David Hume’s Birthday

In all my years in graduate school, the biggest d-bag professor I ever encountered had written his dissertation in the Committee on Social Thought at Univ of Chicago on David Hume.

I’ve been angry at Hume for a long time about that. But seeing as it’s a milestone birthday, I’d like to let it go now.

So, to David Hume, apologies. To the guy mentioned in paragraph 1, GFY.

As Hume wrote, “Where a passion is neither founded on false suppositions, nor chuses means insufficient for the end, the understanding can neither justify nor condemn it. ‘Tis not contrary to reason to prefer the destruction of the whole world to the scratching of my finger.”

A major mystery to me is how anyone could imagine that someone whose best buddy was Denis Diderot, and wrote the following (or, for that matter, what Cosima Shalizi quotes) could be called a conservative, or might even share any sort of an agenda with conservatives.

[also apropos, there is also a nice passage in Peter Gay’s book on the enlightenment, where he quotes Johnson and Boswell – a couple of true conservatives – discussing Hume and clearly finding him terrifying – I have always liked this passage – I think a good philosopher should be able to scare the bejeezus out of educated people simply by thinking]

Anyway, as you all no-doubt know, it goes:

In every system of morality, which I have hitherto met with, I have always remarked, that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary ways of reasoning, and establishes the being of a God, or makes observations concerning human affairs; when all of a sudden I am surprised to find, that instead of the usual copulations of propositions, is, and is not, I meet with no proposition that is not connected with an ought, or an ought not. This change is imperceptible; but is however, of the last consequence. For as this ought, or ought not, expresses some new relation or affirmation, ’tis necessary that it should be observed and explained; and at the same time that a reason should be given; for what seems altogether inconceivable, how this new relation can be a deduction from others, which are entirely different from it.

If we take into our hand any volume; of quotations or ancient personality, for instance; let us ask, Does it contain any abstract reasoning concerning quantity or number? No. Does it contain any experimental reasoning concerning matter of fact and existence? No. Consign it then to the flames: For it can contain nothing but sophistry and illusion.

Too bad; I’ve heard the History of England is good.

Hume, The Sceptic:

“I have long entertained a suspicion, with regard to the decisions of philosophers upon all subjects, and found in myself a greater inclination to dispute, than assent to their conclusions. There is one mistake, to which they seem liable, almost without exception; they confine too much their principles, and make no account of that vast variety, which nature has so much affected in all her operations. When a philosopher has once laid hold of a favourite principle, which perhaps accounts for many natural effects, he extends the same principle over the whole creation, and reduces to it every phænomenon, though by the most violent and absurd reasoning. Our own mind being narrow and contracted, we cannot extend our conception to the variety and extent of nature; but imagine, that she is as much bounded in her operations, as we are in our speculation.

“But if ever this infirmity of philosophers is to be suspected on any occasion, it is in their reasonings concerning human life, and the methods of attaining happiness. In that case, they are led astray, not only by the narrowness of their understandings, but by that also of their passions. Almost every one has a predominant inclination, to which his other desires and affections submit, and which governs him, though, perhaps, with some intervals, through the whole course of his life. It is difficult for him to apprehend, that any thing, which appears totally indifferent to him, can ever give enjoyment to any person, or can possess charms, which altogether escape his observation. His own pursuits are always, in his account, the most engaging: The objects of his passion, the most valuable: And the road, which he pursues, the only one that leads to happiness.”

THERE is no method of reasoning more common, and yet none more blameable, than, in philosophical disputes, to endeavour the refutation of any hypothesis, by a pretence of its dangerous consequences to religion and morality. When any opinion leads to absurdities, it is certainly false; but it is not certain that an opinion is false, because it is of dangerous consequence.

Recycling: http://quoughts.wordpress.com/category/hume/

That’s 26 April (Old Style) = 7 May (New Style).

‘I am apt to suspect the Negroes to be naturally inferior to the Whites. There scarcely ever was a civilized nation of that complexion, nor even any individual, eminent either in action or speculation. No ingenious manufactures amongst them, no arts, no sciences. On the other hand, the most rude and barbarous of the Whites, such as the ancient Germans, the present Tartars, have still something eminent about them, in their valour, form of government, or some other particular. Such a uniform and constant difference could not happen, in so many countries and ages, if nature had not made an original distinction between these breeds of men. Not to mention our colonies, there are Negro slaves dispersed all over Europe, of whom none ever discovered the symptoms of ingenuity; though low people, without education, will start up amongst us, and distinguish themselves in every profession. In Jamaica, indeed, they talk of one Negro as a man of parts and learning; but it is likely he is admired for slender accomplishments, like a parrot who speaks a few words plainly.’

