The Economist has an “article”:http://www.economist.com/World/europe/displayStory.cfm?story_id=2478574 this week on John Kerry’s popularity with Europeans. The argument is twofold – Europeans are rooting for Kerry to win, but they’re likely to end up disappointed if he does.
bq. whoever is in the White House, tensions between European and American approaches to the world seem sure to persist. The heyday of Atlanticism came to a close with the end of the cold war. … Indeed, in some areas, such as trade, the quarrels between the sides could get worse … Mr Kerry might explain American views more tactfully than Mr Bush. He might even do it in French. But transatlantic tensions would endure.
As a piece of international relations analysis, it’s an odd mixture of the obvious and the wrongheaded. Of course, transatlantic disputes aren’t going to go away if Kerry becomes President. But they’re likely to be transformed – much of the sting will go out of them.
The basic error is a misunderstanding of the issues at stake for the Europeans. These have less to do with substantive differences over policy (although these exist) than with the perception that the current administration is unwilling to take its allies’ interests into account. Elizabeth Pond captures this very well in her recent book, “Friendly Fire”:http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/0815771533/henryfarrell-20, which purports to be a neutral analysis of recent transatlantic disputes, but is really a well argued presentation of the European (and most particularly the German) perspective on recent controversies. As Pond says, the real problem for Europeans has been the unwillingness of the US to accept that its allies should have any real role in decision-making; while the US accepts (and expects) their support, it’s supposed to be unconditional. This is a far cry from the post-war security dispensation, which was built on multilateral institutions, in which the US deliberately sacrificed some of its freedom of action by setting up a variety of multilateral institutions which allowed some role in decision making for the allies, even if the US always remained _primus inter pares_. The current administration has downgraded these structures in favour of ad-hoc coalitions in which allies have little to no real decision making clout; what Pond describes as “hierarchical hegemony,” as opposed to the previously existing “participatory hegemony.”
Here, Kerry offers a clear alternative to the current administration. When he says that he’ll reopen discussions on Kyoto, and will “replace the Bush years of isolation with a new era of alliances,” he’s signalling that he’s willing to play ball with the allies, and to accept that the US can be constrained by international institutions as well as using them to constrain others. Indeed, he points to the need to create new multilateral institutions to deal with emerging international problems. There’s good reason to believe that the Europeans will be prepared to sign on to this agenda; it’s in everyone’s interest to tackle nuclear proliferation and other, nastier problems coming down the pipeline. What they’re looking for is less to dethrone the US (except, perhaps the French elite in its less disciplined daydreams) than to get a US administration that they can work with, which will listen as well as give orders. We’d likely see transatlantic tensions ceasing to be an angst-ridden crisis-in-motion over whether there’s a real set of common transatlantic interests at all. Instead, they’d return to their more usual state of institutionalized grumpiness over anti-dumping measures, burden-sharing and the like (perhaps with the odd missile crisis thrown in for savour).
{ 38 comments }
Chris Bertram 03.06.04 at 10:57 am
As a followup to this, people might want to look at “Joshua Kurlantzick’s piece in the latest Prospect”:http://www.prospect-magazine.co.uk/start.asp?P_Article=12419 about how US foreign policy would have been under Gore. In brief: the same but slower and less less unilateral. I meant to blog this, but I’ve been too snowed under.
John Bragg 03.06.04 at 12:30 pm
We tried “participatory hegemony” as an approach to post-Cold War conflicts and found that it hamstrings American effectiveness without contributing much in the way of capabilities. (Operational planning is disrupted, “allies” leak information to Serbs, benefit from sweetheart oil contracts with Saddam, etc.)
Such an approach was barely adequate in a localized elective war against Serbia. It would be stupid to fight a war that way against a serious military opponent.
The general who told Clark “We read your book. No one’s going to tell us where we can and can’t bomb.” had a point.
