Comments on: Respecting Religious Believers

By: abb1

abb1 — Sun, 16 Mar 2008 21:38:05 +0000

But would you at least admit that my comment on 2+2 being equal 10 or 11 was extremely clever?

If not, I’ve gotta tell ya: you’re obviously as biased against me (in a completely irrational way) as Shakespeare (allegedly) was against the Jews. And that seriously undermines your reputation of a rational individual.

By: engels

engels — Sun, 16 Mar 2008 21:26:01 +0000

Lindsey – Fair enough. I hope I haven’t been uncharitable to you, though. If you look up through the thread I think you will find that a lot of people here – Harry, Matt, Roy, probably others – are broadly sympathetic to your idea that whether or not a belief is worthy of respect is determined by the individual’s conduct in forming and maintaining it, rather than my anti-individualistic heresies, so I am in all likelihood wrong about this. Now how’s that for humility!

By: engels

engels — Sun, 16 Mar 2008 21:16:00 +0000

Also, I agreed with parts of your second post, about wanting to protect aspects of humanity that tend to get “chopped up in the jaws of logic”, as you put it. I actually think the conclusion of Blackburn’s essay gets it pretty much right:

So in the end, should I have behaved differently that Friday night? I fear the matter is indeterminate. Was I being asked to express substantial respect for an ontological self-deception whose primary purpose includes protecting arbitrary attitudes and customs from the scrutiny of reason? Or was I being asked to show minimal respect, not much more than toleration, for remembrances and pieties that it is human to have, and that desperately need protection against the encroaching world of cost-benefit analysis? I fear that the somewhat unaccountable state of mind of my host may be interpreted in either way, and no doubt in yet other ways again.

By: engels

engels — Sun, 16 Mar 2008 20:57:21 +0000

Roy – (i) Shakespeare and anti-semitism was not the most apposite or the most sensitive example to choose. I’d imagine you can think of similar examples that would be acceptable to you, though? ‘Let us say’ was an invitation to assume something as true for the sake of argument, not an attempt to declare it true by fiat.

(ii) ‘Dogmatism’ was a reference to abb1’s unfair and stupid smear at #188. ‘Pseudo-hippie sloganeering’ was also a reference to abb1’s comments, eg. that if Dawkins had any power he’d be as dangerous as Ayatolah Khomeini… (yawn)

(iii) I have been trying to distinguish between ‘ideal rationality’ and more limited norms of rationality which guide us in everyday life. For example, if a mathematician tells me that 25 964 951 is a prime number then perhaps I am rationally entitled to that belief in the everyday sense. However, ‘ideal rationality’ perhaps demands that I check all the factors by myself. I took Harry to be claiming that religious beliefs are not excluded by everyday norms of rationality (‘straightforward canons of rationality’). I was trying to show that there are beliefs—for example mild forms of bigotry—which are not so excluded—at least in some cultural and historical milieux—but which we do not feel are entitled to our respect. (I agree with you that all forms of bigotry are excluded by ideal rationality, and I think the same is true of religious belief.)

iv) Finally, I think that one problem with this discussion may have been a haziness about what is meant by respect. I wonder if the concept is itself too nebulous to make this kind of debate very fruitful. Quite a lot of what you have written seems to be a defense of “tolerance” but no-one, least of all Blackburn, said that we should not tolerate religious believers. I’ll admit that I feel a bit uneasy in saying that I refuse to respect people’s religious beliefs, if only because I am not at all sure what this means. However, I am strongly opposed to the attitudes which Harry says his ‘respect’ of Christians consists in, in particular, his

general, hard to define, pro-attitude to them holding [their belief in God] (and no preference that they change it)

If this is what ‘respecting’ believers means, then I have to say I do not ‘respect’ them. I do wonder though, whether such an attitude—of blithe indifference to someone’s holding beliefs which I regard as both false and pernicious—can really be consonant with respecting him as a person.

