I did offer an important bit of evidence, which you seem to have ignored. To amplify on it, the animal exploitation producing the bovine sera used in cell culture (what Singer promotes as a “nonanimal alternative”) involves direct cardiac puncture without anesthesia. The typical experiment ON an animal involves no suffering at all. Note that most of their misdirection involves clever use of prepositions to obscure what actually happens to the animals, the alleged objects of their concern.

Another example of Singer’s unethical behavior is his use of a fictional movie to represent animal research.

“More generally, I’d like to see the several people who’ve objected to Singer’s style of reasoning offer some suggestions as to how we should think about ethical dilemmas. Michael B’s combination of anti-foundationalism and close attention to factual detail is one attempt at that problem – but, as I’ve said in other comment threads, not one that I fully understand, and not one where I completely see the distinction between Michael and Singer.”

You don’t think calling something that involves direct cardiac puncture of an animal without anesthesia “nonanimal” represents a lack of attention to factual detail? What about lazy quote-mining instead of gathering actual evidence?

Here are some more lengthy critiques:
Sharon M. Russell and Charles S. Nicholl.
A Dissection of the Chapter “Tools for Research” in Peter Singer’s Animal Liberation.
Proceedings of the Society for Experimental Biology and Medicine. February 1996, Vol.211 No.2. pp.109-138

Peter Berkowitz
The utilitarian horrors of Peter Singer
Other people’s mothers
The New Republic 30 December 1999
http://www.peterberkowitz.com/otherpeoplesmothers.htm

yes, I have read Peter Singer. I stand by my earlier point.

To the extent Singer has raised high-intellectual awareness of animal rights issues more successfully than the lady in a caftan handing out flyers at the grocery store, awesome (leaving the monstrous parts his argument aside). But he’s not a superior logician by any means and in fact the putatively rational part of his argument is the weakest part.

Second, to the extent that philosophers are supposed to be masters of rational argument (for better or for worse), the truth is that the real force of Singer’s position comes not from his argumentation but from the plight of tortured, suffering animals.

You’re kidding, right?

The plight of factory-farmed veal or cats required to stand on floating blocks in tubs of water until they collapse from exhaustion, etc. etc., will provoke revulsion and horror in most people (why the agents of these tortures DO NOT WANT photos published) apart from whatever philosophical argument they are tacked on to.

I think this is basically correct, but I worry about it for a couple of reasons. First, does seeing these pictures constitute an argument against the practices in question? If so, how? Second, one often hears pro-choicers rail against those anti-abortion protesters who insist upon holding up graphic pictures of mutilated fetuses outside abortion clinics. It seems fairly obvious that these pro-lifers believe that arguments about abortion are finally insignificant, or weak, or fatally abstract, when compared an actual documentation of what the procedure entails.

So I wonder what others think about this problem, if it is a problem at all; and whether my being puzzled about this is something I share with others.

Fair enough. Thanks for the conversation.

I’m sorry, but you seem perversely committed to specious and impressionistic reasoning. Here’s an example of what I mean: “By the way, I am sure that when children were institutionalized the medical community did not worry about the future moral consensus.” This makes no sense, even as a rhetorical sally. Granted that the medical community horribly mistreated children, and granted that they didn’t worry about condemnation from future generations, nothing follows about whether we should worry about condemnation from future generations. Hitler and Stalin, as bad as they were, do not make mustaches evil, not unless we give up on actual reasoning and return to thinking with symbols and totems. And as for the original point—that the mere possibility of future condemnation means nothing—it has been buried and forgotten.

Also, if you repeatedly criticize someone, but then it turns out your criticism is based on a simple mistake of fact, it’s only polite to apologize.

The basic point is that one can (and often does) argue the merits of an ethical issue involving rights (e.g., abortion) without ever addressing constitutional law. After all, there are moral rights unprotected by the U. S. Constitution, and not every constitutional right corresponds to an actual moral right. So discussions about cognitive disabilities and abortion can and do, quite properly, proceed with complete disregard of the U. S. Constitution.

Notice that all this remains true even if you are right about the connection between rights and enforcement mechanisms. I personally suspect that you have overdrawn this connection: whether people have a certain right is surely independent of whether we’re clever enough to know how to enforce it (e.g., the right not to be raped doesn’t wax and wane with our ability to enforce it), and it is most certainly independent of how “easy” it is for someone to propose the right (whatever that might mean). But, even if you are right, it remains true that you don’t have to know a thing about the U. S. Constitution to recognize that slavery is a violation of human rights, or to engage in moral reasoning concerning cognitive disabilities and abortion.

And the radical position on abortion is… pro-life.

Sam C—the view that Singer is a really good philosopher is peculiar to me. First, utilitarianism can lead to all kinds of conclusions, including the ones that EK and I and others proposed above: inclusiveness toward people with disabilities, mental illness, whatever, actually would lead to the greatest good for the greatest number. Singer doesn’t seem to realize his framework can be turned to many ends, not just the one end he says is inevitable.

Second, to the extent that philosophers are supposed to be masters of rational argument (for better or for worse), the truth is that the real force of Singer’s position comes not from his argumentation but from the plight of tortured, suffering animals. If anyone actually came away from Singer’s work thinking “I used to look at photos of factory-farmed veal without flinching, but now that I understand baby cows are better than retarded people, I’m sickened and outraged!” I mean, gimme a break, honestly.

The plight of factory-farmed veal or cats required to stand on floating blocks in tubs of water until they collapse from exhaustion, etc. etc., will provoke revulsion and horror in most people (why the agents of these tortures DO NOT WANT photos published) apart from whatever philosophical argument they are tacked on to. Singer’s argument reduces to “agree with me or LOOK AT THE ELECTRODE IMPLANT MONKEY BABY YOU MONSTER”. It’s not a prize-winner in step by step rational argumentation.

There are great, great reasons for advocating the ethical treatment of animals AND for advocating inclusive social policy for people with disabilities from mild to severe to (supposedly) non-existent (everybody is going to be disabled all of the time for some purposes and at least part of the time—when they are sick or old—for most purposes). Utilitarianism can play a role in both cases, and so can other kinds of appeals to the head and to the heart. To the extent Singer has raised high-intellectual awareness of animal rights issues more successfully than the lady in a caftan handing out flyers at the grocery store, awesome (leaving the monstruous parts his argument aside). But he’s not a superior logician by any means and in fact the putatively rational part of his argument is the weakest part.

1. Yes, of course. I would just ask them what they propose as an enforcement mechanism for reproductive rights to be put in place of the Roe mechanism.
2. Yes, of course. I would just ask them what they propose as an enforcement mechanism to safeguard their proposed “individual human right to own guns for self-defense” if it’s not covered by the 2nd Amendment.
3. Here I’m not sure I follow you. I would think an abolitionist would condemn the US Constitution as it stood prior to the 14th Amendment, precisely because it didn’t provide a concrete enforcement mechanism for their claim that slavery was a violation of basic human rights.

In other words, I think rights are claims on the community, and that proponents of rights owe us an explanation of how those claims are to be enforced. Otherwise it’s just too easy to propose rights, when what aggrieved people need are enforcement mechanisms.