Russell Arben Fox 03.06.04 at 1:38 pm
John, whatever one’s opinion of the Iraq war (and mine has changed significantly over the past year), I think it’s important to distinguish between all the different elements which make up “participatory” multilateralism. There are divergent interests and divergent perceptions between Europe and the U.S.; the key is not to make the latter into the former whenever possible. If attending to the latter–as Henry put it, “listen[ing] as well as giv[ing] orders”–sometimes compromises America’s pursuit of the former, there will of course be costs, but those are costs which can and should be built into the decisionmaking equation (which, arguably, was what Blair tried to do in insisting that Bush & Co. go to the U.N.). General Clark may have drawn too broad a point from his experience in Kosovo; clearly his critics are not incorrect that the war could have been fought much differently if it had been a less “participatory” conflict. But compare the first year of postwar Serbia and Bosnia vs. the first year of postwar Afghanistan and Iraq. Perhaps it’s apples and oranges; but I suspect a great deal of the difference can be attributed to different styles of (and hence reactions to) American intervention.
Andrew Boucher 03.06.04 at 4:10 pm
Perhaps I’m misreading the analysis, but I’m not sure I agree with it. I don’t have any links, but according to my (admittedly, perhaps faulty) memory, Europeans *always* complain about the current American President. When Clinton came in, he was compared unfavorably with Bush I. When Bush I came in, he was compared unfavorably to Reagan. When Reagan was in, he was compared unfavorably to Carter. When Carter was in, he was compared unfavorably to Ford. When Ford was in, he was compared unfavorably to Nixon. And so on, probably, back to George Washington. It’s a European strategy – always to complain, because they think it’s the best way to get something.
At the moment Europeans have managed to convince their populations that the problem in the trans-Atlantic relationship is one of Bush’s making. But is that really the truth of the matter? In the Clinton years, they were already complaining about U.S. arrogance (anyone remember Clinton’s cowboy boots at the G7 summit?) and Amerian indifference to Europe (and leanings to Asia). If, as I think likely, Kerry comes in and the problems don’t just go away, it we be seen that there is a structural element and – gasp – the Europeans share some if not much (most?) of the blame.
The Americans used to allow “some role in decision making for the allies” because the allies were involved – putting missiles in Germany required, after all, German agreeement – or had something the U.S. wanted. Now however Americans are a generation if not longer ahead of Europeans in military organization and ability. It is, of course, the right of Europeans to choose to spend less on the military in favor of social spending. But they shouldn’t cry when that has consequences. Europeans just don’t bring much hard-power to the table. No power, no say – except in fairy tales.
james 03.06.04 at 4:22 pm
“No one’s going to tell us where we can and can’t bomb.”
For f**k’s sake.
Henry Farrell 03.06.04 at 4:49 pm
I agree with pretty well everything Russell has to say. The cost of keeping allies happy is a reasonable one for the US to pay under most circumstances (not all). Andrew – I recommend you read the Pond book; it’s quite good on this. She makes a strong case that this isn’t just European allies griping; as she says, Henry Kissinger (who despite his reprehensible politics is no slouch as an analyst of the Europe-US relationship; read his classic _The Troubled Partnership_ ) describes the transatlantic relationship as the worst it’s been in fifty years. Even during the most difficult years of the missile crisis and so on, there wasn’t the existential angst that there is now about whether there should be an alliance at all, or whether the interests of the two continents were just too far apart. Further, I think that your ‘no power, no say’ argument is wrong. Yeah, in military terms, Europe is a pygmy – but it still has a crucial _ex ante_ role in legitimating interventions, and, as Russell says, it has a similarly vital _ex post_ role in picking up the pieces. It should be blindingly obvious at this stage that brute military power on its own isn’t enough to do what needs to be done – so why should we concentrate on hard power alone as you suggest? It doesn’t make much sense in terms either of practicality or of bargaining theory.
wsm 03.06.04 at 5:58 pm
I suspect that transatlantic tensions will decline, but for a reason not mentioned. A large cultural gulf has opened between the US (religious, violent, libertarian, except sexually) and Europe (secular, pacifist, economically statist, sexually libertarian). Kerry is surely much closer to the European position on these types of cultural issues, and will get along with the Europeans (but not the American heartland) for that reason.
John Bragg 03.06.04 at 6:05 pm
RE: Russell Arben Fox’s comparison of postwar Iraq and Afghanistan to postwar Bosnia and Serbia.
