Recently I learned that at Yale University a “Report of the Committee on Institutional Voice” was published a few months ago. The committee was chaired by professors “Della Rocca & Rodríguez” and so hereafter, I refer to the report as “Della Rocca & Rodríguez.” According to an accompanying editorial by these two lead authors in the Yale News, The report is a response to “disagreement within the Yale community about whether, when and how leaders should speak — on behalf of the University or units within the University, on issues of public significance — particularly when strong differences of opinion on an issue exist.” As they note Yale is not alone in that respect.
As a non-trivial aside, the character of institutional voice matters to all universities. But is worth noting that the turmoil on various campuses of the past year has not resulted in a focus on institutional voice at all universities. For example, in my home country, the Netherlands, university committees are exploring now the existing policies on international, institutional collaborations. (This is a thinly veiled strategy to avoid focus exclusively on a boycott of Israeli institutions.) That North American universities are primarily focusing on institutional voice has much to do with the disastrous Congressional Testimony of the former Presidents of Harvard, Penn, and Columbia a year ago. Even in empire, the same politics is oddly local.
Since “Della Rocca & Rodríguez” is rather brief, I will not summarize the report (here). (Some of the key issues will be clear from what follows.) The formal focus of Della Rocca & Rodriquez is rather narrow: it’s concerned with institutional voice. In the report this is characterized as “whether and when university leaders should issue statements concerning matters of public, social, or political significance.” Included in university leaders are not just “university leadership (the President, Provost, other central administrators, and deans),” but also “leaders speaking on behalf of other units of the university, including academic departments and programs.” As the report recognizes, institutional voice matters on campus (which is the committee’s main focus) and to wider, outside communities.
While it is, perhaps, true by now that the top leadership of elite private universities is becoming a distinct academic class, many such university leaders are also (tenured) faculty as are the leadership of “other units of the university, including academic departments and programs.” This fact matters because in the “Preamble” Della Rocca & Rodriguez, assert that at Yale, “individual faculty, as well as students, have broad freedom to speak, including to take positions on issues of the day—a freedom enshrined in and protected by the Woodward Report, which continues to guide Yale.” Now, Yale’s Woodward Report, named after the famous historian who chaired it, (formally titled the Report of the Committee on Freedom of Expression at Yale), was issued by Yale University on December 23, 1974. Outside of Yale, this report has not been as influential as, say, The University of Chicago’s (1967) Kalven report.
As another aside, this neglect of Woodward is a a bit of a shame because the minority opinion “A Dissenting Statement” to the Woodward report — penned by a law student, Kenneth J. Barnes, — gives an authentic sense of the intellectual ferment of the age. What is amusing is that the minority opinion of Kalven — written by the Chicago economist George J. Stigler — argues for stricter neutrality than Kalven’s majority; whereas Barnes’ minority opinion denies the possibility of neutrality altogether.
Be that as it may, at Yale since Woodward, “individual faculty, as well as students, have broad freedom to speak;” so in many respects institutional voice so constituted here involves a self-limitation by the corporation (Yale) on this broad freedom. For, we are told that in general, “university leaders should refrain from issuing statements concerning matters of public, social, or political significance, except in rare cases.” Unsurprisingly, university leaders are also “obligated to speak to defend the university’s core values or concrete interests.” (This is in line with Woodward and Kalven.)
So, while in the previous paragraph I emphasized how “Della Rocca & Rodríguez” entails a self-limitation by the corporation, it is worth noting that the obligation “to speak to defend the university’s core values or concrete interests” may also require non-trivial courage and forthrightness by university leadership. For, the timing of “Della Rocca & Rodríguez” also coincides with widely commented on political headwinds not to say adverse conditions for academic institutions — including proposals by the incoming Administration to tax university endowments. The job of university leadership may well become more demanding.
One very nice feature of Della Rocca & Rodriguez is that it recognizes that academic speech is itself rooted in particular processes that are time-intensive and deliberative in nature. I quote the whole paragraph because it gives a nice sense of the tenor of the report (not the least the role of judgment in it—which is rather important to the whole framing).
Before I get to the more elaborate discussion of practical judgment, I should make explicit one general unease I have with Della Rocca & Rodriguez. The report repeatedly notes that one of the functions of university leadership is the “fostering the free exchange of ideas” (also “promoting the free exchange of ideas”). Variants hereof are treated as a prized feature of Yale’s mission and campus life throughout the report. Let’s stipulate not just for the sake of argument that the free exchange of ideas is a lovely feature of Yale’s mission and campus life worth having.
Even so, the emphasis on free exchange of ideas on campus does point to two notable omissions (and hence my unease): first, the report implies that the university does not understand its own mission as witnessing truth to the public. This is especially odd and even awkward because the well known university motto, ‘Lux et Veritas,’ is appealed to when the report invokes, as it should, the university’s core values or concrete interests as an expression of its core mission. This motto (as well as its Hebrew ancestor) is as beautiful an expression of the wish to witness truth as any known to us. (Since I am in no way connected to Yale, I won’t wax lyrically on it nor treat you to an exegesis of its Biblical origins.) In light of its motto, Yale’s omission to treat witnessing truth as its core mission is notable.
