Here’s a piece from my Substack blog. Although the references are Australian, much of the argument is relevant to all the realms of the British King, including Britain
With the death of Queen Elizabeth, the issue of an Australian republic has naturally arisen. The immediately following question is whether we should support a ‘minimal’ republic, as similar as possible to our current system, or replace the Governor-General with an elected President.
The starting point for both monarchists and supporters of a minimal republic is the claim that ‘the existing system has worked well’. This is incorrect in two crucial respects.
First, the current system gives the Prime Minister too much power, and this power has been increasingly abused in Australia and other Westminster systems. The discovery that Scott Morrison had been secretly sworn in to five separate ministries showed that, if the Governor-General had any role beyond that of a rubber stamp, this role had ceased to apply (except for the possibility, discussed later of a repeat of 1975). The increased use of ‘Henry VIII’ clauses, combined with the assumption that the Governor-General will automatically comply with their use by the PM has steadily undermined Parliamentary control.
In the UK and Canada, Prime Ministers who have lost their majorities in Parliament have prorogued Parliament, with the acquiescence of the Queen and Governor-General respectively. Johnson’s action was later ruled to be illegal, but the monarch did nothing to stop it. We need a President with sufficient independent legitimacy to resist improper demands from the PM.
Second, the issues raised by the 1975 constitutional crisis have never been resolved. Should the Senate choose, once again, to block Supply, the same problems would arise. The GG would have to either comply with emergency measures proposed by the PM, or repeat the deception practised by Kerr in 1975 to avoid being sacked. Alternatively, the PM might act pre-emptively, asking the King to appoint a puppet GG (perhaps even the PM themself) before the Senate had time to create a crisis.
The replacement of the GG with a President, secure from dismissal by the PM would alleviate these problems. But this would depend on the President having sufficient legitimacy to rule against the PM where necessary. That legitimacy would be more secure if the President were directly elected than if they were appointed by a backroom deal between the major parties.
First, there is the default assumption in a democracy that the people should choose their rulers. Those who argue that the voters will inevitably get the choice wrong, for example by following the dictates of the Murdoch Press, ought to take the argument to its logical conclusion and support the (essentially) random procedure of choosing a monarch by primogeniture.
Second, there is the practical question of which procedure is more likely to select a political partisan.
The proposal that the President should be chosen by 2/3 majority of the Parliament is far from foolproof. Of the Federal elections since 1975, two (1975 and 1977) have produced governments with 2/3 majorities in the House of Representatives while 1996 came close. The Senate is more evenly balanced, but Labor currently holds barely one-third of the seats. Even more lopsided outcomes have been seen in state election.
On the other hand, there is not much risk that either of the major parties could gain enough support to elect a partisan President, especially given a general presumption that the office should be non-partisan. Suppose that Labor, currently well ahead in the polls, nominated an obvious partisan. Provided the LNP did not follow suit, a respected independent would easily defeat the Labor candidate. Even if both major parties ran candidates, one of them would probably finish third, and an independent would win on preferences.
The final argument is that the idea of a nominated President has already been put to the people and resoundingly defeated. This failed model should not be given a second chance, just because it would suit the political class.
Would the President be too powerful? There is no reason to suppose so. The parliamentary republic with which we share the most history, the Republic of Ireland, has an elected President, and the system has worked very well. Even though candidates for President have been supported by political parties, they appear not to have acted as partisans in office, and have left the running of the country to the PM.
{ 36 comments }
Brett 09.13.22 at 5:15 am
I think you could get the same affect just by more tightly constraining parliamentary procedure in your constitution, and letting your High Court strike down acts and administrative decisions by Parliament if they’re not done properly in procedure.
A PM could ignore it, but a PM that powerful is going to ignore a mostly ceremonial President as well.
MFB 09.13.22 at 8:03 am
Can’t really argue with any of this. It does, however, ignore the sentimental “home country” mood which seems to prevail in much of the populace, and which seems to overrule good sense.
