Comments on: Teh evil bastards who advocated what, er, seems to have been the right thing

By: Frank the salesforecaster

Frank the salesforecaster — Fri, 25 Sep 2009 20:22:59 +0000

What a fun thread. I get the impression that we’ve agreeded that getting it right for the wrong reason isn’t really right. Seem fairly standard for the academic world. Some seem to think that you couldn’t get it right for the right reason ‘cause there was no right reason for not getting it wrong. Nice. Now it is a discussion of military history. In that vein, “which is sort of a white man’s view of the American civil war” in contrast to the view we normally get? The old rub about the winners getting to write the history seems off in this case.

By: Joe Wickens

Joe Wickens — Fri, 25 Sep 2009 19:32:48 +0000

I have not read through all 184 responses to this post so do not know if this has been pointed out in any of them but it must be noted that the “negative” feeling experienced by anyone who opposed the invasion was not and is not guilt in having tacitly supported the Baathists but instead a sense of of the tragic fact that we cannot right all the world’s wrongs.

By: roac

roac — Fri, 25 Sep 2009 14:14:51 +0000

After posting no. 175, I looked to see what Wikipedia says about Montgomery—on the assumption that Wiki represents mainstream opinion more often than not—and it says pretty much what I said there, and what Alex said in 181.

The only thing worse than winning a war is losing a war, so the duty of a commander to win is paramount. Given a large and irreversible advantage in resources, such as Montgomery had in northwest Europe and Grant had in Virginia, grinding attrition is pretty much a sure winner if you are careful and keep your mistakes to a minimum. Imaginative tactics can save lives if they work, but if they don’t work they throw away lives without moving the ball. Arnhem is an instructive example.

(Incidentally, the Wiki article says the Arnhem plan was so uncharacteristic of BLM that it left his staff in a state of shock.)

By: Phil

Phil — Fri, 25 Sep 2009 14:14:46 +0000

alex – fair enough. I was working from a quote I saw somewhere in which Montgomery talked about Alamein in rather blithe “if you lose lots of troops, put lots more in” terms, but since I can’t lay hands on it at the moment I won’t press the point. (Wait a minute, I do know where I saw it – it was on the Internet! Surround the Internet, and look under all the beds!)

Anyway, what about EPSOM and GOODWOOD, then?

By: El Cid

El Cid — Fri, 25 Sep 2009 13:22:40 +0000

People who opposed the invasion and occupation of Iraq have no sort of theoretical guilt to bear about not simultaneously being able to find another definite and quick route to helping the Iraqis rid themselves of Saddam Hussein.

By: alex

alex — Fri, 25 Sep 2009 08:11:46 +0000

Sorry, it’s early in the morning, you’re quite right, my apologies. OTOH, Alamein was not so much a matter of grinding attrition, as insisting on building up overwhelming superiority in firepower and logistics before being willing to attack.

And at least this discussion has the merit of being more interesting, and civil, than the foregoing, eh?

By: Phil

Phil — Fri, 25 Sep 2009 07:33:15 +0000

alex – I didn’t mention Arnhem.

By: alex

alex — Fri, 25 Sep 2009 07:22:49 +0000

Phil, clearly, and kindly, it must be pointed out that you really don’t know anything about the Arnhem operation.

By: Chris Bertram

Chris Bertram — Fri, 25 Sep 2009 05:51:04 +0000

Oops. I see that “bored observer” had also posted under some threads as “banned commenter” which is one of the noms de plume of our (banned) friend Seth Edenbaum. I’m zapping all comments (and responses too, sorry Harry, sorry Engels, sorry jdkbrown).

By: Xanthippas

Xanthippas — Thu, 24 Sep 2009 21:24:09 +0000

Yes, I spend many hours feeling guilty about things that never happened.

By: Phil

Phil — Thu, 24 Sep 2009 21:11:23 +0000

My impression was that Montgomery’s approach in both Alamein and Normandy tended to valorise grinding attrition as a militarily worthy as well as appropriate tactic, when it wasn’t necessarily either. But IANAMH.

By: roac

roac — Thu, 24 Sep 2009 20:45:07 +0000

The problem with this, of course, is that more pain = more glory; you’d be better off with the Vulcan. (Something similar has been suggested wrt Bernard Montgomery.)

Guess this is my day for military history nitpicking: Montgomery was an insufferable egomaniac, but he can hardly be accused of inviting needless casualties. The British war effort was seriously constrained, from Normandy to the end of the war, by the fact that they were nearing the bottom of the manpower barrel. Montgomery was painfully aware of this, and American generals accused him of excessive caution as a result. (Arnhem to the contrary, of course.)

By: roac

roac — Thu, 24 Sep 2009 20:37:34 +0000

IIRC at Gettysburg itself, some placque claimed the general whose men suffered the most was Lee.

Sure, but Grant wasn’t anywhere near Gettysburg at the time. He was besieging Vicksburg (which surrendered the day after Gettysburg ended). The Union Army (under George C. Meade) was mostly standing on the defensive, so one would expect Confederate casualties to be higher.

Cold Harbor is generally considered the big blot on Grant’s record, as mentioned above by someone: A longshot frontal attack on a strong position. Comparable to Pickett’s Charge at Gettysburg.

By: Barry

Barry — Thu, 24 Sep 2009 20:03:26 +0000

Chris or D-Squared, thanks for disemvollewing Kane!

By: Ohgodohgodohgod

Ohgodohgodohgod — Thu, 24 Sep 2009 19:43:45 +0000

Yes, if there is one thing that G.A. Cohen is famous for it’s the belief that as long as the right rules are in place, individuals have no further obligations to promote justice. “It’s fine that I’m greedy, the rules keep me in check!”

Oh wait …