Witnessing truth sounds theological. But as I have argued (recall; and here), it is of central importance politically. In society, with its advanced division of (intellectual) labor and its cacophony of opinions and the many strategic agents who have an interest to distort, witnessing truth is more than a luxury it is a necessity to public decision-making and to social coordination. Since the discovery/production of truth is time-intensive and costly, and often unwelcome, universities have a special obligation and authority to secure access to it.* This is one of the key (public-spirited) political roles of the academy in democracies and non-democracies alike So, when society needs it, universities ought to witness truth either in their corporate/institutional capacity or by enabling and defending (the sometimes unwelcome) faculty speech to that effect.
One may object here to my line of argument that a certain amount of reticence by university leadership may well allow faculty members more room to witness truth rooted in their particular expertise. It is, in fact, natural to read “Della Rocca & Rodriguez” in this way. The report writes at first, “we are inspired and guided by the valuable, persistent, and courageous speech of faculty members speaking individually and collectively on matters to which they bring expertise and experience.” And then later the report notes:
Leaders, including deans and department heads, often have academic expertise directly related to matters of public significance and therefore may be well positioned to express opinions on such matters. When they speak, they should note that the expressed opinion is based on their expertise and that they are not speaking in their official capacity. For high-level administrators, especially the President, it may be difficult to disentangle one’s individual capacity from one’s official position.
Let’s leave aside the unfortunate use of ‘opinion’ when it comes to matters of expertise. The really key issue that de facto the report discourages the identification of “the official position” of the university, that is, its institutional voice with the underlying expertise. Now, this is sensible policy if university leaders are in an awful epistemic position to establish what an underlying scientific consensus is if that is outside their own areas of expertise. I happen to think this is often true, but not always. While it is prudent to keep universities away from pontificating on controversies that are (potentially) live issues in the sciences, urging them to keep silent as institutions when, say, scientific matters become a matter of public controversy undermines one of the essential functions of the academy.
Second, at no point does “Della Rocca & Rodriquez” speak of the need to defend academic freedom (as distinct from the freedom to exchange ideas) as a core mission of the university. Academic freedom is rooted in the particular disciplinary methods and practices (and commitments) that constitute expertise. Academic freedom is the principle by which we regulate responsible and authoritative academic speech. It is designed to protect from interference, but also to allow for the exercise of (note this) good judgment when some speech is merely an opinion and not rooted in genuine expertise at all (and so sometimes even inappropriate in front of a classroom or curriculum). That is, universities are not just sites for open exchange, they also are sites for research and learning where speech is disciplined in all kinds of ways. (I return to this at the end of the post.)
So much for my unease. The closing two paragraphs of the report state the following under the heading “The Nature of the Judgment Recommended:”
So, first, I was very pleased to see the explicit denial of embracing “institutional neutrality.” (Recall this post on Jacob T. Levy; also this post on Harvard’s (“Feldman & Simmons”) much more publicized rejection of institutional neutrality.) In particular, I liked how “Della Rocca & Rodriguez” makes explicit that apparent silence by university leadership need not entail neutrality.
Second, I welcome the embrace of practical intelligence (and I loved the use of ‘discernment’ to exemplify it). The possession of practical wisdom and the capacity to act on it is a necessary condition for leadership. And it is lovely to see the committee try to create appropriate space for deference to it at all levels of university leadership. As the report implies such practical intelligence is itself, in part, characterized by self-command.
But this fact also raises some uncomfortable questions for Yale. In our age the PhD is some (defeasible) evidence for the possession of a certain kind of disciplinary expertise which (to simplify) gives access to tenure-track jobs. The fullest protection of academic freedom is secured by tenure. But a PhD is never not even prima facie evidence of such practical wisdom. It is an open, somewhat disturbing question to what degree obtaining a PhD and at a later stage tenure selects against if not undermines the habits of thought needed to exercise practical wisdom. How to ensure that these correct habits of thought are present, thus, in university leadership at all levels (and select for them) is itself no small matter.
The problem is exacerbated by the fact that we also expect from university leadership good judgment in the practice of showing leadership in learning and teaching (or experiments in living) with all the obligations and self-restraint and self-discipline those require (recall this post responding to an essay by Agnes Callard also rejecting institutional neutrality). If phronesis is relatively absent in the ranks of university leadership — and we may not all find ourselves in conditions as blessed as Yale’s — it is by no means obvious that the principles so beautifully articulated by “Della Rocca & Rodriquez” are (ought implies can) binding.
- This post originates in a slightly different essay (here) at Digressions & Impressions.
*There are, of course, other institutions that focus on the reliable production of reliable of truth: the justice system and government agencies.
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