Comments on: Non sequitur http://crookedtimber.org/2007/01/08/non-sequitur/ Out of the crooked timber of humanity, no straight thing was ever made Sun, 22 Nov 2009 08:33:20 -0800 http://wordpress.org/?v=2.8.6 hourly 1 By: John Quiggin http://crookedtimber.org/2007/01/08/non-sequitur/comment-page-1/#comment-183787 John Quiggin Thu, 11 Jan 2007 23:50:11 +0000 http://crookedtimber.org/2007/01/08/non-sequitur/#comment-183787 And conversely the central claim of the right-to-life group is that foetuses are (currently, not potentially) human beings with all the rights of other human beings. This has,as engels says, diddly squat to do with discounting. I thought in posting, and still think, that this was needless to say, but you've complained at length about my not saying it, so now I've said it. And conversely the central claim of the right-to-life group is that foetuses are (currently, not potentially) human beings with all the rights of other human beings. This has,as engels says, diddly squat to do with discounting.

I thought in posting, and still think, that this was needless to say, but you’ve complained at length about my not saying it, so now I’ve said it.

]]> By: engels http://crookedtimber.org/2007/01/08/non-sequitur/comment-page-1/#comment-183730 engels Thu, 11 Jan 2007 15:00:16 +0000 http://crookedtimber.org/2007/01/08/non-sequitur/#comment-183730 <i>“it does not seem to be possible for a [potentially] non-existent person to be wronged [even by the decision to make them non-existent]”</i> Paul - After the abortion takes place and the foetus is dead, no person will exist in the future. Thus your editorial "[potentially]" confuses the meaning of what I said. <i>I am saying that a non-existent person can not be wronged</i> (yes, if you like, "even by the decision to make them non-existent".) I haven't asserted this as a "fundamental truth" but it is what I (and I think most people) believe, and I think it is clear why. If you disagree, and you think that it is possible to wrong 'someone' who does not exist by causing them not to exist, then you will face these issues <i>not only over abortion, but over any decision not have children eg. a decision not to have sex</i>. Therefore, in addition to being implausible, this argument is not in any way specific to abortion and so does not make a good argument against abortion. Needless to say, <i>none of this</i> has diddly squat to do with discounting. “it does not seem to be possible for a [potentially] non-existent person to be wronged [even by the decision to make them non-existent]”

Paul – After the abortion takes place and the foetus is dead, no person will exist in the future. Thus your editorial “[potentially]” confuses the meaning of what I said. I am saying that a non-existent person can not be wronged (yes, if you like, “even by the decision to make them non-existent”.) I haven’t asserted this as a “fundamental truth” but it is what I (and I think most people) believe, and I think it is clear why. If you disagree, and you think that it is possible to wrong ‘someone’ who does not exist by causing them not to exist, then you will face these issues not only over abortion, but over any decision not have children eg. a decision not to have sex. Therefore, in addition to being implausible, this argument is not in any way specific to abortion and so does not make a good argument against abortion.

Needless to say, none of this has diddly squat to do with discounting.

]]> By: Paul http://crookedtimber.org/2007/01/08/non-sequitur/comment-page-1/#comment-183698 Paul Thu, 11 Jan 2007 07:40:59 +0000 http://crookedtimber.org/2007/01/08/non-sequitur/#comment-183698 Mq, I think you miss the point, or at least manage to evade it by splitting hairs. Rewrite your post, ignoring the fetus and dealing only with the harm to the potentially existing person themselves. See how it reads before submitting it. Mq, I think you miss the point, or at least manage to evade it by splitting hairs. Rewrite your post, ignoring the fetus and dealing only with the harm to the potentially existing person themselves. See how it reads before submitting it.

