Following up on Montagu’s post about the EU’s accession negotiations in Turkey, the Economist touches on an issue that I’ve been wondering about for the last few days.
The second big qualification proposed by the commission concerns immigration. The fear that, once Turkey joins, huge numbers of poor Muslim immigrants will stream west is probably the biggest single impediment to its membership. The commission has not dismissed such fears. Indeed, Olli Rehn, the incoming commissioner for enlargement, said that concerns about immigration were “more or less justified”. Yet free movement of labour is a fundamental EU principle; and any restrictions in previous enlargements have always been temporary.
The commission goes beyond this for Turkey by floating the idea of “permanent safeguard measures”. These would stipulate that, if Turkish immigration were deemed to be disruptive to the rest of the EU, controls on free movement could be re-imposed. Officials insist that this is compatible with the EU’s fundamental principles. The Turks dispute this.
The issue is this: as the Economist notes, free movement of labour is one of the “four freedoms” that are supposed to be fundamental principles of EU integration. Temporary measures to restrict immigration have been imposed in the past - but nothing permanent. So what happens if the Commission goes ahead and imposes permanent measures on Turkey as a condition of accession? My best guess (I acknowledge that I’m not an expert on EU law) is that this would be justiciable, and that Turkey, once it had joined, could take a case at the European Court of Justice to try and have the condition overturned. Further, I’d imagine that this case would have a very strong likelihood of succeeding. Finally, assuming that the case did succeed, I don’t think that the member states would be very easily able to resist it, however unpopular it might be - the EU is more than a standard international organization, and ECJ rulings are for all intents and purposes the law of the land. Further, as Montagu notes, much of the opposition to immigration from Turkey has a racist subtext - this means that it’s harder to defend in public, especially when a seemingly authoritative ruling has come down from on high.
So if I’m right on all of this, why is the European Commission touting conditions that it knows don’t have much chance of sticking? My best guess is that it’s trying to kick the issue into the long grass. The Commission is trying to soothe the anti-immigration rumblings in some of the member states in the presumption that ten years or so down the line, when Turkey finally does accede, the issue will be less controversial (or at least, a different crowd of officials and politicians will be the ones who have to take the blame).
‘when Turkey finally does accede’
Turkey will accede to the EU over the cold, dead bodies of half the politicians in France and Germany. Barring the Franco-Germans needing a big big favour from the rest of us, it ain’t gonna happen. QMV? The Franco-German axis may not be what it was, but it can still get together a big enough voting bloc to stymie Turkey.
Dan - as it happens, decisions on accession are taken under unanimity rather than QMV. You’re right that half the politicians in France and Germany don’t want to see Turkey join - but the French were equally opposed to the expansion into Central/Eastern Europe. They acceded reluctantly, primarily because it was too hard for them to articulate their arguments, which were selfish at their base. See further Frank Schimmelfennig’s piece on the subject in International Organization (2000). I’m quite confident that the same is going to happen with Turkey. Almost certainly, negotiations are going to begin - and then the detail will be in the hands of Commission negotiatiors, and removed from the realm of politics as a result. By the time that a formal decision actually rolls around in ten years, I reckon that it’ll be a fait accompli. Could be wrong, of course, but I’m fairly confident that I’m right on this one. Where I think there might be a stumbling block is in the European Parliament, which has an up-down vote to accept or reject at the final stage of the process. We might quite possibly see MEPs elected a few years down the road on a specifically anti-Turkey platform, which could present a last minute hurdle (but not, I suspect, an insuperable one).
Thump! One up to Henry. Couldn’t remember whether it was QMV or unanimity, so I put the last bit in to cover my proverbial. Thanks- have to say that if it’s unanimity, I would put chances of Turkey joining at zero over the next quarter century. In my view, not comparable to Central/East Europe: the Germans and French both have long-standing immigrant populations, dating back to at least the 19th Century, from places like Poland, whom they have assimilated without too many problems, but they feel very differently about brown-skinned mainly Muslim immigrants. One of my best friends is an Arab-German, often mistaken as a Turk by his German compatriots, and it does seem as if there is very little assimilation of Germano-Turks, and a hell of a lot of suspicion and hostility.
