But this is something different, I think. The redistributability of things seems like it must be a precondition to talk of redistributing them; is it morally justified to redistribute some of Feynman’s intelligence to me? Or some of Shaq’s basketball ability? I’d think not. But it might be morally justified to redistribute some of the money that they made to me.

I think that the Zimbabwe situation showed that you can redistribute land in a way that you can’t redistribute farms; trying to redistribute social goods feels to me like it would go down the same path – Canada is already not thrilled about having Americans come over to buy drugs, imagine if we decided to make the US part of Canada so that Americans could come see the doctor there.

Steve,
I’ve been assured that I misunderstood Chris’s point, although to be honest, having re-read everything, I’m thinking the issue is more in communicating than understanding. My current academic background (which admittedly needs expanding, hence continuing the damned education) encourages not distinguishing between “luck natural resources” and “inherited money that was used to create more money” – both would be seen as luck of the draw.

Distinguishing between effort and luck seems a very tricky thing; how do you decide that something is just luck of birth/the draw/whatever, and something is due to the effort you put in? It just seems…vague.

I wouldn’t say (wasn’t saying) that everyone owns the fruit of your labour, only that eventually a certain lucky few do reach a financial point where they and their family are set for life, and the remainder of the wealth can be used to distribute items to those born in less luck-infested areas.

However, I’m apparently off on my own page on this one, so I’ll just be quiet and learn. ;)

This whole discussion reminds me of the time awhile back when Harry B. made the liberal-egalitarian case for forcibly prohibiting parents from sending their children to private schools. In this case, as in that, one can have some respect for the honesty of the reasoning while still goggling at the lack of horror at the conclusion.

1. You say “But given no strong entitlement of successor generations to ownership of Sweden’s social resources, a hypothetical world government or redistribution agency could justly tax those generations for using those resource and use that taxation to redistribute to those who have been unlucky enough to inherit social resources of lower value.”

But if we do not assume that the Swedes have rights to their social resources, why do we assume that a hypothetical world government has the right to tax them? Any argument that the Swedes don’t have those rights applies equally to the hypothetical world government, or any other agency. The hypothetical world government certainly didn’t create the social resources.

2. You also appear to be assuming that democracy, private property rights, stable political system, etc, requires no ongoing investment to make it happen. The next generation just receives all these matters like manna from heaven. But what if they do require continual investment? What if Robert Muldoon and the senior National cabinet ministers did actually make their own decisions when we had that constitutional crisis back in 1984 – and the senior National cabinet ministers thus contributed towards NZ’s social goods? If social goods are like manna from heaven, why all this concern on this blog about George Bush in the USA threatening them? If social goods are like manna from heaven, how do you explain Zimbabwae’s economic collapse?

You also appear to be assuming that there’s some cut-off line when one generation steps forward and suddenly inherits all these social goods. But that, while a easy mathematical model, does not match with reality. In reality, generations are coming forward all the time, and the old ones don’t instantly die away. My grandmother is still alive and contributing to, and drawing on, social goods. Robert Muldoon is dead, but some of the senior National cabinet ministers I referred to are still alive. Generations overlap. On a more minor level, there are 5 years between me and my youngest brother. By the time he turned 18, I had voted in two separate elections and contributed to any social goods (mostly by refraining from rioting in the streets when my own favoured government did not get elected). And my brother and I have first cousins ranging in age from 40 years old to 14. Where’s the generational cut-off? How much responsibility do I bear for the current state of social goods in NZ, compared to my grandmother, or my mother, or my brother, or my 40-year old cousin? At best I think you could justify a level of taxation based on social goods that falls with age.

3. As others on this threat have pointed out, social goods are non-rival. Rather than distributing the resources produced by these goods, why don’t we just say that those without the social goods have the duty to acquire them for themselves?

Possibly, but one potential counter-example of resource restriction that effetively mirrors this whole argument is legacy admissions to elite universities. So there are some mechanisms where model have been constructed institutionally, and flourish (though not with the same goals as implied in the original post).