]]> By: Paul http://crookedtimber.org/2007/01/08/non-sequitur/comment-page-1/#comment-183697 Paul Thu, 11 Jan 2007 07:38:59 +0000 http://crookedtimber.org/2007/01/08/non-sequitur/#comment-183697 Engels, My summary of Conchi's argument isn't intended to relate to abortion, and as such it seems to be a trivial restatement of what zero time preference means- people who will be alive at any point in the future have the same moral weighing as you or I. Now one can go on and distinguish certain kinds of people not yet in existence from this general propisition, as I believe you and Conchi ultimately do, all I'm doing is setting up the prima facie issue to which JQ ought to have responded. Secondly, I don't think you can respond to an ethical argumnent against abortion with "the issue in abortion is not about [x]" for any and all values of x. I hinted at this above when I said that a summary of others' views, even an accurate one (and one that excludes the value of a potential human is pretty far from being that), isn't relevant to a moral debate. To restate the (free-standing) argument, if we count the future utility of people not yet born in the utilitarian calculus then that utility ought to count against a decision to abort. As I've said, I think you adequately, though not conclusively respond to that problem, but not by telling me what you think the critics of abortion think about it. "it does not seem to be possible for a [potentially] non-existent person to be wronged [even by the decision to make them non-existent]" This, and what follows (which does accurately summarise my position, thanks) is the key to the argument. And no, you can't just assert this as a fundamental truth. While I basically agree with that view, one could easily argue that actions which reduce future utility summations are wrong per se, you'd have to actually explain why a reduction in a person's utility by not permitting them to come into existence is to be prefered to an (ex hypothesi) smaller reduction in the utility of someone who will exist (and "will" here only operates in some vague statistical sense, which makes your argument all the harder I'd have thought). Conchi predcates his/her argument on this distinction existing, and you initially ignore it and then assert it as a fundamental truth. I don't think you're wrong, but I think the person who asked the initial question asked one hard enough that it warranted a response. JQ gave a substandard one, which is how we got here. Engels,
My summary of Conchi’s argument isn’t intended to relate to abortion, and as such it seems to be a trivial restatement of what zero time preference means- people who will be alive at any point in the future have the same moral weighing as you or I. Now one can go on and distinguish certain kinds of people not yet in existence from this general propisition, as I believe you and Conchi ultimately do, all I’m doing is setting up the prima facie issue to which JQ ought to have responded.

Secondly, I don’t think you can respond to an ethical argumnent against abortion with “the issue in abortion is not about [x]” for any and all values of x. I hinted at this above when I said that a summary of others’ views, even an accurate one (and one that excludes the value of a potential human is pretty far from being that), isn’t relevant to a moral debate. To restate the (free-standing) argument, if we count the future utility of people not yet born in the utilitarian calculus then that utility ought to count against a decision to abort. As I’ve said, I think you adequately, though not conclusively respond to that problem, but not by telling me what you think the critics of abortion think about it.

“it does not seem to be possible for a [potentially] non-existent person to be wronged [even by the decision to make them non-existent]”
This, and what follows (which does accurately summarise my position, thanks) is the key to the argument. And no, you can’t just assert this as a fundamental truth. While I basically agree with that view, one could easily argue that actions which reduce future utility summations are wrong per se, you’d have to actually explain why a reduction in a person’s utility by not permitting them to come into existence is to be prefered to an (ex hypothesi) smaller reduction in the utility of someone who will exist (and “will” here only operates in some vague statistical sense, which makes your argument all the harder I’d have thought). Conchi predcates his/her argument on this distinction existing, and you initially ignore it and then assert it as a fundamental truth. I don’t think you’re wrong, but I think the person who asked the initial question asked one hard enough that it warranted a response. JQ gave a substandard one, which is how we got here.

]]> By: MQ http://crookedtimber.org/2007/01/08/non-sequitur/comment-page-1/#comment-183677 MQ Thu, 11 Jan 2007 01:31:55 +0000 http://crookedtimber.org/2007/01/08/non-sequitur/#comment-183677 John is right, the original Economist poster (sounds like a Megan McArdle special) is nutty, and so are her defenders on this thread. How we choose to discount what happens to an actually alive person in the future is completely logically unrelated to how we assess harm to a fetus. A fetus is not an actually alive person and will never be an actually alive person (when the actually alive person comes to be, the fetus will no longer exist). They are two totally different entities. There are causal linkages between them, but how we choose to morally assess those causal linkages has nothing to do with discounting. McArdle basically puts her energies into trying to score rhetorical points off liberals, and she thinks she has found one here. But it's rhetorical, and mists away under observation. John is right, the original Economist poster (sounds like a Megan McArdle special) is nutty, and so are her defenders on this thread. How we choose to discount what happens to an actually alive person in the future is completely logically unrelated to how we assess harm to a fetus. A fetus is not an actually alive person and will never be an actually alive person (when the actually alive person comes to be, the fetus will no longer exist). They are two totally different entities. There are causal linkages between them, but how we choose to morally assess those causal linkages has nothing to do with discounting.