As the Dayton Agreement nears its tenth anniversary, Bosnia is still a UN/NATO/EU protectorate divided into three microstates, as is Kosovo five years after that conflict, with no expectation that either society will ever be anything else. One year into the occupation of Iraq, and the three Iraqi groups are hashing out an interim constitution. Afghanistan is as functional as it has ever been, and although the central government’s control over anything outside Kabul is a form of feudalism, the central government has A) not collapsed as some expected and B) successfully removed a regional warlord/governor or two.
It’s not that the Administration isn’t listening. It’s that they listened, and said “No, You’re wrong.”
BP 03.06.04 at 7:37 pm
Andy Boucher wrote:
“At the moment Europeans have managed to convince their populations that the problem in the trans-Atlantic relationship is one of Bush’s making.”
You have some serious subject-object issues here, Andrew. I’m not nitpicking on grammar here, just illustrating that your thinking is on the fuzzy side, and it’s showing through in sentence construction.
BP 03.06.04 at 7:44 pm
Whatever it is you’re smoking, John Bragg, I’d like some too.
Afghanistan is *less* functional than when it was under Taliban rule (they controlled more than just Kabul).
The signing ceremony for the Iraqi constitution for last Friday did not go ahead after the 5 Shia members refused to attend.
Bosnia, on the other hand, is actually becoming a pretty livable place.
Given the choice between moving to Bosnia, Afghanistan, or Iraq, I know what I’d choose – and what you’d choose too.
bad Jim 03.06.04 at 7:51 pm
One might point out that in Bosnia, NATO intervened in a civil war following protracted hostilities between Croatia and Serbia, whereas Iraq was not at war until the Anglo-American invasion.
The NATO casualty rate may also be favorably compared to that of the Coalition in Iraq.
John Quiggin 03.07.04 at 1:33 am
When Clinton came in, he was compared unfavorably with Bush I. … When Carter was in, he was compared unfavorably to Ford.
Evidence for either of these claims?
John Bragg 03.07.04 at 5:18 am
For BP: If your standard of “functional” is controlled by a central government, then Afghanistan was more functional under the Taliban, except for the provinces under the control of the Northern Alliance. But I and most Afghans will take the gladly Karzai government.
As for Iraq, as I said, the three factions are hashing out a constitution. I didn’t say they’ve agreed on it.
Bosnia is livable 10 years into the reconstruction project. With the exception of Sarajevo during the shelling and during World War II, is there any time in the last century when Iraq or Afghanistan was preferable to Bosnia?
For bad jim: If you want to compare casualty rates between 2004 and 1996, do you include the Dharahn bombing or not? I can’t decide if that’s fair–it’s not related to Bosnia, it is related to the, er, Greater Middle East as the new administration phrase runs.
For John Quiggin, I was three years old and cannot remember Carter’s first year. I do remember 1993, however, and the ridicule and abuse that Clinton received for sending Secretary of State Warren Christopher over to listen to the Europeans’ opinions on Bosnia and the lift-and-strike option. Back then, he and Clinton were criticized for not aggressively leading Europe, i.e. telling them what we were damn well going to do and they’d better get on board.
I don’t remember criticism of Bush Sr. in 1989, I was busy starting high school. But my guess is that, in 1989, he was faulted for not giving the kind of moralistic, uplifting speeches that the occasion called for and that Reagan surely would have given. Alternately, he was probably faulted for not embracing Gorbachev warmly enough after Reagan and Gorby had hit it off so well in Reykjavik.
John Bragg 03.07.04 at 5:18 am
For BP: If your standard of “functional” is controlled by a central government, then Afghanistan was more functional under the Taliban, except for the provinces under the control of the Northern Alliance. But I and most Afghans will take the gladly Karzai government.
As for Iraq, as I said, the three factions are hashing out a constitution. I didn’t say they’ve agreed on it.
Bosnia is livable 10 years into the reconstruction project. With the exception of Sarajevo during the shelling and during World War II, is there any time in the last century when Iraq or Afghanistan was preferable to Bosnia?
For bad jim: If you want to compare casualty rates between 2004 and 1996, do you include the Dharahn bombing or not? I can’t decide if that’s fair–it’s not related to Bosnia, it is related to the, er, Greater Middle East as the new administration phrase runs.
