Left Neo-Liberalism and Theories of Politics

I’m absolutely on Team Farrell here.

But while Yglesias did miss the point, I don’t think it’s just a personal failure on his part. We have to acknowledge that policy debates are suited to the online world in a way that practical politics is not. The whole world of online debate corresponds to the neoliberal idea of politics — the only thing that matters is the content of your ideas and there’s no need to build coalitions, choose sides or be accountable to a constituency (and people look pretty silly when they try.)

Or: When “what is to be done” is a question about policy, there’s not too much trouble over who’s doing the doing — it’s the state or some well-defined subset of it. But when it’s a question of political strategy, the actor is much murkier. The conversation is really only possible if it’s among people who have already in some sense committed themselves to a concrete organization or movement. And that can’t happen on blogs.

So I think the answer to the third question is going to have to start with, Get off the internet. Not that I have a better idea that anyone else what comes next.

An excellent post, Henry; great work.

All theories are flawed – but they provide a necessary guide to action. Lefties have a clearly discernible theory of politics, which has to do with collective action, and the building and sustenance of mobilizing organizations. Netroots-style partisans also have a theory, which has to do with the expansion of party structure and organization, and the punishment of politicians who deviate needlessly from the party line. But neo-liberals – not so much, apart from a historical belief in the power of technocratic discussion to reshape politics.

Let me add one thought to this, related to a post I’m working on at the moment. Might it be that one reason why neoliberalism has been historically weak on theories of politics–and consequently often hasn’t been able to really grasp, nor to morally appreciate, the conditions which made the pre-neoliberal establishment viable–is because many, perhaps most, of those drawn towards “technocratic discussion” as a substitute for politics have either abandoned or were never acquainted with the sort of ethical or religious grounding that suggests something prior to discussion? A robust theory of politics is often, perhaps nearly always, animated by a conviction that politics is the means by which human beings can democratically realize certain naturally or philosophically preferred ends. Eliminate a belief in the prior and/or enduring existence of those ends, and maybe politics does seem, to many people anyway, wholly concerned with…well, with just talking, talking as efficiently and responsibly as possible, as each new problem arises. Which maybe works wonderfully while a cultural consensus reigns, but once it is lost, and you’re running up against True Believers, talk as a theory of politics doesn’t produce the same results.

Don’t mean to boil this all down to a simplistic point; obviously there are several epistemological shifts going on in the case of the rise (and decline?) of neoliberalism. But for the left, I wonder if there might be a larger connection between a kind of secularity and the decline of an “ethic of ends” (in the Weberian sense) than many contemporary liberals realize.

Actually I think his problem with you is that the left version of “theory of politics” isn’t as successful as it thinks it is and additionally has some huge problems that it hates dealing with or wishes away. For example: unions and good race/immigration politics. They haven’t fit together very well in the past, and they have all sorts of problems in the present.

Furthermore, both the left and the right appear to have theories of politics that descend easily into what Yeglasias would (correctly IMO) see as dangerous populism. Those who make fun of the Tea Party for example, don’t see the similar level of economic confusion which exists on their side’s populist protest movements (say the Greek protests).

Further still, and this is probably because of the influence of Fundamentalist Christians in the US, he is wary of the non-compromising fundamentalist attitude in general. And that fundamentalist attitude is found in spades to the left of neo-liberalism in the US. (Again, to use an example he talks about often, “our teacher’s unions wrong or wronger”).

SebastianH (#5),

both the left and the right appear to have theories of politics that descend easily into what Yglesias would (correctly IMO) see as dangerous populism

I agree–but what bothers me here is that, when one starts to run through the various political means by which something more than neoliberal, technoractic left policies could be brought to past, almost all of them get this same label: “dangerous populism”. There seems to be a near complete unwillingness to allows that some populisms aren’t “dangerous”, or that at least their possibly illiberal dangers are more than balanced out by the forces for egalitarianism which they embody. The fact that for many neoliberals “populism” is a joke and a threat, and can’t ever possibly be anything more, is something I find quite frustrating and sad.

don’t see the similar level of economic confusion which exists on their side’s populist protest movements (say the Greek protests).

I’m pretty sure the economic confusion here is all on your side. The popular (not populist, you are seemingly unable to distinguish between these) protests in Greek know very well what they are protesting.

Populism is collection of historical political movements. Using the term to describe any and all kinds of collective political organization is just inaccurate.

“I don’t think that many neo-liberals believe any more that moderation from Democrats will produce moderation from Republicans – that theory has been comprehensively falsified. ”

There’s this fellow named Obama that you may have heard of …

Excellent post, Henry. As an auxiliary strand of argument, I would suggest some very skeptical attention to Yglesias’ continual emphasis on “workable.” What this means is that he (and DeLong) know perfectly well that single-payer health care, a sharply higher marginal income tax and capital gains tax rate (along with a five- or ten-fold increase in tax enforcement budgets and personnel), public financing of elections, and other radical measures are desirable, but that it would be tedious and unfashionable to harp on them in their writing or — good heavens! — participate in efforts to take them to their fellow-citizens (ie, engage in real politics rather than the Beltway variety). As I mentioned in the other thread, it really is the Progressive/ Lippmann/<i?New Republic syndrome.

Fearing “dangerous” populism is absurd, not because populist movements can’t do harm but because what is needed is precisely something dangerous. What’s missing from the current scene is a force or group that can realistically threaten the status quo. Unions didn’t get political rights in the 30’s because of the generosity of elites but because business leaders were afraid of them. Of course a democratic politics with teeth also needs brains if it isn’t going to descend into pointless noise and violence. Unfortunately, the resource in critical shortage, at least among would-be leaders, is not brains but balls.

“Almost still totally devoid of content and examples for the general case and in the specific case of MY still completely devoid of content and examples. MY supports pro union policies for the exact reasons mentioned.”

As a pro forma matter, yes he supports unions. Did he spend even close to the same amount of time he spends on barber licensing advocating for Card Check when it was on the table? Obviously he is free to have his own idiosyncratic issues, but Card Check was extremely important for anyone who agrees with Henry’s theory of politics, which I do. Beyond that he spends the bulk of his time talking about unions harping on the inefficiencies they cause. It is true though that that passes for “supporting unions” these days.

Fearing “dangerous” populism is absurd, not because populist movements can’t do harm but because what is needed is precisely something dangerous. What’s missing from the current scene is a force or group that can realistically threaten the status quo.

And furthermore, what’s missing from the minds of the populism-averse technocrats is any recognition that the status quo in the US is itself quite dangerous. The country is on a very bad trajectory and a soft landing is unlikely.

Russell Arben Fox: A strange resistance to engage in any sort of populism is one of the main failures of Democratic politicians in the United States. I think this has numerous reasons. Many people on the moderate and left side of politics in the U.S seem to see only the ugly side of it, especially because the American right has been using the ugly side of populism since the 1960s. Even if positivie populism is recognized as being useful in the past, many Democratic politicians seem to think that it would not be useful now if only because there are certain important parts of the Democratic base who wouldn’t get it or would be turned off by it. The entire Republican base seems to get turned on by populism. I think that many Democratic politicians also seem to think that they could not pull off populism and that it would seem very phoony coming from them.

I think that one reason the liberal/left side of politics has trouble coming up with a new theory of politics is that there seems to be problems with coherent linking of the different policies we want. Most of us want better protection of the environment, more public transportation, civil liberties and equal rights for all, and the social safety net. Finding something in common between climate change and universal healthcare isn’t that easy though. This means that different liberal/left groups tend to work relatively independently of each other on the issue most important to them rather rather than together on one particular issue at a given moment.

The American right is more united because they somehow found a way to link free market capitalism, Evangelical Protestant beliefs on society and morality, and aggressive foreign policy. Climate change is a near perfect example of this. The business people hate climate change legislation because it could decrease their profits. Evangelicals hate it because it contradicts their metaphysical understanding of how the world works. This means that both groups unite to combat climate change legislation. The aggressive foreign policy faction goes along for the ride. The ability to link the varying policy desires of the different factions to gether gives them a theory of politics to work on. Leftists and liberals might develop a theory of politics when we can link our policy preferences together.

To me, the case study in political misadventure that one can firmly pin to the neo-libs was Obama’s healthcare policy – ACA, or as it will forever be known, Obamacare. We were told that the process of infinite mediation, the acceptance of a series of compromises that brought us from the public option to a checkerboard system retaining some ‘nudges’ and some typical Bushian corruption – as in the Obama compromise to keep the Bush era policy of not negotiating prices with drug companies – were all motivated by political realities.

But what were those realities? One of them was that at no point was there any willingness to put this topic into the broader politics of declining wage levels and higher unemployment. The populist rhetoric of the campaign was utterly dropped, so we could do something. But this loses the point. To do something sometimes means that it is more important to fail, politically, to pass a program in return for dominating the context. This gives you more future power, which in turn means you can do more than do something, you can actually do the best thing, because you have pursuaded the majority of people that it is the best thing. If the majority of people thought that the best medical plan for them would entail higher costs that could be shifted to those who have the most – a tiresome theme, but a necessary one – than you do have a winning hand. Instead, the “smartest guys in the room” approach was used. And we are still being assured that, in spite of 2010, a revived right, and polls showing very strong support for repealing ACA, that we were witness to master plays in the game of political reality, avoiding the poor Clintons fate. In fact, Obama did worse. He is now facing cuts in medicare – and negotiating them – that Clinton never had to face. He is facing a more solid GOP opposition. His politics has made it more probable that people in the middle will experience cuts in their healthcare – which it is almost guaranteed will be blamed on the uninsured “poor” covered by Obama. It was an excellent lesson in neolib fiasco. And MY – here, a sort of emblematic para-Dem commentator – is oblivious to this.
This is a serious misunderstanding of how politics and policy must converge. And I keep seeing it go on as the O. administration default.

This is a bad argument because both sides are just attacking strawmen. Also, it isn’t clear what dimension we are arguing about: moderate left/further left, elitist politics/populist politics, economic redistribution/identity politics. Those who ultimately come from Marxism tend to think further left–populist–economic redistribution fit nicely together, but that’s almost certainly wrong in the contemporary United States.

Ultimately, this discussion can’t happen as long as people on one side keep insisting that the other side isn’t actually arguing anything. The very root of the argument is precisely what constitutes an arguable claim and what constitutes difference.

Besides which good policies are good politics is a good theory of politics.

