In 2019, Cyclone Idai generated the fastest wind speeds ever recorded on the African continent. Mozambique, Malawi, and Zimbabwe were all affected – the Mozambican city of Beira was levelled, and hundreds of thousands of people in the region were displaced. Many died from the heavy rains before the hurricane landed, many more died from the hurricane itself, and still more from the cholera outbreak in the wake of the first two calamities: a month after the storm, over a thousand lives had been confirmed lost. A year after the crisis, over 40,000 Zimbabweans and nearly 100,000 Mozambicans were still living in makeshift shelters, and nearly ten million in the region were still in need of food aid.
The response from the international community was muted – it grabbed a headline or two in more cosmopolitan outlets like the BBC and al-Jazeera, but was quickly forgotten even in these places. Crisis in Mozambique still garners international attention today in 2021: but more readily with respect to the aspiring “al Shabab” insurgency, which aims to establish an Islamic State of Mozambique. Its advance has been steady and deadly over the past years, accelerating with last summer’s offensive to seize the port city of Mocimboa da Praia, endangering a nearby $60 billion dollar natural gas industry.
In 2012, New York City faced a similar crisis: Hurricane Sandy. The storm was a thousand miles wide and flooded some 17% of the land mass of the city, doing nearly some $75 billion in economic damage. The hurricane ravaged Jamaica, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic in addition to the United States, where the storm claimed 106 lives, 43 of whom were New Yorkers.
So far so good: the obvious contrast of disaster response in the different zones of the world – across the divide between a “high income” country and “least developed” (Mozambique and Malawi) and “lower middle income” (Zimbabwe), or between a member of the Global North and the Global South, or of the First World and the Third World if you can stomach Cold War lingo. In terms of natural systems, there are many similarities between New York and Beira’s calamities – while Idai was the more intense of the storms, the difference between those we call “hurricanes” and “cyclones” have to do with their location on Earth rather than their intensity.
The difference maker was, of course, the social systems. In the much richer US, the hurricane activated a variety of social support mechanisms that constrained the vulnerability of the affected populations: vast public and private bureaucracies enabling the coordination of hundreds of millions of dollars in funding for federal disaster relief organizations like FEMA, private insurance payouts. That version of disaster response represents a city that was “hardly prepared” for the disaster – the regulatory reckoning with various levels of mismanagement continued seven years later, with revamped building codes, disaster safe zone maps, and new smartphone-ready alert systems. The Mozambican government organized an effective health intervention to the cholera outbreak, aided by Médecins Sans Frontières, the World Health Organization, and the usual cast of other NGO characters – but the difference in the scale of what was made possible there and in New York is nevertheless clear.
Among the interesting aspects of Kim Stanley Robinson’s new climate fiction book The Ministry For the Future is its attention to a much different version of the North/South contrast. The book opens with a calamitous heatwave in Uttar Pradesh, which claims the lives of millions of people in horrific fashion. The responses in Indian politics are deep, wide ranging, and difficult to categorize in blanket, positive or negative terms. The incumbent BJP is removed from power, in favor of a multi-party coalition that gets to work refashioning Indian politics. The agricultural system shifts, switching to the kinds of labor intensive, regenerative agricultural approaches practiced in Sikkim and Bengal with strong local administration modeled off the governance practices of Kerala, a Communist state. The Indian Air Force begins running missions into the stratosphere, spraying aerosols to reflect sunlight back upwards. A network christening itself the “Children of Kali” targets passenger airplanes and surgically assassinates corporate executives it deems responsible for continued carbon emissions, and thus the tragedy the book begins with.
Later in the book, another calamity happens: this time in the Global North. The waters rise up and claim the entire city of Los Angeles. If they are anything like me, the reader braces for a sweeping political change of the kind they saw earlier in the book: a reconstruction of the formal political system, an immediate reckoning and recalibration of all productive industries, a radical break with business as usual. But what comes is interesting: there’s an immediate coordinated attack on the international system – the IMF, the Swiss banks, and the Ministry of the Future (the titular organization that aims to reshape the global political system).
