My latest piece in Independent Australia
THE RISKS of nuclear war are greater than at any time since the Cuban Missile Crisis. Not only is Vladimir Putin threatening to use nuclear weapons to stave off defeat in Ukraine, but the North Korean Government has continued to develop and test both missiles and nuclear warheads.
U.S. President Joe Biden has responded to Putin’s threats with admirable calm so far, playing down the risk that Putin will use nuclear weapons and avoiding any threat of escalation.
Leaks from the U.S. Administration have indicated that the response to a tactical nuclear weapon would be massive but confined to conventional weapons.
Yet the official doctrine of the U.S. would call for the use of nuclear weapons in exactly the situation faced by Putin today: a conventional war going badly.
With Russia and the U.S. currently on the warpath during the escalating conflict in Ukraine, the world is again at serious risk of nuclear disaster.
Unlike Russia and China, the U.S. military maintains the right to a “flexible response” in which nuclear weapons may be used against an adversary who hasn’t used nuclear weapons and doesn’t pose an existential threat to the U.S. itself [1]
If Putin is threatened with massive retaliation for breaking a supposed taboo on nuclear weapons, the U.S. should commit itself to “no first use” of nuclear weapons. But why hasn’t this happened already?
Throughout the Cold War, U.S. military planning was based on the assumption that the Soviet Union would have a massive advantage in conventional weaponry, most notably because of its tens of thousands of tanks and other armoured vehicles, not to mention millions of artillery shells.
In the scenario favoured by Pentagon planners, these forces would pour the Fulda Gap, on the border between East and West Germany, rapidly overwhelming North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces.
Only the use of “tactical” nuclear weapons would even the balance. The term “tactical” might sound moderately comforting, but some of these weapons would have many times the explosive power of the bombs that destroyed Hiroshima and Nagasaki. They would obliterate the advancing forces.
The end of the Cold War shifted the frontier hundreds of kilometres to the east, but the planners found another “gap” to worry about near Suwa?ki in Poland. And, as Putin rebuilt the crumbling armed forces he had inherited, it seemed that he still had at least 3,000 modern tanks, with another 10,000 in reserve.
But the failed invasion of Ukraine has shown Putin’s army to be a paper tiger. More than half of Russia’s front-line tanks have already been destroyed or captured by Ukraine. Indeed, Russia has been the biggest single supplier of tanks and armoured vehicles to the Ukrainian armed forces.
Meanwhile, the vast reserves turned out to be largely illusory. Thousands of tanks had been left to rust in the open air or pillaged for parts to be sold on the black market. By June, Russia was reduced to deploying ancient T-62 tanks, first produced in the 1960s and then updated in the 1980s. These have already been destroyed in large numbers.
After failing to conquer its near neighbour, there is no prospect that Russia could launch a successful conventional attack on NATO. There is, therefore, no need for tactical nuclear weapons. The same is true of a hypothetical invasion of Taiwan by China.
By adopting a “no first use” policy, the U.S. could greatly reduce the risk of an accidental nuclear war or an unintended process of escalation. Such a policy would certainly face resistance from the U.S. military, which never saw a weapons system it didn’t find essential — as it would from the Republican party.
The U.S. is one of a handful of countries that don’t ban the use of landmines. The Trump Administration revoked restrictions on the use of landmines and sought to develop new ones.
Still, there is hope. Richard Nixon, of all people, committed the U.S. to ban chemical weapons and stocks were finally destroyed under George W Bush.
And the Biden Administration has moved towards a ban on landmines. A “no first use” commitment once made, would be difficult to roll back, even for a future Trump Administration.
fn1. Putin has used annexation as a way of claiming that resisting Russia’s aggression represents an existential threat
{ 16 comments }
ambercat 10.22.22 at 5:33 am
Agree with you re: Russia.
But “The same is true of a hypothetical invasion of Taiwan by China.”?