LeeEsq (#23),

Thanks for the reply.

Even if positive populism is recognized as being useful in the past, many Democratic politicians seem to think that it would not be useful now if only because there are certain important parts of the Democratic base who wouldn’t get it or would be turned off by it.

I’m sure you’re right, but it’s worth thinking seriously about just which “parts of the Democratic base” the ones presumably opposed to all sorts of populist rhetoric/strategies may be. Probably not the white industrial working class. Probably not African-Americans and Hispanic immigrants. Probably not the religious left. So who? Single professional women? College-educated urbanites? It’d be interesting to do a demographic study of leading neoliberal thinkers and politicians; my gut tells me that they’re significantly, if not overwhelmingly, members of that final cohort.

I think that one reason the liberal/left side of politics has trouble coming up with a new theory of politics is that there seems to be problems with coherent linking of the different policies we want. Most of us want better protection of the environment, more public transportation, civil liberties and equal rights for all, and the social safety net….The American right is more united because they somehow found a way to link free market capitalism, Evangelical Protestant beliefs on society and morality, and aggressive foreign policy.

Good point. Seriously, the Soviet menace is a gift which historically just keeps on giving to the right. Libertarians opposed state communism because of property rights; the religious right opposed it because of official atheism; the foreign policy clique opposed it because it was a threat which America could build up an empire to fight against and win. 45 years of fusion conservatism, and the legacy of seeing an overlap between the otherwise obviously often contradictory goals of an unregulated market, religious piety, and military strength remains strong.

LeeEsq wrote, “The American right is more united because they somehow found a way to link free market capitalism, Evangelical Protestant beliefs on society and morality, and aggressive foreign policy.”

This kind of thinking illustrates a pervasive error in leftist thinking about politics.

There is no right in mainstream American politics. American conservatism is informed by the Whig tradition in European politics, not by the Tory tradition. If we’re talking political theory, genealogy matters.

We must also distinguish between parties and philosophies. There no doubt that Republicans, not “the American right”, have been able to link free market advocates, religious conservatives, and neo-conservatives into a relatively cohesive party. This should not be mysterious. The Republican Party was founded to end slavery. The party was envisioned as a “big tent” that would allow political cooperation among abolitionists (most of whom were religious zealots), anti-protectionists, and radical Republicans bent on war with the Democratic Party of the South.

We must dismiss the error of using European categories for American politics. We must understand political philosophies as traditions not as abstract logical theories.

geo,

I think your comment is repersentative of the post and the comments.

MY does an excellent job advocating for those policies. Over and over again he hammers away at the idea that higher taxes on CEOs means CEOs will work less. Over and over again he points out that the US has a higher per capita GDP than European nations only because of more hours worked. Over and over again he plays up European productivity and liesure time.

So where is the argument?

There isn’t one about actual content it is about affected styles.

Ok, progress, so now we are talking about politics, rather than policy. Good. The problem here, it seems to me, is the reactionary institutional context provided by the US constitution, which is inherently biased towards making it difficult to change policies (n veto points, supermajorities for allowing people to go to the rest room and what-not). This means that you have to have a theory of politics of the US system for progressive politics. I think MY has that. Overall cultural change will mean that liberal/progressive social issues will become mainstream and adapted with relative ease (repealing DADT, gay marriage, social equality in general), while other issues need a catastrophic crisis to be implemented, and then only half-heartedly (ACA, stimulus, automatic stabilizers, everything that needs to be paid by taxes, except the military). In other words, to overcome the institutional resistance you have to form alliance around common causes, and that’s much easier to accomplish regarding social issues than economic ones in the US context, if only because business is such a formidable adversary. I don’t think MY thinks this is ideal – hence his frequent observations of what a difference parliamentarism makes, and his frequent praise of the Nordic countries – but it is the reality that confronts US lefties. Henry, is this much different from your theory?

MY does an excellent job advocating for those policies. Over and over again he hammers away at the idea that higher taxes on CEOs means CEOs will work less. Over and over again he points out that the US has a higher per capita GDP than European nations only because of more hours worked. Over and over again he plays up European productivity and liesure time.

There isn’t one about actual content it is about affected styles.

No! No! Stop saying that! People are laying out very clearly their differences with Yglesias! If you can’t actually bring it upon yourself to address the arguments that are laid out in this post, in the comments, and elsewhere, then just butt out!

In what sense does the left have a sounder “theory of politics” than left neoliberalism? Left neoliberals have been quite successful at building coalitions: consider the Democratic Leadership Council or New Labour. The constituencies to which left neoliberals appeal coincide with the rather numerous “new classes” much theorized over the past several decades. These constituencies are perforce more fluid and don’t have the quasi-martial “organization” of the unionized working class, but they are no less “une force vive,” as one says in French, and probably rather better at translating interests into policies. If the swing vote lies in the center, then left neoliberals are arguably better placed to capture it. Perhaps what Henry is really arguing is that left neoliberalism’s very success at theorizing politics and forming coalitions has left it saddled with policies that are no longer popular–finance-friendly policies in particular. But that is a different point from the one he’s actually making, and it’s by no means clear that the remedy is to embrace a neo-populist theory of politics that is likely to alienate more votes than it brings in.

“Yglesias is called a neoliberal because he prefers to distribute the proceeds from progressive taxation in cash or cash-like form and because he prefers to distribute broadly rather than to particular interest groups like barber cartels and public sector employees. But I think this should be an advantage in populist messaging.”

No, Yglesias is called a neoliberal because it doesn’t matter how much money you hand out to people if your other economic policies destroy their lives. His basic point is to allow tons of libertarian economic policies to “make a bigger pie,” and then divvy that up in more equal ways through taxes. He also thinks (god knows why) that getting rid of licensing leads to more money for poorer people instead of just different professions joining the race to minimum wagehood.

But Henry’s right. Where’ s the political will for an extra $2500 a year if it ruins your life? I mean, Yglesias gave us this: http://thinkprogress.org/yglesias/2011/07/18/271597/are-successful-property-owners-the-victims-of-gentrification/ can’t

Is it any wonder that the only part of his agenda that will ever get passed is the libertarian economics?

Freddie,

I disagree that anyone is laying out differences with Yglesias. Yglesias says, “The Fed should be pressured to have a minimum inflation target, so that there is more aggregate demand and the labor market tightens, leading to more bargaining power for working people and less unemployment.” Henwood says, “Boo Yglesias! Bad Trust Fund Baby! Marx forever!”

No one here — least of all, you — explains why tight money is good for the working class.

@45 Henry excerpted a small part of Henwood’s argument and added his own analysis. That is what people including Freddie were discussing. Left-neoliberalism can have a faulty theory of politics, with or without Yglesias needing to be wrong on monetary policy. (I happen to think Henry is right on the former and Ygelsias right on the latter. )

If you can identify anyone anywhere who fits this straw person conception of a neoliberal

Brad DeLong.

@ 41

There are a lot of assumptions in this post that, I think, would require some more thorough defending; but my main issue is the idea that the DLC or New Labour represent the kind of politics Henry et al are talking about. They really, really don’t. To some degree, the fact that some would be unable or unwilling to see a genuine difference between grassroots coalitions and the Better Business corporatism of the DLC says it all. But even if you’re made uncomfortable by phrases like “grassroots” (which is, admittedly, overly-used and much over-romanticized), I think it’s a stretch to point to the era of American politics following the advent of the DLC as one of commendable success for the left.

Lemuel@36:

I am proposing that leftists campaign on direct redistribution downwards, and then enact policies to achieve this end when they get in power. I believe this strategy will be more effective in attracting the necessary coalition to achieve left values and keep leftists in power than a strategy based on strengthening and mobilizing particular minority interest groups like labor unions, because it is too easy for the opposition to exploit divisions between such interest groups and everyone else. I believe that once broad redistribution programs are in place, they will be kept in place, because people who have attained a level of consumption dependent on such redistribution will be reluctant to give it up.

Mr. Yglesias, what people mean when they state that neo-liberalism lacks a theory of politics is that it lacks a theory for getting elected into office so that neo-liberal policy cna be implemented. The neo-liberal method for winning elections seems to be just to win elections by having the other side mess up so badly so that you win and than implement policy. Actually trying to motivate the masses into voting for neo-liberals seems beyond neo-liberal capibilities. I’d perfer to have a system where the left/liberal side as an election strategy besides when by default.

I really find it frustrating how few people get specific here. I think there may well be an argument, but I can’t quite make it out. If Yglesias had a “lefty” theory of politics, which of his positions do you think should change? I see a couple of allusions here in the thread:
1. Licensing: He should write less about licensing. But at least as L2P writes about that, it’s a disagreement about policy effects – is less licensing going to lead to more opportunities for small service sector entrepreneurs or to a race to the bottom? I don’t think anyone is going to claim that licensing boards and the associated types of organizations are meaningful vehicles for progressive collective action?
2. Free Trade: Should Matt be against free trade, because that would strengthen manufacturing jobs and workers? I think MY would argued – backed by some decent evidence – that the effects of trade on jobs and unions have been hugely overstated. Also, he’d argue that especially where there have been some noticeable effects – trade with China, especially – they have also lead to enormous increases in the livelihoods of workers outside of the US (and, in terms of theory of politics, also an increase in their political power – see the debate and the passage of the new Chinese labor law a couple of years ago).
3. School policy – no one has brought this up, but it’s the policy where MY clashes most frequently with lefties. I think MY is pretty wrong here, but again I see that mainly as a policy debate. Yes, the “reform” movement tends to be anti-union, but I really don’t see the believe that teachers’ unions are crucial for long-run political reasons anywhere close to the center of the arguments of most reform skeptics.

The other argument is that MY should write more about other things. But I’m not quite sure what those would be?

Finally, as a theory of politics, CAP is modeled after the conservative foundations, Heritage, Cato et al. There is a very good case to be made that their influence on policy over the last 40 years has been tremendous and that their political strategy has been quite successful. So why does that not count as a theory of politics?

The idea of policies that are “optimal” in some interest-neutral, value -neutral way is ridiculous.

Sure, sure, of course. I’m just saying that the “technocratic” aspects of policymaking count. Like we might agree that “let’s stick it to the rich bankers and boost the incomes of the poor” is a good idea. But that still leaves us with the question of which policies to stick it to rich bankers will, in fact, boost the incomes of the poor.