McArdle basically puts her energies into trying to score rhetorical points off liberals, and she thinks she has found one here. But it’s rhetorical, and mists away under observation.

]]> By: engels http://crookedtimber.org/2007/01/08/non-sequitur/comment-page-1/#comment-183675 engels Thu, 11 Jan 2007 01:12:41 +0000 http://crookedtimber.org/2007/01/08/non-sequitur/#comment-183675 <i>the relevance to abortion, which is clear to me, to the author of the original post and to Conchi, with whom you agree, is that, if one adopts a near zero rate of time preference that is inconsistent with viewing the interests of people not yet in existence as less morally considerable than our own</i> No, Paul: I've just read through Conchis' posts on the MR thread and he or she does not seem to think anything of the sort. I'm not sure I completely understand everything else you say, so let me just try to make my point again. As far as I am aware, the issue in abortion is not about weighing the wrong done to a pregnant woman against the wrong done to a person who may or may not exist in the future. It is about weighing the wrong done to the woman and the harm done to the foetus she is carrying. Apparently, you reject this summary but you won't explain what you think is wrong with it. I don't think it is controversial or partisan. You seem to want to characterise the wrong done by an abortion not as a harm inflicted on the foetus but as a wrong inflicted on a future person, but this account does not appear to be sustainable, because after the abortion takes place that person will not exist and it does not seem to be possible for a non-existent person to be wronged. Finally, I did misunderstand your claim about assertions made without argument. If I understand you now, you are saying that although I explained why the cases are different, I haven't explained why this difference is of any moral significance. But it should be clear from the above that the difference comes down to the difference between people who exist or will exist and 'people' who do not and will never exist. I do not think the claim that non-existent 'people' can not be morally wronged needs to be defended here. the relevance to abortion, which is clear to me, to the author of the original post and to Conchi, with whom you agree, is that, if one adopts a near zero rate of time preference that is inconsistent with viewing the interests of people not yet in existence as less morally considerable than our own

No, Paul: I’ve just read through Conchis’ posts on the MR thread and he or she does not seem to think anything of the sort.

I’m not sure I completely understand everything else you say, so let me just try to make my point again.

As far as I am aware, the issue in abortion is not about weighing the wrong done to a pregnant woman against the wrong done to a person who may or may not exist in the future. It is about weighing the wrong done to the woman and the harm done to the foetus she is carrying.

Apparently, you reject this summary but you won’t explain what you think is wrong with it. I don’t think it is controversial or partisan. You seem to want to characterise the wrong done by an abortion not as a harm inflicted on the foetus but as a wrong inflicted on a future person, but this account does not appear to be sustainable, because after the abortion takes place that person will not exist and it does not seem to be possible for a non-existent person to be wronged.

Finally, I did misunderstand your claim about assertions made without argument. If I understand you now, you are saying that although I explained why the cases are different, I haven’t explained why this difference is of any moral significance. But it should be clear from the above that the difference comes down to the difference between people who exist or will exist and ‘people’ who do not and will never exist. I do not think the claim that non-existent ‘people’ can not be morally wronged needs to be defended here.

