nagl has served in Iraq and is currently a military assistant in the office of the deputy secretary of defense, so one can assume that the book's historical lessons are informing (however imperfectly) contemporary stability operations / counterinsurgency doctrine. Krepinevich has written a lot on the Vietnam-Iraq conparison, notably the Foreign Affairs article but also a very detailed three part series, archived here.

Another excellent book on historical counterinsrugency is John Nagl’s fantastically titled “Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam.” Nagl has served in Iraq and is currently a military assistant in the office of the deputy secretary of defense, so one can assume that the book’s historical lessons are informing (however imperfectly) contemporary stability operations / counterinsurgency doctrine.

]]> By: Charly http://crookedtimber.org/2006/01/19/the-army-and-vietnam/comment-page-1/#comment-140248 Charly Fri, 20 Jan 2006 17:44:39 +0000 http://crookedtimber.org/2006/01/19/the-army-and-vietnam/#comment-140248 <i>The best examples of truly successfully resolving a conflict with a militarily superior opponent (as opposed to merely defeating them) are South Africa and India, </i> Could argue that white South Africa was the militarily superior opponent but the Indian army was in a state of open rebellion when Clement Attlee promised independence to India . It is also clearly true that if the Indians would have rebeled in the 30's that they obvious would have won but that it would have cost millions of lives. The best examples of truly successfully resolving a conflict with a militarily superior opponent (as opposed to merely defeating them) are South Africa and India,

Could argue that white South Africa was the militarily superior opponent but the Indian army was in a state of open rebellion when Clement Attlee promised independence to India . It is also clearly true that if the Indians would have rebeled in the 30’s that they obvious would have won but that it would have cost millions of lives.

]]> By: abb1 http://crookedtimber.org/2006/01/19/the-army-and-vietnam/comment-page-1/#comment-140238 abb1 Fri, 20 Jan 2006 15:59:34 +0000 http://crookedtimber.org/2006/01/19/the-army-and-vietnam/#comment-140238 Well, FWIW, I agree that left-wing dogmatism isn't any better than right-wing dogmatism. The crucial (and obvious) concept here is that British government is always acting in the interest of Britain. Thus any benefit to any group of foreigners or humanity in general would be, obviously, highly unlikely and purely coincidental. Well, FWIW, I agree that left-wing dogmatism isn’t any better than right-wing dogmatism.

The crucial (and obvious) concept here is that British government is always acting in the interest of Britain. Thus any benefit to any group of foreigners or humanity in general would be, obviously, highly unlikely and purely coincidental.

]]> By: soru http://crookedtimber.org/2006/01/19/the-army-and-vietnam/comment-page-1/#comment-140232 soru Fri, 20 Jan 2006 15:09:31 +0000 http://crookedtimber.org/2006/01/19/the-army-and-vietnam/#comment-140232 'did not', 'could not help' and 'wanted to feel' are all past tense, referring to the war. 'many intellectuals follow' is present tense, referring to the post-war situation. 'foreign politics' would be a very strange phrase for an Englishman to use about WWII in 1945. soru ‘did not’, ‘could not help’ and ‘wanted to feel’ are all past tense, referring to the war.

‘many intellectuals follow’ is present tense, referring to the post-war situation. ‘foreign politics’ would be a very strange phrase for an Englishman to use about WWII in 1945.

soru

]]> By: abb1 http://crookedtimber.org/2006/01/19/the-army-and-vietnam/comment-page-1/#comment-140228 abb1 Fri, 20 Jan 2006 14:19:08 +0000 http://crookedtimber.org/2006/01/19/the-army-and-vietnam/#comment-140228 Soru, the essay is from 1945, but he is talking about 'anglophobia' in the context of the WWII there: <blockquote> English left-wing intellectuals did not, of course, actually want the Germans or Japanese to win the war, but many of them could not help getting a certain kick out of seeing their own country humiliated, and wanted to feel that the final victory would be due to Russia, or perhaps America, and not to Britain. In foreign politics many intellectuals follow the principle that any faction backed by Britain must be in the wrong. As a result, "enlightened" opinion is quite largely a mirror-image of Conservative policy. </blockquote> What else have I been wrong about? Soru, the essay is from 1945, but he is talking about ‘anglophobia’ in the context of the WWII there:

English left-wing intellectuals did not, of course, actually want the Germans or Japanese to win the war, but many of them could not help getting a certain kick out of seeing their own country humiliated, and wanted to feel that the final victory would be due to Russia, or perhaps America, and not to Britain. In foreign politics many intellectuals follow the principle that any faction backed by Britain must be in the wrong. As a result, “enlightened” opinion is quite largely a mirror-image of Conservative policy.

What else have I been wrong about?

]]> By: soru http://crookedtimber.org/2006/01/19/the-army-and-vietnam/comment-page-1/#comment-140227 soru Fri, 20 Jan 2006 14:12:07 +0000 http://crookedtimber.org/2006/01/19/the-army-and-vietnam/#comment-140227 <i>Orwell is talking about the WWII, not some colonial war</i> Has anyone ever found a case of abb1 being right about anything ever? That essay was post-war. soru Orwell is talking about the WWII, not some colonial war

Has anyone ever found a case of abb1 being right about anything ever?

That essay was post-war.

soru

]]> By: soru http://crookedtimber.org/2006/01/19/the-army-and-vietnam/comment-page-1/#comment-140225 soru Fri, 20 Jan 2006 14:00:59 +0000 http://crookedtimber.org/2006/01/19/the-army-and-vietnam/#comment-140225 'a good idea' is ambiguous, meaning any of 'effective', 'desirable' and 'moral'. If someone says 'in order to achieve B, we need to do A', there are three potential objections: 1. A will not result in B (is it effective?) 2. I don't want B (is it desirable?) 3. Doing A is unacceptable (is it moral?) In case you are genuinely unclear, in this case I meant 'effective', not the other two. The best examples of truly successfully resolving a conflict with a militarily superior opponent (as opposed to merely defeating them) are South Africa and India, which both took the route of a single national congress. It's not without problems, such as the lack of credible opposition to the ANC, but few things are. soru ‘a good idea’ is ambiguous, meaning any of ‘effective’, ‘desirable’ and ‘moral’. If someone says ‘in order to achieve B, we need to do A’, there are three potential objections:

1. A will not result in B (is it effective?)

2. I don’t want B (is it desirable?)

3. Doing A is unacceptable (is it moral?)

In case you are genuinely unclear, in this case I meant ‘effective’, not the other two.

The best examples of truly successfully resolving a conflict with a militarily superior opponent (as opposed to merely defeating them) are South Africa and India, which both took the route of a single national congress. It’s not without problems, such as the lack of credible opposition to the ANC, but few things are.

soru

]]> By: Brendan http://crookedtimber.org/2006/01/19/the-army-and-vietnam/comment-page-1/#comment-140216 Brendan Fri, 20 Jan 2006 12:40:55 +0000 http://crookedtimber.org/2006/01/19/the-army-and-vietnam/#comment-140216 I don't think you quite got my point. Are you seriously arguing that ‘a programme in Iraq similar to Vietnam’s revolution … <i>based on a single political party </i>' would be a good idea? Cos I don't. I don’t think you quite got my point. Are you seriously arguing that ‘a programme in Iraq similar to Vietnam’s revolution … based on a single political party ’ would be a good idea?

Cos I don’t.

]]> By: abb1 http://crookedtimber.org/2006/01/19/the-army-and-vietnam/comment-page-1/#comment-140215 abb1 Fri, 20 Jan 2006 12:34:49 +0000 http://crookedtimber.org/2006/01/19/the-army-and-vietnam/#comment-140215 Orwell is talking about the WWII, not some colonial war. I don't think the quote works in this context. Orwell is talking about the WWII, not some colonial war. I don’t think the quote works in this context.

