From the category archives:
Academia
Yesterday Columbia University gave in to blackmail by President Trump (see here the letter [HT: NYT]) in order to allow to begin negotiations over the recovery of $400 million in research funding. Its unsigned letter (here HT: Leiterreports) leaves ambiguous which potentially sensible elements they were planning to do anyway (“parts of our comprehensive strategy”) and which parts were added in light of the demands (“several additional actions.”)
The last sentence of the unsigned letter expresses commitment to the university’s mission, “while preserving our commitment to academic freedom and institutional integrity.” While I am no critic of judicious use of hypocrisy, this passage is also a nice example of what has come to be known as ‘performative contradiction.’ If government officials get to dictate to you that certain departments must be put into receivership, and you then go and promise to rejig the curriculum (for ‘balance’), perhaps you should not claim ‘institutional integrity’ or present yourself as a guardian of ‘academic freedom?’
I want to put this episode in a wider context. But before I get there, I make two of my background commitments explicit. First, there is no essential connection between the modern research university and the values of liberal democracy other than, as (recall) Michael Polanyi noted, that they can have the same enemies. The German research university with its cosmopolitan Humboldtian ideal rose and fell in the absence of liberal democracy. The very first modern research university Stateside, Hopkins, was a private institution that was, however, shaped by Jim Crow (and racially integrated rather late in its history).
It’s been evident since Trump’s inauguration that the US, as we knew it, is over. I’ve been looking at some of the US-centred organisations and economic dependencies that will need to be rebuilt. But I hadn’t given much thought to the university sector, where I work, until I got an urgent email asking everyone at the University of Queensland to advise the uni admin if we had any projects involving US funding.
It turns out that Australian participants in such projects had received demands from the US to respond, at short notice, to a questionnaire asking if anything they were doing violated any of the long list of Trump taboos: contacts with China, transgender issues, persecution of Christians and so on.
This is front-page news in Australia but I couldn’t find anything else about it except for a brief story in the New York Times a couple of weeks ago. Presumably, though, this is happening everywhere.
Here are two groups of Western philosophers. We’ll call them Group A and Group B. Here’s Group A:
Plato, Epicurus, Plotinus, Aquinas, Duns Scotus, Francis Bacon, Hobbes, Locke, Spinoza, Newton, Leibniz, David Hume, Herbert Spencer, John Stuart Mill, Schopenhauer, Kant, Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Wittgenstein, Jean-Paul Sartre, Kurt Gödel, Karl Popper, Jeremy Bentham, Alan Turing, Saul Kripke.
And here’s Group B:
Aristotle, Socrates, Descartes, Bishop George Berkeley, Rousseau, Heidegger, Hegel, Marx, Frege, Bertrand Russell, John Dewey, Albert Camus, Frantz Fanon, John Rawls, Willard Quine.
Okay, so: what distinguishes these two groups?
Answer under the cut, but… stare at those two lists. Take a moment; give it a try. Do you see it?
Hints: It’s something pretty straightforward. Frege is an edge case. And while Rousseau is formally part of Group B, he really belongs with Group A.
If you have a guess, put it in a comment, then come and look. [click to continue…]
At the cutting edge of world history and industrial progress back when it was built in 1799, but now Ironbridge and nearby Coalbrookdale are bucolic backwaters where you struggle to get a decent phone signal.
Every time I start writing something about The Situation, it seems pointless. Both the media environment and the world itself seem to be spinning out of control. The bubble of Boomer Realism has been popped. The weirdness which has been bubbling since 2008 has flooded the territory; old maps seem worse than useless. I’ve got nothing better than aphorisms to offer to understand the present.
Thankfully, my job interacting with students and colleagues forces me to be a bit more concrete. I’m very excited about the re-launch of the APSA Experiments Section Newsletter, which I’m editing along with Krissy Lunz Trujillo — check it out here.
But mostly today I want to talk about the graduate seminar I just finished teaching, about Media, Social Media and Politics. The syllabus is here. To summarize what we spent the most time talking about in class, I’ll quote a sentence from Green et al (2025): “The online information ecosystem in the early twenty-first century is characterized by unbundling and abundance.”
A while ago, ALLEA (the alliance of European science academies) published a statement on ethical problems in collaborations between academia and commercial parties.*
With this post, I want to draw attention to this topic (my impression was that it got a bit overshadowed by all the horrible attacks on academic freedom and academic institutions that are currently happening in the US – ALLEA also published a statement on academic freedom in response), but also raise some more questions.
I’ve not been out taking pictures, so here’s another cormorant from the sequence I shot a few days ago.
As I type this, Trump is threatening tariffs on anyone who challenges the interests of America’s technology oligarchs, all of whom are now paying obeisance at this court. Technology is the US biggest weapon against the free world of which it was formerly part, and the right place to fight back. But what can be done?
[click to continue…]
So – Germany has elected, and the results look grim: a huge shift the right, with large wins for a party, the AfD, parts of which have officially been declared anti-constitutional (but a ban does not seem on the horizon). I spent the first few hours after the polls had closed with a group of volunteer election helpers counting votes. I had registered my availability a few weeks earlier, and had gotten a letter that summoned me to appear at 7.30 on election morning in a middle school in a rather diverse neighborhood of the city in West Germany where I spend part of my life. I cycled through the empty city at dawn, we received instructions, and then we had to agree on shifts and it turned out that I wasn’t needed until 1pm. I cycled home and showed up again later.
