Insert the Usual Princess Bride Joke About Words and Their Meanings

Really bizarre. “Idealism” apparently means appealing to potential enemies in terms of rational cost-benefit calculations (Once Tehran started on the path to accommodating the West (they theorized), the mullahs would realize that the benefits of collaboration and transparency outweighed the burdens of isolation and confrontation), while “realism” means treating potential enemies as actual enemies (Regime change remains the only realistic option to bombing or bearing the danger of living with a nuclear-armed Iran.).

If you’re serious about maintaining and strengthening the empire

then you’re not speaking Westphalian. Which is probably the problem here, to be honest. If your world consists of sovereign nation states, there’s a debate to be had between idealists (“let us guide you into the light!”) and realists (“you want this, we want that, let’s talk”). If your world consists of the USA plus a bunch of people sitting on a bunch of resources (and some lines on the map, but hey), the entire discipline of IR is going to look a bit crazy. Carafano is just confusing us by using the word ‘idealist’ to mean ‘jeez, these starry-eyed hippies’.

To say that states are sovereign doesn’t mean they’re each free to do whatever they want regardless of any other state’s objection. It does mean that they’re each equally free to act, and equally entitled to object.

Having nukes is a really bad idea: nukes are an enormous expenditure with lots of dangers and no real use except threats (unless you really are going to push the button). So some of the mullahs want to climbdown but without losing face. Meanwhile the clowns at The Corner fancy themselves “realists” because religionists must be irrational (though revealingly, the Corner clowns extend no such criticism to the full-mooners such as the Teas in the GOP).

Since people now write about things without actually reading or studying beforehand, I will now do the same, and weigh in on the Iran preliminary agreement without reading it: 1) it is only a half-year long, so Obama could still bomb them before the U.S. mid-term elections; 2) it is a major wrench for the Iranians, because it can only lead to improvements in Western intelligence; and 3) the fact that the Know-Nothings in the U.S. hate the deal, means the Iranians will find it less suspicious.

The Iranians have promised to forego nuclear weapons. Whether or not they live up to it remains to be seen. The USA in this deal gives up….nothing, not one bomb, not one military base, not one bullet.
The deal is a freebie. What’s not to like about getting something for nothing? Actually, ending sanctions against Iran puts downward pressure on oil prices which is a good thing.
If Iran does not intend to comply, the West is no worse tomorrow than it is today. If Iran complies, the West gets stability and bigger oil supplies. And we don’t have to give up anything!

Slugger
Actually, ending sanctions against Iran puts downward pressure on oil prices which is a good thing.

As I understand it, this agreement doesn’t end sanctions, just eases them a bit. But I haven’t familiarized myself w the details.

One noteworthy thing here is Netanyahu’s reaction that the deal is “a historic mistake.” As if Israel isn’t sitting on some 200 (or whatever it is) nuclear weapons. Does Netanyahu take us all to be complete fools? Does he take the Iranian leadership to be completely insane? Because it wd have to be insane to launch a nuclear strike on Israel, knowing that the Israeli response wd be to nuke Tehran into dust.

Afaics the only decent argument that Iran getting a nuclear weapon might be bad is that it wd entrench its existing foreign policy, i.e. aid to Hezbollah, aid to Assad — that is, Iran wd do the same things it’s doing now but w more boldness or vigor or something. Which, while it might be unfortunate, wd be far from the historic calamity that Netanyahu, the Corner, and most of the US Congress, and everyone ‘official’ in the US and Europe anticipates.

As the Middle East becomes less important to us, devoting money, men, and attention to it becomes less rational. Ending what was always a rather artificial conflict with Iran is a piece with getting out of Iraq and Afghanistan. We can’t ignore the region, obviously, if only because there the Sunnis and the Israelis have their own reasons to keep the heat on Iran, and they can certainly cause trouble. Still, things are different from a Real Real Politik sense as opposed to the posturing that defines itself as Real Politik.

Of course, if our policies were idealistic (I was going to write “really idealistic”), we’d also change our stance viz a viz Iran. After all, there is an extraordinarily repressive and corrupt regime in the area, a proudly intolerant theocracy that exports terrorism around the globe. It just isn’t Iran. Of course, we aren’t going to send in the Marines to seize Riyadh and liberate the Shi’ites, women, and foreign slave labor languishing in Saudi Arabia. On idealistic grounds, though, we certainly should be considering it, right?

“The Corner has gone Everyday-is-like-Munich full neocon.”