On the other hand, Australia is not an independent country; it is a satellite of the United States. Getting rid of the British monarchical connection would not alter that in any substantial way, in my view. If my view is correct, then getting the monarchical connection out of the way would merely create an illusion of independence. It’s a bit like the “decolonisation” narratives in South Africa, which never address the actual colonisation of South Africa in the contemporary world but merely point fingers at statues and placenames from one or two centuries ago.
P.M.Lawrence 09.13.22 at 10:58 am
“The starting point for both monarchists and supporters of a minimal republic is the claim that ‘the existing system has worked well’”.
No, that is not the starting point for monarchists. Among themselves, monarchists start with a stronger position, which they do not share with republicans, such as a commitment to monarchist principles. What you are describing is the starting point of monarchist engagement with supporters of a minimal republic, often as part of an argument that the latter already have what they want and so need not press their cause.
“We need a President with sufficient independent legitimacy to resist improper demands from the PM”.
Unfortunately, that risks facilitating the reverse: a PM with insufficient independent legitimacy to resist improper demands from the President. This was pretty much how the Prince-President of the Second Republic of France behaved.
“The replacement of the GG with a President, secure from dismissal by the PM would alleviate these problems”.
Only in the sense that sitting on a safety valve does. After all, you want a safety valve that works. This statement assumes that that function is no more than ornamental, that wiser and better heads will always head off any actual need for and use of it.
“The final argument is that the idea of a nominated President has already been put to the people and resoundingly defeated. This failed model should not be given a second chance, just because it would suit the political class.”
The same logic applies just as well to rule out any proposal for a republic. To my mind, though, it is only sufficient to rule out any proposal for a republic within the same generation or so, as not doing so would allow the political class to keep trying until the people got it right, as in the EU treaties with Eire.
“The parliamentary republic with which we share the most history, the Republic of Ireland, has an elected President, and the system has worked very well”.
That does not happen to be the case. I studied the matter last time around, and found to my mild surprise that an Irish researcher had come to a very different conclusion. Unfortunately, I do not have the references to hand, these many years later. Maybe google can help readers with this.
I refer readers to Gibbon’s opening remarks in chapter 7 of his “Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire”, many which remain applicable in many times and places.
Orange Watch 09.13.22 at 11:36 am
I’d quibble that the logical conclusion most easily reached by those making anti-democratic arguments invoking ignorant rubes being manipulated by the Murdoch press would not be a monarchist one, but rather the small-l liberal arbitry classist illusion of meritocracy found in Imperial Chinese bureaucracy or its descendents in modern standardized testing regimes.
Bob 09.13.22 at 5:00 pm
MFB @2: “On the other hand, Australia is not an independent country; it is a satellite of the United States. ”
MFB, can you point to something that Australians would like to do, or refrain from doing, but cannot, because of US control/interference?
Tm 09.13.22 at 5:36 pm
It seems to me that what you need are constitutional reforms that restrict the power of the PM. Whether those reforms necessarily require a president isn’t clear to me, in any case I would like to know more of the specifics of the constitution you propose.
both sides do it 09.13.22 at 8:07 pm
N-thing the “what you seem to what are constitutional reforms” point, with the addition that presidential systems of what’s being proposed in OP (whether elected, appointed, etc.) have been much more unstable and prone to gridlock or failure than parliamentary systems without an executive veto
John Quiggin 09.13.22 at 8:41 pm
Brett @1 & TM@6 It may seem bizarre, but our constitution doesn’t even mention the PM – that’s all a matter of Westminster convention in which the state is the King/GG in Parliament. So codifying the powers of the PM would be hugely difficult. Notionally, the GG has great power, but in the absence of the legitimacy derived from popular vote, they can’t exercise even the minimal checks they should
By contrast, replacing the GG with a President and specifying how they should be chosen is straightforward.
Alex SL 09.13.22 at 9:30 pm
I would be careful with formal institutional arrangements and with too much power conferred to a single person. A prime minister can be deposed by a majority of parliament at any time. A president would presumably be elected for more stable 4-5 year terms, so I would hesitate to give them more responsibility than signing off on laws and giving a New Year’s speech, just to reduce the damage a bad president can do single-handedly. That may also my German bias showing, as having a long-serving president with the strong mandate that flows from direct election didn’t work out well for Weimar.