Matthew Stevens @ 4:

Okay, but I refuse to believe that those debates among technocrats have no effect, at all, on policy. As I see it, you need the technocrats and folks chanting and marching. That’s why conservatives have Heritage and the Tea Party.

Heritage is an advocacy organ, not a group of technocrats. After policy is set, they cherry-pick some data and assemble talking-points to push the next round of tax-cuts, benefit cuts, deregulation, etc…

Did he spend even close to the same amount of time he spends on barber licensing advocating for Card Check when it was on the table?

I didn’t. But here we have a question about theories of political change. Do you think that if I had written more blog posts about the Employee Free Choice Act that it would have passed? My personal theory of how I ought to live my life is that I ought to spend time focusing on issues that I think are important but that other ideologically similar political bloggers don’t care to spend their time focusing on. Maybe that’s an incorrect theory, but it’s different from a grand ideological difference about theories of politics.

But for the record, if given the choice between making EFCA law and deregulating the barber industry, I think EFCA is a no-brainer as a choice.

Pithlord, you aren’t actually disagreeing with me. I see no meaningful difference in what we are saying. No one, least of all you, is offering an alternative to my position, based on my Zod-like ability to dictate who does and does not agree with me. Thanks for your support, Pithlord!

(This is fun!)

Almost forgot, you have long supported school choice, testing, and etc, now that the evidence is in and they don’t achieve their aim, have you, like Ravitch, tried to come up with an alternative set of policy prescriptions? Or is the same old market-based solutions to all problems?

Matt Yglesias @59

But that still leaves us with the question of which policies to stick it to rich bankers will, in fact, boost the incomes of the poor.

That’s not the open question. The question at hand is: How do you enact policies, once you’ve decided you want them?

I think that because I think that if you reduce the price of things that poor people buy, then poor people’s living standards increase.

But doesn’t this assume, then, that poor peoples’ income has either stayed the same or increased?

But Matt

1. Other prominent liberal bloggers don’t write about supporting unions a lot, in part because the coziness between progressive media and libertarian media makes it professionally preferable for them to stay quiet on those issues, and

2. I don’t think it’s fair to make appeals to what is politically possible only when it is convenient. Sure, your position on EFCA wouldn’t do much to get it passed. Neither, frankly, do your opinions on monetary policy have much sway. That’s no knock on you. It’s a symptom of democracy. And it’s a little odd to talk about how your input wouldn’t have mattered on EFCA while simultaneously insisting that theories of political change are irrelevant in the face of sound policy. Right?

its, that is

@63: Do you think that if I had written more blog posts about the Employee Free Choice Act that it would have passed? My personal theory of how I ought to live my life is that I ought to spend time focusing on issues that I think are important but that other ideologically similar political bloggers don’t care to spend their time focusing on.

Well, doesn’t it depend on whether those issues that other bloggers aren’t focusing on (and that you consequently choose to focus on) are anywhere near as important as the ones they are? Otherwise, wouldn’t your motive seem to be product differentiation rather than effectiveness?

christian_h at 64: That was very funny. Thanks for the snark.

@60 Hey, small ‘c’ conservatism isn’t all bad. Maybe one of the problems with people like MattY is that he’s a radical, obsessed with changing everything. Tear it up, rip it down, start again. Year 0.

“Did he spend even close to the same amount of time he spends on barber licensing advocating for Card Check when it was on the table?”

Yglesias: I didn’t. But here we have a question about theories of political change. Do you think that if I had written more blog posts about the Employee Free Choice Act that it would have passed?

Obviously not, but had you and other progressive opinion makers tried to make Card Check a litmus test for Democratic lawmakers in the same way voting against an anti-choice bill woud have been, I think the vote would have looked different. (Though I can’t say whether it would have passed. I suspect not. ) I also think that since you have taken on an economic beat it was especially incumbent on you to explain to other progressives and the public the importance of Card Check, and I think if you had an understanding of politics closer to Henry’s you would have naturally done so, even if it was a losing battle.

This has been an interesting and frustrating debate to follow. From the sidelines it feels like coming into the middle of a conversation. It’s also timely, for me, since I’ve just been reading Winner Take All Politics which, while infuriating at times, makes a convincing case for the importance of interest groups in a theory of contemporary American politics (as Henry said, “a theory of how policy proposals can be guided through the political process, and implemented without being completely undermined.”).

Trying to get a better understand of the actual points of disagreement, I just commented at DeLong’s, offering the following attempt at a very broad picture which might illustrate the points of divergence.

Without trying to sidetrack the conversation, I’m curious if this seems like a reasonable gloss to others —

How about the following as a summary of the logic behind interest group politics:

1) Politics and political outcomes are contested on the basis of intensity of preference as well as the number of people who share a given preference.

— see, for example, how the NRA can successfully fight gun control laws supported by 60% of the population, or how difficult it is to raise taxes on the wealthy, even when 60+% of the population support the idea. In both cases the group which is in the minority has much more intense preferences and is more likely to donate/vote based on that preference than the people in the majority.

2) Interest groups can been seen as a proxy for preference intensity. A successful lobby is going to represent some group of people willing to commit resources to a given cause. While the size of that group may be large or small, depending on the issue, the existence of the lobby still represents an intensity of commitment to the issue.

3) To implement rational technocratic policy depends not only on making an argument which is generally convincing to a majority of people, it also requires there to be a group of people willing to devote resources to the passage of said rational technocratic policy.

4) If there are few or no organized interest groups currently existing that seem likely to prioritize a given set of rational technocratic policy, than the aspiring technocrat should ask themselves what would to change in “the political landscape” to either have exiting groups throw their weight behind the desired policies, or for new groups to organize in support of the policies.

5) It is likely that these groups will have interests which are not completely congruent with that of the aspiring technocrat (e.g., the line quoted in your post today, “They be less-likely to prioritize efficiency. They will also be less-likely to prioritize positive-sum solutions. They will also be less-likely to prioritize basic fairness or democratic principles or whatever else. They will assign a higher priority to increasing the economic and political power of the people they are trying to represent . . . .”). I feel like the critics of “neoliberalism” would say that conceding this point does not reduce the importance of point (4), but rather increases is. It makes it even more important to be attentive to, and invested in changing, the ways in which the political system encourages certain kinds of lobbies and discourages others.

I can’t speak for anybody else, but I find that picture convincing and am not convinced that the self-identified neoliberals are responding to points (3-5).

Yglesias: But that still leaves us with the question of which policies to stick it to rich bankers will, in fact, boost the incomes of the poor.

The more interesting question is after we’ve confiscated their money and redistributed it; do we barbecue the bankers, or would the poor prefer them roasted. Obviously we’d humanely cull them; they’re the monsters, not us.

So as progressives, our challenge is to join ourselves [to] a group that is cohesive enough to exercise social power, but broad enough to have interests aligned with the broad majority. I think someone mentioned upthread a political philosophy that’s given some thought to this very question…

Yeah, its called the new Right. And they’re winning…

Freddie ,

No they aren’t and they haven’t and your comment was also content free.

On the one hand you have folks like geo making this claim

‘I would suggest some very skeptical attention to Yglesias’ continual emphasis on “workable.” What this means is that he (and DeLong) know perfectly well that single-payer health care, a sharply higher marginal income tax and capital gains tax rate (along with a five- or ten-fold increase in tax enforcement budgets and personnel), public financing of elections, and other radical measures are desirable, but that it would be tedious and unfashionable to harp on them in their writing or—good heavens!—participate in efforts to take them to their fellow-citizens (ie, engage in real politics rather than the Beltway variety). ‘

which is just wrong. Matt writes about advocates for single payer health care and higher public expenditures very frequently and effectively.

We also have Henry

‘Neo-liberals’ dislike of labor unions in the 1980s was doubtless partly justified – but they didn’t seem (as best as I’ve read the debates) to be at all interested in the question of whether strong unions helped alleviate inequality, sustain the political conditions of embedded liberalism usw.’

But MY supports Unions in part for the reasons Henry mentions. This is just one small example –

http://thinkprogress.org/yglesias/2011/02/18/199965/on-wisconsin/

I am not even sure MY disagrees with Lemuel’s

‘If, like them, you think this is just a disagreement about what is to be done, and not who will do it, how they’ll gain or maintain the power to do it, and they can be kept accountable to us, whoever we are’

Again the above link idicates that MY doesn’t just understand what Henry et al are saying he supports it.

But you are right that it really isn’t just about affected style. It is also about MY being willing to deviating from the stupidest orthodoxy/cant.

MY will be thrown out of the left.

You can’t deride corporations for too long and expect to maintain an academic career or get hired by a thinktank or work for Kaplan/WaPo.

Look, guys– the whole “you don’t disagree, and there is only this one option” thing is fucking creepy. Passionate disagreement is democratic; the insistence that there are no disagreements is fascistic. Henry has now written several thousand words articulating his disagreements with Yglesias. The fact that these don’t follow the narrow constraints of a few, dictated-from-above policy options is precisely the point. A political philosophy based on the notion that there are a tiny number of “responsible” policy options, which happen to inevitably break towards the advantage of the people holding that philosophy, is what many of us are working against. Philosophy matters. Ethics matter. Morality matters. Assumptions matter. First principles matter. And yes, politics matter.

The fact that you have only got a hammer doesn’t compel the rest of us to use no other tools.

Sorry “someguy” but “support for labour unions” is a practical matter. If a person does not actually support unions in specific cases (DC bus drivers, teachers…) that person doesn’t actually get to say they “support unions”.

Steve LaBonne @94

Fortunately, participants in this thread aren’t the only audience. I’m fairly sure I got a clue about these matters by lurking in discussions not-unlike this one.

Cranky Observer at #88

Of course I’m leaving things out, it was intended as very, very broad pass, and intended as a way to highlight some issues rather than a complete catalog.

I was starting from, “assume that there are many policies that both parties would agree are good policies what, then, is the crux of the disagreement?” Your response is helpful as a reminder that the disagreements are about policy as well as politics.

It also makes me think that it does, in fact, seem to be difficult to isolate the points of contention. If you feel like you have a significantly different conception of human welfare and utility from Yglesias (for example), no wonder it feels like an argument about politics derails from a lack of shared assumptions and vocabulary (that is, people aren’t using the same words to mean the same things).

If the price of haircuts for working people goes down by $10, then working people’s real income is $10 higher. but they are in no better position than they were before to fight for anything else. On the other hand, a union campaign that yields the same real wage increase is a collective act that builds people’s sense of solidarity and capacity for collective action, and creates (or strengthens) an organization that can fight for working people on a whole range of other issues as well.

