“Laudable project X enjoys far less popular support in the US than it does in other civilised countries and this is the fault of… its deeply marginalised supporters within the US.”

A bit counterintuitive perhaps, but still…

However by that time it was quite clear that the Soviets wanted a deal, so that part of the story is not as crucial to the point I’m trying to make as the events which led up to it. U Thant’s most important moves were on Oct 24th, when he called for a moratorium on military action, and Oct 25th, when he appealed to Khrushchev to stop his ships short of the quarantine line. (Khrushchev agreed on 26th.) My impression is that the Americans suggested to U Thant that he make that second request, since it would be easier for Khrushchev to accept it coming from him. That’s the important point: the existence of an internationally respected broker gave Khrushchev a way to back down with dignity. Maybe he would have backed down anyway, we’ll never know.

We may be wandering away from the topic of Henry’s post. What prompted my first comment was this remark of yours: “No country needs the UN in order to commit themselves not to wage aggressive war, they can just promise not to wage aggressive war.” It’s not that simple. In a showdown what governments often need most is a way to get out of a corner where they have been trapped by their own rhetoric, domestic opinion etc.; institutions like the UN can come in very handy in such cases. You say that “a neutral arbitrator seems important in trade disputes, or other relatively [un?]important matters, but less so in matters of war and peace” but actually I think the reverse is true. People expect their leaders to compromise on commercial matters, so they are likely to do so in any case, with or without an arbitrator. The pressure to “take a stand” is greater where war is concerned. So states do have an interest in promoting institutions dedicated to finding peaceful solutions.

Henry, These seem like very good points, but if they were in your original post, I didn’t see them.

The role of a neutral arbitrator seems important in trade disputes, or other relatively important matters, but less so in matters of war and peace. You sort of said that international law isn’t going to matter for really important decisions, but you also said that international law can play a role in deterring events like the Iraq War.

Kevin also says that international institutions have an important effect on events more significant than trade disputes. He links to a document, claiming that it shows that UN Secretary-General U Thant “proposed” a deal in the Cuban missile crisis, a deal that the two sides later accepted. But actually, the document says that U Thant just passed on a Soviet proposal that RFK had already discussed with the Soviet ambassador. It’s very explicit that he was just reporting a Soviet proposal: “[UN Secretary General U Thant] also adds that the other side may ask the US to dismantle the missile sites in Turkey and Italy as part of a settlement.”

paul – one day I hope to write an article which will set out better my ideas about the relationship between reputation and institutions (including laws). Short version: I think that standard game theoretic models of reputation leave out the interesting stuff (Kreps is a partial exception here – but he doesn’t try to formalize his most important insights). For reputational arguments about sanctioning etc to work, there have to be common understandings about what does, or doesn’t constitute a “bad act.” Institutions provide these understandings. Adjudicatory institutions further provide a realm of authoritative interpretation and fact finding that can cement reputational effects. But the key is that I think that without the kinds of common understandings generated by either informal institutions or formal ones such as laws, reputational mechanisms won’t work. This mostly gets left out of the famous work by Greif etc etc.

Maybe the two Ks could have sorted it out without the UN and then again maybe not, but the fact is that the deal which U Thant proposed was the deal that was done:

“These proposals are essentially identical to the agreement which RFK, speaking for the president, would propose to the Soviet ambassador late on 10/27 and Khrushchev would accept early on 10/28. However, the understanding concerning the removal of US missiles from Turkey would remain secret for several decades and was not included in the public announcement on 10/28.”

http://www.hpol.org/jfk/cuban/

Once you spell out the role of institutions, it’s easier to see their limitations. I’ve never heard of the Secretary-General’s role in the Cuban missile crisis, and I’m skeptical that he had any impact. For one thing, I don’t see how the UN Charter gave him any authority in the situation. As to Antigua, they don’t need the WTO to give them permission to ignore US copyrights, they can choose to ignore them whenever they please.

Didn’t the Cuban missile crisis provide an example of what institutions can do? The UN Secretary General called on both sides to back off and they did. Sure, Khruschev could have made the same decision without the UN but it would have been harder for him to do so. Given the stakes it’s not a trivial example.

Surely the point of these institutions is they tend to turn lots of small bilateral agreements and conflicts and bring them into a multilateral system – whereas before the WTO lots of countries would have their tit for tat protectionist exchanges, once most people join up any action against one member tends to attract more attention from third parties – two third parties breaking agreements held between themselves only is (at the very least psychologically) different to breaking an agreement that you yourself are part of.

Equally these organisations also group things together – would Antigua be able to put anywhere near the amount of pressure on the US regarding internet gambling if it wasn’t for the WTO and the threat of them legally being able to ignore all american copyrights etc.

But what does this have to do with institutions? No country needs the UN in order to commit themselves not to wage aggressive war, they can just promise not to wage aggressive war. That promise is no more or less credible than signing the UN Charter. This theory doesn’t seem to give institutions anything in particular to do.

I don’t disagree – you can have a system of commitments based on reputation – I simply think that, once that’s the mechanism you’re relying on, the concept of “international law” doesn’t really have much work to do – except, as I suggested, as a language in which to phrase your rational (taking reputation effects into account) promises.

Maybe that’s a quibble based on reading too much into your specific invocation of “international law” rather than “international constraints on behaviour” or some other, broader notion of rational restraint by state actors.