I’m not at all persuaded, based on what I know, that tactical nuclear weapons might not be part of an optimal deterrence package here. What’s your argument?
steven t johnson 10.22.22 at 3:42 pm
Reminding you that you are permanently banned – JQ
Jonathan Hallam 10.22.22 at 8:53 pm
I’d understood that US doctrine foresaw only defensive first use of nuclear weapons? I don’t necessarily disagree with you, but I have the following doubts:
If US will only nuke at existential threat, would other advanced nations currently sheltering beneath US nuclear umbrella not seek nukes of their own, creating a proliferation hazard more dangerous than the existing risk? South Korea, especially? But also possibly Australia, Japan, Poland, Turkey, Germany, Baltic states jointly, some EU collaborative effort? (Or perhaps not much would change for NATO and EU if France and UK took up the US’s former role – in which case is there not little benefit)? This is my main concern.
Would the timing not be seen as cynical in Russia, and therefore the messsage ignored?
Is not Putin’s whole annexation effort intended to create the image of a pseudo-existential threat to Russia? If he were willing/able to ignore his dotrine, whatever US doctrine is, would he not already have done so?
JimV 10.22.22 at 11:11 pm
No use at all except under existential or genocidal threat would be my preference. (Not a huge difference, I know.) No disproportional use would be another way of stating it
Of course, any such commitment would be vigorously condemned by many Republicans and Fox News, so it will take some bravery for Democrats to make it. .
John Quiggin 10.23.22 at 1:53 am
Ambercat @1 The reasons for Russia’s failure in Ukraine apply with even greater force to a Chinese invasion of Taiwan https://insidestory.org.au/why-an-invasion-of-taiwan-would-fail/
JH @3 “sheltering beneath US nuclear umbrella” implies that Russia (or maybe China) has the capacity to conquer US allies without using nuclear weapons, and that these allies are only protected by the threat of US first use. The whole point of the OP is that this isn’t true.
Murc 10.24.22 at 5:14 am
It seems worth noting that the US has, in fact, never used nuclear weapons when a conventional war was going badly. We were fought to a standstill on the Korean peninsula; no nukes. We LOST in Vietnam and Afghanistan; no nukes. We have in fact acted with restraint.
If our doctrine calls for the use of nuclear weapons in the same situation Russia faces now (an invasion that’s going very badly for them) we have ignored this doctrine many times.
This is true, but it seems worth noting that the Cold War scenario you describe later, which in fact never happened, involved the potential use of nukes to defend against existential threats to longstanding allies, some of whom maintained their own nuclear arsenals.
It seems worth noting that while not formal signatories to the Ottawa Treaty because of the Senate, the Obama Administration basically acceded to it in all substantive respects except for a carve-out for the Korean Peninsula, which is reasonable.
It seems incomplete to write this sentence without adding “a policy that President Biden has since reversed.”
Thomas P 10.24.22 at 8:58 am
One scenario for first use of nuclear weapons is if USA decide they have to take out a facitilty dug down too deep for conventional weapons. Say in a strike against Iran and their buried enrichment facilities. A similar argument could be made in case of suspected facility for making biological weapons. A conventional bomb risk dispersing pathogens while a nuke is likely to sterilise everything in the area.
How would the world react to a single strike against a smaller country?
John Quiggin 10.24.22 at 10:34 am
Murc @6 I agree that the US is highly unlikely to use tactical nukes, especially under a Democratic Administration, and similarly for most uses of landmines. That means that the cost of a formal declaration is very low, while the benefits are large
Thomas @7 shows that you can always dream a rationale for keeping any weapon.
Aardvark Cheeselog 10.24.22 at 2:16 pm
While I don’t necessarily want to defend the American position, I do think the title claim fails to acknowledge what a long path it is from here to there. If you could possibly be a candidate for leadership in the United States, you share a commitment to a set of ideas that make it seem reasonable for you to insist on maintaining the right to first use.
That is to say, “If only Americans would forswear first-use, the world could be immeasurably safer” is basically the same as “If only Americans were a different kind of people than they actually are, the world could be a lot safer.” It’s the moral equivalent of bitching about the weather.
Aardvark Cheeselog 10.24.22 at 3:29 pm
OP @8:
That means that the cost of a formal declaration is very low, while the benefits are large
American leadership does not see things this way. To them the ambiguity about what America might do in any situation is seen as highly valuable. Leaders who reasoned the way you suggest they ought would be removed and replaced with ones who would restore the status quo ante.