That seems compelling to me. Labor unions are good. If someone wanted to organize a labor union at CAP, I would gladly join the union. But surely the view isn’t that labor unions are so important that nobody is allowed to write about any other political issue, right?

someguy @100, what is that post supposed to prove? A tepid admission that a teachers’ union that promotes “inefficiency” is still better than a cartel of charter school owners is perfectly congruent with his routine denunciations of teachers’ unions when they actually do their jobs by, say, protesting when the careers of their members are terminated due to statistical noise in crappily designed high-stakes tests. Either you’re not actually familiar with MY’s writings on education, or you’re as disingenuous as MY routinely is when writing on the subject.

Someguy:
So Yglesias shows support for unions by arguing that the Teacher’s Unions advocate for spending money inefficiently?While insisting that Union bus drivers earn too much? With friends like that, who needs right-wing Neoliberals.

This business of “efficiency”, by the way, really needs to be analyzed far better and not just thrown around as a buzzword- a task for which one would think a Harvard philosophy concentrator would be well fitted. As has already been pointed out, in the very short run the most “efficient” way to make poor people less poor is to hand them some cash- but this does nothing, or less than nothing, to empower them to fight for future gains and is thus highly “inefficient” on a longer timescale and taking political power into account. The late Tony Judt was very eloquent on the way that the diversion of all kinds of thought into the narrow channel defined by the presuppositions of neoclassical economics produces exactly the sort of impoverished discourse we get from people who make unexamined notions of “efficiency” their be-all and end-all.

Henry,

But that is the direction your commentators insist on pushing the thread and I find it interesting.

Also I think if follow the link you can see MY gets your argument. If I looked harder I could find other posts stating the same thing.

Matthew Yglesias:
You realize that Lemuel Pitkin has offered not just a reason why unions are good but theory of politics that joins concrete policies with long term social/economic change of the sort you have been demanding? So what’s yours?

I still want to know what Brad DeLong meant when he said there’s no coalition to build on the left outside of public employees and celebrities. That was kind of weird. I’m not sure where Matt Yglesias fits with that argument. But still….

To AndrewW

I think Brad was trying pin down exactly what Henry meant by “Lefties have a clearly discernible theory of politics, which has to do with collective action, and the building and sustenance of mobilizing organizations. ”

Is it
A) Lefties are trying to organize a “universal class” that best represents the just and right interests of Americans and/or the world as a whole and will use that organizational power to achieve those just and right interests
or
B) Lefties are organizing interest groups that can achieve political influence that are largely sympathetic to leftist goals, which are just and right. These interest groups will include public employees, celebrities, trial lawyers, etc. Lefties will use this political influence to achieve said goals but the interest groups will also get to shape left-wing policy preferences in exchange for their support.
or
C) Lefties are organizing interest groups that can achieve political influence that are largely sympathetic to leftist goals, which are just and right. Sympathetic interest group influence will largely be balanced by opposition interest group politics and the main impact will that the interests of the people will prevail.
or
D) Something else.

He has expressed disagreement with A, B or C though I don’t think he has proposed an alternative (to be fair, I feel Matt and Brad’s point is that while they haven’t solved the question of how to effectively push for leftist goals, they don’t think anyone else has either).

How about this for a neo-liberal’s theory of politics:

– if you create a policy now, eventually the policy’s beneficiaries will become a strong constituency for continuing that policy. So far, that only leads us to good policies having good long-term political effects, and bad policies having bad ones.

– any other long-term political effects of policy are going to be too unpredictable to usefully guide decisions, and in any case will be swamped by exogenous effects – e.g. demographics, economic development, general loosening of social attitudes (some may argue about how truly exogenous such things are, but it tends not to be a very promising road to go down – e.g. if the body politic at large accepts manipulating demographics for long term political effects as valid policy, then you can be assured that you’ll get much politicization and a severe tightening of immigration procedures).

What Henry is trying to do here is too clever by half, and will not work out that way he wants it. The more room you allow for people to cite vague distant benefits from their policy choices, the more they will exploit it for old-fashioned special interest rent-seeking.

stubydoo @ 118

I don’t think that qualifies as a theory of politics.

From Henry’s post:

a theory of politics – that is, a theory of how policy proposals can be guided through the political process, and implemented without being completely undermined.

Even if we assume that Yglesias and DeLong can work out the best of all possible policies, how do they propose to get them implemented?

The idea that good policy creates its own constituency is a reason for your political opponents to oppose that policy, because it threatens to dilute the power of your political opponents. You need a way to convince people that your policies will benefit them and convince them to support your policies (voting for your preferred candidates and lobbying officeholders).

At this point, im more confused about the way the term technocracy is used than about the way the term neoliberal is used.

As i see it, there is no natural fit between technocracy and neoliberalism, on the contrary. Neoliberal rethoric is about how they know the one best way, the way GM and the like are run that shall be implemented in the public sector arround the world by their social tribe MBAs, elite Universty graduates and the like.

This is just a basless claim, there is no evidence whatsoever that those alegdly best “technocratic” solutions would actually work any better if neoliberals could do all that stuff without unions and the like getting in the way. A real life technocrat can be an Union or Kammer emloyee in Austria or a French high level public servant with a grand école background. Two examples within a completly different system, with a completly different social background and jet they both have one thing in common, they are both an antithesis to neoliberalism.

Does anyone want to defend left neoliberalism’s record in advancing liberal or neoliberal policy? We’re likely getting the Bowles-Simpson plan foisted on us. Where do the neoliberals stand on that as a policy goal? I know Ezra Klein loves removing the mortgage interest deduction (and there are some decent arguments for getting rid of it–well, at this stage, benefits of never having had it, actually).

So how effective has left neoliberalism been in this country, even setting aside political concerns?

@AndrewW – well, that depends on the counterfactual and which neoliberalism. I’d argue that overall 1990s neoliberalism doesn’t look so hot. They certainly passed some good laws – medical leave, pell grants – but a lot of the most marked achievements – balanced budgets, welfare reform – don’t look so hot in retrospect.

I think if you actually look at the policies Obama has passed given the constraints of the possible it’s pretty good: Universal HC (however flawed) will be a lasting achievement. Financial Reform itself probably not, but the consumer protection bureau has a good chance to be a major force for good along the lines of the EPA. DADT repeal, lack of defense for DOMA – I think these will be lasting achievements that also will help to build and sustain progressive coalitions.
I’m concerned about the way budget is going – Bowles Simpson or not – but I think this is also were left-neolibs have been most fiercely critical of Obama. MY, for example, has frequently said that he thinks it’s completely crazy that Washington is so focused on the budget with unemployment close to 10% and interest rates close to 0.
Balancing budgets in the middle of the recession is certainly not a left-neoliberal position.

Umm… at its core, “neo-liberalism” is anti-political. Politics concerns collective social conflicts and public matters. But neo-liberals want to reduce all matters to private “interests” and their manipulation by “policy”, which reduces political agents to cyphers and ostensibly eliminates conflict through imposed “consensus”. It’s a matter of privatizing the res publica, together with just about everything else. The republican state, the public sphere, the political are simply to be handed over to corporate power, of which the neo-liberals are just the assiduous hand-maidens.

Everybody seems to be “missing the point” of your discussion about social democracy. That suggests the problem is with you, not with Brad deLong or Ezra Klein.

adam@nope.com– I think the top-down reform of American social reforms relates to my point about important parts of the Democratic Party being turned off by populism. The parts trying to do top-down social reform are those parts.

Bryan and Huckabee are nowhere near alike. Bryan generally had better policy ideas than Huckabee and was genuinely left. He also was able to secure his party’s nomination.

My sense is that this discussion is an indirect expression of frustration with the lack of remedy for the decisively non-social-democratic cast of American public opinion. If the desired theory of politics is a non-fantastical account of this remedy, then there is no such theory. To face this truth is to concede that improving policy on the margin must suffice. It is no objection to a slate of progressive policy proposals that its elements are not derived from some theory explaining how these policies, once enacted, will combine to prepares the way for the progressive reeducation of American political sentiment. Because there is no such theory. Is there?

I posted a version of this on Crooked Timber, but I want to expand on my simple answer to the relatively complex question of “why the left and/or Democrats are constantly reactive and small-minded.” The simple answer is: “the Left/Dems have yet to fully come to grips with the fact that they are the party of women and minorities, and to embrace their role of representing the interests of those constituencies.” The Texiera/Judis/Schaller body of pop political science had made a pretty air-tight case that the demographics of American politics have changed, only the system has yet to adapt to that change. The ideological poles of American politics have larger shares of the total electorate, and are increasingly further apart on policies questions. They represent very different groups of people who live in different places, do different things, come from different ethnic and racial backgrounds, and essentially want little to do with each other. The South is basically irrelevant to Democratic politics and is the backbone, heart, lungs, brain (so to speak) and pancreas of the modern GOP. This political moment is unlike the previous 70-odd years, but a lot like the 150 years that preceded it, when sharp regional, racial, ethnic and religious divisions drove national politics. And to an even greater degree than in the pre-New Deal era, the right-wing group is homogenous and the left-wing group is heterodox. This type of period of stark division and conflict opens up the the right-wing play book of sewing division in the coalition of their heterodox opponents. Meanwhile, the Liberal/Dem playbook of using inclusive, universal values to argue for policies that benefit its heterodox constituencies at the expense of the conservatives’ are less resonant. The notion of a middle class lifestyle being an “American dream” doesn’t make sense when it means a house in an ex-burb near a Mega Church to 30% of the country, a decent apartment in a nice neighborhood near the subway to 40%, is so laughably out of reach to 25% to be insulting to even mention, and would be punishment worse than death for the top 5%. The notion of “equal rights” and appeals to universal human freedoms don’t make sense anymore when the central constituency of the right stakes its entire political agenda to restricting those freedoms from the poor, women and/or non-heterosexual people. All that is to say that the left and Dems have to abandon their notion that they represent this country’s “better nature” or that they will win with guilt trips and changing “hearts and minds” to be more like theirs. They need to accept the fact that they are the party of women and minorities, and defend those constituencies, rather than selling them out to protect “middle class tax cuts” and mortgage interest deductions.