Exactly. Every opponent isn’t Hitler or Stalin. This is a good deal. No one dies and at the very least Iran slows down any pursuit of a nuclear weapon. Another foreign policy win in the Middle East for the Obama Administration.

The way Carafano would get out of your formulation is to claim that the US and Iran (or at least this Iranian regime) can’t ever find shared interests, because Iran’s only interest lies in destroying the state of Israel, if not all Jews. That’s an interest the US could never share. So, yes, no possibility of shared interests, at least not with Iran, so we shouldn’t actually be negotiating with them, except to receive their unconditional surrender. He would claim that that’s why his position is the realist one, he recognizes the essential character of the Iranian regime, and the consequences of that character, while fools who would make any deal with them, other than accepting their surrender, are being misled by their idealistic faith in our common humanity, or some such nonsense. They can’t be expected to behave rationally, even to the point of putting their own self-preservation ahead of their monomaniacal interest in destroying Israel, so we can’t even establish a shared interest in preventing a war between us.

This is exactly the point of the whole Munich idea. We really are already at war with the aggressor nation, just as the Western democracies really were already at war with Hitler long before they were willing to acknowledge this reality and fight back. That’s what Carafano means by realism, that he accepts the fact of an already existing state of war between the whole civilized world and Iran, while weak, idealistic fools such as the typical Crooked Timberian persist in reality-denial, and imagine Iran can be negotiated with, much as Chamberlain imagined Hitler could be negotiated with.

“Yeah, but the calendar, you know, it just keeps on throwing them days at us. One after another. Relentlessly, so far. ”
True, but why not enjoy the good days when they come?

“This is a good deal. No one dies and at the very least Iran slows down any pursuit of a nuclear weapon. Another foreign policy win in the Middle East for the Obama Administration.”

I so totally want to believe this – but perhaps too many spy novels and James Bond movies have taught me that when the “bad guy” appears to change his stripes is when he is at his most sinister. It hardly seems right to invoke the old Reagan mantra “Trust, but verify” (actually the teaching of a Russian fable)…but its how my brain answers my heart when it thinks it sees good news.

Maybe Charlie Brown really will kick the football this time, right now he’s still on the run-up and there is every reason to be optimistic.

Re :massive uncertainty as to when Iranian obligations would revert simply to that of any other NPT member

I don’t really understand this, since (1) there’s no agreement on exactly what rights the NPT does or does not implicitly grant re enrichment, and (2) isn’t it fairly obvious that Iran is not being treated just like any other NPT member — for some good reasons arguably, but it’s also true that if some other NPT member began enriching uranium or increased enrichment, few wd probably care.

LFC @ 12:

Does Netanyahu take us all to be complete fools?

He takes the GOP and its deranged apocalyptic fundamentalist Christian base to be fools, certainly, and with good reason. A lot of this rhetoric is for endless Fox News replay. He also usually takes Democratic grandstanding assholes like Chuck Schumer to be fools, but that might not be working out quite as well for him this time.

Does he take the Iranian leadership to be completely insane?

No. He wants those he takes to be fools to continue thinking so, but he doesn’t, or he wouldn’t simply be using such warnings for continued distraction and electoral gain. Hence his growing hysteria that enough people might realize that Iranians aren’t actually universally eager to be turned to radioactive glass as long as they can hit Israel with a nuke first.

too many spy novels and James Bond movies have taught me that when the “bad guy” appears to change his stripes is when he is at his most sinister.

Maybe so, but I can’t figure out what Obama’s next sneaky move could be…

“Good thing MPAVictoria isn’t in the US diplomatic service – no wait, Hilary “Obliterate Iran” Clinton did become foreign secretary … I think Iran should get the bomb after all.”

Care to further explain this comment novakant?

LFC –

My concern is that the retention of any significant enrichment capability provides the regime with additional means of supporting a covert enrichment program. I know almost as much about uranium enrichment as I do about elliptical curve cryptography, but it seems to me that a government with a home field advantage can probably find a way to move a decimal point, a container of ore, parts for a centrifuge, etc., over a period of time. Removing the enrichment capability entirely would reduce the regime’s opportunity for cheating.

I don’t really understand this, since (1) there’s no agreement on exactly what rights the NPT does or does not implicitly grant re enrichment, and (2) isn’t it fairly obvious that Iran is not being treated just like any other NPT member

I agree that (1) is a fair point, but the wording of the agreement casts some doubt on whether what’s obvious to you is actually agreed upon by all the parties:

Following successful implementation of the final step of the comprehensive solution for its full duration, the Iranian nuclear programme will be treated in the same manner as that of any non-nuclear weapon state party to the NPT.

