One might respond that we can mitigate the effects of the “status syndrome” within capitalism itself by, for example, creating programs that encourage more civic and/or political participation (fostering a sense of autonomy and solidarity). However, to the extent that such programs involve redistributing resources away from markets, they would appear not to be capitalistic in spirit. Further, there remains the problem that, even with increased civic and/or political participation vast disparities in income in wealth would persist, which itself undermines the “real freedoms” of those with little income and wealth (which Wright also discusses in Ch 2). Being unable to pursue one’s life plans because of one’s low level of income and wealth is hardly likely to bolster one’s sense of autonomy.

One might also respond by pointing out that alternatives to capitalism are unlikely to eradicate inequality to the extent that people experienced no health-detrimental anxiety related to social status. This seems right, and certainly the question of how much status anxiety can be treated is complicated if not only material goods are sources of anxiety, but social positioning is as well (so that, even if material goods are distributed more equally, political position and influence is not). All this shows, however, is that the problem may extend beyond the difficulties posed by capitalism. It would not show that capitalism itself does not significantly detract from one dimension of human flourishing.

I realize that the idea here is not to focus on the American system, or any particular capitalist economic system, for that matter. Still, I was wondering whether a variation of capitalism might count as a good alternative to the capitalism that, judging from chapter 2, is pretty awful. This question arose when I was reading your explanation of why capitalism gives rise to (encourages?) exploitation. There, you say, “It is precisely because capitalism creates the potential to eliminate material deprivation, but itself cannot fully actualize that potential that it can be indicted for perpetuating eliminable forms of human suffering.” Indeed, several times during that chapter you clarify that the problem might not arise if we took non-capitalist measures to prevent it, but capitalism itself does not contain the solution to the problem it creates. Fair enough, but is a good alternative one that just results in less harm, or is it one that, in addition to resulting in less harm, also still creates the potential to eliminate material deprivation (or gives rise to the other benefits of capitalism)? I suppose this is a question about the desirability of a particular alternative, and we’d have to weigh losses in benefits against gains in a reduction of human suffering, but I am not quite certain, given chapter 2, that any alternative that is simply restricted capitalism will even be a candidate. Of course, I am one of the people who, as you say, takes capitalism for granted.

I have a question about the first chapeter of the book where Wright maps out the project for real utopia pursuers. He divides the project into the critique of the existing society, the offering of alternatives, and the transformation.

The Transformation stage involves four different components. I’m concerned with the first “A theory of social reproduction.” I am not going to make a complaint about this as an importnant step; I’m just going to raise a concern about how this component of realizing real utopias fits into the bigger picture.

Social reproduction is part of what distinguishes political problems from other problems. For instance, imagine I was trying to decide whether or not giving “stakes” of 80,000 dollars to all 21 year olds was a good idea in the US. If “stakes” are a good idea it is because some of the problems I see in the US are reproduced by our current policies in which some people inherit good arrays of opportunities and others very bad arrays of opportunities. The current policies of relying on parents to stake out what opportunities their children will inherit reproduces the inequality of opportunity generation after generation.

Clearly, having this “theory of social reproduction” is an important first step in transformation. However, it seems like a step that comes into play much earlier in the real utopias project. Looking at the case of stakes for 21 year olds, it seems that in order to make a political critique, I need to have this theory of social reproduction. If not, then I don’t know that my critique is political in nature.

Also, in order to come up with desirable, viable alternatives to our current system I need to have this theory of social reproduction. If I didn’t have it, I wouldn’t know that “stakes” would change people’s opportunities at all- which means the stakes might not be viable. (Afterall, without my theory of social reproduction, I could speculate that poorer people whose children had fewer opportunities were genetically different from others). I need to be confident that it is this social reproduction that is causing the problem in order to be confient about the viability of an alternative method.

It seems like a theory of social reproduction is not just the first step in the tranformation part of the project. It seems like it’s a step that needs to be taken before the critique, the offering of alternatives, or the transformation can begin.

“They told me that the road I took would lead me to the Sea of Death; and from halfway along I turned back. And ever since, all the paths I have roamed were entangled, and crooked, and forsaken.”

I just wanted to add that this analogy at the end of chapter 3 was great. It added that extra something that’s often missing in dry political philosophy articles. It also reminds us that sometimes you have stop over thinking and just act (as Kierkegaard would recommend), instead of spending all of our time over analyzing. If we make a mistake, we can always try a different route.

Note to Bekka, I agree with you now (upon further thought) that virtue isn’t necessary for justice. My new concern surfaced in part because of class, but it is somewhat different than the topic we discussed. I’m just wondering how you could justify (of if you can justify) policies that go beyond material justice (virtue-driven). Because that seems to be part (but definitely not all) of the critique of capitalism, and I’m concerned that I can’t think of a good way to justify my intuitions on that matter (though I still think it would be a good goal for the state/economy).

‘…[I]f institutions are not knave-proof, it helps not to have too many knaves around.’

‘Just political and economic institutions and social institutions can easily be perverted by cultures of corruption.’
—-Onora O’Neill, Towards Justice and Virtue: A Constructive Account of Practical Reasoning (1996).

I do think our concept of flourishing should make some reference to our conception of goods and/or the Good or some basic, principled ethical desideratum as a baseline or form of circumscribing the parameters of what human flourishing entails. This need not mean the concept cannot remain ‘open-ended,’ as I believe it rightly should. I have to wait to another day to explain why I believe the concept cannot remain so vague…so perhaps Harry and E.O can permit me to respond later by e-mail correspondence.

And thanks for posting this material, which I’ve yet to read in full but hope to do soon. I thinks such work exemplifies political philosophy at its best.