Isn’t the argument “There is no neoliberal progressive politics or worldview in America; therefore, no one should try to create one–it will fail” begging the question? Compare and contrast the legacies of the broad union movements of the 1930’s vs. the neoliberal thinktank approach of 1980’s-present day. Which one “failed?” Which one succeeded? I’m still mystified by a Berkeley professor’s embarrassing response to Henry’s post yesterday. Someone help me contextualize DeLong’s silliness.

137: They need to accept the fact that they are the party of women and minorities, and defend those constituencies

Sorry, I just don’t think this works, or works to my satisfaction.

The Harvard educated corporate lawyer, woman or black, and the poor or lower middle class woman or black do have issues in common like workplace discrimination and reproductive rights, but also simply have too much in direct conflict on economic grounds. And it is pretty clear, and supported by studies, that the UMC or college educated woman or minority identifies overwhelmingly with white men of their socioeconomic status than with poor or working class minorities.

Obama doesn’t golf with the Hispanic groundskeeper, does he?

@141

You’re wrong that a college-educated black person has more in common with white middle-classers than he/she does with black working class/poor. You’re way wrong there. Maybe an extreme outlier like the Harvard-educated corporate lawyer would, but that’s such the exception to the rule as to be almost meaningless.

Well, I guess I should know better what mcmanus means by “identify with” in his above post. But in terms of “whom do I befriend, whom do I marry, whom do I live near, whom do I share a common set of assumptions about the world with, whom do I go to church with, whom do I vote with” it’s not white middle class men. I live in a predominantly black working class neighborhood and teach at working class urban high school (97% minority pop.)

What’s surprising to me is that many people do not. My rough hypothesis from observing who gets it easily and who does not, as that a major explanatory factor is exposure/lack of exposure to Marxist and social democratic thought.

Sounds plausible. I’m fascinated by this series of posts, because it’s beginning to explain a lot of past arguments between people both of whom I think of myself as roughly agreeing with, and I’m certainly weak on Marxist or any left political theory generally.

I think a big reason for the confusion/disagreement over the term “theory of politics” is that the “technocratic” tendencies Henry (rightly) criticizes aren’t limited to (or even especially characteristic of) neoliberals. Most of the content of the left blogosphere is either journalism or discussion of What Should Be Done. It’s also true that there is a lack of an overall theory, and often even of an overall narrative. Marcos Moulitsas does a pretty good job at providing a narrative–he says some things similar to Mark @137–but it’s not really a theory, and he still tends to say a lot of things along the lines of “Democrats can win by doing this…” which feels a bit like Monday morning quarterbacking–the real audience is (or should be) not elected officials, but ordinary visitors to the site, and there’s only so many times you can say “The Democrats should fight harder” before it stops being helpful. On the other hand, I can see how this is important because it gives the “troops” a shared understanding of what is happening and what they should work towards, why their time on the site and doing things advocated by the site (canvassing, calling elected officials) is a good investment. And also, it seems to be pretty clear that the main aim of the site is to build an online (and sometimes offline) community. So that implies at least part of a theory of politics. I’m curious what people who follow more/other political blogs have observed.

So I would tend to agree with Henry’s overall point–that a theory of politics is missing and needed–but I would shift the burden away from any particular subset of the left blogosphere (e.g. “neoliberals”), and to people like him (and I guess the rest of us, since this is an academic blog) to come up with such a theory, and show how it can be applied, rather than expecting Yglesias and others merely to accept our criticism that they lack a theory.

I think one problem that has to be overcome is the tendency for parts of the left blogosphere to specialize. People are excited and informed about one set of issues and tend to be less sensitive to others, and don’t understand how their respective agendas affect each other.

There are a couple corners of the left blogosphere I tend to visit that I think are particularly successful in this regard, and it’s instructive to look at the things they have in common.

One is Boing Boing, because they bring together journalism, criticism, and a sense of fun and possibility. They don’t try to play up a constant sense of crisis, they don’t traffic in easy answers, but they also aren’t afraid to make very scathing criticisms when those are due. And they are actively dealing with the social dimensions of media and technology.

The other is Mondoweiss, along with other neocon-watchers like Lobelog, the former especially raising extremely important and difficult questions about why so much of the left in the US has remained silent about Palestinian suffering, and what the implications for that are in the larger context of American politics WRT wars and the security state. Like Boing Boing, Mondoweiss doesn’t try to convey a constant sense of crisis, and the tone is often optimistic, at least with regard to the long-term trend in the conversation about Israel in the US. This is really remarkable given that 1) what they cover includes an apartheid system and war crimes, with the growing possibility of eventual mass-deportation of Palestinians (what with the continuing downward spiral of Israeli politics) and 2) they manage to be (conditionally) optimistic without ever becoming overly self-congratulatory or condescending.

Henry at 147

Henry, freedom is not always exit, having exit options from expensive barbers; it is also voice or institutional voice through the formation of groups. The problem is not that your opponents don’t know Marxist or social democratic thought; it’s that everyone has forgotten about Hirschman.

Those who believe that Black and female corporate lawyers are ideologically identical to White, male corporate lawyers are almost certainly academics who have never actually worked at any kind of “corporate” job in their lives. There is nothing that will disabuse a person more quickly of the thought that the private sector is the be all end all than the opportunity to observe it closely at the level where strategy is charted and decisions are made, particularly when there are layoffs happening. Unless, of course, you’re one of the lucky few who has “executive presence” and enjoys “good relations with key stakeholders” at the firm. Sincerely, a corporate lawyer.

155
I probably should have asked for clarification on “identify with” before I made my point. The phrase could mean anything. But as I interpret it, it means what I said above, ““whom do I befriend, whom do I marry, whom do I live near, whom do I share a common set of assumptions about the world with, whom do I go to church with, whom do I vote with.” I just thought his flippant example of the corporate lawyer and Obama on one end and the Hispanic groundskeeper on the other as avatars of anything was kind of meaningless.

I have no problem accepting the argument that the black superrich have an easier time identifying with the white superrich than they do with the black working class.

I don’t see how scott @154 could be improved on.

What’s even more befuddling is that technocrats at the more leftward margin of the technocratic center (Krugman, DeLong, et al) are totally ignored frankly at the national level and thrown over for the extreme rightward margin of the technocratic center (Third Way). You’d think they would probably ask themselves: why are my opinions so utterly marginalized in these discussions instead of saying “Shut up peons!”?

shah8. You’re a mensch.

And an emotionally crippled name dropper.

My point wasn’t that Henry or anyone didn’t need to have content. I’m saying that point is less interesting than what started this whole discussion, which was DeLong’s weird broadsides against Henry’s earlier post.

I’m hardly inimical to the best ideas of economists, philosophers, political scientists, technocrats. In fact, I feel their place is probably paramount in most discussions of policy. Just not to the exclusion of democratic will.

Fair enough. Please edit post. It is bad taste.

Henry – I’m a big boy, I can take some snide ;-) – my abbreviated version of what you said wasn’t entirely serious either – though as a general sentiment I still think that “people who don’t understand my point just don’t seem to have read the right literature” is an unfortunate rhetorical turn.

More generally, I think a better way to start this thready might have been to think about what the (implicit) theory of politics of neoliberalism is. I think there are several candidates:
1. The Varieties of Capitalism version – in many ways the Hall/Soskice story of the welfare state, in which enlightened business supports the welfare state through cross-class coalitions with unions fits the neoliberal mode of politics. And the angry attacks of Streeck and Korpi against that version of VoC can be understood as (different forms of) social democratic critiques of that mode.

2. The Ezra Klein version (and yes, I think Ezra is a neoliberal): Voters vote mainly along economic lines –> Politicians wanting to maximize votes should focus on passing the best possible economic policies –> Coming up with the best policy is important.

3. The power of ideas story: One reason the conservative movement has been so successful is that it has been able to develop a set of policy measures driven by an appealing ideological story. The left needs to re-win the battle of ideas in the public arena and lefty-policy blogs are one of the ways that can happen.

Probably not an exhaustive list – I’d argue most neolibs have a theory of politics that is made up of these (and probably some other) tools. I think the claim that they just don’t understand politics is needlessly inflammatory and likely empirically wrong – the DLC, for example, very likely did think about a longterm vision for a Democratic/neoliberal project. I think it’s much more helpful to think and argue about where and how their theory of politics is wrong and has negative results – thus my continued insistence on specifics – which don’t have to be about MY.

I should have anticipated that this would map onto some blogreaders’ unhappiness with people like Matt and Ezra, who they perceive as sellouts.
I’d just like to make that point that I don’t criticize Ygleasias for being a “sell-out” but rather because his preferred policies haven’t worked and that his justification(s) for them rely the market fundamentalism that is such a key component of the disaster of neoliberalism.

AndrewW, in the nonabusive Delong version, the sentiment about collective action is pervasive in many fields. I suspect that most dense (if not easy to understand) version would be from game theory.

It boils down to people having individual wishes and individual saliences attached to those wishes joining in an activity and leaving as they wish. A collective is too much the quantum cloud to have coherent aims, and any *real* policy–ie something that deals with scarce resources or something that impact someone’s standing in society will generate motivated subgroups for and against for said policy. The applies to all the turtles all the way down the column of significance.

Again, this is a game theory thing, about a collective of strangers with limited history with each and without perfect knowledge. If you’re a bunch of farmers discussing how to fund and build irrigation to the area’s fields, “collective will” in this instance is easy. However, politics in the here and now (as H L Mencken might agree) involves a great number of people and complex policy environment that your average individual has no familiarity with and defaults to personal heuristics–such as: The state has a budget that it has to adhere to, just like me. In the worst case, we have the referendum system out on the West Coast that makes for eventual severe crisis, because such populist mechanisms crush the ability to make good policy.

In an honest discussion about reconnecting people to politics and policies, we’d be talking more about mechanisms in which technocratic policy makers are detached from public conversation, and how the government guides conversation and public action away from technocratic priorities. For instance, if the average joe knew about and understood about what people mean with “inflation targeting”, I think most people would be very enthusiastic about that idea. It’s one reason why I was really pissed off with giving Doug Henley’s column so much credibility–his comments about who wanted loose money and why in the 19th century was so wrong as to be mendacious. If your average farmer from 1890 had inflation targeting explained to him, he would nod vigorously, Yeah! That’s Silver without it being Silver! There are all sorts of things, that the better generalist bloggers talk about, explain to the masses, and in general, doing good work in building the potential for a better political regime. A culture that saturated in good information, who willfully selects good information, can attach value judgments onto different policy choices in a way that evades controls and supercedes some random guru’s notion of what is good. With something like that, it only takes a bit of democratic tinkering to really rev up popular and good policies.