The destruction of Los Angeles opens the breach for the Ministry of the Future. Suddenly, Mary Murphy is able to corral the leaders of major central banks into minting a carbon coin tied to sequestration, which they govern in a Climate Coalition for Central Banks. Meanwhile, the African Union sends drones to remove the guards operating a foreign owned mine in Namibia – ownership of which is then given to the workers, to be held cooperatively by whoever wishes to stay.
What is most interesting about this contrast is the level of centralization in the political responses to the two calamities. What the tragedy of Uttar Pradesh sets into motion in India is a full social transformation, stewarded most broadly by peasant leadership. There are transformations at the top, of course, but these mainly take the form of reconstituting the state so as to get out of people’s way, to put it somewhat polemically. The opposite seems to be the story in the North’s response to the tragedy of Los Angeles: while there are certainly people’s movements involved, the protests at the various major capitals at the world where people engage in alternative economies, what is important to the plot of the book at that point in the story is the response of the titans of capital. Neither Los Angeles’ disaster, nor a subsequent one in Arizona, leads to an immediate reshuffling of domestic political systems.
In one sense, Robinson’s narrative choice is equal parts fatalism, pragmatism, and optimism. One can read into the text a thought something like this: the capacities of a rich state express themselves in both directions: positively, when responding to calamities like Hurricane Sandy, and also negatively, when responding to threats to the established order. The same vat of resources which provides housing assistance payments also keeps COINTELPRO running – this radically circumscribes the space of transformative politics in the North in the ways it does not in the South. This is why calamity in Los Angeles and Arizona leads to symbolic political protest where tragedy and destruction in Namibia Uttar Pradesh ignites more holistic transformations of social and even natural systems (through agricultural and stratospheric aerosol injection).
On the other hand, maybe this lets us Northerners off the hook too easily: the idea that a fuller transformation is possible in the South than in the North is at the very least compatible with a radical imagination in which it is their job to take the revolutionary actions that liberate us all – taking their share of the risks on their land and at their dinner tables while Mary Murphy and the Ministry take their share at conference tables. If Robinson’s description of the horizon of political possibility is correct, then perhaps this is an objection of the wrong kind – if we object to this arrangement, we’re really objecting to the embedded unfairnesses of world history, and to direct this charge at Robinson is to shoot the messenger. But stakes should motivate us to, at the very least, double check the message: is it, in fact, true that the best we can do is cajole the elites of the elites into capitulations as slight as the construction of a new financial instrument?
To put the question another way: what prevents us from learning from Kerala and Sikkim, in the very same way that the incomprehensibly diverse and massive country of India manages to do in Robinson’s telling? What prevents us from giving the mines to the workers, as the Namibian government and the African Union manages to do in this same novel?
And what stories might we have to tell to make this possible?
{ 17 comments }
RichardM 05.03.21 at 2:28 pm
Nothing specifically, but what makes you think it would address the problem? Unlike in the global South, the median worker in the developed world is already living unsustainably. Power in the hands of the people is still power, and still emits the the same rate.
The only non-genocidal solution to the problem of the unsustainability of the bulk of the population of the developed world is technological. And only political in so far as selecting, funding, developing and adopting the right set of technologies is a political decision.
If you have those technologies, you don’t need radical political change. And if you don’t have them, no amount of radical political change in favor of those causing the problem is going to help.
Tim Worstall 05.03.21 at 4:18 pm
“The agricultural system shifts, switching to the kinds of labor intensive, regenerative agricultural approaches”
More labour intensive farming than India’s current peasant agriculture is a recommendation?
“What prevents us from giving the mines to the workers”
It costs hundreds of millions of dollars to open a mine. It’s a capital intensive operation. That capital must come from somewhere. A workers coop is a lovely thing but one of the attributes is that it doesn’t have much capital. And if a couple of thousand workers did have a few hundred million in capital investing it all in the one mine might not be all that good an idea.