By: lindsey

lindsey — Sun, 16 Mar 2008 20:46:07 +0000

engels,
I’ll leave it at this: when I said militant (for both believers and non-believers) I had in mind people I’ve met in my own life. Of course everyone assumes I mean the big wig atheists, but I really was referring to actual acquaintances I’ve had and the condescending way that they’ve treated me. So you couldn’t really defend them if you wanted to. That’s not to say the more famous folks wouldn’t fall under that category, it just means I don’t really know if they would or not.

And I’ll admit I’m not sure how to respond to your last point. It was, after all, just a blog post, not a full blown theory of respect (in other words, I have my intuitions, but nothing that would satisfy you I’m sure). Maybe if I pursue that in graduate school I’ll get back to you :)
In the mean time, try and be charitable and take the post in the spirit it was meant, or not, it’s up to you. I think that’s enough from me on this thread.

By: Roy Belmont

Roy Belmont — Sun, 16 Mar 2008 19:43:01 +0000

Engels-
Firstly, I meant no insult with the third-personaging, sorry if it hit you that way. It’s not a habit by any means.
Possibly if you had phrased it other than as
“For example, Shakespeare was an anti-semite…” then tagging a “…let us say.” on the back end.
Smearing Shakespeare, even hypothetically, will get my dander up. And accusations of anti-semitism are way too common right now, it makes that part of the example glare, rather than shine.
The formation of bigoted views may at times come out of a kind of reasoned process, but it’s clearly a defective one.
By definition bigotry is inaccurate and rationality accurate. But rationality is not a binary option, so they’re not exclusive to each other. Though I’m sure you’ll agree that any rational process that results in bigotry would perforce be inaccurate somewhere.
The subject of this post would cover the part where the bigot instead of screaming hate-filled catchphrases presents a subjectively rational case in a dialog with others not holding those bigoted views.
“I got jacked at an ATM in Palo Alto. My sister-in-law got jacked at an ATM in St. Petersburg Fl. My Uncle Howard got mugged in Boston in 1957. In each case the perp was black. Therefore all blacks are dangerous and prone to harmful criminal conduct.”
This is a reasoned and sincerely held bigoted belief. Not impossible, actually common, but the rational process is prionic, incomplete. So yeah, it happens, but I doubt it happens anywhere as a result of an entirely rational process from start to finish. The elisions and logical jumps, the leaps of dark faith that make the conclusion seem inevitable aren’t logical or rational, they’re emotional.
I don’t see my linking you with any “dogmatism” so I’m not sure what that’s about.
The solution isn’t obvious because it’s organic, alive, situational. There is a season for firm intolerance, and a season for understanding. Where we are in that isn’t ever going to be so clearly obvious that it needs no pondering. These times are so fraught, understanding and mercy and tolerance can do so much to quiet the anxious, why not?
If the non-believers’ view is superior, shouldn’t the attitudes and comportment of non-believers be superior as well? Adolescent superiority, proceeding from competitive insecurity, gets expressed as derision and violent rejection. But scorn and rejection out of hand won’t make the already worried calmer. Starting from a position of open-minded respect may.

By: abb1

abb1 — Sun, 16 Mar 2008 19:41:41 +0000

or that it is logically inconceivable that I be mistaken (it is not)

It’s not that you are mistaken necessarily, but someone could claim that 2+2 is equal 10 or 11 and they would be correct too.

By: engels

engels — Sun, 16 Mar 2008 18:45:42 +0000

Lindsey – I suppose I just don’t really understand your and Harry’s worries that using the word “certain” can make me guilty of some kind of hubris. Are the two of you saying that—in order to display humility in the fact of our finite nature—we ought never to utter this word on its own: although I can be “very-close-to-certain” (Harry) or “damn certain” (Lindsey) I can never be just certain (and above all not completely certain or “100% certain”). This seems to me a bit like the conversational equivalent of wearing a hair-shirt. I am happy to say that I am certain (completely certain, 100% certain) about plenty of things: I have two hands, 2+2=4, torture is wrong. That isn’t to say that I believe I am infallible (I don’t) or that it is logically inconceivable that I be mistaken (it is not).