“And the angry attacks of Streeck and Korpi against that version of VoC can be understood as (different forms of) social democratic critiques of that mode.”

Didnt Streeck play a very unfortunate personal role within the Bündnis für Arbeit? That might explain later angry attacks much better than any critism of neoliberalism from a social democratic perspective.

I am late to comment but I will give it a shot anyway.

“A proposed policy measure that seems desirable in principle (because e.g. it is cheaper than another alternative) may not be so desirable if it has malign political consequences”

I agree, and your example of the financial deregulation is appropriate.

Indeed, “there are often tradeoffs between policy benefits and political sustainability.”

But if the neo-liberals tend to disregard political sustainability, it seems to me that others on the left tend to downplay policy benefits (or damages) too. For example, here on CT I usually read mostly a positive attitude toward unions and barely a mention that in some cases unions may support quite inefficient policies.* Obviously, this is OT with respect to your critique of neo-liberalism. But I am just making a note that, moving forward, if on the left the pendulum will swing more toward unions’ supporters and away from neo-liberals, the trade-off that you enunciate will remain and should be kept in mind.

*This is my impression from reading the blog’s posts, and their comments from time to time. I did a quick search of “unions” on the site and I found mainly positive posts but I am happy to be pointed to some posts that do not align with my impression.

@180, actually they (Yglesias, at least) do pay lip service to income distribution. In an extremely patronizing and deceptive manner, like this: ‘let markets do their magic, and then “we” will tax the rich and give to the poor’.

The question isn’t what policy solutions will work best, but why are the best policy solutions being triangulated out–why does Larry Summers acquiesce to austerity (or remain silent) while in office but speak up stimulus when he leaves, for example? If depression-creating cuts to entitlement programs will continue to transfer costs from the government to the taxpayer why are some technocrats not arguing more forcefully against them (and some arguing for them) or looking for ways to better educate on other policy prescriptions? I have absolutely no reason to believe that much of the current policy decisions made at the national level aren’t being impacted by collective action, so what gives conservative collective action clarity but liberal action (collective or otherwise) such muddiness? It’s not simply a question of money or power (though it is that as well). Why does collective action and policy/consensus formation have to be mutually exclusive? Why not just better heuristics?

Thanks, shah8, for the response.

Bruce Wilder, who gets what is politics, or at least the intersection of politics and economics. Agreed on the crucial pedagogy aspect. Bad teaching is a crucial aspect of technocratic rule, the same way churchmen weren’t actually okay with people learning to read the bible on their own. Again, this is why we should be intensely anti-idiocy and pro-knowing-what-you’re-talking-about. Bad teaching, with its indulgence of personal egos, plenty of terminal argumentation, and shoving bad, uncomfortable things to abstractions.

In the world where we’re a strong, knowledgeable force in the world, we’d readily be able to take apart the Hernando De Sotos of the world, speaking up with the central truth that political organizations *prevent* poor people from being able to exercise land rights, and that merely offering legitimizations of legal rights to whatever improvements simply makes it easier for kulak-types and actual rich people to predate on poor people with assets. Why would we schmaht people say that? Because we’re adept in the world of data, and we can do our own research and see…OMG! Mexico had the exact same idea and tried it! And it was a disaster for everyone but the schemers!

Why would anyone who’s a hard-working leftist/progressive want to associate with people who wants fast results and easy politics? Why would they want to associate with people who think that explaining to someone about what’s in their best interest, in the context of the huge social noise that current entrench interests puts out, is a short term project? Nobody here is a hero-teacher type that pulls project kids into the middle-class by sheer will and creativity. Making things better is a drip by drip process.

Obama might not be much of a liberal, but he’s a *better* liberal than most of you commentators. Why be outworked at *pushing* liberal outcomes than some conservative dude? Take a look at Lula, or Chavez–sellouts and authoritarians–they worked relatively hard to bring about liberal outcomes, the main thing being organizing and teaching. Over and over and over again. Teaching profitable ways to be less selfish and cruel. Not airy theories of politics.

Henry – yeah, I don’t know of anything, either. Let me know if you find something, else this might be an interesting project.
As for Streeck – I don’t know if he counts as a lefty anymore (some of his policies views probably don’t), but I think his insistence on the embeddedness of markets is very much social democratic, especially if you follow Sheri Bermans argument that social democracy is essentially the Polany-esque middle road between Marxism and market radicalism.

In functionalist [read: VoC] “backward induction” of this
sort, technocratic social engineering replaces social conflict and political mobilization
as the driving force behind social progress, and capital accumulation, rather than hav-
ing to be made compatible with the public interest by political regulation, is identified
with it. In the end, a functionalist defense of the welfare state may do nothing more than deliver legitimacy for a monistic, economistic concept of a good society, and with it for the rationalization of social life in the service of economic efficiency.

http://www.mpifg.de/pu/workpap/wp08-3.pdf (page 13)

hix: I think his disdain for VoC is really more deeply rooted in his intellectual emphasis on the sociological classics – Durkheim, Weber, Simmel, Polanyi especially – and their relevance for political economy. I think he’s quite bitter about his experience with the Schroeder government, but I think that takes the form of the “everything is going to hell” attitude he takes in his Re-Forming Capitalism book. That’s just an impression, of course.

Catsorp @ 188

The error as I see it, and I realize that those more committed to Marxism here won’t agree, is the left neo-liberals focus too much on redistributing income in an efficient mannter and not enough on changing the institutions and entrenching their like-minded allies in the “the ruling portion of the community” to make and sustain those changes.

I’m a very poor Marxist, not at all familiar with his writing and not very familiar with his theory. I’d agree that your proposal (if it was workable) would make the neoliberal project less-flawed.

However, if you shift terms from income to influence or power, it’s difficult to see how your proposed solution can be made workable, viz. though the lower class lacks in income, it also lacks in influence. Entrenching neoliberal allies to exercise power on behalf of the lower class without also redistributing power/influence (I’m sure a proper Marxist could tell me which term to prefer here) to the lower class seems like a doomed project.

The error as I see it, and I realize that those more committed to Marxism here won’t agree, is the left neo-liberals focus too much on redistributing income in an efficient mannter and not enough on changing the institutions and entrenching their like-minded allies in the “the ruling portion of the community” to make and sustain those changes.

That’s just a lot of waffling. Look: people like Matt support a tax-and-redistribute regime because it is the most efficient. Efficiency and productivity matters. Efficiency and productivity are the chief determinant of human living standards.

What the left non-neoliberals (like you) are saying with this stuff is that “hey, the politics are important too! If we don’t get the politics right we won’t get the whole truckload of redistribution we want!” But Matt and others (like me) are saying “look, we might or might not get a certain distribution, but in the grand scheme of things it is better than ruining the economics by coming up with politically nice but economically suboptimal solutions, with economic optimality defined as maximum (social) efficiency and productivity. Hey, that’s what the Soviet Union/Cuba/postwar-Britain did, although not anywhere to the same degree! They spent all their days sitting around and figuring out the politics, and came up with shitty economics. In the end, both politics and economics ended up being shitty. In the long term, we get nothing out of deciding on economically suboptimal states just because they are more politically convenient; the material world, after all, forms the empirical constraints within which politics must operate.”

And that’s basically the thing here. Leftists don’t really believe that there are inter-temporal trade-offs, or if they do (that’s the more intelligent ones), believe that a bit of long-term economic welfare sacrifice is OK as long as the politics (i.e. egalitarianism) is better. Sure, then. But people like Matt (and me) do believe that there are serious trade-offs, and that we are better off taking Kaldor-Hicks improvements and generally pushing our economy from a Kaldor-Hicks to a Pareto situation than sacrificing serious parts of it to get more preferrable political outcomes in the present day. Leftists say, no, we want Pareto now, even if that means we don’t actually get Pareto or even Kaldor-Hicks.

Tied up with this is the literally retarded tendency of certain left-wingers to attribute the post-war economic boom in the U.S. to more egalitarian economic policy. (Yes, by all means let’s completely ignore the massively pent-up demand and forced savings during WWII and the economic prostration of America’s economic competitors when analyzing post-war economic performance.)

So it’s a pretty toxic mix, with leftists often believing that “hey, what have you got against having more of both apples and oranges? We got more economic growth and more egalitarianism when unions were actually powerful in America!” And Matt saying “well, a) this isn’t actually as real as you think, and b) to be honest, I don’t think it works the way you think it does.”

As a Liberal (capital L) of the Gladstone and Laurier persuasion, I am firmly with Matt. Let’s just do calculus here: integrate the sum of human welfare across time, and then see if non-Kaldor-Hicks but politically preferable outcomes (let’s just take the cozy Detroit automaker-autoworker postwar deal) are for real, better. And once you do the math, it doesn’t seem like it is, because in the long run, human welfare isn’t determined by politics or egalitarianism or income distribution or what have you, it’s determined by productivity and innovation. Human welfare, in the long term, is indifferent to present-day egalitarian goals.

Myles: If I’m reading you right, the only goal should be to make the pie higher, is that correct? If you believe that efficiency is all that matters, then you and I are simply not on the same side.

Distribution of power matters. If I’m powerless then it’s my house that gets bulldozed when Kaldor & Hicks need to build a highway. If I have power, then maybe it doesn’t (or at least I can get compensation).

Daily quota exceeded.

Daily quota exceeded yet again. Repeated breaches will result in heavier penalties.

Myles: “. . . people like Matt support a tax-and-redistribute regime because it is the most efficient. Efficiency and productivity matters. Efficiency and productivity are the chief determinant of human living standards.”

People like Matt don’t know enough about economics to distinguish technical efficiency from allocative efficiency or know what policies support productivity. Their doctrine isn’t even a real ideology; it is just a cover story. They’re sure deregulation is great stuff, even if airline pilots end up paid less than bus drivers, and crash their planes, when they fall asleep from overwork. They’re sure financial deregulation is wonderful, even when local community banks and thrifts are replaced across the neighborhood with payday lenders charging 400% interest. Housing bubble? Ah, the madness of crowds, eh? (Surely, you don’t mean to suggest that the deterioration of underwriting was anything, but an honest error by bank executives, who failed to appreciate the limits of their fancy models? — black swans and all that!)