For John Quiggin, I was three years old and cannot remember Carter’s first year. I do remember 1993, however, and the ridicule and abuse that Clinton received for sending Secretary of State Warren Christopher over to listen to the Europeans’ opinions on Bosnia and the lift-and-strike option. Back then, he and Clinton were criticized for not aggressively leading Europe, i.e. telling them what we were damn well going to do and they’d better get on board.
I don’t remember criticism of Bush Sr. in 1989, I was busy starting high school. But my guess is that, in 1989, he was faulted for not giving the kind of moralistic, uplifting speeches that the occasion called for and that Reagan surely would have given. Alternately, he was probably faulted for not embracing Gorbachev warmly enough after Reagan and Gorby had hit it off so well in Reykjavik.
Andrew Boucher 03.07.04 at 7:33 am
JQ: As I recall, Clinton was compared unfavorably to Bush I, precisely on the point of willing to discuss and take the advice of Europeans. Bush I used to telephone Mitterand and Kohl often, to take about foreign policy, and that went into decline with Clinton. There was also much talk about American arrogance under Clinton – the American economy was doing so well and Europeans didn’t appreciate the high-handed advice by Americans to Europeans to liberalize their economies.
As for Carter, the Europeans and especially the French thought his emphasis on “human rights” was the worst kind of foreign-policy folly.
Sorry, only my memory on this one.
Joshua W. Burton 03.07.04 at 8:53 am
Isn’t it clear to everyone that the turning point in the transatlantic relationship was Srebrenica? For two years bipartisan US opinion was solidly behind allowing the Bosnian Muslims to rearm, but instead we had to sit back and watch the Dutch (foreseeably!) out-Shatilla Ariel Sharon, then listen to the French lie about it.
Participatory hegemony presupposes a common _moral_ framework, and even on the American left, a lot of us just don’t quite see it anymore. Particularly, if we’re going to engage in Muslim nation-building (Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq — it does seem to be what US armies are for, nowadays), we’d rather meet the Muslim presumption of bad faith with our own awkward baggage, not yours.
nick 03.07.04 at 5:38 pm
I’m actually in agreement with those like wsm who see this primarily in terms of cultural, rather than strictly political differences. The occupant of the White House and his policies present a partial image of the US to the world, which is by (unfortunate) necessity extrapolated into a more totalising one. Under Bush II, the US seems like a more alien place than it did under Clinton (or even under Bush I). There’s less room for the perception of detente.
My vague teenage memory of British perceptions of Bush I — and this was in a pre-Web media climate where the day-to-day intricacies of American politics were much less obvious — emphasised his supposed detachment more than anything else.
The game has changed over the past decade: instant online access to US media turns the rest of the world into engaged observers of the game.
ginger 03.07.04 at 6:29 pm
When Clinton came in, he was compared unfavorably with Bush I.
Huh? Never heard that.
That’s so funny really, that some people are saying Clinton was disliked in Europe, when it was the exact opposite. He was even too little criticised really. Especially after he teamed up with Blair during his golden period. And even during Kosovo, there was very little criticism of that war compared to Iraq, even in Europe. Clinton had got full backing from NATO and all the left-wing governments in Europe at the time. Only the German Greens raised a stink.
(Not to mention it wasn’t even Clinton but Blair calling the shots there.)
Anyway, at popular level, Clinton sure enjoyed a lot of affection from Euros too. I remember when he came to visit Ireland (before going to Northern Ireland for talks), and I was staying at a friend’s in Dublin and he paid a visit to the pub just round the corner. Soon as the rumour spread, was a huge queue outside, you’d think there was some rockstar inside, heh… Celebrity cult, tsk…
Seriously, compared to the lack of interest or overt dislike for Bush’s visit to the UK recently, it’s a huge difference in reactions. Not entirely Bush or Clinton’s own doing, of course. But Clinton was a lot more skilled in PR and Euro-courtship, for sure.
He hasn’t been called the “European President” for nothing, has he? Or has everyone forgot that too? :)
I doubt Kerry would ever match Clinton’s popularity, but he would probably be more overall liked than Bush.
