Roger. Originally, I criticized you for rejecting, without argument, the idea that we have a moral obligation to Iraq, and that this obligation might entail continued occupation. I don’t recall backing any particular Democratic policy other than my own, your Latin bravado notwithstanding. And as long as we’re engaging in rhetoric, you were also complaining about the media’s tendency to cast every issue in black and white. Yet here you are, boiling everything down to “pro-war” or “anti-war” and calling me naive, while failing to support your lone argument (the dubious Basra example) against a fairly obvious objection (disanalogy). I don’t know what to say to that, except ad hominem and tu quoque.

Seth? Thanks for the insight. This has been my first time posting comments to a blog, so I’m a little unfamiliar with the protocol. But I still think making baseless, inflammatory remarks is the way to confirm ignorance, not persistent questioning of those who pretend to knowledge. I don’t know if you saw my question answered above somewhere, but perhaps you can explain to a genuinely concerned liberal voter how you know the civil war following an American withdrawal wouldn’t be worse than the occupation itself? Maybe you can help Roger with that, too.

I should have been clearer. It’s never been a question of breaking up the country or not. There’s no evidence that anyone in US policy circles has ever cared one way or another.
The overriding interest, the only thing about which this administration has been absolutely consistent, is having more military outposts in the mideast.
Facts on the ground.

You don’t know that. Look at that NIE thing, clearly something’s is going on in there. It might.

Mostly because people continue to talk out of some sort of psychological inertia, some version of: “I still think…” etc., even when their question has been answered (or their ignorance confirmed.)
“So to your phrase about the US will unilaterally (and voluntarily) withdraw or it won’t, the answer is ‘it won’t’.”

As to whether the US plan has always been to break up Iraq, I’d say no. The one thing the US has been consistent about is the desire for long term military ties, in the form of bases and men on the ground. This is not occupation as such, but its got nothing to do with the interests of the Iraqi people. The Iraqi’s recognize that, as Badger has pointed out, much more than Americans do, or even than JQ is willing to admit.
Everybody wants to be a doctor and no one is willing to listen to the god damn patient.

I don’t know what I can say to that,except q.e.d.

However, I’m sorry that I didn’t specify that the tooth fairy would contribute to UNICEF. And to President Clinton’s charity. It is a good little tooth fairy.

I’m hopeful that as the U.S. heads into a recession, the minds of the warparty enablers in the Dem party will be wonderfully concentrated. Because otherwise, they will share the blame with the GOP for the vast and insane waste of resources that is what the Iraq war is all about. And I don’t think that outcome is going to make them too happy.

I’m skeptical about the claim that in Iraq it’s going to get worse if the US troops leave.

On July 20, 1987, the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the country was announced…and on February 15, 1989, the last Soviet troops departed on schedule from Afghanistan.

Najibullah’s regime, though failing to win popular support, territory, or international recognition, was however able to remain in power until 1992. Ironically, until demoralized by the defections of its senior officers, the Afghan Army had achieved a level of performance it had never reached under direct Soviet tutelage. Kabul had achieved a stalemate that exposed the Mujahideen’s weaknesses, political and military. For nearly three years, Najibullah’s government successfully defended itself against Mujahideen attacks, factions within the government had also developed connections with its opponents.

According to Russian publicist Andrey Karaulov, the main reason why Najibullah lost power was the fact Russia refused to sell oil products to Afghanistan in 1992 for political reasons (the new Russian government did not want to support the former communists) and effectively triggered an embargo.

Roger,

You didn’t really answer my objection to Basra. Whatever happened immediately following the British withdrawal, the city is once again a battleground. And again, even if it weren’t, Basra isn’t Baghdad. See my previous response for details. Nor do am I ignoring US actions on the ground—I’m simply arguing that those actions are not obviously worse for the Iraqis than American withdrawal. On one level, yes, it’s absolutely wrong for the US to exploit the Iraqi people. But on an even more fundamental level, US exploitation might, might, be a better deal for them than American withdrawal and the resulting instability. In order to disagree with me, you’ve got to think that Iraqis would be more secure and better fed if the US left.