]]> By: Paul http://crookedtimber.org/2007/01/08/non-sequitur/comment-page-1/#comment-183670 Paul Thu, 11 Jan 2007 00:03:46 +0000 http://crookedtimber.org/2007/01/08/non-sequitur/#comment-183670 Engels, That's a bold summary of the anti-abortion movement, but even were it not it doesn't resolve the underlying ethical question - why do you weigh the interests of my daughter who will be born to those of my son who might be born contingent on how you weigh his interests. That's a stand alone question, and doesn't rest on the vocal support of abortion's critics, however intimately you're familiar with their arguments. "And people haven’t just “asserted” that the two cases are different, they’ve tried to explain to you why they are. You seem to agree, so I’m not sure what kind of “demonstration” you still think is called for." You're confusing two issues here Engels. I'm perfectly clear on how aborted foetuses are different from future generations - in fact I can add to your reasons by citing Daniel, who kindly points out that foetuses are only 9 months away from (maybe) existing, and that Stern's future generations are tens of years or more away. I could also add that they're different because aborted foetuses will be primarily the children of first world nations, while Stern's future generations will existy disproportionately in the third world. All of these are clear differences between the two classes, but the second two are clearly morally irrelevant. The distinction you draw, which is similarly clear, may or may not be morally relevant, but one certainly wouldn't be able to draw any conclusions either way from your post, which doesn't address the issue. Hence "assertion". To recap, explaining that two things are different by some standard is not the same as demonstrating why they ought not to be treated alike. Engels,
That’s a bold summary of the anti-abortion movement, but even were it not it doesn’t resolve the underlying ethical question – why do you weigh the interests of my daughter who will be born to those of my son who might be born contingent on how you weigh his interests. That’s a stand alone question, and doesn’t rest on the vocal support of abortion’s critics, however intimately you’re familiar with their arguments.

“And people haven’t just “asserted” that the two cases are different, they’ve tried to explain to you why they are. You seem to agree, so I’m not sure what kind of “demonstration” you still think is called for.”
You’re confusing two issues here Engels. I’m perfectly clear on how aborted foetuses are different from future generations – in fact I can add to your reasons by citing Daniel, who kindly points out that foetuses are only 9 months away from (maybe) existing, and that Stern’s future generations are tens of years or more away. I could also add that they’re different because aborted foetuses will be primarily the children of first world nations, while Stern’s future generations will existy disproportionately in the third world. All of these are clear differences between the two classes, but the second two are clearly morally irrelevant. The distinction you draw, which is similarly clear, may or may not be morally relevant, but one certainly wouldn’t be able to draw any conclusions either way from your post, which doesn’t address the issue. Hence “assertion”.

To recap, explaining that two things are different by some standard is not the same as demonstrating why they ought not to be treated alike.

]]> By: Paul http://crookedtimber.org/2007/01/08/non-sequitur/comment-page-1/#comment-183668 Paul Wed, 10 Jan 2007 23:53:00 +0000 http://crookedtimber.org/2007/01/08/non-sequitur/#comment-183668 John, It's clear that secretly agreeing with a variety of different people isn't the clearest way to transmit your views - the relevance to abortion, which is clear to me, to the author of the original post and to Conchi, with whom you agree, is that, if one adopts a near zero rate of time preference that is inconsistent with viewing the interests of people not yet in existence as less morally considerable than our own. Given that approach the the interests of potential human beings, how then does one weight the interests of foetuses. This sounds, for some reason, eerily familiar. Your "0 to 3 per cent" is precisely as relevant as Daniel's "9 months or 100 years", which is to say not at all. The point is not that people who propound low discount rates must hate abortion, it's that there is a relationship between the moral questions that go to formulating each position. You can respond that you distinguish those questions, but not that they are completely unrelated. John,
It’s clear that secretly agreeing with a variety of different people isn’t the clearest way to transmit your views – the relevance to abortion, which is clear to me, to the author of the original post and to Conchi, with whom you agree, is that, if one adopts a near zero rate of time preference that is inconsistent with viewing the interests of people not yet in existence as less morally considerable than our own. Given that approach the the interests of potential human beings, how then does one weight the interests of foetuses. This sounds, for some reason, eerily familiar.
Your “0 to 3 per cent” is precisely as relevant as Daniel’s “9 months or 100 years”, which is to say not at all. The point is not that people who propound low discount rates must hate abortion, it’s that there is a relationship between the moral questions that go to formulating each position. You can respond that you distinguish those questions, but not that they are completely unrelated.

]]> By: engels http://crookedtimber.org/2007/01/08/non-sequitur/comment-page-1/#comment-183622 engels Wed, 10 Jan 2007 14:28:37 +0000 http://crookedtimber.org/2007/01/08/non-sequitur/#comment-183622 Paul - As far as I know, people don't think abortion wrong because it harms a non-existent person in the future (by causing "him" never to have existed). They think it is wrong because it harms <i>the foetus</i>. (The fact that the foetus can develop into a person might be a reason for caring about the foetus but that is not at all the same thing as saying that <i>that person</i> is being harmed.) And people haven't just "asserted" that the two cases are different, they've tried to explain to you why they are. You seem to agree, so I'm not sure what kind of "demonstration" you still think is called for. Paul – As far as I know, people don’t think abortion wrong because it harms a non-existent person in the future (by causing “him” never to have existed). They think it is wrong because it harms the foetus. (The fact that the foetus can develop into a person might be a reason for caring about the foetus but that is not at all the same thing as saying that that person is being harmed.)