It’s more a matter of apparently superficial things like image, language, attitude, PR rather than actual policies, but all that is not so irrelevant either. Like Henry said.
linden 03.07.04 at 7:17 pm
And yet it was under Clinton that the US was condemned as unilateralists and the “hyperpower” label was created.
linden 03.07.04 at 7:24 pm
‘As Pond says, the real problem for Europeans has been the unwillingness of the US to accept that its allies should have any real role in decision-making; while the US accepts (and expects) their support, it’s supposed to be unconditional.”
Frankly, this entire comment is fantasy thinking.
ginger 03.07.04 at 8:19 pm
And yet it was under Clinton that the US was condemned as unilateralists and the “hyperpower†label was created.
When, and about what?
I remember a Time cover with “World Supercop” headline back in the late 80’s, before or around the First Gulf War. And lots of similar articles talking of the role of the superpower etc. looong before that.
Actually, it’s been going back decades.
ginger 03.07.04 at 8:20 pm
… First Gulf War which was ’91, I know, but I’m not sure if the Time cover was a few years before that,is what I meant.
Randy McDonald 03.07.04 at 10:12 pm
watch the Dutch (foreseeably!) out-Shatilla Ariel Sharon
That analogy would only hold true if the Netherlands was an ally of the Bosnian Serbs, having invaded Bosnia in order to secure territorial and ideological goals, and being inherently hostile to Bosnian Muslim aims.
As it was, with less than a hundred lightly-armed troops in the enclave, going on the offensive would only have invited a further massacre of the Dutch UN troops.
They should have been much better supported, by their own nation and by the broader community, but that’s a different action altogether.
Doug 03.07.04 at 10:23 pm
Henry, the transatlantic relationship can be at its worst point in 50 years (Kissinger’s take) because there are no longer any structural limits to how bad it can be. Now that the Warsaw Pact and the USSR are no longer Over There, relations among the allies can get as bad as people want to make them.
I think that’s one reason things have gotten a little better in the last six months or so. In the run-up to Iraq, everyone got out of hand and no one had really come to grips with the fact that there isn’t any bottom that things will automatically bounce off of.
If France’s role in the world is to limit US power – as some people in high positions there were known to say in late 2002 – then that role will carry costs, and damage to transatlantic cooperation is clearly one of them.
As I said, both sides seem to have stepped back a bit because they have seen the abyss that it’s possible to leap into. A change in tone under a Democratic president would also bring benefits.
(Two minor items in parentheses: 1. The US veto of Caio Koch-Weser to head the IMF was just one example of US “arrogance” under Clinton. 2. Happy talk about Kyoto is a freebie for Kerry; the Senate had a 95-0 resolution against it, and there is no way in hell that Kerry would invest the political capital necessary to overturn that set of opinions. So he gets to score points against Bush while knowing he won’t have to do anything about it. Hey, if you can’t take cheap shots as an opposition candidate, what’s the point?)
Joshua W. Burton 03.07.04 at 11:39 pm
_watch the Dutch (foreseeably!) out-Shatilla Ariel Sharon_
…
_That analogy would only hold true if the Netherlands was an ally of the Bosnian Serbs, having invaded Bosnia in order to secure territorial and ideological goals, and being inherently hostile to Bosnian Muslim aims._
Two out of three, is the way it looks from this side of the Atlantic. (And “territorial and ideological goals” is a sufficiently farfetched description of Begin’s/Sharon’s/Gemayel’s ill-fated campaign that no. 2 is also a wash in my view, but let’s not go there today, if you don’t mind.)
As the noose contracted around those “safe zones”, the suspicion that our NATO allies were callously pro-Serb, for basically Godfrey of Bouillon’s reasons, was certainly in frame. The inquiry report, which used to be available at
http://www.haverford.edu/relg/sells/srebrenica/srebrenica.html
(link to French hearings now appears to be broken, sorry!) makes it clear that there was no shortage of military power, only a manifest absence of will, which also conveniently aligns itself with Europe’s long prior refusal to let the Bosnian Muslims defend themselves.
