Comments on: Pro-war bias

By: Easily Distracted » Blog Archive »

Easily Distracted » Blog Archive » — Mon, 15 Jan 2007 18:28:27 +0000

[...] For this reason, and no other, I favor the Democrats letting Bush had free rein to “surge” away. Because surge as much as he likes, nothing’s really going to change. If there was a time when more troops and more money for reconstruction could have made the difference, it was back at the start of this whole thing. Now this is nothing more than a gambler hopelessly in the hole relentlessly doubling his bet, hoping somehow to avoid getting called on his losses. (John Quiggin pointed this out at Crooked Timber this last week; I’ve noted the same thing before in terms of poker analogies.) [...]

By: Phoenician in a time of Romans

Phoenician in a time of Romans — Sun, 14 Jan 2007 21:13:53 +0000

And empirically, it’s usually the case that both sides end up worse off relative to both the status quo ante or to a possible peace settlement they could have secured at a point well before the end of the war.

Depends on the methods of wealth creation in society. Almost certaily true for information-age societies (since human resources dedicated to war and the military are “wasted”). Not so true for industrial age societies (sweet, sweet oil) and almost certianly not true for agricultural age societies (capturing land WAS wealth).

By: radek

radek — Sun, 14 Jan 2007 17:12:33 +0000

Charles XII’s invasion of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth killed a percentage of the population that can only be compared with Hitler’s impact on Poland.

I think that peace loving Swedish blogger is taking too much credit. There was like, 8, different wars going on in Poland during this time. Swedes, Cossacks, Russians, Transylvanians, Prussians, not to mention a nobles’ rebellion and a peasant rebellion. So yeah in total it’s true but the credit should be properly divided.
And anyway, it was downhill for the Swedes since that time too, the big winners of all that mess being Russia and Prussia.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Deluge_%28Polish_history%29

and Sienkiewicz wrote some books about it;
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Deluge_%28book%29

By: magyarman

magyarman — Sun, 14 Jan 2007 12:24:43 +0000

Old men start wars and require young men to fight (and die) in them.

By: aaron

aaron — Sun, 14 Jan 2007 08:47:55 +0000

Even without Sadr, there’s that whole hezbollah thing Iran built for his father.

By: Jon Kay

Jon Kay — Sat, 13 Jan 2007 23:16:37 +0000

> 72: Middle Eastern warlords don’t go away when you kill them. (See Lebanon, Sadr’s dad, al-Hakim’s dad…)

Neither al’Sadr, al’Sadr’s family, nor his successors will matter nearly so much if al’Sadr’s militia can’t get violent on the streets without getting shot at.

By: Alex

Alex — Sat, 13 Jan 2007 20:52:27 +0000

38: The Swiss, Swedes, and Norwegians were military thugs during their early history—the Swedes as recently as 1709. They’re pretty much the same people genetically, so the difference must be institutional. (Unless hundreds of years of war weeded out the aggressive genes.)

Indeed. Walking around the Royal Palace in Stockholm, a Swedish and peaceloving blogger explained to me with some relish that Charles XII’s invasion of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth killed a percentage of the population that can only be compared with Hitler’s impact on Poland.

72: Middle Eastern warlords don’t go away when you kill them. (See Lebanon, Sadr’s dad, al-Hakim’s dad…)

By: abb1

abb1 — Sat, 13 Jan 2007 14:48:07 +0000

What I don’t understand is why everyone thinks this plan can’t work. Is Mr. Sadr too strong? Maybe he is, but what if he has to meet an unfortunate end by a car-bomb or something? Things happen, you know.

By: abb1

abb1 — Sat, 13 Jan 2007 14:27:48 +0000

Here: Analysis: Iraq PM’s silence telling. Similar to what I said in #3:

Al-Maliki aides have suggested the prime minister will attempt to avoid an all-out attack on the militia by attempting first to focus the new security drive on Sunni insurgent-held regions of the capital. If that were to prove successful, the theory goes, al-Maliki could then go the Mahdi Army and demand it disband because Shiites were no longer under threat.

And that appears to be the deal: Americans help SCIRI/Dawa kill some Sunnis – and then SCIRI/Dawa help Americans crack down on anti-American militias, Sadr. Then, I guess, the SCIRI/Dawa ayatollahs are somehow supposed to become American clients? Well, why not, if Saudi princes and Jordanian kings are…

By: Anarch

Anarch — Sat, 13 Jan 2007 04:55:51 +0000

To piggyback off samchevre’s point, war is a perfectly rational course if you know that your opponent is going to compromise with instead of fighting back: asymptotically, you end up with everything and they with nothing. [Alternatively, in a less unrealistic format, asymptotically you end up with everything negotiable and they with nothing beyond the barest necessities.] Reminds me a little of the old computer game Balance of Power: threatening to nuke the opponent is a surefire means of success in the short, it’s only the (either short-term irrational or long-term rational) impulse to fight back which produces cataclysm.

By: radek

radek — Sat, 13 Jan 2007 03:19:21 +0000

You’re right John though I think in the case of the ‘44 Rising the leaders were also banking somewhat on the Germans’ being “rational” – not wasting resources on defending a city which was bound to be captured anyway (and most of the German troops were being pulled out right before the rising). In both cases – reactions of Germans and Soviets – they got it wrong, with tragic consequences.

By: wandering wonderer

wandering wonderer — Fri, 12 Jan 2007 21:36:32 +0000

Can irrational incentives be bought off? I’d argue evidence from some civil wars in Africa suggest the answer is yes – a willingness to sacrifice a measure of independnece for access to financial resources or gains from natural resources – rebel groups in diamond rich areas specifically noted in negotiations they’d require a higher price to be bought off than rebels in areas with less lucrative natural resources.

Makes me wonder about Amitai Etzioni’s pooh-poohing in the National Interest the job creation package Bush suggests as “Dollars for Peace in Iraq”. Maybe dollars for peace works.

By: aaron

aaron — Fri, 12 Jan 2007 20:32:33 +0000

Because wars occurs when both parties believe they can win:

In cases with two type II motivation parties, there will be a net negetive.

In a case with type I and type II, it depends on the victor.

In cases with two type I parties, there will be a net posetive, because with both parties believing they will win, the one with be best institutions will win, resulting in greater longrun growth and productivity.

By: John Quiggin

John Quiggin — Fri, 12 Jan 2007 19:57:20 +0000

Radek, the critical case for Poland was the Warsaw rising in 1944. If the leaders knew that the Red Army would not come to their help, they were wrong to stage the rising, since it was almost certain to be defeated with heavy casualties, as actually took place.

By contrast, the Warsaw Ghetto uprising in 1943 was a case where it was better to die fighting. And as you say it was rational to resist Hitler, having confirmed by experiment that making deals with him wouldn’t work.

By: Quo Vadis

Quo Vadis — Fri, 12 Jan 2007 19:55:08 +0000

Many wars have been initiated on the assumption that war was inevitable and the relative strength of the potential combatants would change over time. The party with the early advantage then has an incentive to initiate the conflict. The “lessons learned” from previous wars are often used to reinforce this assumption.

Is this assumption ever valid? History provides us with plenty of opportunities to engage in “what if”s.