Then again, many concerns about institutional arrangements are missing the forest for the trees. If a nearly all the voters, media, and politicians are willing to play nice, even weak institutions work well. If at least a third of the voters, media, and politicians are happy to undermine democracy, that democracy is in terminal trouble even with the strongest institutions you could devise.
John Quiggin 09.13.22 at 10:13 pm
@7 You are confusing presidential republics (President has executive power) and parliamentary republics. Parliamentary republics, where the executive (PM) is responsible to the legislature and the President only acts to resolve things when the legislature can’t (eg no clear majority in lower house or conflict between lower and upper houses) have been quite stable. In fact, I’d say the most stable system in existence.
J-D 09.14.22 at 12:11 am
The Australian system doesn’t work well. The UK system doesn’t work well. The Swedish system, the Norwegian system, the German system, the Italian system, the Portuguese system, the Finnish system, the Irish system, the French system: none of them work well. However, all of them mostly work well enough. Changing between one and another of those systems would make some difference, but it wouldn’t make a lot of difference. It wouldn’t be a catastrophe if Australia switched from a monarchy to a republic, it would be an improvement, but it would be a limited improvement, no more a eucatastrophe than a catastrophe.
TM 09.14.22 at 7:54 am
Alex 9: “A prime minister can be deposed by a majority of parliament at any time.”
I don’t think that is the case in Westminster type constitutional systems.
JQ 8: Why is it so hard to work out a real constitution? And why do Anglo people (including of course the US) generally have the shittiest constitutions? Just askin’ ;-)
J-D 09.14.22 at 10:03 am
https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/sn02873/
‘It is a core convention of the UK constitution that the Government must be able to command the confidence of the House of Commons.
‘The traditional position was that a Government that lost a confidence vote would resign in favour of an alternative administration, or the Prime Minister would request a dissolution from the Queen, triggering a general election. …
‘Prior to the 2011 Act, a confidence defeat for a Government could lead to a request for a dissolution of Parliament, as an alternative to the resignation of the Government. … Practice has been that a Government is only obliged to resign (or, prior to the 2011 Act, seek a dissolution) after being defeated on a confidence motion, although a significant defeat on any other motion may lead to a confidence motion.
‘Broadly speaking there are three main types of motion which act as tests of the House of Commons’ confidence in the Government: ‘confidence motions’ initiated by the Government; ‘no confidence motions’ initiated by the Opposition; and other motions which, because of the particular circumstances, can be regarded as motions of censure or confidence.
‘… The defeats on questions of confidence in 1895 and January 1924 led to the resignation of the Government and the defeats in October 1924 and 1979 were followed by requests for a dissolution. …’
(The 2011 Act referred to established fixed terms and thus removed the ability of a government to seek a dissolution as an alternative to resignation; but it has since been repealed, restoring the earlier position.)
Historical practice in Canada, Australia, and New Zealand has been, if not identical, extremely similar.
These CANZUK parliaments don’t have the power to use a no-confidence vote to remove an individual from the Prime Ministership, only to defeat the government as a whole. The government’s alternative to resigning is to request a dissolution (which means a general election follows), but it is possible for the request to be refused, in situations where the relevant monarch or Governor-General considers that there is some reasonable prospect that a new government can be formed which will be able to retain the confidence of the existing parliament without a general election.
Matt 09.14.22 at 10:17 am
TM – the US constituion has the excuse that it was the first of its sort, and the people making it (in addition to facing some real difficulties and serious conflicts of interest) didn’t really know what they were doing, and didn’t really understand what was (very soon) going to happen. It does surprise me, I’ll admit, that the Australian constittuion, which, on paper, seems difficult to change, but significantly easier than the US constitution, has been changed so few times. (When I ask Australians why it’s been so rarely amended, they usually say that it’s because it’s very hard. But it should not be that hard! The problem seems to be psychological, which is, I think, part of the answer here more generally.)
On a broader picture, I think it’s hard in general to make a good constitution that will work. Witness the recent debacle in Chile, where a large majority of people wanted to change the current constitution, but the group that was drafted to propose a new one came up with a fantasy wish-list that could not possibly work as a law, leading to it being defeated handidly. Maybe they will come up with something better the next time around. But the main answer seems to be that it’s a hard task.