But let’s forget the dark suspicions and innuendoes, and stipulate that Europe was powerless to protect the safe areas. Even at that reading, why should a nation with the will to support the (more-than-equally untenable) Berlin airlift, continue to yoke itself to allies who were powerless in their own back yard, and who _still_ show scant signs of remorse a decade later?
ginger 03.08.04 at 7:29 am
“powerless in their own back yard”
Joshua, I believe that’s a copyrighted phrase. Not sure who you should cite as the copyright owner, but a copyright note is not to be omitted anyway.
suspicion that our NATO allies were callously pro-Serb
Hmm? Oh they were so pro-Serb that Blair wanted to send in ground troops, and the Americans had to tell him to calm down…
But if you’re looking for the country that had more perplexities not so much about the need to stop the massacres but about the opportunity to grant Kosovo independence by dealing with the KLA terrorists, it’s Israel – just to quote at random, from Slate:
As it turns out, those reports were not so unfounded, and Sharon’s position was not entirely a matter of “courting the far right wing and anti-Muslim sentiment” either. Kosovo is now ethnically clean of Serbs, and the same mujahedeens that fought in Afghanistan also went to aid the mujahedeens (NB: not regular Muslims, but the jihadists) in both Bosnia and Kosovo.
And that’s one item that never bothered NATO, either its US or European members. In fact, there were reports (half-unsubstantiated) that the muhajedeens in Kosovo had been helped just like the ones in Afghanistan had.
So maybe you got your memories of the subject a bit mixed up there.
Joshua W. Burton 03.08.04 at 9:04 am
I’m not sure why we keep jumping from Bosnia to Kosovo; the new “hierarchical” paradigm of US/EU military cooperation was already mostly in place by the time of the latter, largely as a result of the catastrophic, avoidable events of the former.
Israel and the Balkan Muslims: not sure of the relevance of this, either; I brought in Sharon solely as an epithet tuned to jar the European ear. But here’s a newswire from the 1995 era, concerning the Bosnians and the Israeli PM who came to their aid while Janvier fiddled. Scroll down to item 10, the last entry for SE Europe.
http://www.b-info.com/places/Macedonia/republic/news/95-07/jul19.mak
ginger 03.08.04 at 10:50 am
Joshua: Bosnia and Kosove were different but also similar in many respects, and in this context of US-Euro relations they’re both often cited as instances of “powerless in their own backyard”. That’s why I jump from one to the other.
But of course Bosnia was even more of a mess. I’ doubt it would have been an easy situation for US alone even if it had been in their own “backyard” (not to mention the Balkans are not anyone’s backyard…). Many mistakes were made, many contrasting interests were at play, but you don’t “solve” ethnic conflicts degenerated into massacres by external intervention that easily. Especially where sovereignity and independence issues are involved.
I mentioned Israel because I happen to think the position of some Israeli government officials at the time, like Sharon, was justified by factors that both the US and NATO at large happily ignored. I also remember, in the cse of Kosovo, the reformists like Rugova weren’t too happy to have NATO deal with the KLA instead of other, democratic, forces. That the KLA had received assistance from German and US services amongst others is not a secret either.
So to hear that European countries within NATO were more reluctant to intervene than the US because they tended to be more “pro-Serb” sounds plain ridiculous.
A belated intervention, or hesitation, does not in itself equal “pro-Serb”. Germany for one had no interest in seeing a big Serbia, and was all too happy to help the dismemberment of Yugoslavia.
As for the item in that link you mention, how is that in contradiction with what I wrote? I never meant to imply any idea that Israel was *hostile* to the Bosnians or Kosovars per se, or merely knee-jerk anti-Muslim, or didn’t want a solution to the massacres and humanitarian problems. Point was: there were also, within the Israeli government of the time, more concerns (and very sound ones, in my view) about the kind of people NATO chose to have diplomatic talks with on the Kosovar side, in particular, about how those talks were carried out, and about the implications of granting independence by conceding to self-proclaimed leaders of a group which was actually a terrorist group, and had been overtly listed among terrorist groups by the US too, just before the negotiations with them started. That’s an entirely different issue than, and not in contradiction with, offering humanitarian aid to refugees.
Those concerns were totally overlooked by both the US and its European partners within NATO. In Bosnia and then Kosovo there were indeed organizational bases for Islamic fundamentalist terrorism, as in Afghanistan. Yet, neither the US or Europe had any qualms in dealing precisely with that kind of people. There should have been MORE prompt intervention for humanitarian goals, but a little less cynicism or calculations that led to empowering the wrong people. In this respect, I find both the US and Europe to blame in the very same way.