Sounds like a Conservative to me, and a remarkably contemporary one.

Carneades got there first.

Alex: I wasn’t making a claim about priority, but if we’re being picky, actually Pyrrho of Elis got there first.

As for the initial Hume quote, is this still true? One of the standard arguments against gun control is that with light arms, the populace can overthrow the government by force should it become a tyranny. A standard liberal response to this, recently (last few months) articulated at length by Rachel Maddow and several of her guests is that it is absurd to hold that one could oppose a government possessing nukes and other advanced arms with guns and other light weapons anyway. Based on recent experience in Iraq and Afghanistan involving light arms and improvised explosives, one could dispute this. But assuming for the argument it is correct, doesn’t it invalidate Hume’s argument as applied to the present era? We have seen, in the 20th century, tyrannies that may have had a lot of support initially, but probably remained in power longer than that support lasted. That applies to most, perhaps all, of the communist powers, and possibly also fascism, although that was too brief to be a good test of what happens when attitudes change over time. It probably also applies to the some of the less ideological dictatorships, like Burma and Guatemala under Montt. It doesn’t seem strictly to be constrained to modern technology. The Khmer Rouge could not have been popular for long, but their attack on intellectuals, on literacy, really, left them virtually the only literate people in the nation (they started as a student group at the Sorbonne, so themselves were quite educated). This greatly impaired the ability of any potential uprising to communicate, and made governance impossible without them in any case. I’m not sure Hume’s imagination captured all the possibilities.

“It is confessed, that the utmost effort of human reason is to reduce the principles, productive of natural phenomena, to a greater simplicity, and to resolve the many particular effects into a few general causes, by means of reasonings from analogy, experience, and observation. But as to the causes of these general causes, we should in vain attempt their discovery …. These ultimate springs and principles are totally shut up from human curiosity and enquiry. Elasticity, gravity, cohesion of parts, communication of motion by impulse; these are probably the ultimate causes and principles which we shall ever discover in nature; and we may esteem ourselves sufficiently happy, if … we can trace up the particular phenomena to, or near to, these general principles. The most perfect philosophy of the natural kind only staves off our ignorance a little longer.” Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding Sect. 4, Part 1

“For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never can catch myself at any time without a perception, and never can observe any thing but the perception. When my perceptions are removed for any time, as by sound sleep; so long am I insensible of myself, and may truly be said not to exist. And were all my perceptions removed by death, and could I neither think, nor feel, nor see, nor love, nor hate after the dissolution of my body, I should be entirely annihilated, nor do I conceive what is farther requisite to make me a perfect non-entity. If any one, upon serious and unprejudiced reflection thinks he has a different notion of himself, I must confess I can reason no longer with him. … He may, perhaps, perceive something simple and continued, which he calls himself; though I am certain there is no such principle in me.” — Treatise of Human Nature Sect. 6

It seems like Hume’s assertions regarding the governed could apply to any situation. Power is based on a relationship between two potential agents. If those clever few exercise their ability to annihilate the “mob”, they do not have an other to have power over.

The governed may have to risk destruction to do it, but they can at least negate the power of their government.

Dustin, what Hume said was: “as FORCE is always on the side of the governed, the governors have nothing to support them but opinion” If the people can resist the government, but will fail and die leaving the government without subjects, that still does not constitute force being on the side of the governed. For that matter, the governed could simply commit suicide to deny the government subjects, but that does not constitute possessing a preponderance of force. And if the governors can annihilate the people, it is false that they have nothing to support them but opinion.

When anyone tells me, that he saw a dead man restored to life, I immediately consider with myself, whether it be more probable, that this person should either deceive or be deceived, or that the fact, which he relates, should really have happened. I weigh the one miracle against the other; and according to the superiority, which I discover, I pronounce my decision, and always reject the greater miracle. If the falsehood of his testimony would be more miraculous, than the event which he relates; then, and not till then, can he pretend to command my belief or opinion.

Philosopher of Doubt—Father of Postmodern Nihilism
By SB
© 2006

Approximately three hundred-years ago, amid well-tended, aristocratic estates and neat little commoner gardens, an infant was born in the placid city of Edinburgh, England. That baby would eventually grow up to become the world’s leading empiricist philosopher. His sceptic philosophy would shake and eventually demolish men’s certainty in reason by capitalizing on the errors of the great philosopher of reason, Aristotle.