On the second point, if you won’t be drawn on who are referring to as “militant atheists” then it does become very difficult for anyone to try to defend them against your accusations…

Finally, you do acknowledge that your original generalisation [a belief is worthy of respect if (a) sincerely held and (b) formed in a minimally rational way] was “incomplete” in that there are beliefs that while meeting these conditions are nevertheless not worthy of respect. But then it seems you owe us an explanation of why religious beliefs are not of this kind.

By: engels

engels — Sun, 16 Mar 2008 17:30:53 +0000

Roy – I don’t think you right to say that it is impossible for someone to be an honest and sincere bigot. I also don’t think the issue of whether someone can arrive at bigotted opinions by following rational norms of belief formation is—at the very least—as obvious as you think it is. Bigotry might well be irrational in an ideal sense (as indeed I think religious belief is), but I think that one can arrive at mild forms of bigotry by following everyday norms of rationality, if such attitudes are prevalent within one’s society. Surely it is easy enough to think to think of examples in history, and perhaps today, of people who have held mildly bigotted views but whom we would not wish to describe as irrational, in the everyday sense…

(Some free advice: if you care so much about “tolerance and understanding …of… differences”, perhaps you should reconsider your habit of talking about people whose views you object to in the third person? Some people could find it a little bit insulting and creepy…)

Anyway I wasn’t trying prevent people from “making [their] own minds up” by suggesting they “defer” to my opinions on Shakespeare’s attitudes to Jews, or trying to indoctrinate anyone with my “dogmatism”, fun though all that would have been. Believe it or not, I was hoping to have an argument about a difficult issue which interests me and to which the solution does not seem to me to be obvious.

By: abb1

abb1 — Sun, 16 Mar 2008 13:00:56 +0000

Like theism and atheism, antisemitism too is a product of indoctrination (or, I suppose, it could be a backlash against indoctrination, as with Steve LaBonne’s rejection of theism).

Like theism and atheism, antisemitism is not something to be respected or disrespected, only noted and understood in context.

And just like theism and atheism, antisemitism as such isn’t necessarily dangerous – Shakespeare’s (alleged) antisemitism ain’t anybody’s business but but his own – unless it turns violent or oppressive, of course; but that’s a different story altogether.