That’s of a piece with Iran’s regular insistence that the NPT recognizes its inalienable right to pursue nuclear development and research unhindered, so long as Iran promises not to use any of that stuff to create devices purposed for mischievous exothermic activities.

Most states have concluded so-called Comprehensive Safeguard Agreements with the IAEA, which essentially amount to promises to declare nuclear activities, sites, etc., to the IAEA and then invite the IAEA to verify the truth of those declarations. Many states have also concluded so-called Additional Protocols, which give the IAEA some power to attempt to verify the absence of undeclared nuclear activities (principally by granting the IAEA expanded access to known parts of a state’s nuclear processes, and, in consultation with the host government, IAEA power to take environmental samples in areas where no nuclear activities are declared). See the IAEA’s handy reference guide for a NPT compliant state, Guidance for States Implementing Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols, and a more condensed colorful pamphlet for NPT states that want to be compliant but don’t have time for a lot of words about rules and regulations, Verifying Compliance with Nuclear Non-Proliferation Undertakings.

Iran concluded a CSA in 1974, which seems to mostly re-state the NPT. Anyway, the lack of recognized standards as to what enrichment activities are appropriate, and what are not, is a huge unresolved issue going forward. The agreement as worded leaves room for Iran’s position that the restrictions in it are temporary and unusual, which will be altered in a final, comprehensive agreement. It also leaves room for the view that they’re practical and appropriate as described. Which view will prevail? I have no idea. Perhaps 6 months of confidence building will bring the parties closer together, though I worry that we’ll simply get multiple renewals of 6 month periods of confidence building. At some point this will fade into memory for most of the public, and will be rationalized by governments as “managing” the problem, until the day that some intrepid soil sampling, air sniffing, eavesdropping, and picture-taking causes alarm with certain governments. And then the shit will really hit the centrifuge (couldn’t resist, sorry).

So, I’m a little skeptical, but I don’t know enough to say whether it’s a bad move, and I recognize that some of my skepticism may derive not from the above rational considerations, but from a fear that the President may have “delegated” too much play-calling to Kerry, in whose judgment I do not have the greatest confidence. But perhaps 6 months will change that.

Things widely assumed that are, in fact, either false or debatable:

1. Iran has an active nuclear weapons program and is seeking to build a nuclear bomb. Not according to the US Intelligence Estimate, the IAEA or the Iranian Supreme Leader, who has declared nuclear weapons unIslamic.

2. Enrichment to near 20% is proof that Iran wants a bomb. In fact, bombs need enrichment to 90%, enrichment to 20% is needed for medical isotopes, and Iran converted most of its stockpile of highly enriched uranium to a form unsuitable for bombs but usable for medical isotopes.

3. The US has any good military options against Iran. Highly doubtful: Iran is large, largely politically united against intervention and has a reasonable industrial base. The US has not the strength to sustain an occupation of Iran for any length of time, not the internal allies (of the kind it had in Iraq) needed for regime change. A bombing campaign could cause support for sanctions to collapse while provoking Iran to reverse its current position on nuclear weapons. Iran also has leverage against the US in Pakistan and Afghanistan. In short, stalemate.

4. Stronger sanctions would produce a more compliant Iran. Possibly. But they could also irritate China, India, Turkey and Russia, and cause these and countries like Brazil to think harder about an international financial regime not centred on New York. As with most other available moves, there are significant medium term downsides – and the oil market is not getting any looser (hype over fracking and tight oil to the contrary).

In short, this may well be the best deal the US is going to get.

But let’s not let a realist analysis get in the way of a vigorous discussion in the finest traditions of the internet.

Cranky Observer, there is a bit of a difference between retaliation weapons intended to stop an invading army after three wars nearly resulted in genocide, and weapons in the hands of a state supporting terrorism around the world. Not every country deserves nuclear weapons: certainly Pakistan shouldn’t have them. But would you be worried if Sweden got a few? It isn’t terribly crazy to conclude some countries are just better than others, and Iran isn’t on anyones nice list.

= = = Watson Ladd @ 1:49 am Cranky Observer, there is a bit of a difference between retaliation weapons intended to stop an invading army after three wars nearly resulted in genocide, and weapons in the hands of a state supporting terrorism around the world. = = =

And yet throughout the W Bush era we were told that professional security analysts must only consider capabilities, not cloud their judgement by attempting to divine intentions. How exactly would Middle Eastern nations that are not confirmed possessors of nuclear weapons such as Iran know that those possessed by the one that is are merely “retaliation weapons” and not intended for an offensive first strike?

