“An ELECTIVE DESPOTISM was not the government we fought for; but one which should not only be founded on free principles, but in which the powers of government should be so divided and balanced among several bodies of magistracy, as that no one could transcend their legal limits, without being effectually checked and restrained by the others.”—Jefferson’s Notes as quoted by Madison in Federalist Papers 48.
Today’s post focuses on the ‘design flaw(s)’ in the US Constitution. It turns out, again, that the system of checks and balances is no such thing. And the reason it is no such thing is because an energetic presidency may overpower the other branches and slide the whole ship of state into a species of despotism (in the technical sense of arbitrary government).
Some libertarians may feel vindicated by the previous paragraph, but it is quite notable that public libertarianism has imploded during the last decade. (About that some other time more.) My own view, which is not original with me, is that the underlying problem is not the size or extent of the government (these may be problems, too), but that the American presidency combines too many functions in one office/person: (i) head of state; (ii) leader of the government; (iii) head of the executive branch/administration; (iv) leader of the party, including fund-raiser in chief. This understates the problem because some American presidents can shape prosecutorial power and parts of the judiciary through a spoils system; and have law-enforcement or trade-policy be directed at partial ends. (And so on.) Since America is still the global imperial power, I don’t mean to deny some of the attractions of this way of proceeding.
When 19th-century liberals (French and English Victorians) contemplated this evolving edifice, which was, of course, not yet reshaped by WWI and the New Deal, they understood the risk of elected despotism and advocated for the separation of the first three of these functions by advocating for a (A) constitutional monarch, who could be a source of (theatrical) unity and be the ‘dignified institution’ of the polity; in particular, the monarch could fill the affective space that a demagogue or cult of personality might otherwise fill. A prime minister who would (B) be politically accountable to fellow politicians and the voters for securing the common good and who could be removed by a majority in parliament (including his/her own party) or by the voters in a general election. (C) A minister of the interior or a high-ranking civil servant who would run the civil service with considerable independence from (A and/or B). (D) A leader of the ruling party who could serve in government or parliament or stay outside of elected office altogether. A very good book on the underlying nineteenth-century analysis is Parliamentarism: From Burke to Weber by William Selinger (Cambridge University Press, 2019; see also Vincent Ostrom (1991) The Intellectual Crisis in Public Administration, 2nd ed, pp. 123-124).