So, the capital must come from outside the resources of the workers of the mine. Which makes the mine a capitalist enterprise in one important sense. That sense being in the use of capital from outside the resources of the workforce. The moment the investors of capital – whoever they are, the state, some pensions systems, big bad capitalists if you like – don’t gain the return on the capital invested then no new mines get opened.
Note that this cost of a mine is not the cost of the underlying resources. The deposit, or the existence of the ore. It’s what it costs to go build the mine, the ore processing equipment, the roadways to haul the ore away and so on.
Brett 05.03.21 at 10:15 pm
That description of the massive, sweeping Indian response to a calamity feels almost dated already. There is a devastating calamity sweeping in India that will likely kill at least a million Indians or more in truth (if not in the official statistics), and the BJP does not seem to be about to lose power over it. Instead, they’re consolidating power.
Gareth Wilson 05.04.21 at 4:38 am
“Meanwhile, the African Union sends drones to remove the guards operating a foreign owned mine in Namibia – ownership of which is then given to the workers,”
“I vote that we sell the mine to the highest bidder and split the price evenly.”
“Seconded.”
Mark 05.04.21 at 6:29 pm
Tim @2
But they’re not building a new mine are they, they’re expropriating it. And – as you note – there are other sources of capital beyond private capital. I guess I don’t understand what point you’re trying to make.
RichardM @1
But in the world we live in it apparently takes radical political change to use the right set of technologies. It’s not an either/or in the way you’ve described.
TTT 05.04.21 at 7:02 pm
“Ministry” is not climate sci-fi, it is climate fantasy. Make that climate YA fantasy.
The point of the book is that a mixture of “just DO SOMETHING!” and well-meaning mass terrorism will surely solve all of our problems within a viewable timeframe. No, really, it’s that simple. There’s a serious shooting killing war and about 98% of that shooting and killing comes from Team Good. The politics of reaction, of resentment, of zero-sum, are absent from this world; Team Good carries out a global eco-superterrorist attack that deliberately mimics 9/11 but is 1,000 times bigger – and all governments and militaries and intel services sleep on it. Mass kidnapping and executions of the richest and most powerful business execs, some running companies that are in effect nation-states of their own, likewise provokes no significant response. A new habitat corridor is created in North America to house a vast host of caribou and deer and wolves and bears that all march into it in lockstep, in some Doolittle / Narnia spectacle, and a local NRA group fights back against this by…. peacefully protesting, then going home!
Bitcoin and geoengineering vaporware plus the complete non-existence of opposition plus an immediate payoff (oh, did I forget that part? The 30-year time lag within carbon emissions doesn’t exist for Team Good. All of their mass killing and kidnapping is shown to be worthwhile when atmospheric carbon levels and average temperatures dip visibly within 5 years) are all that is required to save the planet – it’s so obvious! Why didn’t environmentalists figure that out in the last 50 years? Like, duh!
Tim Worstall 05.05.21 at 11:53 am
” I guess I don’t understand what point you’re trying to make.”
It’s right there in my comment.
“then no new mines get opened”
As the usual life of a mine is around 30 years that’s a certain problem for the medium term future, isn’t it?
J-D 05.06.21 at 12:15 am
Caveat: I haven’t read the book
There is an important difference between the question ‘What prevents people from imagining radical transformations of political/economic/social systems?’ and the question ‘What prevents radical transformations of political/economic/social systems from taking place?’ There is, correspondingly, an important difference between the question ‘Where are radical transformations less difficult to imagine, in the Global North or in the Global South?’ and the question ‘Where are radical transformations less difficult to achieve, in the Global North or in the Global South?’ Even if it were proved (which a single novel could hardly be expected to do) that they are more difficult to imagine in the Global North but less difficult to imagine in the Global South, that wouldn’t demonstrate that they are in fact less difficult to achieve in the Global South but more difficult to achieve in the Global North. A question about why the Global North as imagined in the novel does not learn from the Global South as imagined in the novel is a question about how people imagine, not directly a question about what’s actually going on in the world we’re living in.
