My own humble contribution here is the observation that words like “intervention” (especially “humanitarian”), “use of force”, “military action” and even “starting a war” currently don’t have the connotation of something extremely barbaric, like, say, the word “torture”. I feel that this confuses the issue.

War is indeed, as general Sherman had it, all Hell, but there are circles of Hell, and I am fairly certain that the one containing cowards who stood by and justified a refusal to act against atrocities, under any circumstances, on the grounds that ‘it will just make things worse’ is a deep pit indeed. But perhaps you didn’t quite mean that?

p.s., I was unaware that, for example, the liberation of France in 1944 involved widespread rape and torture by the advancing allies. Evidence appreciated.

“…is unjust if it will cause harm out of proportion to the relevant good it will secure…” – if that’s the main criterion, then how is it different from Dershowitz’s “ticking bomb” scenario? It seems to be exactly the same argument.

In fact, your scenario even seems weaker, because while Mr. Dershowitz inflicts excruciating pain (though not disproportionally, using sterile needles only) on the terrorist; your scenario, no matter how proportional the force is, is likely to kill, maim, rape, torture, etc. a bunch of innocent bystanders. Because that’s what happens in wars.

Fair enough, and I’ll agree that philosopher friends have been far too confident in their off-the-cuff judgements about particular wars. I was writing a newspaper column at the time of the 1991 Gulf War and felt compelled to have an opinion about it, which I found very difficult because the kinds of balancing required to decide whether the war was proportional and/or a last resort demanded a kind of skill in judgement, let alone knowledge of the facts, that I as a professional philosopher didn’t think I had.

You may not agree with this example, but I think Michael Walzer, though not (as he himself admits) the greatest abstract philosopher, often shows very good judgement on these types of questions.

If, when you write

And I think most philosophers writing on the topic have been perfectly aware of that.

you mean that most professional philosophers writing scholarly papers in journals etc have indicated an awareness of the point, then that’s still correct.

But philosophers don’t just contribute through “writing on the topic” in that sense, but also through educating students, and through influencing debate in the media, on blogs and in other places (and in their ordinary conversation on policy matters). In those places, I think the vices I’m worrying about are far more evident.

I’d also add that the fact that people acknowledge the fact that philosophers can’t settle question X, agree that real-world information is required, &c, doesn’t establish that they do actually give those extra-philosophical considerations the weight they should.

The philosophical literature on humanitarian intervention has mostly addressed the prior question of whether, proportionality apart, such intervention is in principle forbidden (as e.g. the UN Charter claims) or can in certain circumstances be permitted.

But the latter question has always been discussed with the caveat “proportionality and other similar conditions permitting,” and it’s been understood that whether those conditions are satisfied isn’t something philosophers can settle.

You can believe (I certainly do) that humanitarian intervention is in principle permitted, i.e. can be a just cause for war, even though many and even most such real-world interventions would be unjust because they would cause excessive or unnecessary harm. And I think most philosophers writing on the topic have been perfectly aware of that.

“So, in asking what the policy of a liberal state should be, we proceed as if the actual states in which we live “liberal democracies” approximate that moral ideal rather closely. (They don’t.) ”

The Cold War is long gone and these kids don’t have a memory of it and how bad the West behaved in the name of fighting Communism. Some people are just stuck in the 60s.

And these kids are idealistic and see the older generation and the government as complacent.

I fucking hate the name “Decent.”

It’s worse than you think. I’m having my vasectomy reversed.

Moreover, even if all things “humanitarian intervention” fell within the purview of just war theory, which they don’t, you seem to be under the mistaken impression that the just war tradition presents something like a coherent, unified account of the morality of war, which it doesn’t. For that matter, the questions just war theorists address are considerably more interesting and difficult than deciding whether or not Iraq is a disaster.

Just because you aren’t interested in a subject doesn’t mean other people shouldn’t talk about it. Frankly, there are many intellectual enterprises we need less than just war theory, and blog commentary about which intellectual enterprises are worthwhile is one of them.

Meanwhile, 12 raises the horrible possibility of second-generation Decents.