Seekonk 10.24.22 at 3:48 pm
A pledge of no first use of nuclear weapons is absolutely necessary, and because using military force for policy ends is so catastrophic, we should require that international disputes must be resolved non-violently by means of mediation and arbitration.
Meanwhile, the powers-that-be need to rethink the international arrangement that assumes and glorifies competition among nation states. In the age of doomsday weapons, to be king of the mountain you have to blow up the mountain.
patiniowa 10.24.22 at 5:22 pm
“By adopting a “no first use” policy, the U.S. could greatly reduce the risk of an accidental nuclear war or an unintended process of escalation. Such a policy would certainly face resistance from the U.S. military, which never saw a weapons system it didn’t find essential — as it would from the Republican party.”
This slightly mis-states the situation. The military might oppose such a declaration. The Republicans surely would.
The quote implies that the declaration would be supported by Democrats and their party. I suspect that it would opposed by many, perhaps most Democrats as well, especially those in the executive branch.
Democrats have had ample opportunity to publicly declare a no first use policy, and have never done so. I don’t see any reason to suppose they’ll do so in the near future.
I can see any number of moderate Democrats campaigning against Elizabeth Warren, saying, “The Republicans will say she wants to cripple our military. Let’s run someone who’s willing to use American military force for good, like Hillary Clinton or Joe Biden. Surely the Republicans won’t be able to say they’re anti-military.”
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/top-democrats-introduce-bill-to-prevent-us-from-striking-first-with-nuclear-weapons/2019/01/30/a5959ee6-24bc-11e9-ba08-caf4ff5a3433_story.html
Murc 10.24.22 at 8:00 pm
John @ 8
I can’t help but notice there is no discussion in the post, and little in the comments as of yet, as to what our allies might think?
Obviously the US will make its own foreign policy but one would think when considering such a bold change in our publicly-stated nuclear doctrine, we would want their input and consider it and possible change our own calculus based on it. Perhaps they would wish us to maintain a different posture for various reasons; South Korea especially seems like it might have some pressing input.
Jonathan Hallam 10.24.22 at 9:20 pm
JQ @5 thank you for that, helped clarify my thinking. There’s an implication (unintentionally?) in the opening post that the US would retain right to first use in the face of existential conventional threat. Thus, from the point of view of South Korea, NATO etc etc US nukes are no longer as good as domestic nukes. Additionally, retaining that right creates the impression US can imagine some future foe against whom even the US mainland cannot be defended against using conventional means. No first use under any circumstances* would be stronger (but possibly, not a believable statement)?
*there could be a carve out for bioweapons or extensive/substantial chemical weapon use, under the broad WMD category if necessary.
Thomas P 10.25.22 at 9:15 am
Jonathan, we see how rather primitive drones are effective at destroying Ukrainian infrastructure. In the future it may turn out to be difficult defending against mass produced swarms of small drones wiping out infrastructure and ruining a country´s economy while killing few people instantly. It may be tempting to declare that any such attack will be met, not by tit-for-tat, but with a nuclear strike.
In any case, the whole question of policy is kind of moot. Does anyone really think an official policy of no first use would stop any leader who decided they needed to use nukes? As long as the weapons exist they can be used and the main deterrent is how the rest of the world reacts.
Hugh Mann 10.29.22 at 10:57 am
“Not only is Vladimir Putin threatening to use nuclear weapons to stave off defeat in Ukraine”
Has he actually said this? I keep seeing the allegation. Is that his annexation speech where he said “We will defend our land with all the powers and means at our disposal.” ? That would certainly imply going to all lengths.
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/9/30/russia-ukraine-war-putins-annexation-speech-what-did-he-say
But at the same time “Russia” as legally constituted in Russian eyes (i.e. including Donbass/Kherson/Crimea) is under attack and indeed occupation (from a Russian perspective) – yet so far the nukes aren’t flying.
I must say we seem a lot closer to WW3 than we were say in 2014, and I sometimes wonder why the US seem so happy to keep pushing Russia. Do they know something we don’t? Have Langley cracked quantum computing and are therefore reading all Russian codes? Are the Russian nukes all rusted up? Is some form of Stuxnet infesting their control systems?
Comments on this entry are closed.