John Quiggin 09.14.22 at 11:04 am
Matt: Australia has passed eight amendments since Federation (1901). US has managed twelve in that time, but two (Prohibition and repeal) cancelled out, and one had been hanging around for 200 years. So, both processes are difficult.
J-D 09.14.22 at 11:09 am
There are multiple constitutions which state the powers of the Prime Ministership (or an equivalent position). It would be easy to write text for the Australian constitution based on one or more of these, if that’s what people wanted. The problem isn’t that it’s hard to do it. There are (at least) two problems: one is that it’s hard to do it in a way that works well**, and the other consists of the political difficulties in getting such a change accepted.
** The constitutions which state the powers of the Prime Ministership don’t, in general, work any less well than the Australian constitution, which also doesn’t work well; what they do, as I observed previously, is work well enough most of the time.
Trader Joe 09.14.22 at 11:22 am
@14
As an exercise – try thinking about what’s involved in writing an actual constitution. Your inclination will be to try to anticipate every possible thing that a constitution will need to do when instead what a constitution needs to do is admit that there is no possible document that can anticipate everything and instead has a clear process for dealing with the omissions that will inevitably arise (who decides, how they decide, is it a vote, is it an executive decision etc.).
There is a natural disconnect between creating a flexible living document that can adapt to change and a populace that will want their constitution to provide enduring “solutions” for things that cannot readily be anticipated (particularly if those enduring solutions correspond to their personal politics and preferences).
To use obvious examples US examples things like slavery and gun ownership seemed like items that were such a given the framers couldn’t imagine a world where the former didn’t exist and the latter needed control. A more robust constitution would have provided better solutions than the ones that were utilized (i.e. a war and trying unsuccessfully to legislate). JQs example regarding prohibition is also on point – alcohol use or not should not be an element of a constitution – its entirely a matter of law that should be easily voted for or against as societal values change.
Matt 09.14.22 at 11:30 am
John – yes, but 1) I’m not sure that that’s the right time frame, as opposed to number of ammendments divided by number of years. 2) I don’t think that changing, and then changing back “cancelles out” in this case, where the question is whether something is too difficult to change, and that explains not changing. If anything, it seems to go the other way. 3) Just looking at the procedure, the US constitution should be much harder to change. The Australian constitution requires a majority vote on a referendum and a majority of states to vote for it -so, two majorities. But the US constitution requires a 2/3 vote in both the House and Senate and then ratification by 3/4 of the states. That seems a lot harder! Does it not? This again makes me think that the main issue is psychological. That doesn’t make it wrong, but it seems objectively the case that the US procedure is harder, but has been used more often. (I do think it makes senese to not count the first 10 ammendments to the US constitution since they were passed at the same time as the constitution. But leaving those out, the US constitution has been ammended the equivalent of once every 13 years, and the Australian once ever 15 years, despite having an objectively easier method. Again, that’s not obviously wrong. A lot of things about constitutions were learned between 1789 and 1901, and the circumstances were different, so there’s no obvious “right” number of ammendments to make. But it is the case that it shouldn’t be so hard to make a change as is often made out in Australia.)
soru 09.14.22 at 11:39 am
The danger to democracy comes not from the people who vote, but from the people who count the votes. Recent american history is enough by itself to make the idea of doubling down on that single point of failure unappealing.
Ideally the job would be done by some immortal AI. Doesn’t need to be super-intelligent, but does need to apply logical reasoning to constitutional law in a way that can’t be trivially gamed, or made to produce absurd results.
The technology for that isn’t quite there yet, though might well be surprisingly soon. Automating royalty is probably simpler than automating taxis.
MisterMr 09.14.22 at 11:54 am
J-D at 11 says: “The Australian system doesn’t work well. The UK system doesn’t work well. The Swedish system, the Norwegian system, the German system, the Italian system, the Portuguese system, the Finnish system, the Irish system, the French system: none of them work well.”
Buy according to what parameter this or that electoral system works well/not well?
When I was 18 (1994) we had a referendum to pass from a pure proportional system to a mixed proportional/first past the post one. It was my first vote, I voted for pure proportional but the other side won.