J-D 05.06.21 at 12:18 am
That’s true, but its truth is contingent on particular systemic arrangements. People have been opening mines for thousands of years; possibly even for tens of thousands of years. It hasn’t always cost hundreds of millions of dollars to do so. Different systemic arrangements were possible in the past, so it’s not clear that no different systemic arrangements will be possible in the future.
Mark 05.06.21 at 7:35 am
“then no new mines get openedâ€
But as you say, there are a number of different sources of capital, and a (developmental) state in particular could turn the mind over to workers (to run as a co-op that repays the state its capital, among other options.)
Of all the things Robinson and TáÃwò wrote “where do we find capital” does not seem to be high on the list of implausibilities. There’s capital around everywhere.
Tim Worstall 05.06.21 at 3:50 pm
“(to run as a co-op that repays the state its capital, among other options.)”
Then the workers don’t in fact own the mine, do they? The state does.
“People have been opening mines for thousands of years; possibly even for tens of thousands of years. It hasn’t always cost hundreds of millions of dollars to do so.”
The concept of scale might be important here. Sure, they were “mining” tin by collecting alluvial cassiterite out of the stream beds up on Dartmoor millennia back. Newommen’s steam engine was a very substantial, for the time, capital investment required to get the water out of deeper hard rock mines once the alluvial deposits were exhausted.
OK, sure, you can still get alluvial tin over in Bangka and Belitung. When people die – as they do, unshored diggings and all that – The Guardian runs pieces about how Apple is responsible for people mining without capital. Even those folks are reliant on someone having built a tin smelter, that’s not a cheap piece of equipment these days either.
Mining isn’t one of those things with a William Morris arts and crafts financial or capital structure any more.
J-D 05.07.21 at 10:55 pm
Might be? Of course scale is important! So, what’s the largest mine ever operated without an investment of hundreds of millions of dollars?
I haven’t checked. Have you? If you do the homework, please report back.
Grace 05.08.21 at 2:04 am
Thank you so much for this beautiful and insightful essay. You highlighted something I didn’t see in the book. It reminds me of the quote attributed to Fredric Jameson that it is easier to imagine the end of the world than it is to imagine the end of capitalism. It is also easier for us in the “first world” to imagine a full social transformation in India than it is for us to imagine it in the US, because we don’t know it well and thus it’s already to an extent an imaginary space. Or another explanation could be that we think that countries in the global south retain cultures which are more focussed on collective good and less on winner-takes-all, so a social transformation proceeding from that point will be easier.
Thanks again for your insight.
Tim Worstall 05.08.21 at 9:15 am
” So, what’s the largest mine ever operated without an investment of hundreds of millions of dollars?”
“The”? Dunno. But to give an example. South Crofty. This was first opened as a tin mine in the 1600s. Plans are underway to reopen it again. Tens of millions of $ in capital, when fully open and running perhaps 300 jobs including the refining/smelting, not just the mine. That’s to reopen. Much the same minerology at Cinovec in the Czech Republic. Larger, more jobs – couple of thousand maybe. $400 million in capital required last time I looked. That’s to open for the first time.
J-D 05.08.21 at 11:34 am
I don’t know of any way to measure how easy it was, but Margaret Atwood imagined a full social transformation of the US in The Handmaid’s Tale. I’d be surprised if that were the only example from fiction; it’s just the one that happened to spring to my mind.
J-D 05.08.21 at 11:57 pm
Thank you for the example!
So, reopening now will (you inform me, and I don’t doubt it) require tens of millions of dollars in capital.
But surely the opening in the 1600s did not require tens of millions of dollars in capital?
And it’s the selfsame mine?
J-D 05.09.21 at 12:08 am
In a different vein, I offer the example of Edward Bellamy’s Looking Backward: 2000–1887 and its sequel Equality. Surely the number of people who joined the clubs inspired by his work is some evidence of what it was easy for people to imagine?
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