What’s the intertemporal tradeoff in the U.S. financialization making a dustbowl out of midwest manufacturing? What’s the intertemporal tradeoff in the U.S. rate of medical bankruptcy? What’s the intertemporal tradeoff in saddling college and graduate students with tens of thousands of dollars of debt, which, by law, can not be discharged in bankruptcy? Is debt peonage pareto efficient?

Sebastian H: “Cuba was well on its way to being one of the best Latin American countries—Communism sidetracked that and destroyed it.”

I’ve read Brad DeLong pushing that line. Because a kleptocratic dictator outsourcing the national economy to the Sicilian Mafia is such a brilliant development strategy that it was bound to succeed after just a few more years. The Batista literacy program was still in its development phase, but it had great promise, and the price of sugar and tobacco was bound to rise, in the best of all possible worlds.

Yeah, weird. Cuba consistently beats Jamaica and Dominican Republic (not to mention Haiti) for all the usual basic indicators: life expectancy, infant mortality, literacy rate, etc. How exactly do you propose integrating that sum of human welfare?

I might be okay with my standard of living dropping if it meant other exceedingly poor parts of the world could get in the boat to enjoy the rising of the tide. But that’s not what’s happening at all in this. Whatever productivity might be increasing, its benefits aren’t accruing to anyone but the ultra-rich.

Everything I have ever read about modern China suggests that this is not true.

roac: Everything I have ever read about modern China suggests that this is not true.

Read this:
http://www.dailytech.com/Foxconn+Installs+AntiSuicide+Nets+at+Its+Facilities/article18877.htm

For those still following this thread: Mark Thoma picked up a post by Lane Kenworthy, which has now been picked up on nakedcapitalism (links for 21/7). Henry’s comment on Kenworthy’s post suggests he is in agreement with its conclusions, which are basically that given the absence of a strong labor movement in the U.S. (and not only), the best policies that can be expected most times are incremental ones – the politics of what is possible, not what is ideal.

Obviously a reframing of older (progressive, union-based) arguments that supported the Democratic Party in the U.S. throughout part of the 20th century is needed. One of the commenters suggested that the Dems need to acknowledge that they are essentially the party of “women and minorities”. As initially disheartening as it sounds, there may be something in this, given that (white) women and minorities (men and women) tend to be more economically disadvantaged and consequently, politically disempowered. Perhaps Democrats should rebrand themselves as the party of the economically disadvantaged (the poor) and politically disempowered – gosh, I thought that’s what they were through much of the party’s history.

If one sides with the poor and powerless, then there tend to be policies one supports; it’s a fairly consistent list, at least for an old-style liberal (progressive taxation, redistribution programs of the monies captured to public goods like health, education, infrastructure, well-being). A 21st c. new-style old-style liberal will also tend to hold certain views on the commons, e.g. on climate change, on sustainability of natural resources, and on who should bear the cost for their exploitation (e.g. for the consequences of fracking, mountain top removal, nuclear meltdowns, etc.).

Globalized financialized capitalism as it operates today has no politics or national allegiances whatsoever. Its goal, which remains the same as it always was (the accumulation of wealth), is fully decoupled from the liberal humanism from which it emerged. One can’t expect capitalism to watch over itself, given its absence of political/national loyalties. An old-style liberal will likely feel that global capitalism needs a great deal of watching/regulation/”re-adjusting”. On the basis of the comment thread, I imagine neoliberals would tend to believe that it required some but not too much watching. IMHO, not too much watching is proving harmful to large segments of the U.S. (and world) population.

@206
Improvements in living standards of those in the East were mutually exclusive of the success of GM? I’ve not read literature to that effect. Do you have any recommendations? (a genuine, non-flippant request–I’ve never read a crystallization of that argument, only hints here and there).

“Yes I mean you just have to compare Cuba with all the countries which surround it. Like Jamaica, the Dominican Republic and Haiti. Shining examples of economic success in every respect.”

Cuba was already well above Jamaica, the Dominican Republic and Haiti. You should be comparing it to its 1950s peers–for example Mexico and Chile. Both are actually interesting to compare it to, because neither had smooth rides (and Mexico’s US induced drug lord problems are a recent disaster).

dbk: Globalized financialized capitalism as it operates today has no politics . . .

! It seems to me that the problem in the U.S. is that globalized financialized capitalism has all the politics, which remains.

Unions, nationalism, the professions, local business: none has significant representation in running the Federal government. The Democratic Party has lost its union base, as de-regulation of transportation and communication and globalization/financialization has wiped out unionized business. But, the same processes wiped out the Main Street business base of the Republican Party, which gave us Bob Dole and Bob Michel, back in the day.

@213:

http://www.npr.org/2011/07/21/138537515/how-alec-shapes-state-politics-behind-the-scenes

@215

Yeah I just heard that and thought of this convo. Republicans seem to have a theory of politics.

Bruce, I agree with you in #204 except in your labeling of this as pragmatic.
It isn’t pragmatic. Pragmatism has a firm sense of wholes in which we operate. William James’ opposition to the Philippines war was, I think, an example of pragmatic thinking – that is, thinking about trends, contexts, and the way that interests develop institutionally. Dewey, of course, went on about this at great length.

I can’t reconcile the idea that you have to be “pragmatic” and compromise with “political reality”, and at the same time put your faith in technocratic solutions. In fact, as one has to compromise with ‘political reality”, you have already admitted that your technocratic solutions will be full of improvisation and interest tending from the very beginning. So it strikes me that the neo-liberals have things backwards: pragmatically, you need to create ‘political reality” in order to even have a ghost of a chance of creating ‘solutions’. And, pragmatically, you understand that solutions are always being revised. One hundred fifty years ago, the solution to disease in urban areas was for the state to use its leverage and put in clean water and sewage facilities. This worked well all across the world, from Merida, Yucatan, to New York City. And now in certain third world areas of the U.S. – West Virginia, for instance – it has fallen apart. See http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/13/us/13water.html?pagewanted=all. The question is: why is this happening in the richest country in the world? And this has to bring us back to wealth, cultural values, the media, etc. – the booming buzzing confusion in which all solutions are always going to be interest tending and temporary.
Pragmatically, the old solutions become unviable not because the science of nutrition and disease have changed, but because the social context of power has changed. This is one of the reasons a left inclined liberal finds the neo-liberals so tiresome – by refusing to acknowledge the greater social context and the determinants of power, but instead concentrating on an atomistic view of a world of problems and ‘nudges”, they find continually that their solutions blow up in their face – and their tendency is then to blame the ‘people’ for whom they have convinced themselves that they have been working.
This isn’t pragmatism.

How is it pointless? It’s very much relevant to Myles’ point about integrating the sum. Here’s a quote by John F Kennedy (of all people): “there is no country in the world including any and all the countries under colonial domination, where economic colonization, humiliation and exploitation were worse than in Cuba, in part owing to my country’s policies during the Batista regime.” So, at least that one liberal didn’t believe that it was, in a very important sense, “already well above Jamaica, the Dominican Republic and Haiti”.

I don’t really think labor is crucial to getting large gains. All I’ve ever read about historical social change is that it’s a generally elite driven aspect. It takes resources to bring change. A lot of it.

*Large* social change is driven by warfare and tense, multipolar geopolitics that forces elites to educate and bargain with their lessers, usually with privileges and civil rights.

In part, I owe my freedom to Uncle Joe. Not that he gave damn.

“So, at least that one liberal didn’t believe that it was, in a very important sense, “already well above Jamaica, the Dominican Republic and Haiti”.”

Well as an exercise in taking political rhetoric and pretending it was empirical fact, that’s freaking brilliant. JFK was trying to cover his noticeably exposed ass over the Bay of Pigs and come up with a reason to retreat from the position that Castro should be overthrown after JFK failed at such attempts.

The idea that Cuba wasn’t well above Jamaica, the Dominican Repbulic and Haiti, in the 1950s is pretty difficult to defend. If YOU would like to defend it, instead of pretending that JFK did, have at it. But of course you won’t, because frankly you’d look ridiculous. As such, comparing them to Cuba now, is similarly ridiculous.

If you compare Cuba to its actual peers, it doesn’t come out great, taking it from “one of the better Latin American countries” to “better than Haiti, the Dominican Repbulic and Jamaica” isn’t thrilling. But its actual peers have had some serious bumps in the road too (though still doing better than Cuba).

The countries that are doing better than Cuba relative to 1950 have had resource booms that requires a great deal of fixed investment and educated personnel.

Bruce Wilder, deliberately confusing the likes of Richard Cobden with Otto von Bismark is not helpful.

I have no position on what these numbers mean, but here the 1955 GDP/cap for the five countries mentioned (from Madison’s historical GDP data – the Penn tables don’t have Cuba until 1970) in 1990 dollars.
Chile: 3975
Cuba: 2005
Dom Rep: 1183
Jamaica: 2020
Mexico: 2740

My last word on Cuba.

I’m willing to be corrected, but as far as I can tell Cuba, Mexico and the Dominican Republic all had similar GDP per capita’s in 1950 (around $2,000 in 2005 dollars). Chile was about twice as wealthy per capita at the time.

@213
“! It seems to me that the problem in the U.S. is that globalized financialized capitalism has all the politics, which remains.”

Hmm. I can see your point, but have difficulty associating the purchase of politics (politicians, legislators, and the judiciary) with nation-state goals as traditionally conceived. Perhaps allegiance to the goals of financialized capitalism is a sui generis form of politics (core belief: Kapital ueber Alles) which must be imposed at local, regional (state), and national levels to achieve its ultimately global objectives.

Look, the neo-liberal bottom line is pretty simple: a) allow markets to work as effeciently as possible and then b) transfer income through the tax code and provision of public goods. The problem: we handle a) pretty well but somehow never manage to get to b). The reason: conservatives are delighted to join neo-liberals in pushing a) but draw the line at b). In many ways, neo-liberals are the “useful idiots” of the conservative ascendency.

I should clarify, the first paragraph of that comment should have been in quotation marks.

Look, the neo-liberal bottom line is pretty simple: a) allow markets to work as effeciently as possible and then b) transfer income through the tax code and provision of public goods. The problem: we handle a) pretty well but somehow never manage to get to b).

Huh? It seems like provision of public goods both direct (cash and specific services) and indirect (regulation) has increased quite dramatically in the last generation. (Medicaid and Medicare for the first category (per the CMS, they go from 35% to 50% of health care expenditures, 3% to 6% of GDP) , and environmental regulations and disability access regulations for the second, are some of the most widespread and dramatic examples.)