There are long-standing client-partner relationships between both France and Germany and different Central/East European countries: I think you have to go back to Wilhelmine Germany and the last days of the Caliphate to say the same about Turkey. But the Turks are very close to the US and have a very important military cooperation deal with Israel: this may change given the rise of Turkish Islamism, but if it doesn’t both these points will count big against Turkey.
And Turkey is just a lot bigger than any of the Central/East European republics: it would join Britain, France and Italy on the ‘biggest population bar Germany’ rung, and it would have more military heft than any country bar Britain and maybe France. (A lot of countries spend more in absolute terms on defence than Turkey, but the Turkish military, like the British, is capable of fighting battles, which most other European forces aren’t.)
Maybe we should have a bet on this, to be decided in ten years…
The United States has a hard time keeping Massachusets and California from flying apart. What exactly will it mean to have a “union” which reaches from the tip of Scotland to the border of Iraq and includes cultures as diverse as Finland and Turkey? How will Brussels develop policies that satify English, French, and Turkish citizens?
Cranky
Don’t the close US-Turkey ties cut the other way, i.e., the US will publicly support Turkey’s admission to the EU, making not-so-veiled suggestions that European opponents of admission are racist and anti-Muslim. France and Germany, being in a global p.r. war with the US for influence in the Third World, including the Muslim world, will be hard put to refuse admission. And I don’t think that the Germans are yet in a position where they can trumpet the fact that a friend to the Jews is no friend to Germany.
Being in the US, I’m not as clear on the details here, but my partner, having lived in Turkey for 8 years, tells me that Turkey really, really, really wants to join.
In other words, they’re gonna do what they need to in order to make it happen. Although free movement of labor is attractive for individuals (and states needing cheap labor), it’s not necessarily attractive for the orignating state, is it? Mass exoduses of able bodies drains the work force for building new industries and increases wages costs, no?
In other words, if the exception can be justified so that it doesn’t look discriminatory (but is based on, say, lack of support networks [i.e., not enough mosques, perhaps]…I don’t know…something), and Turkey agrees to it, what would their motivation be later for challenging it? Do they stand to gain, as a state, if their people are free to emigrate?
Do they stand to gain, as a state, if their people are free to emigrate?
Well, it would reduce the level of unemployment in Turkey, and expatriate workers tend to send hard currency back to their families in the motherland, so it probably would be of economic benefit to Turkey.
So what happens if the Commission goes ahead and imposes permanent measures on Turkey as a condition of accession? My best guess (I acknowledge that I’m not an expert on EU law) is that this would be justiciable, and that Turkey, once it had joined, could take a case at the European Court of Justice to try and have the condition overturned. Further, I’d imagine that this case would have a very strong likelihood of succeeding.
No. Treaties, including accession treaties, are the fundamental law of the EC / EU (the terms aren’t interchangeable). The ECJ has no more jurisdiction to review the treaties than the US Supreme Court has to review the First Amendment.
“anonymous coward” - a quibble, but I don’t see that the EC/EU distinction is relevant here - most likely the EU will have legal personality by the time that this question becomes a live one. And surely you’re stating it a little strongly when you say that the ECJ has no power whatsoever to review accession treaties? It surely has the power to interpret them as it does other Treaty texts - and to seek to resolve incompatibilities or incongruities through such interpretation. Perhaps there is some well established doctrine limiting its powers to interpret here - is there some caselaw on this that you’re referring to?
I’m not terribly certain we should think that Turkey in the EU will be good for US interests, or that this would be a stumbling block. Bainbridge has recently quoted another economist collum discussing this that’s worth considering. You can see his posting of it here:
www.professorbainbridge.com/2004/10/turkey_in_the_e.html
(Unlike Bainbridge I’m not at all bothered by the idea that turkey in the EU might be an off-set to US power.)
I’ve done a fair amount of research on this from the political angle (not the legal angle), even going so far as to consider this as the topic for my ma thesis.