In any case, AECA Section 101 is a United States law that applies to the actions of the United States, not any foreign power. Not that an empire in the process of acting, as we will, pays attentions to trifles such as duly enacted laws.

Cranky

Munichaeism.

Andrew F. @32
I don’t have the time, energy, or sufficient familiarity w the wording of the deal to address most of this at the moment.
As to this:
My concern is that the retention of any significant enrichment capability provides the regime with additional means of supporting a covert enrichment program.
I’m sure you’re not alone in that concern. I wd note that the deal calls for inspection of centrifuge manufacturing/production workshops, or so I gather.
Jeffrey Lewis on the NewsHour (11/25):

Well, look, there’s an easy problem in Iran and a hard problem. The easy problem is verifying the declared facilities. And so having daily access to those facilities I think gives one a very high level of assurance. The hard problem in Iran is always going to be the possibility of a covert facility, a facility one can’t see. And so the way that one needs to address that is by having a much broader and more comprehensive access to the Iranian program. So, for example, what Greg [Jones] mentioned was access to the workshops where the Iranians build the centrifuges. Right now, the Iranians can build as many centrifuges as they want and if they show up at Natanz, the inspectors see them. If they show up in a mountain somewhere, in a tunnel, we don’t see them. So being able to get inside those workshops and see how many centrifuges they’re making — and, in fact, the deal contains a constraint on how many centrifuges they can make — helps deal with that second harder problem of sites we don’t yet know about.

But I suppose — to anticipate a reply — this doesn’t rule out the poss. of covert workshops!
However, as I’ve hinted, or more than hinted, in the other thread (on Corey’s post), I don’t hold the apocalyptic view of this whole situation that some (I’m not saying you) do. I realize that’s cryptic but I don’t feel like elaborating more right now.

This evening’s Monday Night Football game: WORSE THAN MUNICH!!1!
~

Removing the enrichment capability entirely would reduce the regime’s opportunity for cheating

Why use this this as counterfactual for the deal? It’s not as if the US was making progress towards this.

Interesting comment from Watson Ladd, and interestingly phrased, as a ‘deserve’. I would like hear more about it.

It reminds me of a couple of conversations. One with an older Swede guy I worked with, for, like, 10 years. He told me once, casually: “Hitler had the right idea, but he didn’t go about it the right way.” The only time I heard anything like this from anybody.

These days I have a Pakistani colleague, who used be in the army, most of the time stationed in Kashmir, where the war is ongoing, bullets and artillery shells fly all day every day. He says there was a moment a few years ago when Indian invasion seemed imminent. Pakistan deployed 3 lines of defense, the first two lines were to be sacrificed to slow down the invasion, and the last one was supposed to stop it, although everybody knew there was no hope of that. He was in the second line. He says, it was only after Pakistan declared that it will definitely use its nukes, the situation normalized, down to the usual mess.

Champions League Group Stage: Dortmund WORSE THAN MUNICH!

Conall, of course, and that’s what worries the Realists. Give Iran time to build up its armaments, and it might defeat an invasion when we get to it. Hitler lost the war, we should not follow his example.

Since I noted it in the other thread, I’ll also note here that there is an interesting exchange btw C. Kahl and K. Waltz, touching on some of the issues raised here, in Foreign Affairs, Sept/Oct 2012.

@38: by that logic we must immediately strike Israel before they gain the capability to deliver their already existing nuclear weapons to our shores. I don’t think you can ignore intentions completely or you start too many hares at once, although some amount of humility about the reliability of your estimates of others’ intentions is probably wise.

“Why this deal now? ”

I would think in part Rouhani coming to power and in part that the Iranians really arent as committed to this as is made out.
Apparently (according to Gary Sick anyway) the main thing preventing a deal is domestic politics in Iran and the US, not a set in stone desire in Iran to build a bomb or a genuine fear in the US executive of any potential bomb.

Where’s the love for C.Wright Mills, who nailed this phenomenon long ago as “crackpot realism“?

For a succinct discussion of Chamberlain and appeasement that corrects some probably-still-held misconceptions (e.g., about the meaning of the word itself), I recommend: David Kaiser, Politics and War: European Conflict from Philip II to Hitler (1990), pp.385-87 (including fn.51).

I agree that skeptism is probably the right stance.
But the negotiations havent even really opened yet, so we’re as well off waiting to see how they turn out, is my only point