What I think the US is going to do is quite different from what I think the US ought to do. What’s going to happen, obviously, is that the US will cave to popular dissatisfaction with the war, it’s going to pull out prematurely, and it’s going to leave Iraq to a brutal civil war which, ultimately, Iraqis are going to blame on us. What the US ought to do—if my tentative arguments are correct—is to sustain its present troop levels, beg the UN for assistance with the voice of a newly elected president, facilitate reconciliation among Iraqi ethnic groups, and then wait, hope, pray, and cajole the Iraqi government into compromise and viability. Those are all possible goals, in some sense. The only thing that makes them impossible, I surmise, is the anti-war movement’s unwillingness to set aside its (justified) hatred of the Bush Administration long enough to put things in perspective. But if all you care about is what’s probably going to happen, then you can stop arguing. Sadly, you’ve already won.

I don’t think the length of the occupation is directly relevant to the moral question. Indirectly, of course, the longer the US stays in Iraq the more people will become convinced that the occupation is really an attempt at imperial expansionism. But suppose, contrary to fact, (1) that the Iraqis are permanently unable to form a working government, and—maybe not contrary to fact—(2) the violence in Iraq will continue to decrease. Under those conditions I’d think we should stay, if only because some form of political authority is necessary to secure human rights, but also because their instability is the result of our initial stupidity. In that sense, and on those idealized assumptions, I don’t see anything wrong with a “holding operation.”

Of course, at some point, the Iraqis will probably be able to form an effective government (or several regional governments—I’m inclined to think the Kurds are entitled to their own state, moderate Turkish oppression notwithstanding). And of course, violence in Iraq will continue to fluctuate. I’m genuinely pained, Magistra, because part of me strongly agrees with you: if we’re making any gains at all, its in inches, not miles. But I’m not convinced that substantial gains are beyond reach. And it’s important to remember how tragic the choice really is, because more—many more—are going to die no matter what we do.

What frustrates me on the domestic political front, however, is how quick those of the anti-war persuasion were to criticize the surge on the grounds that not enough political progress has been made. I’m not sure if the US could ditch attempts at democratization and install a relatively benign dictator at this point, but I think the Iraqis certainly deserve more time if we can give it to them. If a drawdown of the ‘surge’ troop levels results in increased violence, I would take that as evidence that more troops are needed, not less. But again, increased troop levels will only incite Iraqis to more insurgency, so there is definitely a balance to be struck. As for how to strike it, and whether the attempt will ultimately be worth it? Those are exactly the complicated questions that anti-war advocates must face honestly, and answer convincingly, if they’re going to have a case for withdrawal.

Let me preface this with a good-faith disclaimer that I am neither a military strategist, nor an expert on the Soviet-Afghan War. I’m just a guy trying to figure out for himself where to stand. At first glance, I have to admit that the parallels between the US occupation of Iraq and the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan are striking.
But one important disanalogy is that Afghanistan was a proxy for the Cold War. The Mujahideen had stronger external support than any faction does in Iraq, and they also appear to have been better organized. Given US aid through Pakistan (along with some aid from Saudi Arabia, China, and the UK), the Mujahideed were not likely to be exhausted by military losses, and Soviet offensives would be continuously offset by more US aid to their opponents. In the Iraq occupation, the US can bring a greater (though not necessarily decisive) amount of pressure to bear on would-be financiers of the insurgency (Iran, Syria, etc), and as the ‘surge’ may have shown, escalation can have positive effects on the security situation (compare the disastrous results of Gorbachev’s 1985 troop increases).