I think that proportional is much better, but a lot of people disagree and it seems we are not going back to proportional anytime soon.
Every 5 years or so we have a change in the electoral law (there was a law that was changed so fast that it was never used).
Some years ago another PM tried another constitutional referendum but failed.
Meloni, who might win big in the next elections, has in her program a constitutional reform from a parliamentary system to a presidential one.
In the meanwhile people bitched that italian politics didn’t work well at the time, and still bitch that italian politics don’t work well, and probably will bitch in the future that italian politics don’t work well.
My opinion is that italian politics (and probably in other countries too) work well, but because people love to speak bad about politicians there is a constant idea that all politicians are bad and the system is not working.
I still think that a pure proportional system would be better (as the first past the post thing disadvantages small but existing points of views), and that parlamentary is better than presidential, because I’m not a fan of strong government, but many are pro first past the post and pro presidential because they want strong governments, that I think is stupid and borderline anti-democratic.
Tm 09.14.22 at 3:52 pm
„On a broader picture, I think it’s hard in general to make a good constitution that will work“
It seems to me that some countries have managed, and others might choose to learn from their experience. The UK still doesn’t even have a written constitution, Australia‘s constitution doesn’t even specify the working of the government, and the US has a ridiculously outdated constitution that is just shitty in so many ways. This can hardly be explained by saying that writing a good constitution is hard.
that is shitty in so many ways th
Tm 09.14.22 at 4:14 pm
J-D For comparison, the German constitution specifies that the government is elected by the Parliament and remains in power until Parliament elects a new government (a deliberate choice to prevent power vacuums). My understanding is that the British PM is not elected but appointed by the Queen (long live the King!) and remains in power until he/she resigns. (Imagine if Trump had become British PM and refused to resign after losing the election… what does the (unwritten (UK) resp. unspecific (AU)) constitution say about that?)
Am I wrong? The quote you offered says that PMs generally resign when they lose the confidence of Parliament but there doesn’t seem to be any binding constitutional provisions to that effect…
Alex SL 09.14.22 at 10:12 pm
I find it funny how often, when some improvement on the situation in the USA is suggested, the reply is to the effect of “that is sooo difficult to do”, when every continental European country (and in some cases nearly every country in the world) manages to do that thing without issue. How can it be so difficult to write a decent, time-appropriate constitution if others have done that again and again throughout the 20th century? In other words, what Tm said. Same for implementing a better health insurance system, etc.
Tm,
As you wrote, part of the arrangement is by unwritten constitution. And I find it difficult to imagine how governing could work in a Westminsterish system if a PM didn’t have majority support.
In practice, PMs are removed even more easily if their “party”, really their party’s representatives in parliament, want them replaced*. Again that would be unimaginable for a president, which is why I would invest that position with as close to zero power as possible.
*) One of the most bizarre aspects of the British and Australian system is the fusion of three completely different roles into one: party leader elected by the party’s members or the federal party congress, leader of the party’s faction in parliament elected by the party’s MPs, and head of government / party’s candidate for head of government at next election nominated by the federal party congress and then winning an election. In Germany those are clearly different roles that may be held by three different people at any given moment, but in the UK, for example, the PM changes not because they lost a coalition partner and thus their majority in parliament, but merely because the governing party wants a new party leader. Weeeird.
J-D 09.14.22 at 11:17 pm
As an exercise, I not only thought about it, but actually wrote one that reflects my thoughts, and–
–after I’d thought about it for a while my inclination was the opposite one, to make it as skeletal as I could. I got it down to a single page.
I wasn’t referring specifically to electoral systems.
About this statement it could just as easily be asked ‘according to what parameter’?
However, suppose for the sake of argument that it’s true that there are multiple systems which do work well. That would still be consistent with the conclusion I drew, that is: ‘Changing between one and another of those systems would make some difference, but it wouldn’t make a lot of difference. It wouldn’t be a catastrophe if Australia switched from a monarchy to a republic, it would be an improvement, but it would be a limited improvement, no more a eucatastrophe than a catastrophe.’
You don’t specify which countries you think have good constitutions that work, or on what basis you’re judging that those constitutions work and are good.
