The latest terrorist bombings in Iraq came closer than usual to home for Australia, with two soldiers suffering (reportedly) minor injuries in an attack on the Australian embassy1, while 20 more Iraqis were killed, adding to the tens of thousands already killed by both/all sides in this terrible war, which seems to get more brutal and criminal every day.
It’s pretty clear by now that Iraq is approaching full-scale civil war and that, as is usually the case in civil wars, the presence of foreign troops is only making things worse. But rather than arguing about this last point, it might be better to put it to the test. This NYT Op-ed piece by three researchers from the Center for Strategic and International Studies suggests a referendum on US withdrawal to be held soon after the forthcoming elections. They make a pretty good case that it would be hard for the Baathists to justify disrupting such a referendum, though no doubt some would do so anyway. At least, this would be true if the main Shiite parties adhered to their previously stated position of favoring withdrawal.
I expect such a referendum would lead to a majority vote for withdrawal. But a majority the other way would probably be an improvement on the current situation. The only really bad outcome would be the case where the Kurds voted solidly for keeping US/UK troops, reversing a majority vote the other way among Arab Iraqis.
Of course, withdrawal of troops wouldn’t produce instant peace. But I can’t see any better alternative. If military force, ruthlessly applied, was going to end the war, the levelling of Fallujah and the expulsion of the population ought to have done the trick. On the other side, I think the resistance would lose their main recruiting tool if the Americans were gone.
1 Despite this event, Australia has suffered far less direct loss in Iraq than many nations who were far less deeply involved in the decision to start the war.
Most of the candidates are calling for withdrawal, so I can’t see what grounds the authors have for thinking a referendum is required. They say that “Iraqi leaders may be slow to show us the door if we are guaranteeing their security”, but there is precious little evidence that Iraqis see it that way. It is hard to see how a government can win respect by calling for foreign assistance against rebels.
I wonder if the current occupiers of Iraq would even allow the “sovereign government of Iraq” to hold a referendum on withdrawal — unless they were hoping for a “Yes” vote.
I can’t seem to figure out if withdrawal would be a good idea or not (certainly during the election we were bombarded with the notion that any hint of early withdrawal was tantamount to treason, unless voiced by Bob Novak). It seems like withdrawal could reduce incentives for joining the insurgency, but wouldn’t it also be a green light for a full-scale internecine battle b/w the old baathists/sunnis, shiites, and kurds? What stops them from trying to wipe each other out (for fear that if you don’t wipe the other out, they will obliterate you)?
If the soon-to-be-elected Iraqi government asks us to leave, what are we going to do? Wreck their democracy by staying?
Hmm.. I guess I have seen dumber policy decisions, but not by much.
Please. The Baathist insurgents aren’t fighting to get the coalition troops out of the country so they can all go home, kick back, and relax—they’re fighting to get the coalition troops out of the way so they can launch the REAL battle to regain power.
They are a minority, yes, but they have plenty of money, plenty of arms, and decades of expertise in the ruthless use of violence to impose their will. What’s more, they have a history of coming back after defeat. You think they’d have no chance of success in the case of a complete, early withdrawal?
But the newly elected Iraqi government, whoever they are, will be perfectly aware of this. They may well want to negotiate a withdrawal schedule. But it will be a flexible one—either in its writing or its implementation.
Put yourself in the place of a newly elected, shiite-dominated government. Would you be certain that, with coalition troops gone, the insurgents could not overrun Baghdad? Would you get rid of the coalition forces that guarantee your government will not be overthrown by force? You might want them out of the way, camped out somewhere in the desert, but gone completely? I don’t think so.
Please. The Baathist insurgents aren’t fighting to get the coalition troops out of the country so they can all go home, kick back, and relax—they’re fighting to get the coalition troops out of the way so they can launch the REAL battle to regain power.
They are a minority, yes, but they have plenty of money, plenty of arms, and decades of expertise in the ruthless use of violence to impose their will. What’s more, they have a history of coming back after defeat. You think they’d have no chance of success in the case of a complete, early withdrawal?
But the newly elected Iraqi government, whoever they are, will be perfectly aware of this. They may well want to negotiate a withdrawal schedule. But it will be a flexible one—either in its writing or its implementation.
Put yourself in the place of a newly elected, shiite-dominated government. Would you be certain that, with coalition troops gone, the insurgents could not overrun Baghdad? Would you get rid of the coalition forces that guarantee your government will not be overthrown by force? You might want them out of the way, camped out somewhere in the desert, but gone completely? I don’t think so.
It all depends on how many people you think are fighting just to fight Americans and how many people you think are fighting to try to gain power.