]]> By: soru http://crookedtimber.org/2006/01/19/the-army-and-vietnam/comment-page-1/#comment-140206 soru Fri, 20 Jan 2006 11:09:35 +0000 http://crookedtimber.org/2006/01/19/the-army-and-vietnam/#comment-140206 If the situation was such that a movement like that had a chance of success, if the kind of people who would lead a movement like that was doing so, instead of working for the elected government, then yes I would. The correct alternative to 'my country right or wrong' is not 'my country, therefor wrong'. If there's one political essay I thoroughly agree with, it's Orwell's Note on nationalism: http://www.resort.com/~prime8/Orwell/nationalism.html <i> In foreign politics many intellectuals follow the principle that any faction backed by Britain must be in the wrong.</i> It is perfectly possible to imagine a world in which the US had goals sufficiently sinister (and attainable) to be worth fighting against (preferably by smarter, and consequently less bloody, tactics). The judgement of most of the people on the ground is that that is not the case. soru If the situation was such that a movement like that had a chance of success, if the kind of people who would lead a movement like that was doing so, instead of working for the elected government, then yes I would.

The correct alternative to ‘my country right or wrong’ is not ‘my country, therefor wrong’.

If there’s one political essay I thoroughly agree with, it’s Orwell’s Note on nationalism:
http://www.resort.com/~prime8/Orwell/nationalism.html
In foreign politics many intellectuals follow the principle that any faction backed by Britain must be in the wrong.

It is perfectly possible to imagine a world in which the US had goals sufficiently sinister (and attainable) to be worth fighting against (preferably by smarter, and consequently less bloody, tactics). The judgement of most of the people on the ground is that that is not the case.

soru

]]> By: Brendan http://crookedtimber.org/2006/01/19/the-army-and-vietnam/comment-page-1/#comment-140204 Brendan Fri, 20 Jan 2006 10:24:16 +0000 http://crookedtimber.org/2006/01/19/the-army-and-vietnam/#comment-140204 Soru The point of Tran Dac Loi’s comments is that ‘the Iraqi resistance (are like) the many aborted attempts to end French colonisation of Vietnam before World War II.’ What he is arguing is that: ‘Iraq needs a unifying political figure like Ho Chi Minh. ‘’You need a political figure who can introduce a long-term objective that’s in the basic interest of the majority of the people.’‘’ Avoiding the obvious fact that he would say that, wouldn’t he, do you agree with him? Are you arguing that what the Iraqi resistance needs is a Ho Chi Minh figure? Are you also arguing that ‘a programme in Iraq similar to Vietnam’s revolution … based on <i>a single political party</i>, aimed at throwing out the aggressor, defending the unity of the country and the country’s economic and political sovereignty’ is what is desirable? (emphasis added). And are we to infer that if such a resistance did grow up (as it did in Vietnam) you would then support it against the Americans and British? If not, why did you post this link? Soru

The point of Tran Dac Loi’s comments is that ‘the Iraqi resistance (are like) the many aborted attempts to end French colonisation of Vietnam before World War II.’ What he is arguing is that: ‘Iraq needs a unifying political figure like Ho Chi Minh. ‘’You need a political figure who can introduce a long-term objective that’s in the basic interest of the majority of the people.’‘’

Avoiding the obvious fact that he would say that, wouldn’t he, do you agree with him? Are you arguing that what the Iraqi resistance needs is a Ho Chi Minh figure? Are you also arguing that ‘a programme in Iraq similar to Vietnam’s revolution … based on a single political party, aimed at throwing out the aggressor, defending the unity of the country and the country’s economic and political sovereignty’ is what is desirable? (emphasis added). And are we to infer that if such a resistance did grow up (as it did in Vietnam) you would then support it against the Americans and British?

If not, why did you post this link?