And people haven’t just “asserted” that the two cases are different, they’ve tried to explain to you why they are. You seem to agree, so I’m not sure what kind of “demonstration” you still think is called for.

]]> By: John Quiggin http://crookedtimber.org/2007/01/08/non-sequitur/comment-page-1/#comment-183618 John Quiggin Wed, 10 Jan 2007 13:25:31 +0000 http://crookedtimber.org/2007/01/08/non-sequitur/#comment-183618 Paul, I'm not asserting that the difference is morally significant, just that whether it is or not has nothing (or almost nothing) to do with discounting. If you think abortion is wrong, changing the annual rate of time preference from 0 to 3 per cent is not going to make it OK, and vice versa. This point was made early on in one of the threads I pointed to. Paul, I’m not asserting that the difference is morally significant, just that whether it is or not has nothing (or almost nothing) to do with discounting. If you think abortion is wrong, changing the annual rate of time preference from 0 to 3 per cent is not going to make it OK, and vice versa. This point was made early on in one of the threads I pointed to.

]]> By: Paul http://crookedtimber.org/2007/01/08/non-sequitur/comment-page-1/#comment-183608 Paul Wed, 10 Jan 2007 10:52:52 +0000 http://crookedtimber.org/2007/01/08/non-sequitur/#comment-183608 uiop, That's fine, and obviously, as Daniel points out, there's a distinction (or "confusion" if you think it does anything to clarify the point) between people who will be alive in 9 months and people who will be alive in 100 years. From the point of view of this debate, what matters is if that difference is morally significant. Daniels, based on time, wasn't. You've done no more than assert that yours is, and Engels, Conchi and apparently JQ have done the same (“There’s a perfectly reasonable strand of thought" you'll recall). As it happens that asserted distinction makes sense to me, not least because of the consequences of holding the opposite view, as Brad Delong outlines above. But for you to argue "by asking for equal consideration to be given to these two classes you are confusing them" is a question begging argument; you're assuming that the difference you've outlined in morally significant, and then helpfully provided the conclusion that, if it is, then they need to be treated differently. That's not a substitute for demonstrating the reason why that difference matters any more than, say, timing. uiop,
That’s fine, and obviously, as Daniel points out, there’s a distinction (or “confusion” if you think it does anything to clarify the point) between people who will be alive in 9 months and people who will be alive in 100 years.
From the point of view of this debate, what matters is if that difference is morally significant. Daniels, based on time, wasn’t. You’ve done no more than assert that yours is, and Engels, Conchi and apparently JQ have done the same (“There’s a perfectly reasonable strand of thought” you’ll recall). As it happens that asserted distinction makes sense to me, not least because of the consequences of holding the opposite view, as Brad Delong outlines above. But for you to argue “by asking for equal consideration to be given to these two classes you are confusing them” is a question begging argument; you’re assuming that the difference you’ve outlined in morally significant, and then helpfully provided the conclusion that, if it is, then they need to be treated differently. That’s not a substitute for demonstrating the reason why that difference matters any more than, say, timing.