I tend to think that there is a large number of people who are fighting to gain power—suggesting that withdrawing would make things uglier. Of course if you want to take a very US-centric view perhaps it would make things uglier only for Middle Eastern people so a la Cambodia it wouldn’t really matter to the rest of the world.
Baathist or democraticly electic islamist. Which to choice?
ps. we all know the answer
Shit, this isn’t hard. Set aside all the macho postering and apelike chest beating—In what way is the occupation forwarding American interests in the region? I can’t find any angle where one can make the argument that it does.
Fostering democracy? Draining the “swamps” that breed terrorists? Scaring the bejeezus out of Ay-rabs? No, no, and most surprisingly no. Rather, the occupation seems to be a catalyst for violence that will lead at best to an autocract; it has blooded a whole new generation of jihadis, and has given them a rallying cry for further operations; and has exposed to Muslims (and, indeed, the wider world) numerous weaknesses in American warfighting capabilities—I doubt any nation is as half afraid of the U.S. as they were four years ago. Extending the occupation another year or two will not reverse those trends, but would rather lead to more repression in Iraq, more anti-Americanism in the Muslim community (and elsewhere) and a further degradation of American war-fighting ability.
The occupation has been a mistake of historic proportions, and continuing it is not in the American interest. That’s reason enough to end it today.
But jlw, ape-like chest beating is all that’s left to us.
Rather, the occupation seems to be a catalyst for violence that will lead at best to an autocract
The occupation is not the ‘catalyst’ for violence. What’s behind the violence is the loss of power by the Sunni Baathist elite and their efforts to get it back.
Your metaphor implies that when the ‘catalyst’ is removed, the ‘chemical reaction’ will stop. But we have no good reason to expect that to happen. So ‘catalyst’ is a lousy metaphor.
Has exposed to Muslims (and, indeed, the wider world) numerous weaknesses in American warfighting capabilities—I doubt any nation is as half afraid of the U.S. as they were four years ago.
You’re nuts. Four years ago, before Afghanistan, there were many, many ‘experts’ who argued that US air power with a few special forces, and some rag-tag militias could not possibly succeed where the Soviets had failed (and the British before them). And even after Afghanistan, there were many predictions that Baghdad would turn into another Stalingrad (type ‘Baghdad AND Stalingrad’ into Google — there’ still some pretty entertaining stuff there).
After Iraq and Afghanistan, few governments could feel comfortable that they could hold out even for a few weeks against an American invasion — and that was not the general belief four years ago.
Where weaknesses have cropped up, of course, are in occupation and “nation building”, but it’s not much comfort to a tyrant to know that after he was gone, the US would likely run into difficulty trying to establish a democratic government in his place.
The occupation has been a mistake of historic proportions, and continuing it is not in the American interest. That’s reason enough to end it today.
Withdrawing and allowing a Baathist insurgency (allied with Al Queda) to regain control of Iraq (or a large part of it) or even callously allowing Iraq to descend into a vicious, all-out civil war (whoever ends up winning) would be a mistake of historic proportions.
Ah, the return of the “peace with honor” quandary. The authors’ referendum proposal is quite cynically advanced as gimmick for dressing up stinking reasons of state in the clean duds of democracy. The fifth justifucation contains the crux:
And fifth, a referendum gives us an exit strategy, one that affirms the very reasons we went into Iraq in the first place. There’s more honor in being voted out than in climbing into helicopters from the roof of the embassy.
One alternative exit stategy, of course, is just to say “we’re leaving” and then leave. But the authors fear that such a withdrawal is “dishonorable”, and what’s more that the US will then get the blame for whatever chaos ensues. They cleverly recommend passing the buck to the abused Iraqi public first, so we can later blame the victim if things go terribly sour. They also see a possible bonus to the referendum in that the victim may ask us to stay after all, thus wiping away all our sins:
Two criticisms are sure to follow. First, the plan could be perceived as a smokescreen that allows the United States to cut and run. Second, our departure could create a power vacuum, emboldening the insurgents and leading to an anti-American regime or a civil war.
Rather than signaling wavering support, however, a referendum would show our commitment to empowering the Iraqis. We’re not saying we’re leaving; we’re saying that it’s up to the Iraqi people to decide what’s best for themselves. And the results of a referendum may not be as obvious as some people think - careful consideration of life after a withdrawal may encourage Kurds and Shiites, for example, to back a continued American presence.