By: Roy Belmont

Roy Belmont — Sun, 16 Mar 2008 10:33:21 +0000

I’ve been searching around all day for some genuine hippie sloganeering but everything that came up was so clearly just media-generated cliches I had to let it all pass. God only knows what dreck “pseudo-hippie sloganeering” would turn out to be.
Oh.
I like Dawkins more than any religious adherent in his weight class. I feel championed by him in many ways, defended. Yet I believe in the infinite nature of reality, that its perceived boundaries are all illusory, the same way the tactile surfaces of things are real to us only as a pragmatic compromise, between our sensory apparatus and that infinitely complex reality. Given that, it seems pretty much inevitable that there’s a lot more going on, in the sense of orders of complexity and magnitude and being than we’ve cataloged so far. And that’s where the rationalists/atheists/scientificalists all run away screaming. Or really just turn away in disgust. Because you can’t prove it. Even as people like Duetsch come back from the front lines with pictures that are weird and unimaginably complicated. Still you can’t prove their existence without the cooperation of those purported beings. And believing in things you can’t prove is rationally indefensible.
What you can prove is how easily an institutionalized moral focus on something as nebulous as powerful beings who exist in other dimensions but can invisibly influence things in this one, can be bent to serve the aims and desires of that institution’s elect. This is what I take to be Dawkins’ main motive in attacking the illogic of religious dogma. That’s one of the ways I feel defended by him.
But because the context of Dawkins’ effort is an already polarized field, it can’t help but intensify that polarity. This hardens the sides, and further obscures and drowns out the not-so-adamant unpolarized, where I believe the truer frequencies originate.
Respecting someone else’s religious beliefs or not is a moral choice.
Moral choices occur within moral systems.
Every moral system has an identifiable goal as its reason for existing, whether the participants can identify it or not.
Moral systems center on their goals. For an individual to be able to clearly comprehend and articulate the goal of a moral system he or she subscribes to it has to be able to fit inside his or her head. Consequently the default moral system for contemporary humans is a refined hedonism, a more or less socially functional greed.
It takes all kinds of work to get us up to anything like a deferred reward as a conscious moral direction, unless that focus is pre-existing, institutionalized, traditional, inherited.
Most religions place the center of their moralities outside the mundane and immediate, in the divine plan, the mysteries. In some ways this isn’t much different from and at its best is aligned with getting people to consciously and actively place the interests and well-being of not-yet present generations ahead of their own – behavior that reflects the needs and interests of unseen and essentially imaginary beings.
Rationalists don’t mind that so much because of the nearness of those fictive beings. They’re close enough to what we are already as to warrant recognition.
When it comes to “spirits” and “deities” etc, the rational or atheist position is the inverse of Pascal’s wager, there seems to be no percentage in believing. I respect that as a belief, though its logic is less an inevitable progression than a hunch, based on the odds. It’s honest, sincere, legitimately come by. I don’t share it, and I see a danger in it of ommission, much like that of ignoring the needs and well-being of future generations
“The exclusive focus on legitimate procedure and individual motivation seems dead wrong to me.This is because it is possible for someone to come to hold beliefs that are wholly unworthy of respect despite her following legitimate procedures in good faith.”
If anti-semitism means an irrationally negative and unjustly prejudicial attitude toward Jews then it seems by definition to be excluded from “legitimately came to” and “being sincere and honest about”. These are important qualifiers.
If we’re just going to defer the determination of Shakespeare’s attitude toward Jews to Engels, then of course if Engels says Shakespeare’s an anti-semite, he, Shakespeare, is an anti-semite, and his beliefs in that regard will not be deserving of respect, because they’re irrational and illegitimately come to, and unnecessarily harmful besides. But if we’re not going to defer that to someone else then we’ll have to make our own minds up about Shakespeare’s beliefs, and their honesty and legitimacy.
Another example might be, let us say, Iago, who is disliked. But Iago says that the people that don’t like him don’t like him because he’s smarter and more noble and honest than they are.
Maybe he believes that, but since we can see that Iago is doing and saying things that are causing people not to like him, we can say his beliefs are not honest even if they are sincere, and they were not legitimately come to, and thus are not worthy of respect.
That’s how it works in the abstract world.
Out here in the real world things are breaking everywhere strange, and anything that calls to and confirms humane qualities like tolerance and understanding, especially of profound and even potentially volatile differences, is a kind of treasure and should be preserved and defended.

By: s.e.

s.e. — Sat, 15 Mar 2008 15:10:24 +0000

Steven Weinberg is delusional.

By: lindsey

lindsey — Sat, 15 Mar 2008 14:30:01 +0000

abb1,
Take the post for what it was, a blog post with some random thoughts I had one day about a random paper I found online. If you want an air-tight-dissertation-style argument, you’re looking in the wrong place. The point was to get some stubborn people on either side of the ideological divide to simmer down and listen to each other. Perhaps then they could find some common ground and (gasp!) lose the animosity. People clearly missed that message. Maybe I’m naive in thinking that’s even possible.

By: Righteous Bubba

Righteous Bubba — Sat, 15 Mar 2008 14:28:34 +0000

Does it sound like he’s trying to “engage in reasonable and open discussion” with religious folks?

Having seen Dawkins engage in reasonable and open discussion with religious folks it doesn’t much matter how you think he sounds.

By: abb1

abb1 — Sat, 15 Mar 2008 12:55:55 +0000

beliefs that clearly don’t deserve respect, regardless of how you rationalize it

Hmm, I remember reading all those race/IQ discussions recently and it seemed that the strongest anti-racist argument went like this: ‘we don’t think there’s a causal link, but we just don’t have enough information to know for sure.’ If that’s true, it certainly falls into your ‘1% uncertainty’ category.