That being said, I’ve come to the following conclusions:
a. France, and a few other smaller (and surprising) countries will do everything they can to stand in the way of Turkish accession. I believe you can look to a country like Ireland or Austria for this. On the other hand, I don’t think Cyprus will be able to stand up against Turkey very well without looking like sore winners - kind of like they did after the referendum, where their vote against the Annan plan actually made Turkey gain momentum.
b. Turkey will do a lot to change its policies on the books, and the EU has recognised that. But I think that as time goes on, if the EU decides to begin accession talks, they’re going to be sticklers about a lot of things “on the ground,” so to speak. Don’t get me wrong - that’s a good thing for the betterment of minority rights, the rights of prisoners, women, etc. But as they make more and more demands, the Turkish public will be less inclined to accomodate them. Not only that - whenever you impose change quickly on a population, it gets flustered. And while the Turkish population is in favor of accession, a number of fringe groups and political parties against accession are starting to rise. If it seems hopeless, their popularity will increase. On the other hand, the fact that the religious-based party that is currently in power (AKP) supports accession shows that it may take a while for anti-EU powers to gain lastng credence. The AKP’s predecessors were not as eager about accession as they are.
c. I really think that the EU is looking to expand its credibility in the Middle East, etc., in large part because of the missteps it perceives in U.S. action. With Turkey, an active and prominent member* of the OIC (Organization of the Islamic Conference), they gain a vocal proponent. I don’t think they will necessary try to use Turkey against the U.S., as someone above alluded to, but rather in competition with America. And the EU’s current leaders see this as vital both economically and politically. That’s why you’ll see Chirac, who plays for an international audience, speak out in favor of Turkish accession, whereas his Prime Minister goes the opposite direction.
d. The immigration issue isn’t as big of a deal as some suggest. When Spain and Italy joined the EU, immigration from those countries was banned for the first 7 or so years, and then slowly ratcheted up after that. I see no reason why the same can’t be applied to Turkey.
So what does that mean? Since the EC gave the green light, I think the EU’s going to dangle the carrot. They’re going to begin talks, but set no specific deadlines so they can appease both sides. If they don’t, I think the EU’s going to have one pissed off neighbor - heightened by the fact that Turkey has been trying for this for so long (since 1962 with the Ankara Agreement).
The other eventual option is some kind of regionalized economic partnership on the European side of the country; something like the Free Economic Zones on the border of North and South Korea and DPRK and China. I’m not too sure how well that would work out, but it would lead to an arrangement wherein Turkey would get many of the economic benefits but would not have a seat at the political table. This is more plausible since the Treaty of Nice (I may be off on what it’s called, but I think that was it), which rearranged the voting rules to acommodate for Central/Eastern Europe, did not leave room for a large country like Turkey to join.
Oh, one last thing: if Turkey does join, the Constitution will be set beforehand. See the debate about whether or not to include God in it as to why.
*Turkey’s not actually a member of the OIC because they are not an Islamic state. They do have permanent observer status, the best military in the bloc, one of the stronger economies and larger populations, and happen to be 99.8% Muslim, so their voice gets heard.
I’ve done a fair amount of research on this from the political angle (not the legal angle), even going so far as to consider this as the topic for my ma thesis.
That being said, I’ve come to the following conclusions:
a. France, and a few other smaller (and surprising) countries will do everything they can to stand in the way of Turkish accession. I believe you can look to a country like Ireland or Austria for this. On the other hand, I don’t think Cyprus will be able to stand up against Turkey very well without looking like sore winners - kind of like they did after the referendum, where their vote against the Annan plan actually made Turkey gain momentum.
b. Turkey will do a lot to change its policies on the books, and the EU has recognised that. But I think that as time goes on, if the EU decides to begin accession talks, they’re going to be sticklers about a lot of things “on the ground,” so to speak. Don’t get me wrong - that’s a good thing for the betterment of minority rights, the rights of prisoners, women, etc. But as they make more and more demands, the Turkish public will be less inclined to accomodate them. Not only that - whenever you impose change quickly on a population, it gets flustered. And while the Turkish population is in favor of accession, a number of fringe groups and political parties against accession are starting to rise. If it seems hopeless, their popularity will increase. On the other hand, the fact that the religious-based party that is currently in power (AKP) supports accession shows that it may take a while for anti-EU powers to gain lastng credence. The AKP’s predecessors were not as eager about accession as they are.
c. I really think that the EU is looking to expand its credibility in the Middle East, etc., in large part because of the missteps it perceives in U.S. action. With Turkey, an active and prominent member* of the OIC (Organization of the Islamic Conference), they gain a vocal proponent. I don’t think they will necessary try to use Turkey against the U.S., as someone above alluded to, but rather in competition with America. And the EU’s current leaders see this as vital both economically and politically. That’s why you’ll see Chirac, who plays for an international audience, speak out in favor of Turkish accession, whereas his Prime Minister goes the opposite direction.
d. The immigration issue isn’t as big of a deal as some suggest. When Spain and Italy joined the EU, immigration from those countries was banned for the first 7 or so years, and then slowly ratcheted up after that. I see no reason why the same can’t be applied to Turkey.