If somebody made the statement ‘In the UK, there is a constitutional document which stipulates that a prime minister can be deposed by a majority of parliament at any time’, it would obviously be incorrect. However, the statement ‘In the UK, a prime minister can be deposed by a majority of parliament at any time’ is close to the truth (technically, it’s the House of Commons which has the power, without the House of Lords, but that’s a mere quibble; also, the power affects the government as a whole and not the Prime Minister individually, and the government can avoid being replaced if it can win a general election, which are important qualifications to the statement but don’t make it simply erroneous). Just because the arrangement is not stipulated in a constitutional document doesn’t mean it doesn’t exist!
Murc 09.15.22 at 2:58 am
As an American, it is kind of surreal for me to see someone going “You know what my country needs? MORE veto points!”
Orange Watch 09.15.22 at 10:34 pm
Murc@25:
As another American: too few veto points is no better than too many. At the extreme it’s autocracy. Too many leads to deadlock, but they’re built into republics for a reason, and it’s entirely unsurprising that the US erred on the side of too many veto points coming out of a revolution against a monarch. It’s also worth pointing out that few veto points do not ensure smooth working either if initial action is difficult; recall that the short-lived first American republic was dissolved and replaced with the second primarily because it could not act effectively. The reason it couldn’t wasn’t an excess of veto points – it had few – but instead supermajoritarian thresholds for its weak government to act at all.
KT2 09.16.22 at 7:29 am
JQ you said “The parliamentary republic with which we share the most history, the Republic of Ireland, has an elected President, and the system has worked very well.”.
Ireland is now up to the 38th Amendment to it’s Constitution.
Relatively. I wouldn’t go as far as P.M.Lawrence in negating JQ’s “the system [Ireland] has worked very well.” to which PML replied “That does not happen to be the case.” I’m more inclined to J-D’s statement “However, all of them mostly work well enough.”
Ireland makes my point;
The process of selecting, communicating, gaining broad concensus to avoid future discensus is more important at this time.
What if Viatlik Butlin, Elin Musk and Clive Palmer decide to spend a billion or three?
Haste! No, process please.
“The Act, which was signed into law on 12 December 1936, was one of two passed hurriedly in the aftermath of [ insert dead monarch, GG, President, crisis here].
(Republic of Ireland Repeals
Executive Authority (External Relations) Act 1936 – Wikipedia below )
JQ’ s statement “On the other hand, there is not much risk” above, doesn’t inspire me with confidence. As…Ireland is now up to the 38th Amendment to it’s Constitution.
In 2001 the ability to investigate and remove Judges was NOT enacted by both houses! ? What the…
“There is no Twenty-second Amendment. The Twenty-second Amendment of the Constitution Bill, 2001 [relating to the removal of a judge from office and providing for a body to be established by law to investigate or cause to be investigated conduct constituting misbehaviour by a judge or affected by incapacity of a judge] was not passed by the Houses of the Oireachtas.
It was not until 2013 Ireland amended the Constitution to include a Court of Appeal, still with the attendant risks of a black letter rukings from the court.
“Thirty-third Amendment of the Constitution (Court of Appeal) Act 2013 [Provided for the establishment of a Court of Appeal]
If Ireland is the best example, I am underwhelmed.
If the process doesn’t provide unity from the start, my kid will still be arguing about this in, as with Ireland, 88 years.
On the other hand, there is not much risk. Didn’t NN Taleb write about that?
*
Republic of Ireland “Repeals
Executive Authority (External Relations) Act 1936
“Executive Authority (External Relations) Act 1936
…”The Act, which was signed into law on 12 December 1936, was one of two passed hurriedly in the aftermath of the Edward VIII abdication crisis to sharply reduce the role of the Crown. It is also sometimes referred to as the External Relations Act.
Executive Powers (Consequential Provisions) Act 1937
“Unfortunately the speed with which the 1936 Act was passed also meant that some serious legal matters had been overlooked by the draughtsmen, touching on the top of the Irish legal hierarchy.