Other instances that are less fixed would be in the area of HR/Hiring. Name blind interview processes my mitigate nepotism. I recall a professor giving a resume workshop telling us that using a headshot on resumes was outlawed when it became systemically clear that it led to racist hiring pracitices (I don’t know how broad or institutional that was—this was in Georgia, and he was southern, so it may have been a regional issue).

On an individual basis, for example, inheriting X amount of land or money provides a concrete benefit in a way that inheriting X connection to the general in charge of the Texas National Guard does not (necessarily).

Likewise, on a collective basis, inheriting democrcacy or capitalism (assuming arguendo that capitalism is a good) or secularism does not necessary provide a concrete benefit to any given member of society in the same way that inheriting participation in a national health care system, a social insurance scheme, or a healthy local economy does.

Well, mostly rhetorically. But there is something that’s genuinely puzzling to me. In 29 you say liberal egalitarians tend to reject strong natural rights claims to ownership by individuals within states but seem to assert such claims with respect to states or peoples as historical collectives. And that looks inconsistent to me.

I agree that’s inconsistent; but in this discussion people who (to my eye) are “assert[ing] [natural rights] claims with respect to states or peoples as historical collectives” seem to be asserting (say) the right of the U.S. to keep the gains its sterling society has developed, as against a redistribution of resources to other societies based on something other than property rights.

Why aren’t the property-rights folks citing the historical theft of North America by the people most U.S. citizens are descended from, and demanding the restoration of the place to the descendants of the folks who were living here at the time?

I think consequentialist and non-property-rights arguments would (rightly) suggest that “U.S. out of North America,” even if practical, would cause so much human misery that there must be some other basis for a just society. So on that level I agree with you. But the tenor of the conversation sets my teeth on edge.

Yes, “we need to get straight about the principles that we ought to aim at.” For me that’s (at minimum) a society where people don’t cause other people extreme misery (torture and fear of torture, starvation and fear of starvation, etc.) and (asking for just a bit more) where people don’t prevent people from participating in the decisions that affect their lives. We’re not there yet, not nearly there, and I’m impatient with talking about what would be just in a society that had eliminated human-caused misery when we are so far from that place.

I understand this question might be too broad for the more limited topic being discussed. But I’ve never heard the explanation for this. What is it?

Access to all kinds of collective goods enjoyed by Americans are denied to Haitians, and Americans do their best to stop said Haitians entering the country to enjoy said goods. Immigration controls are one fairly obvious way that insiders exclude others from access.

I’m not at all sure what ought to follow from the fact that the relative unimportance of natural resource distribution means that Rawls & co can maintain symmetry without too much pain. Would it change things if natural resource turned out to be more fateful than Rawls supposes? And if it would change things, then shouldn’t we revise our view in the case of those assets that are highly fateful.

On the difficulty of identifying generations. Yes. But this is going to afflict any discussion of intergenerational justice.

I am trying to track this discussion and I am confused by its basic premise. Chris, could you please offer an example of how or which social goods are not freely transferable? Perhaps an example of how insiders try to exclude others from access?

I’m imagining that you are referring to a social institution such as representative government. (Of course maybe I totally misconstrue the issue.) But in the case of representative government, its transfer is not a zero-sum game i.e. the British can have it and so can any other nation. No?

This is an academic blog; play by the rules, man.

I’m not sure that helps. Unlike natural resources things like stable institutions, a culture conducive to economic growth, and the like just aren’t conceived as property. And I can’t see how you could conceive of it as property without destroying its value. An electricity grid is property, but isn’t property that belongs to your average insider of a western state.

The argument about natural resources is one about compensation for the unjust appropriation of property. But inherited social resources aren’t property in that sense. You can come up with other grounds for justifying redistribution – say from people with natural physical advantages to the disadvantaged because of fairness – but that’s not the argument made above.