One misconception that seems to appear here is the idea that Benatar does not take happiness or pleasure seriously. In fact, Benatar merely argues that, in deciding whether to bring someone into being, that person’s happiness and pleasure do not weigh against his future suffering in the decision to procreate or not.

The asymmetry that is the core of Benatar’s argument is that, while absent suffering is good, absent pleasure or happiness (where no one will miss it) is – no matter its profundity – merely neutral. This asymmetry seems strange, and many are quick to claim they don’t see it when faced with its consequences, but rejecting the asymmetry leads to some morally hideous consequences. While I agree with Benatar, the argument is relatively new, and I think there are good arguments on the other side (for instance, is coming into existence – or the existence of humans or life in general – an agent-neutral value?). As Benatar argues, we should hold off on nuking the planet just yet (especially since people who exist have a moral right to continue to exist, even if death would be instantaneous and wouldn’t cause them to subjectively suffer). Benatar argues that death is often a harm.

A final note on suicide – suicide and antinatalism don’t really have much in common. One doesn’t imply the other, although antinatalism does give support to the idea of rational suicide, and the suicide-minded are more likely to take suffering seriously, and therefore be psychologically prepared to hear Benatar’s argument. People who equate them are conflating evaluations of present lives with those of future lives. Benatar, however, is sympathetic to the suicide and the would-be suicide. He does not think a right to suicide solves the problem of antinatalism, because through existing we form attachments that make existence into a kind of trap. See especially pp. 219-220 for his discussion:

Procreators would do well to consider this trap they lay when they produce offspring. . . . Once somebody has come into existence and attachments with that person have formed, suicide can cause the kind of pain that makes the pain of childlessness mild by comparison. Somebody contemplating suicide knows (or should know) this. This places an important obstacle in the way of suicide.

Yes, it’s a pleasure to do that. But there are subtleties in deciding how that applies to the world we know, because it involves assumptions that are false.

I’m not sure what point you are trying to make.

That conclusions drawn about imaginary universes may not apply to the one we’re in.

So for example we have the imaginary universe that lasts only 20 minutes, with only one sapient entity in it. This was carefully chosen. When there are many entities and we try to decide what’s good for them, there’s the question about present good versus future good. How do you know the thing that looks bad now isn’t going to lead to something very very good later for somebody else? How do you balance out the people and the times? If you admit you don’t know how things are connected together, how can you be sure the current badness won’t result in something that’s worth it 20 years down the road, beyond the time you can predict? Well, none of that matters in a universe that only lasts 20 minutes and only has one individual in it.

But our universe will probably last more than 20 minutes and unless I’m a practicing solipsist it probably has more than one person in it.

“But I claim that what we are discussing are not statements that are true or false. We’re talking about judgements, about choices, about what we think is good and bad.”

I rather agree with you. This is the problem I have with Benatar’s premise number 3. I find the idea of a situation being good even if there is no sentinent being around to care rather incoherent. Good/bad are inherently judgments, choices, and for those words to have meaning there must be some one doing the judging and choosing.

When Benatar imagines a world with nobody in it, Benatar is doing the judging. It’s an imaginary world inside Benatar’s head. Benatar gets to decide what he thinks is good or bad about it.

If you say so. I am not an expert on formal logic.

You can say whatever you like about what things would be like if they were different, because in fact they are as they are.

I agree. I can also say whatever I like about things as they are now, as the Surrealists have shown. What I do find interesting though is trying to say consistent things about what things would be like if they were different (and trying to say true things about the world is now). This is one of the things I like about the best SF - eg the way Asimov made up this imaginary set of rules of robotics, and then teased out all the implications of those rules. He could have said whatever he liked, what makes his stories interesting is that he tried at least to say consistent things, given his starting point.

I have a feeling I am repeating myself here over my last two comments. Does it really bother you that I like to think and talk about imaginary universes? Are you trying to persuade me to stop? I’m not sure what point you are trying to make.

But I claim that what we are discussing are not statements that are true or false. We’re talking about judgements, about choices, about what we think is good and bad.

I rather agree with you. This is the problem I have with Benatar’s premise number 3. I find the idea of a situation being good even if there is no sentinent being around to care rather incoherent. Good/bad are inherently judgments, choices, and for those words to have meaning there must be some one doing the judging and choosing.

Benatar gets to choose whatever values he wants, and he gets to act on them. If I disagree the most I can do about it is try to stop him.

You also have the option of trying to convince him that he is wrong. Or you can try to convince other people that he is wrong.

For that matter, I’m more committed to existing than I am to being good. So that if you manage to convince me that exisiting is evil, then OK, I’m evil. Compare Nietzsche, for example.

But I claim that what we are discussing are not statements that are true or false. We’re talking about judgements, about choices, about what we think is good and bad. If you decide that the unexamined life is not worth living, that the examined life is not worth living, that life under Communism is not worth living, etc then that’s your choice. It’s true for you because you chose it.

Benatar gets to choose whatever values he wants, and he gets to act on them. If I disagree the most I can do about it is try to stop him.

Morphine overdoses all around!

http://harelbarzilai.org/words/omelas.txt

Yup
An experiment in formal logic and rhetoric. A sub-genre of a sub-genre. Scholasticism. At best brilliant, but brittle always.

J Thomas, I am arguing a counterfactual because Benatar is arguing a counterfactual – that it would be better if we had never been born. I am enjoying this argument for its own sake, I don’t need it to reflect the real world in any way. I find the mental exercise of contemplating different universes to this one interesting.

So many things are wrong with this argument, I don’t know where to begin.

I am flabbergasted.

Tracy W, you are arguing a counterfactual. The truth is you have been born and you have thought it.

We can argue about what things would be like if they were different, but this is how it is. We can argue all we want about how things would be if nobody had ever been born, just as we can argue what the world would be like if Truman never nuked japan or if Kennedy didn’t die in office.

Like, say I have a toothache. That’s not good. The toothache tells me that I have a problem that needs to be fixed. If a dentist can fix the tooth so it heals up, that’s good. If the dentist instead cut the nerve so that I no longer felt pain from that nerve, it wouldn’t be nearly as good. I’d still have an infection. I woudn’t have the feedback that told me when I was doing other things that damaged those teeth.

Often pain is part of a useful feedback loop. Pain isn’t evil, it’s a signal that is often useful. I find it more plausible that tooth decay is evil than tooth pain.

The problem is that things happen that are bad for me. The problem is not that I find out about things that are bad for me and that knowing about them disturbs me.

And I get to choose what I think is bad. There’s nothing particularly startling about deciding that everything’s bad on average and everybody would be better off dead. But it doesn’t lead anywhere I want to go. In my observation this view has mostly been propounded by guys who think it will get them laid. And it sometimes works.