…
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Executive_Authority_(External_Relations)_Act_1936
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Republic_of_Ireland_Act_1948
*
Constitution, Bunreacht na hÉireann,
CONSTITUTION OF IRELAND
January 2020
“Enacted by the People 1st July, 1937
“In operation as from 29th December, 1937
“This text of the Constitution is a copy of the text enrolled on 13 November, 2019 pursuant to Article 25.5.2° except that the Transitory Provisions (Articles 34A and 51-64) are omitted as required by their terms and the Irish text has been altered so as to make it conform to modern standardised Irish.
“Amendments effected since the Constitution was enacted in 1937 up to the time of printing of this edition (January 2020) are listed below.
…
https://www.irishstatutebook.ie/eli/cons/en/html
TM 09.16.22 at 7:47 am
Honest question: what would happen if the British PM refused to resign after losing the Parliamentary majority? Just because this doesn’t usually happen doesn’t mean it couldn’t happen.
23: “in the UK, for example, the PM changes not because they lost a coalition partner and thus their majority in parliament, but merely because the governing party wants a new party leader.” Especially if the new party leader/PM is “elected” by all of 80000 party members. What I find grating is that there isn’t even a pro forma vote in Parliament to give the new government democratic legitimacy. Again, am I wrong? It may be a mostly symbolic difference (as long as the norms are respected) but isn’t it a huge difference whether the government is formally appointed by the monarch or elected by Parliament?
reason 09.16.22 at 7:49 pm
As I posted before, it matters a lot HOW you nominate and elect the president in this case. You want to avoid having a president who is a divisive figure (loved by 50% but despised by the other half). And I’m not convinced the problems you are talking about are serious enough to warrant the dangers inherent in the solution you are proposing. The allegiance of an elected president to the spirit of the constitutional republic is not assured. Protecting the constitutional order surely is ultimately the job of the high court. And as we have seen in both Australia and the United Kingdom, parliaments (if not the parties themselves) respond to unpopular prime ministers quite readily by sacking them.
J-D 09.17.22 at 4:59 am
This is a little bit like asking ‘What would happen if somebody attempted a coup?’ or ‘What would happen if somebody attempted a revolution?’ or, in a vaguer and more general way, ‘What would happen if somebody tried to avoid playing by the rules?’
There are many examples in history of people attempting coups: in a general way, when people attempt coups, one of two things happens: either they get away with it or they don’t. That gives a reasonable basis for a kind of answer to the question of what will happen the next time somebody attempts a coup: either they’ll get away with it or they won’t!
There isn’t the same extensive historical basis for answering the question ‘What would happen if a British government tried to continue in office (without a general election) after losing the confidence of the House of Commons?’ Nevertheless, it is a kind of answer to say: either they’d get away with it or they wouldn’t! However, I think it is possible to give a little more detail of how it would be if they didn’t get away with it: what could easily happen would be a dismissal of the government by the monarch and the appointment of a new one. I think the odds are that the Prime Minister in the new government would then advise the monarch to dissolve Parliament and a general election would be held; however, if there was a clear majority in the House of Commons that favoured keeping the government in office either temporarily to deal with urgent matters or for an extended period, that could happen.
I don’t say that something like this would certainly be the outcome if a government tried to continue in office without the confidence of the House of Commons; it would depend on the circumstances in which the attempt was made, just as the success or failure of an attempted coup or revolution depends on the circumstances.
Of course it’s a difference; in significance, it’s bigger than some differences, smaller than others.
engels 09.18.22 at 6:56 pm
what would happen if the British PM refused to resign after losing the Parliamentary majority?
The King would appoint whoever has the majority.
Ebenezer Scrooge 09.19.22 at 1:33 pm
I would also note that the Israeli presidency has worked quite well for its intended purpose, despite a Knesset that can never deliver a stable majority and a very polarized (over Bibi) electorate.
RobinM 09.19.22 at 10:06 pm
I believe this recent article has not yet been referenced:
José Antonio Cheibub, Fernando Limongi, Adam Przeworski§ “Electing Presidents: A Hidden Facet of Democratization.”