To answer your question, whether or not the Soviet military should have stayed in Afghanistan seems to be contingent on two factors. First, whether the Mujahideed could have been defeated (which is of course contingent, in turn, on whether they would have received continuing support from their external allies); and second, whether continued occupation would have been better for the Afghans than the intensification of the civil war that followed Soviet withdrawal.
In this case, assessing the costs is complicated by competing considerations. On the one hand, the post-Soviet civil war was relatively short and seems to have been considerably less intense than was the Soviet occupation (though I can’t verify this without doing some research I don’t have time to do). On the other hand, when a modicum of stability finally arrived, it was because the Taliban came out on top. Here, I’m swayed by the increasing intensity of the Soviet occupation, and I’ll concede for the sake of argument that the withdrawal was the right thing to do.
But note the crucial role of the disanalogy: the violence in Iraq has been decreasing. If this is the result of sustainable improvements—and I think it just might be—then my answers to the Soviet-Afghan war and the Iraq war need not be the same. Moreover, I’m not convinced that the impending civil war in Iraq wouldn’t be much worse than the one in Afghanistan. In short, though we should not leap to the conclusion that withdrawal is always the best option, I leave open the possibility that, in particular circumstances, it might be.

If you’re off the “what kind of actor” language and back to plain English, then I’ll put it this way:

My reasons for insisting US policy 2003 to date is very important are two: (1) Non GreenZone Iraqis (and I agree) think the policy continues to be bloody-minded as far as tearing the country apart is concerned, and if that is the case (and there is a strong case for that view, which naturally you don’t see much about in the corporate media), then an election on the question of policy-change that doesn’t even raise that issue (namely the issue of what policy you’re changing from) is really a sham. And by saying “it’s moot”, you’re supporting the idea of not even raising that issue. That was my initial beef, namely that it’s pointless to say I JQ am for speedy withdrawal, and it doesn’t matter whether actual US policy is to continue tearing the country apart. The answer would be: So what if you’re for speedy withdrawal, the point is the electorate doesn’t understand the existing policy (supported in this ignorance by 1000 people who like you say it doesn’t matter), hence there won’t be pressure for change.

(2) The US has been in talks of some kind with people connected with the Sunni resistance, and one major stumbling block seems to be their demand for a commitment to speedy and complete withdrawal. Negotiations and withdrawal in the real world seem to be connected issues. You can have helicopters on the roof, or you can have a negotiated withdrawal. So to your phrase about the US will unilaterally (and voluntarily) withdraw or it won’t, the answer is “it won’t”.

But as you say, this isn’t the right forum…We could leave it at that

As regards alternative proposals like a US-sponsored partition plan or permanent bases, these questions would indeed be important, and the implication would be that such proposals are unlikely to work well for most of those involved (Iraqis and Americans in general) although they would certainly benefit some.

I mentioned Basra because there we have seen an experiment. And in November, we got this story from the AP:

“Attacks have plunged by 90 per cent in southern Iraq since Britain withdrew its troops from the main city of Basra, their commander has said.

Their presence in central Basra, Iraq’s second-largest city, was the single largest trigger for violence, Major General Graham Binns said.

“We thought, ‘If 90 per cent of the violence is directed at us, what would happen if we stepped back?’ ” Gen Binns said in an interview in Baghdad yesterday.

“About 500 British troops moved out of one of Saddam Hussein’s palaces in the heart of Basra in early September, joining some 4,500 at a garrison at an airport on the city’s edge.

Since then there has been a remarkable and dramatic drop in attacks. The motivation for attacking us was gone, because we’re no longer patrolling the streets.”

What the story doesn’t say is that Basra has become a much worse place by all accounts over the last four years, a mini Taliban state ruled by thuggish Islamicists. Eventually, I’m sure there will be more fighting – to overthrow the Islamic militias that run the place. If, as seems likely, the Shiite who are returning to Iraq complete the take over of ethnically cleansed Sunni areas in Baghdad, and the Sunnis who, so far, are staying in Syria and Iran, see this and decide to do something about it, fighting will also break out. In the latter case, it helps that the U.S. has armed all sides. So: what, concretely, do you think the U.S. is going to do? If you aren’t thinking in tooth fairy terms, then surely you have a concrete sense of possible American actions leading to a peaceful Iraq. What are they? Permanent occupation? Permanently arming and disarming militias? Permanently making Iraq a potential launching pad for other Middle Eastern wars? By this time, such ingenue suggestions are no longer simply naive – they are simply pro-war.