]]> By: lurker http://crookedtimber.org/2006/01/19/the-army-and-vietnam/comment-page-1/#comment-140192 lurker Fri, 20 Jan 2006 08:24:51 +0000 http://crookedtimber.org/2006/01/19/the-army-and-vietnam/#comment-140192 @R-Squared You could start by reading 'Britain's Gulag' by Caroline Elkins, on the way the Brits won in Kenya in the 50's and the 60's. Virtually the entire Kikuyu population was herded behind barbed wire. Nairobi was ethnically cleansed in a big roundup removing 60000 people. Torture was massive, systematic and savage. The only people whose hearts the Brits won were the 'chiefs' appointed by them, who dearly loved their privileges, perks and power. Elkins notes that the main problem she had in persuading local people to talk to her was getting them to understand she was American and not British. The one thing the Brits did do better is covering up their crimes (and sentimentalizing their Empire). @R-Squared
You could start by reading ‘Britain’s Gulag’ by Caroline Elkins, on the way the Brits won in Kenya in the 50’s and the 60’s. Virtually the entire Kikuyu population was herded behind barbed wire. Nairobi was ethnically cleansed in a big roundup removing 60000 people. Torture was massive, systematic and savage. The only people whose hearts the Brits won were the ‘chiefs’ appointed by them, who dearly loved their privileges, perks and power. Elkins notes that the main problem she had in persuading local people to talk to her was getting them to understand she was American and not British.
The one thing the Brits did do better is covering up their crimes (and sentimentalizing their Empire).

]]> By: abb1 http://crookedtimber.org/2006/01/19/the-army-and-vietnam/comment-page-1/#comment-140098 abb1 Fri, 20 Jan 2006 07:11:56 +0000 http://crookedtimber.org/2006/01/19/the-army-and-vietnam/#comment-140098 SamChevre, OK, maybe, but I don't think you can argue that the Southerners staged anything even close to "insurgency" as described in the post above. Even if we accept that their sense of justice was somewhat offended by liberation of slaves, clearly not many, not enough of them were willing fight and die for the cause. The cause wasn't strong enough. SamChevre, OK, maybe, but I don’t think you can argue that the Southerners staged anything even close to “insurgency” as described in the post above. Even if we accept that their sense of justice was somewhat offended by liberation of slaves, clearly not many, not enough of them were willing fight and die for the cause. The cause wasn’t strong enough.

]]> By: Oskar Shapley http://crookedtimber.org/2006/01/19/the-army-and-vietnam/comment-page-1/#comment-140060 Oskar Shapley Fri, 20 Jan 2006 01:31:31 +0000 http://crookedtimber.org/2006/01/19/the-army-and-vietnam/#comment-140060 to soru, I'd say the winning socio-economic ideology would be: "all oil money for the good of Iraqis, not the Yankees!". Base it on some Islamic principle of sharing wealth/food, and you have a potent political message. The first Iraqi politician/revolutionary to use that, wins. to soru,

I’d say the winning socio-economic ideology would be: “all oil money for the good of Iraqis, not the Yankees!”. Base it on some Islamic principle of sharing wealth/food, and you have a potent political message.

The first Iraqi politician/revolutionary to use that, wins.

]]> By: R-Squared http://crookedtimber.org/2006/01/19/the-army-and-vietnam/comment-page-1/#comment-140017 R-Squared Thu, 19 Jan 2006 23:10:09 +0000 http://crookedtimber.org/2006/01/19/the-army-and-vietnam/#comment-140017 We should look a little bit farther outside American hisotry. Don't you think that British and Japanese were pretty good in conquering and managing colonies. I think they did manage to win the hearts of at least some of their colonial subjects. This is how "divide and rule" works. To learn occupation strategies, I would prefer studying British colonial hisotry to Vietnam war history. We should look a little bit farther outside American hisotry. Don’t you think that British and Japanese were pretty good in conquering and managing colonies. I think they did manage to win the hearts of at least some of their colonial subjects. This is how “divide and rule” works. To learn occupation strategies, I would prefer studying British colonial hisotry to Vietnam war history.

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