Abstract
A hidden facet of democratization in the world over the past two centuries has been the increased weight of people’s voice in electing presidents. On the basis of new data on all presidential elections in the world since 1789, we show that they evolved from systems in which the final decision was made by someone other than voters, to systems in which the choice of voters was decisive only if it generated a majority, to systems in which the final decision is made by voters. This means that in countries where presidents have executive powers elections may not be the mechanism by which the people, as a collectivity, always selects its rulers, thus violating the fundamental norm of democracy. We document the history of presidential election rules, offer some tentative explanations, and explore the consequences of particular systems.”
Their conclusions are particularly interesting, relevant (to those contemplating instituting a presidential system), and troubling (particularly for Americans).
J-D 09.19.22 at 11:57 pm
It seems as if it should, doesn’t it? Yet experience seems to indicate differently. If you consider the experience of countries where the President is elected by the Parliament on the one hand, and countries where the President is elected by the voters on the other, it doesn’t seem to make a lot of difference.
This is no more and no less true than saying that you want to avoid having a monarch who is loved by 50% but despised by the other half, or a Governor-General who is loved by 50% but despised by the other half. The question is whether a President (under a parliamentary system**) is more or less likely to be divisive than a monarch or a Governor-General, and the evidence isn’t clear that they would be.
Neither is the constitutional allegiance of a hereditary monarch or an appointed Governor-General assured.
Insofar*** as protecting the constitutional order is anybody’s job, it is everybody’s job; and if it’s ultimately anybody’s job, then ultimately it’s the job of the population at large. If the population at large is determined on the overthrow of the constitutional order, then it’s in their power to overthrow it no matter who tries to protect it; but if the population at large is determined to protect the constitutional order, then it’s in their power to thwart any attempt to overthrow it. (Usually the population at large shows little sign of determination in either direction, and not much more sign even of understanding what the constitutional order is.)
Parliaments in more than one country have removed unpopular Prime Ministers from office, but it’s less clear how readily they have done so. Admittedly, they have probably been readier to do so than heads of state; but the comparison reflects a misunderstanding of the key function of a head of state in a parliamentary system, which is not the removal of a Prime Minister at the end of a term of office, but the confirmation of the designation of a Prime Minister at the commencement of a term of office.
** Presidents in executive Presidential systems are naturally more divisive figures than in parliamentary systems, but what they should be compared with are Prime Ministers in parliamentary systems, who are also more divisive figures than heads of state in parliamentary systems.
*** Sometimes the constitutional order shouldn’t be protected; sometimes the constitutional order is bad and should be overthrown.
J-D 09.20.22 at 3:12 am
Few if any people in Australia are advocating an executive presidential system; there is significant support in Australia for a republic, but for a parliamentary republic, not a presidential republic. (There is, admittedly, signficant confusion on this point, in that some of the opposition to republicanism is from people whose only idea of a President is the American President.)
TM 09.20.22 at 9:54 am
Not on topic but I hope you’ll allow it JQ.
On the other thread – now closed – the claim has been hanging in the air that “Some Dems, including the DCCC, gave to MAGA candidates in primaries” . The claim is false and it remains false despite some very misleading media narratives.
A commenter points to a Politico article (https://crookedtimber.org/2022/09/04/who-thinks-who-is-a-threat-to-democracy-part-1/#comment-819291) and since the thread is closed, it’s important to set the record straight. Neither Politico nor any of the other media outlets have claimed that the DCCC gave money to MAGA candidates, because it’s absolutely not true. What has been claimed is that Democrats have been running ads “in support” of MAGA candidates. These are misleading claims to the point of being nonsensical but they have been repeated a lot. Democrats have been running ads accurately describing the political positions of the MAGA candidates and explicitly warning against them. This is what it’s about. None of the ads in question made any positive statements about the MAGAs or heaven forbid made any appeal to vote for them.
Consider one tidbit from NBC: ““How conservative is Ron Hanks? Hanks was rated one of the most conservative members in the state House. He says Joe Biden’s election was a fraud, Hanks wants to ban all abortions and he wants to build Trump’s border wall,” the ad’s narrator says. “Ron Hanks — too conservative for Colorado.”” NBC’s headline: “Democrats boost some GOP election deniers in primaries”.
CTers really shouldn’t promote this particular piece of beltway pundit misinformation.
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