In so doing, this British empirical giant would undercut the rational direction of the Enlightenment by unleashing the anti-reason philosopher, Immanuel Kant, who ultimately sent Western Civilization tail spinning into the nihilism that now dominates Western intellectual thought. If there were only one event in the history of mankind that could be changed, that event would be preventing the birth of that baby, whom his mother, Katherine Falconer Home (pronounced “Hume”), lovingly named, David.

David Hume destroyed much during his lifetime assault on the Age of Reason. But his most infamous exploit was to divorce fact from value in his sceptic philosophy—to claim that facts were objective and were approached by rational methods but that values were approached subjectively, the result of men’s biases and prejudices, i.e., the result of men’s feelings, which Hume claimed were intrinsically a-rational. He identified these two approaches as, respectively, Intellectualism and Sentimentalism. This (false) opposition of Hume’s is known in philosophy as the is-ought dichotomy (which, in justice to Hume, is a derivative of Descartes’ (and, before him, Plato’s) mind-body dichotomy).

What Hume did, in essence, was to render unto reason the world of science but unto emotion (a-rationality), the world of ethics and morality. Thus, one could prove—using Hume’s argument—that increasing the yield of crops on a given acre of land was in fact possible. But not that it was moral. One could prove that freedom increased men’s prosperity but not that this was necessarily good. One could prove that anesthetics relieved men’s pain, but not that this was right.

Hume had, in essence, placed morality outside the realm of reason. No one, after Hume, could state with any certainty—unless they refuted his argument at its base—that murder was objectively wrong; that progress was objectively good; that increasing men’s life expectancy was objectively right.

There is much more that Hume did to help extinguish the fires of the Enlightenment. He laid, for instance, the foundation for questioning the validity of the senses (on which Kant capitalized by inventing a supernatural “Noumenal” realm whose eternal Truths were forever beyond the grasp of men’s reason).

Further, Hume attacked causality as uncertain (on which Kant again capitalized by further claiming that men cannot truly know not only causality, but also identity—that men, because they can not be certain of a thing’s actions, can not, therefore, be certain in their knowledge of the thing itself.) This and more did Hume “achieve.” But the most damaging of his nefarious deeds was to deny to men any claim to a rational morality, thereby laying the foundation for today’s postmodern moral relativism and multiculturalism (which has effectively degenerated into nihilism).

Hume’s (Jupiter sized) mistake lay in the morality that he himself implicitly accepted with certainty, never placing his ethics within the sphere of his sceptic philosopher’s eye. Hume never questioned whether Man’s life qua rational being ought to be the moral standard; never doubted the moral standard that he had accepted by default—that of placing the welfare of others above one’s own life; above one’s own values; above one’s own reason, honesty and integrity.

Hume therefore never saw, having not identified Man’s life as the moral standard, the fact that fact determines value:

· The fact that men can be cured by antibiotics makes their discovery a value because antibiotics save men’s lives
· The fact that interchangeable parts lead to mass production makes their invention a value because mass production saves men time, allowing them to be more productive with their time and, thus, to have more time to enjoy their lives.
· The fact that the political recognition of rights leads to freedom makes their formulation a value because individual rights protect the fruits of men’s labors, preserving men’s lives

Hume never discovered any of this and more because Hume never made philosophical inquiry into the nature of facts and their relationship to men’s lives. Because he never viewed Man’s life as a value. Fortunately for mankind, a modern philosopher did (“It is only the concept of life that makes the concept of value possible.”); and in so doing (finally) rebutted Hume’s philosophy of scepticism (and the mind destroying philosophy of Kant, whom he made possible) with a philosophy of Objectivism.

What terrible events, though, would have been avoided (Hitler’s gas chambers; Stalin’s Gulag; the carnage of Mao’s cultural revolution; etc.)—and what great achievements would have occurred—had someone, somehow, prevented the birth of that baby a little over 300-years ago, buying time until the birth of Hume’s antipode, in St. Petersburg, Russia, in 1905, who came to be known by the pen name of Ayn Rand.

Works Cited
Morris, William E., ed. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: David Hume. Stanford University. February, 2001.

Thus, one could prove—using Hume’s argument—that increasing the yield of crops on a given acre of land was in fact possible. But not that it was moral.

… a crop like, say, tobacco? opium poppies? brussels sprouts?