I do think I had better say something, though. Political theory and philosophy is technically the field I study.

I was thinking before this thread that I would only submit grant applications in the humanities. Now I’m not so sure. Harvey Mansfield, who is as Straussian as one can get, has argued that political philosophy was prior to political science and that the latter grew out of attempts to end political philosophy. Instead of people debating about the nature of good and using various metaphors, people could be looked at as more predictable than deliberative and the question of what is good for all could be recast in terms of preferences.

Whether one agrees with the story above or not isn’t crucial to my point. What I think is that the mere possibility that the story could be true means that political science could be entirely defined by method and political theory could be defined as a critique of method. I think someone doing work on voting rights in developing countries or changing notions about gender in Africa could very easily be said to be critiquing method even as they employ particular approaches that also need to be explained and scrutinized.

The suggestion I’m making is this: if you look at yourself, when proposing a task, as critiquing the current state of knowledge, you don’t need to be explicit about your own methods necessarily. More important is to ask how the current state of knowledge was established, explain and analyze that method, and then move into criticisms.

I think the suggestion in #13 that political theory does sit between the humanities and social sciences and should be viewed thus is invaluable. I like to think of my work as purely in the humanities. But I know that’s a lie I’ve made up not to deal with social scientists – the truth is that any question I find myself pondering and working through literature or philosophy to explore always has something to say about the current state of research in another field, and whether that research is directed well or not.

It might be because I’m arrogant that I feel my thought has broad appeal. But if someone who is more thoughtful than I am can pick up this argument and salvage it, I might have actually contributed something here.

It will include essays by Daniel McDermott on analytical political philosophy; David Miller on the relation between facts and principles in political theory; Adam Swift and Stuart White on some of the connections between political theory and ‘real politics’; Iwao Hirose on formal theory and political theory; Lois McNay on political theory and critical social theory; David Leopold on dialectical approaches; Mark Philp on the history of political thought and political theory; Sudhir Hazareesingh and Karma Nabulsi on the joys of archival work; Elizabeth Frazer on the boundaries of the political; and Michael Freeden on ideology and thinking politically.

The book is aimed at first year graduates in political theory (assuming readers who are clever but not assuming much previous experience of political theory).

noaman I am trying to distinguish between an approach and a method, but with a certain difficulty!—I’m not at all sure I can do it. Game theory I’d call, in this context, the game theoretic/al approach, so I’d prefer a different example.

For instance, in physical sciences, measuring the mass of an object is a method—it’s something that can be replicated and falsifiable on its own.

meauring the mass is a method, yes (but I hadn’t thought of that way of explaining why it’s a method) and a survey is a method (an application of a method), but (I’d say) ‘game theory’ is an approach. I suppose I’m saying a method’s a simple tool of analysis, an approach is more overarching. A theory, I’ve never been good at defining theories, I tend to avoid its formal definition/s.

But I’m not sure what you mean by method—something that can be replicated and falsified on its own rather than as part of a general theory? For instance, in physical sciences, measuring the mass of an object is a method—it’s something that can be replicated and falsifiable on its own. This, I fear, is grossly simplifying what you’re trying to get across.

It stems from the ESRC’s research training thing, of course (I thought it applied only to ESRC recognition, but of course departments want/need that), and a one-approach-fits-all ethos; and it seems to have got worse (the ESRC is now going on about transferable skills).

I do think methods courses and approaches courses and research training are desirable, but I also understand your unease.

aaron_m yes, I think this is in large part a practical question, and arises because of the demands of research granting boards and, in the UK, the boards’ insistence on the teaching of ‘methods’. I do though think there are interesting intellectual questions here too.

such as game theory.

I wouldn’t have called that a ‘method’ but I see what you mean.

Chris thanks for the author list, clearly this is going to be an ‘approaches’ book. So, back to square one… .

It is quite right—-as Adam Swift notes—-that in the UK we must give instruction on methodology to theory students which always makes me deeply uneasy. My approach is to have students read Plato’s Crito and reflect on whether or not they were convinced by Socrates and why (not—as most are not). This at least gets students reflecting more on how to persuade others with a convincing case, surely the end game of what we do.

Obviously it does not follow that because political theory lacks methods of the character we find in empirical sciences that we also fail to demonstrate a purpose to our field. In fact the methods in empirical science do not tell us anything about their purpose either.

As for the method problem generally, maybe we should be a bit more pragmatic about what we are after here.

1. We want something quick and reassuring for grant committees. I have a hard time believing that “reflective equilibrium” can do the job (especially given that Rawls does not appear to actually use the “method” himself).

How about something written to be method sounding that focuses on how to go about analytic reasoning and/or critical reflection. Of course these skills are needed in any academic effort, but because the philosopher relies on them much more in the absence of systematic methods like those found in empirical sciences its seems appropriate to claim them as our methods.

Some philosopher must have written an uncomplicated yet impressive one/two pager along these lines at some point. No?

2. For teaching the problem seems to me more difficult. The link above to a course in political theory method is telling.

“In the third part, students will be introduced to methodological issues that are specific to moral and political theorizing, such as basic meta-ethics, the nature of values and norms, the controversies between universalism and relativism, the idea of reflective equilibrium, and the role of political theory and its connection to the rest of political science.”

Does not sound like instruction on how to go about doing political theory but rather simply doing political theory. Learning by doing is the only way I have been taught ‘how to do political theory,’ and that works well but I would have benefited from explanatory analysis of the process as well.

I have also been introduced to tools that I then learned to use by trial an error, such as game theory. Hear it seems to me that there should be more in the way of pedagogical work for students spelling out how to use such tools for addressing different kinds of problems political theorists address and the limits of such tools (maybe there are lots of such works out there and I have just not had the benefit of being introduced to them).

There are a relatively small number of nations in the world, and they have great variety across many dimensions [area, population, wealth, neighbors, climate, resources, geography, technology, history, culture (itself many dimensions)]. It isn’t surprising that the sorts of methods favored in other social sciences can’t be well applied to political science.