Quick quiz. Suppose you read a headline in the online version of the Wall Street Journal (or NY Times etc) stating that, from now on, US Treasury bonds would be redeemed in crypto. Would your response be
(i) That’s absurd. Either it’s April Fools Day or someone has hacked the website
(ii) That’s unlikely. Surely [1] Wall Street will be able to kill this crazy idea
(iii) That will be tricky. Which cryptocurrencies will be included and what will be the exchange rates?
If your answer was (i) you can stop reading here (and don’t bother commenting to justify your position). This answer assumes that, despite Trump’s bluster, nothing has fundamentally changed. You’re still in the denial stage, with six more to come..
If you’re answer is (ii) or (iii) you are paying at least some attention. I’ll point to some evidence suggesting (iii) is a plausible answer, and look at what that implies for the global financial system.
Looking specifically at debt, the idea of defaulting on US government debt, or threatening to, has long appealed to Republicans. Here’s a piece I wrote back in 2013 [2] Unsurprisingly, Trump has embraced the idea, suggesting not only that a default might not be too bad, but also that some (unspecified) debts might be fraudulent.
But there are lots of other possibilities. One, raised by Paul Krugman is that the US Federal Reserve might be coerced into understating the inflation rate, thereby reducing the return on Treasury Inflation-Protected Securities.
Another, already taking place, is that the government may be able to coerce private banks into reversing legal payments. Henry Farrell (of CT) and Felix Salmon discuss this here.
The longer-term implication is that the existing global financial system, built around the US dollar can no longer be regarded as a reliable basis for organising trade, investment and banking. Some alternative will have to be constructed at an international rather than global levle. Moreover, this will have to be done on the fly, as the existing system crumbles around us.
This will doubtless be seen as good news for the BRICS countries, which have long chafed under the dominance of the dollar. But the obvious alternative, the Chinese Renminbi (aka yuan) is no better. As well as not being fully convertible, it is subject ot the political control of the CCP dictatorship.
An important point to start with is that the rapid growth in international financial integration that characterised the era of neoliberal globalisation came to an end with the Global Financial Crisis. As in this case, at least part of the adjustment to the end of the US will occur autonomously, as investors either steer clear of US financial markets or decide to play the increasingly corrupt games that will be required to survive there.
In this context, it’s crucial to understand the “weaponisation” of the global financial system, most notably by the US, as discussed by Henry Farrell and Abe Newman. The most striking instance of this so far has beem the seizure of Russian financial assets after the 2022 (further) invasion of Ukraine. Most of these assets were held by EU financial institutions, which Putin imagined to be safe from the US.
Until now, the main complaint of critics about weaponisation of the financial system was that it was being overused in the pursuit of secondary objectives. But with Trump in power, it will be used to do direct harm. Reliance on the US dollar is giving hostages to his regime.
Deconstructing and replacing a global system based on the assumption that the US is a reliable guarantor of stability will be a huge task, but the alternative of a system run by Trump and Musk is even worse.
We need to recognise that the idea of a single global financial system, which has been dominant since the 1980s, is done for. It’s not a loss to be mourned, but that won’t make the task of replacing it any easier.
I’m thinking about an alternative system, centred on the Eurozone, but incorporating other countries that don’t want to be dominated by either the US or China. That’s a mammoth problem
I’ll put up two ideas to start with.
The first is the need for unremitting hostility towards crypto. Should proposals for recognition of crypto as a reserve asset for the US turn into reality. the result will be to make the $US itself useless as a reserve currency. Governments and financial institutions outside the US should be ready to dump dollars if this looks like becoming a reality. In the meantime, financial institutions should be prohibited from dealing with it in any way, and individuals should be required to report crypto holdings and transactions.
My other suggestion is to take seriously a mildly snarky reference, in comments to my Crooked Timber post, to a “Brisbane Woods” conference. (I live near Brisbane, Australia, and the allusion is to the 1944 Bretton Woods conference which established, among other things, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.) These were set up in Washington both because the US was by far the largest contributor and because they could be colocated with the US Treasury. The famous “Washington consensus” of the 1990s referred to the neoliberal policy views shared by these three institutions.
But US contributions have been dropping steadily in both real and nominal terms and will doubtless be cut further by Trump. And proximity to the Musk-controlled US Treasury is now a danger not an asset.
The World Bank needs to move out of the US and drop the convention by which the president is always a US citizen (along with the parallel convention where the IMF managing director is European). Rather than moving to a single new location, both the Bank and the IMF need a more decentralised setup, ideally with significant centres in every continent[3]. This would involve both competition and co-operation with the BRICS group, which shares the aim of breaking with $US hegemony, but is not so keen on legal and democratic governance.
Those items are challenging enough, and just scratch the surface of what needs to be done. But repeating myself from previous posts, the idea of the US as the indispensable centre of a stable and democratic global order is gone for good. The sooner we realise that, the better.
fn1. Quiggin’s Rule of Surely: It’s a Sure Sign that you are not Sure
fn2. I didn’t pick the headline which was overblown even at the time. Now, if we wake up in four years time with Trump gone and nothing worse than a US default to worry about, it will have been the pleasantest of dreams
fn3. Except Antarctica and maybe Oceania, though of course Brisbane would be a great choice.
The UK has recently introduced (via “guidance” rather than legislation) a permanent ban on naturalisation for people who arrive in the UK via “dangerous journeys”. The power used to block their applications is the Home Secretary’s discretion to refuse citizenship to someone of “bad character”. This new policy seemingly conflicts with the UK’s commitments under the Refugee Convention. I’ve a short piece on this at the London Review of Books blog.