So here’s what the CSIS referendum proposal amounts to: I stick a sword in someone’s neck, and then ask him to decide whether I should remove it. The sword, let us suppose, is now the only thing preventing him from bleeding to death. If he says “no”, then I argue that I must have been justified in stabbing him all along, since he has now invited me to continue the bodily intrusion. If he says “yes”, on the other hand, and then bleeds to death after I pull the sword from the neck, I can claim that he made his own bed, and is responsible for his own death.
The US is perhaps now in the final, degenerative “peace with honor” phase of the Iraq invasion disease. Unfortuanately, we can recall that Vietnam lingered in this phase for years.
MW: We have a disagreement on the facts. Most of us believe that the presence of US troops is a catalyst that accelerates the chemical reaction.
MW: We have a disagreement on the facts. Most of us believe that the presence of US troops is a catalyst that accelerates the chemical reaction.
But what is your belief based on? That is, what makes you think that the insurgency is NOT composed mostly of Baathist Sunnis and Sunni Wahabbis from other Arab countries? Other than your chemistry analogy, what makes you think the insurgents will go home and stop fighting if US forces leave?
Juan Cole (certainly no supporter of the war) argues that a ‘Third Baath Coup’ is a real possibility, and, for that reason (and others), that a fixed withdrawal schedule is problematic. Do you think he doesn’t know what he’s talking about regarding the nature of the insurgency?
The fact that the British are under constant fire and the Sadr rebellion does indicate that it is more than just old Baathist. I fear that Juan Cole is overly optimistic about a “Third Baath Coup” and that we really end up with Iraq controlled by coalition of Shiite and Sunni Islamists. Something that anybody with a brain could predict would be the result
“Where weaknesses have cropped up, of course, are in occupation and “nation building”, but it’s not much comfort to a tyrant to know that after he was gone, the US would likely run into difficulty trying to establish a democratic government in his place.”
Actually, I think the opposite. If I was a tyrant, and I had seen how Bush had cheerfully overthrown Saddam, fucked up the occupation, and STILL refused to admit that he had done anything wrong or made any mistakes (except in word choice), I would be terrified.
“Sure, it’s obvious that if Bush overthrows me, Millistan will be thrown into chaos even more violent than usual — but he’s so crazy that he wouldn’t even CARE! I’d better get me some nuclear weapons like North Korea,” I would say. And my yes-men would reply “Excellent idea, Eternally Beloved President Mill. Shall we get the uranium guy on the phone?”
That is, what makes you think that the insurgency is NOT composed mostly of Baathist Sunnis and Sunni Wahabbis from other Arab countries?
There’s actually a reasonably-informed Wikipedia article on the composition of the insurgency that collects most of the informed conjecture that I’ve seen. Unless you’re in possession of some particularly compelling secret informatioin that you’re about to share with the rest of us, the “it’s all just Baathist dead-enders” line is pretty thin at this point.
The tyrant may fear the US but their bureaucracy wonn’t fear it and that is where the real power lies. Also there are not many tyrants left outside of central Asia and North Korea (and i have my doubts about North Korea). Most undemocratic countries are dictatorships by a group and those groups often can hold on to power even after an occupation.
There’s actually a reasonably-informed Wikipedia article on the composition of the insurgency that collects most of the informed conjecture that I’ve seen.
Yes, exactly — Baathists providing the leadership and money, ordinary Sunni foot soldiers who are sympathetic to the Baathists and willing to plant IEDs for money and Sunni fundamentalist foreigners fighters (you know, the guys driving the car and truck bombs into the crowds of Iraqis) constitute the active insurgency. If this bunch wins, the Baathists end up running the place again.
Al Sadr’s group is a separate Shiite organization that is not actively fighting at present, is participating in the elections, and is NOT allied with the Baathists. (Let’s recall—the Baathists murdered Al Sadr’s father, the Wahabbis think the Shiites are infidels). The Sunni insurgency and Al Sadr’s group are not friends and allies—what they ARE are the two potential opposing sides in a full-blown civil war.
That is the optimistic scenario. But is it right? Also nobody but the arm merchants win in a civil war and Sadr and the Sunni’s will win more if they can stop it from happening because the Iranian Shiites would win it.
At this point, we’re stuck. The continued presence of US troops has granted the insurgency a legitimacy it never would have had. If we had not screwed up the reconstruction, or if we had made a transition to a legitimate Iraqi government earlier, the Baathists and foreign fighters would find it a lot harder to recruit sympathetic foot soldiers.
If we wouldn’t have screwed up the reconstruction we would have been kicked out by now. If we had elections earlierer we would have been kicked out by now. And that is not even the worst part. It would have been ruled by islamic parties and i doubt somehow that Bush would have been re-elected.
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