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“Objectives Based Regulation:” buzzword du jour?

by Bruce Carruthers on April 2, 2008

Buried within the U.S. Treasury Department’s just-released blueprint for a new financial regulatory structure is a “proposal”:http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/reports/Blueprint.pdf for a new approach to regulation. The report calls the regulatory status quo an “institutionally based functional system,” and as a long-term goal seeks to replace this with “objectives-based regulation.” In fact, OBR is celebrated in the document as the optimal regulatory structure. Strong words indeed. I’ll resist the temptation to dismiss this as recycling “management-by-objectives” for the public sector. Instead, it is useful to regard OBR as one of a new set of approaches to economic regulation, all of which stem from criticism of “old-fashioned” command-and-control regulation. These new approaches include “principles-based” regulation and “performance-based” regulation.

Whatever their faddish qualities, the problem they respond to is real. When regulation is done by promulgating detailed rules (that explain what the regulated shall and shall not do, and how), and then enforcing compliance with those rules, two problems arise. First, the regulated activity or industry typically evolves faster than the governing rules, and so the latter become increasingly irrelevant. In fact, escaping the grasp of static regulations becomes a big incentive to innovate. Regulators trying to keep up will usually add more rules, spelled out in excruciatingly greater detail, until the ungainly corpus of rules looks like, like, well, … the IRS code. Second, compliance increasingly becomes formal compliance with the strict letter of the law, even when such compliance violates the spirit of the law. It encourages a “check list” mentality that focuses solely on the literal meaning of the rules. OBR, and the other alternatives, try to avoid such difficulties by recasting regulation so that it focuses on a desired outcome or objective, and then grants a measure of flexibility to the regulator to steer towards that goal in whatever way seems best. Flexible regulations make sense if the behavior, market or industry that is to be regulated is dynamic, innovative, or highly variable.

Is OBR truly optimal? Who knows? Evidently the Australians have some experience with it, and the British know something about its close cousin “principles-based” regulation. But OBR certainly isn’t a failsafe measure, for the flexibility that makes OBR adaptable can also be used to render it ineffective or even toothless. The discretion that it necessarily entails means that both the regulators and the regulations matter. Thus, people who fear regulatory capture get even more worried about the possibility that the captured regulators possess lots of authority that they can legally exercise under the rubric of broad rules.

Riddles Wrapped in Mysteries Inside Enigmas

by Bruce Carruthers on March 31, 2008

In the greatest sea battle of World War I, British Admiral David Beatty watched with uncomprehending dismay as his battlecruisers got blown out of the water, and famously remarked that: “… there seems to be something wrong with our bloody ships today.” Ninety years after Jutland, there seems to be something wrong with our bloody financial system. A big reputable investment bank like Bear, Stearns wasn’t supposed to get into such trouble that it had to be bailed out by the Federal Reserve before it blew up. One of the legacies of the last systemic American financial crisis, in the 1930s, was a regulatory system intended to ensure greater transparency for investors, some measure of confidence for bank depositors, and prudential requirements for financial institutions. Recent events suggest that this system is no longer adequate to the task. The savings-and-loan crisis of the 1980s could have slowed down the push to deregulate, but in the 1990s the Asian Financial Crisis provided a moment for self-congratulatory triumphalism about the superiority of Anglo-Saxon finance and the perils of crony capitalism. With rigorous accounting standards, regulatory oversight, and a quantitatively-based credit culture that kept lenders honest, surely the U.S. wouldn’t be vulnerable to the real estate bubbles that plagued Indonesian, Thai and South Korean banks. Or so we fervently hoped. Thus, financial deregulation and innovation proceeded apace. Today’s sub-prime mortgage crisis wasn’t supposed to happen, and now investors are haunted by the fear that financial portfolios are filled with near-worthless paper. And the baleful effects of the credit crunch are now felt widely by both individuals and firms.
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