I think Henry has an interesting and persuasive general thesis, but I’d like to see it applied to a specific case.

The general thesis as I understand it is:

(1) Certain policies cause the accretion/loss of political power for different interest groups;
(2) After a certain point, the difference in power among interest groups that results from the process described in (1) will allow the more powerful groups to effect policies opposed by neoliberals;
(3) To prevent (2), neoliberals must account for the effects of their preferred policies on the political power of various interest groups;
(4) To the extent neoliberals do not perform (3), they lack a good theory of politics and suffer from a narrowed view of policy.

That’s a strong argument from an analytic perspective. Are there good empirical cases where it can be applied? What are those cases?

“The rise of neoliberalism is actually concurrent with the discovery that discount rates in a lot of things are lower than we traditionally thought, and thus that a great deal of intertemporal trade-offs don’t make sense anymore.”

Myles! He so funny.

Umm… B.W., what I’ve found remarkably lacking from this thread and related discussions is the failure to recognize that “financialization” and “globalization” waltz together, hand-in-hand. That means that corporate power, having become increasingly “extra-territorial”, has correspondingly weakened the regulatory powers of (national) government(s). And then perversely colonized them. The diminishment of public-political power is almost an after-thought or epiphenomenon to the gradual/emergent restructurings of corporate power that “neo-liberalism” both abets and articulates. (I think the break-down of Bretton Woods is the place to start the retrospective discussion here). So it’s not just a matter of the decay or entropy of institutional orders, but rather of their deliberate re-organization. And the deliberate neglect of that institutional dimension,- (“shock therapy” in Russia!),- is not just a sin of omission, but also a sin of commission. It’s part of how “neo-liberalism” works: a deliberate oversight.

“Matt took econ with Greg Mankiw (I think)…”

Greg Mankiw and Martin Feldstein are propagandists , not teachers. Matt Y. does not understand economics.

@ 246:

“What policies desired by neoliberals have been made politically imposssible by the effects of previous policies desired by neoliberals?”

Well, how about the pursuit of “free trade” pacts, which led to further waves of de-industrialization, burgeoning CA deficits, stagnant incomes for the broad working class, and their entrapment in mounting debt loads, resulting in crisis, followed by demands for “fiscal consolidation” and still further privatization of public assets and functions. Is that not “empirical” enough for you?

But then the whole premise of these threads is slightly off. Neo-liberals are not on the left or “progressives”. They’re center-right. Or as one prominent exponent put it, rather comically, “Dewey-Eisenhower-Rockefeller social democrats”.

No, *this* is what bugs me about threads like this.

Al Gore is a neoliberal. Paul Krugman is originally from the right of Obama. Carbon taxes and carbon credits, like the original Clinton BTU plan is classic neoliberalism. The deregulation efforts by the Carter Admin are neoliberal plans.

Then we have the studied, casual, and maybe deliberate confusion of technocratic governance with liberal/neoliberal political orientation. However, doing that is not illuminative of anything and elides serious critical analysis of liberal technocrats such as the elder Galbraith or Patrick Moynihan.

@245: ““financialization” and “globalization” waltz together, hand-in-hand. That means that corporate power, having become increasingly “extra-territorial”, has correspondingly weakened the regulatory powers”

I am not a fan of making the concept of “corporate power” a Greek God riding on a deus-ex-machina of extra-territoriality to weaken the regulatory state, but I guess I know you well enough to excuse that phrasing as a stylistic error. The specific mechanisms by which supra-national bodies of technocrats take over regulation, and weaken democratic government are worth exposing. And, the fact that many of those technocrats are card-carrying neo-liberals is not, I think, an accident.
Henry’s hypothesis is that neo-liberals lack a theory of politics.
My thesis would be that neo-liberals lack a theory of economic institutions.
I thought the exchange with DeLong in the previous thread may have been illuminating, when DeLong seemed to reject the idea of balancing conflict and power, as “not how things work”. The neo-liberals do seem to have some very weak idea of institutions, often expressed in solemn prescriptions (see, e.g., the “Washington Consensus”) that turn out to have operational expressions that allow the powerful to exploit the powerless.
Certainly, what I observe in the American economy is an evolution away from institutions, which try to organize balanced conflict and process it rationally (collective bargaining over wages and working conditions; class-action lawsuits; utility regulation by public commission), toward an authoritarian arrangement (bankruptcy cannot touch a student load or cram-down a first mortgage on a primary residence [but cramdown on a second home, a-ok — what does that tell you?]. Is there an implicit bias in neo-liberalism, which favors this kind of one-sideness? I know the neo-liberals on “free trade” never want labor protections, at home or, especially, abroad. Brad DeLong is pro-labor, when he’s talking about Herbert Hoover, but when it is union leaders being murdered in Columbia, he doesn’t see why such issues should stand in the way of even the de minimus gains of a free-trade agreement with Columbia.
“Bretton Woods II”, the Basel Accords on banking regulation, the “design” of the Euro are all pertinant examples, along with the experience of the housing bubble across the global, and the global financial crisis, which ought to let us question the basic competence of the neo-liberal technocrats. The collapse of the original Bretton Woods got us Mundell-Fleming; feel the insight!

Left Neoliberal: dfn: Someone who proves that talk is cheap.

I just wanted to say that Bruce Wilder’s comments are very illuminating and make the whole thread worthwhile.

Some of the students I had at Harvard have described Mankiw’s course to me during private conversations as “massive conservative propaganda.” One of them told me that he thought that Mankiw manages to “indoctrinate a whole generation.” In 2003, a protest against a similar course then proposed by professor Marty Feldstein, an ex-adviser to President Reagan, led to the creation of an alternative intro economics course, taught by radical economist Steve Marglin. But while Mankiw’s course gives the required credits to students, Marglin’s does not. As a result, Mankiw has around 800 students, and Marglin 100. Not to mention the more than 100,000 students around the globe who learn from Mankiw’s textbook.

I’ve tended to say that “neo” in both neo-liberal and neo-conservative could be accurately replaced by “technocratic.”

Why do Marxists oppose technocratic Keynesianism?

I thought the answer was obvious: since Keynesianism frames our understanding of convulsive downturns in a such a way that people are led to believe that the state action can remedy them, it discourages workers from taking advantage of a moment objectively propitious for revolutionary decisions, a moment that will pass only to return at some uncertain time.

Bourgeois intellectuals, anxious about huge losses to their portfolio,
desperately want the economy fixed as measured in the recovery of their
portfolios and society politically stabilized so that their lifestyles
remain secure.

In a downturn the causes of which they don’t really understand, they clutch
at straws, claiming that the stabilization of the price level will set
things straight or that a moderate inflation target will get us rolling
again or that fiscal policy can pump prime the economy. So desperate are
they for a lasting recovery of their portfolios and the political
de-activation of the population, they remain blind to how their proposals
could possibly work: an inflation target for example could export
unemployment via a devaluation of the home currency and radically reduce
real wages all-around for a small boost in the employment to population
ratio.

They promise that once capitalism is stabilized, the workers (or at least
their grandchildren) will enjoy a paradise of creative leisure time in a
generation or two so that there is no reason for radical politics today.

Some on the left think that redistribution of income would increase spending
and raise aggregate demand, and that redistribution is not only compatible
with the capitalist system but also a fillip to profit making in absolute
terms over the long term. They too believe that capitalism can be
stabilized.

When their ideas are rejected by financial and business leaders, and when
it’s not clear that the policies would work in any way and are thus not
adopted, the Keynesians speak of the inertial weight of zombie ideas and
fall into pessimism and outrage.

That’s how a Marxist would see it; but there is of course no more alienated
position from which to see society today. There are no real alternatives to
Keynesian policies today except deflationary, social Darwinist ones; the
working class is not revolutionary as Quiggin rightly points out; intellectuals are not Marxists. A Marxist understanding has no potential political efficacy today.

Political attention today falls on the so-called independent voters, middle
class voters who have no sense of social responsibility and feel that they
stand more to gain in tax relief by cuts to Medicaire and Social security
than they would themselves benefit from those programs being fully funded.

The Democrats kow-tow to these mostly white, disproportionately male swing
voters.

@258 “vague”

I think this whole thread, and the previous one has struggled with the problem of making the thesis concrete, of finding a definitive text to interpret in common, so to speak, but I don’t think “neo-liberal”, itself is a particularly vague term. People immediately, and in my opinion correctly, identified representative “neo-liberal” voices, such as Matthew Yglesias and Brad DeLong, who, not incidentally, themselves accept the designation. (And, as Cranky observed, it is not like many aware liberals or progressives would regard “neo-liberal” as a badge of honor, at this late date; no one is falsely claiming to be “neo-liberal” because the neo-liberals have so much to be proud of.)
Would neo-liberals have wanted powerful labor unions involved in the shaping of financial regulation, either in the 1999 reforms, or more recently? Seems doubtful to me.
My own view is that the institutions of the “New Deal/WWII liberal-international order” put into place by FDR in the 1930s and 1940s were centrally concerned with altering income distribution, between rich and poor, Capital and Labor, powerful elites and the mass middle-class. And, they succeeded (because of WWII). The effect was an enormous shift in income distribution in the 1940s, called by the economists, the Great Compression.
As I said earlier, the neo-liberals emerged to rationalize feeding off the entropy of the New Deal order, in the corruption of its old age.
The emerging “neo-liberalism” of Matthew Yglesias or Ezra Klein, which gets so many hereabouts exercised, reduces not to deep personal philosophical conviction, but to responding to the demands of careerism. They are doing what they have to do, to make their way as professional opinion journalists.
A politics centered on changing income distribution to favor the mass of wage-earners is not going to be the politics of priestly mandarins and careerists, not, at least, until it is a good deal more advanced. Right now, such a sentiment comes close to the revolutionary: at the very least, you have to be willing to recognize that the existing order and structure cannot be preserved and reformed at the same time. It is not that neo-liberalism has no “theory of politics”, it is that the neo-liberals, as shah8 said, do not need a theory of politics, because they believe the existing order can and should be preserved. The neo-liberal idea is that the existing structure and order can be preserved, (and, then, usefully reformed by clever neo-liberal policy entrepreneurs, pundits and technocrats, of course).

Yes I remember the libertarian, gold bug economist Mark Skousen jumping for joy that the paradox of thrift was not presented in the main textbook (Mankiw’s) to replace Samuelson’s.