So what does that mean? Since the EC gave the green light, I think the EU’s going to dangle the carrot. They’re going to begin talks, but set no specific deadlines so they can appease both sides. If they don’t, I think the EU’s going to have one pissed off neighbor - heightened by the fact that Turkey has been trying for this for so long (since 1962 with the Ankara Agreement).
The other eventual option is some kind of regionalized economic partnership on the European side of the country; something like the Free Economic Zones on the border of North and South Korea and DPRK and China. I’m not too sure how well that would work out, but it would lead to an arrangement wherein Turkey would get many of the economic benefits but would not have a seat at the political table. This is more plausible since the Treaty of Nice (I may be off on what it’s called, but I think that was it), which rearranged the voting rules to acommodate for Central/Eastern Europe, did not leave room for a large country like Turkey to join.
Oh, one last thing: if Turkey does join, the Constitution will be set beforehand. See the debate about whether or not to include God in it as to why.
*Turkey’s not actually a member of the OIC because they are not an Islamic state. They do have permanent observer status, the best military in the bloc, one of the stronger economies and larger populations, and happen to be 99.8% Muslim, so their voice gets heard.
“The fear that, once Turkey joins, huge numbers of poor Muslim immigrants will stream west is probably the biggest single impediment to its membership.”
I’ve spent some time reading about migration from an economic and historical perspective. This is not an uncommon fear from states and labour unions. However, their fears are rarely realized. Probably this is due to economic predictions often miss out and ignore more ‘esoteric’ parts of human behavior. Usually, people do not want to leave their home country unless there’s quite a lot of push and pull factors to make them move.
Before the recent expansion of the EU there was a typically un-informed debate here in Sweden about the risk of so called “social turism”, ie an influx of citizens from the new member countries that would stream into the country and take advantage of the generous welfare system. As far as I know, they still haven’t found a single example of this.
While from an economic and rational perspective the people might have reasons to do this, there seems to be a lot of other factors that has the effect that unemployed poles doesn’t leave all their friends and family and move to an empty appartement in a strange county where people speaks a language they do not understand and tries to live of their welfare system.
Poor people in Turkey will probably not come in huge hordes to Europe unless there’s some kind of push factor. This is something that Kurds might still have in the future. They also have the advantage of already having relatives ‘inside’ Europe that would ease their move. But on the other hand, there’s reason to believe that the Turkish govt would have to improve in their attitudes against the kurdish minority to be allowed in in the first place.
Just a couple of eurocents.
To build on the references to the Spanish and Portugese experience mentioned above, my understanding is that before the became members of the EC (no EU yet then, I believe) they sent very large numbers of young people to the more wealthy countires, many of whom did not return. But, after their transition period, quite a few of those who had left came back to their home countries, which had in the mean time become wealtier and more free. If I recall, the long-term impact was actually a slight in-draw of people of Spanish and Portugese origin to their home countries, though of couse they are now free to live and work anyhere in the EU (as civilized rules would require.) We should not assume that something similar won’t happen to Turkey. Keep in mind, too, that while Spain and Portugal are much more wealthy than they were 20 years ago, and than Turkey or the Easter European countries, they are still less wealthy than the other pre-expansion countries.
What exactly will it mean to have a “union” which reaches from the tip of Scotland to the border of Iraq and includes cultures as diverse as Finland and Turkey?
Well, it’s been done before - the Sami weren’t part of it then, but the Romanians, the Libyans, the Brits and the Egyptians were all part of it.
It’s also funny that you should pick those two - you do know that they’re historically related, and that the Sami don’t have any cultural-linguistic connection with the rest of Europe? They’re Finno-Ugric, instead of Indo-European.
So that’s kind of like saying “as diverse as the Italians and the Greeks,” though nobody knows the prehistoric reasons behind the exodus of a bunch of Ugaritic colonists to the frozen north.
> ou do know that they’re
> historically related,
Damn - no, I didn’t know that, and I was trying to pick the two European cultures with the least possible in common that I could think of!
Back to the drawing board on that example, but I think my point/question is still valid.
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