]]> By: Paul http://crookedtimber.org/2007/01/08/non-sequitur/comment-page-1/#comment-183607 Paul Wed, 10 Jan 2007 10:45:17 +0000 http://crookedtimber.org/2007/01/08/non-sequitur/#comment-183607 Daniel, I think you're trying to make the analogy between the two issue too literal. One argument for time preference is that we should treat individuals in the future differently, not because of any temporally based characteristics they might have, but because they are not real persons now and therefore do not deserve equal weight in any utilitarian calculus. By arguing for a near zero rate of time preference you implicitly reject this argument, together with all other arguments one might make for lowering the moral value of future individuals. Having rejected that argument, that not presently being alive reduces their moral significance, it is then reasonable to ask whether you would reach the same conclusion about all individuals who are not presently alive but may be at some point in the future. Whether we're talking about 9 months or 100 years is completely, and I'd have thought obviously, beside the point. One can however reasonably (but not conclusively) respond that people who are only potentially alive can rightly be treated differently from people who are statistically certain to be alive. I buy that and JQ presciently supported Engels argument to that effect, but I suspect many people on the other side of thew abortion debate wouldn't. That's why you have the argument. As I believe I've mentioned already, the gentleman JQ chose to quote appears neither interested in nor capable of engaging in that particular discussion. Daniel,
I think you’re trying to make the analogy between the two issue too literal. One argument for time preference is that we should treat individuals in the future differently, not because of any temporally based characteristics they might have, but because they are not real persons now and therefore do not deserve equal weight in any utilitarian calculus.

By arguing for a near zero rate of time preference you implicitly reject this argument, together with all other arguments one might make for lowering the moral value of future individuals.

Having rejected that argument, that not presently being alive reduces their moral significance, it is then reasonable to ask whether you would reach the same conclusion about all individuals who are not presently alive but may be at some point in the future. Whether we’re talking about 9 months or 100 years is completely, and I’d have thought obviously, beside the point. One can however reasonably (but not conclusively) respond that people who are only potentially alive can rightly be treated differently from people who are statistically certain to be alive. I buy that and JQ presciently supported Engels argument to that effect, but I suspect many people on the other side of thew abortion debate wouldn’t. That’s why you have the argument.

As I believe I’ve mentioned already, the gentleman JQ chose to quote appears neither interested in nor capable of engaging in that particular discussion.

]]> By: uiop http://crookedtimber.org/2007/01/08/non-sequitur/comment-page-1/#comment-183604 uiop Wed, 10 Jan 2007 09:45:03 +0000 http://crookedtimber.org/2007/01/08/non-sequitur/#comment-183604 Or, Paul, to put Engels and Daniel's point more succinctly: there is not so much a "distinction" between the "potential" humans who will exist in hundred of years and the "potential" humans who are fetuses now, but rather a <b>confusion</b> between two uses of the the language associated with the word "potential." Or, Paul, to put Engels and Daniel’s point more succinctly: there is not so much a “distinction” between the “potential” humans who will exist in hundred of years and the “potential” humans who are fetuses now, but rather a confusion between two uses of the the language associated with the word “potential.”

]]> By: Far Away http://crookedtimber.org/2007/01/08/non-sequitur/comment-page-1/#comment-183602 Far Away Wed, 10 Jan 2007 08:04:45 +0000 http://crookedtimber.org/2007/01/08/non-sequitur/#comment-183602 "In the year 2007 there will be 100 babies born if abortion were illegal, but only 80 if abortion were legal." etc etc To people who believe this argument, why not substitute contraception for abortion? Indeed, why not substitute masturbation (for men, anyway)? At the end of this particularly slippery slope, I think that we reach the conclusion that every sperm is sacred. “In the year 2007 there will be 100 babies born if abortion were illegal, but only 80 if abortion were legal.” etc etc

To people who believe this argument, why not substitute contraception for abortion? Indeed, why not substitute masturbation (for men, anyway)?

At the end of this particularly slippery slope, I think that we reach the conclusion that every sperm is sacred.

]]> By: Daniel http://crookedtimber.org/2007/01/08/non-sequitur/comment-page-1/#comment-183599 Daniel Wed, 10 Jan 2007 06:24:26 +0000 http://crookedtimber.org/2007/01/08/non-sequitur/#comment-183599 Paul, since a foetus is here right now and will turn into a person in a minimum of ten months unless action is taken, there is no sensible discount rate at all (and certainly no "market consistent" one) which will make it OK to abort that foetus if it wasn't OK anyway. The problem doesn't have anything specific to do with abortion and isn't solved by making a different assumption about discount rates. Paul, since a foetus is here right now and will turn into a person in a minimum of ten months unless action is taken, there is no sensible discount rate at all (and certainly no “market consistent” one) which will make it OK to abort that foetus if it wasn’t OK anyway. The problem doesn’t have anything specific to do with abortion and isn’t solved by making a different assumption about discount rates.

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