I hope that’s clearer.
ginger 03.08.04 at 11:04 am
A few more references:
http://www.acpr.org.il/publications/policy-papers/pp109-xs.html
http://www.ict.org.il/articles/mediaarticledet.cfm?articleid=2
http://www.balkanpeace.org/rs/archive/sep03/rs230.shtml
Joshua W. Burton 03.08.04 at 2:28 pm
_But of course Bosnia was even more of a mess. I’ doubt it would have been an easy situation for US alone even if it had been in their own “backyard†(not to mention the Balkans are not anyone’s backyard…)._
The theory being that the Adriatic is to Europe what the blue water is to us?
Turkey is (or had better be, for your own sakes!) on its way into the EU, and Greece (along, now, with Slovenia) is a full member state. If the citizens of European democracies do not feel a special geographical obligation to foster democracy _even within historical Europe_, then it’s silly to talk about a transatlantic alliance based on shared values. The last two US administrations may accuse each other of botching Haiti, but neither would dream of asserting that it’s someone else’s problem, because the Florida voters would punish anyone who made such an assertion.
This isn’t just, or even primarily, about flexing military muscles. The US takes a (sincere, if sometimes counterproductive) long-term interest in the Mexican economy, because it’s better for both countries if we create good jobs at Mexican wages there than bad jobs for illegal immigrants at Mexican wages here. How much is France investing in job creation in the Maghreb? Why isn’t there a BMW plant in Egypt or Turkey? (Well, there _is_ one in Egypt —
http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2003/664/ec5.htm
— but it’s not on anything like an export scale.)
The less you ask yourselves questions like these, the less interesting the old alliance looks from our end.
Sebastian Holsclaw 03.08.04 at 5:37 pm
“The basic error is a misunderstanding of the issues at stake for the Europeans. These have less to do with substantive differences over policy (although these exist) than with the perception that the current administration is unwilling to take its allies’ interests into account.”
So say some of the Europeans. The substantive differences over policy drive the perception. France especially acts as if it should have nearly a veto power though its actual contributions are small. The problem of substantive differences is that Europe wants the US to cease operation if there are substantive differences. Europe also wants to use the US military because it needs to avoid spending money on a military in order to prop up the socialized state–see why ‘NATO’ in Kosovo really meant the US fights, Europe mops up.
The substantive difference in the War on Terror is that most European governments are not interested in the change needed in the Middle East to minimize violent terrorism. There is constant whining that Afghanistan isn’t being effectively dealt with, but Europe doesn’t offer to increase troop levels, Europe doesn’t offer to double the money outlay.
So either the complaint is empty, or the commitment of Europe is empty.
This problem is repeated in numerous debates. Europe wants ‘consultation’ (which means a near veto or it apparently doesn’t count) but it doesn’t want the cost of doing difficult things. The US feels it is getting very little help, so it wants very few restrictions.
It is a feedback loop. The US does something and gets little help with many restricitions. So it distances itself from the restictive institutions, which then are even less interested in giving even token help. Repeat.
I’m sure you want the US to break the cycle. It gets to do everything doesn’t it? ;)
ginger 03.08.04 at 11:37 pm
The theory being that the Adriatic is to Europe what the blue water is to us?
I’m not sure what you mean. I just meant that phrase, “powerless in their own backyard”, means nothing, is a cliché, and an overused one, and a rather hypocrite one too.
Bosnia and Kosovo were in what once was Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia back then had sovereignity.
Who’s telling Putin to “stop messin’ with the Chechens” right now? No one.
Whether it’d be right or wrong to step in – the thing is Russia has sovereignity over Chechenya.
You can’t overlook that, so I don’t know how it can be overlooked that Yugoslavia had sovereignity back then.
Whatever was going on, whatever the goals of intervention, even with the most justified aims and concerns – you can’t just invade a country like that by pretending it’s your own backyard when it’s not. You have to at least deal with that matter. And that takes time. You don’t want to go in and start bombing and come up with something worse than before. Right? Also, I seem to recall the US had very direct interests in the area, so, if they ALSO took their time to consider the issue, it means, there were things to consider… no?
You make it sound as if we’re talking of something quick and easy like stopping kids from picking a fight in the schoolyard. We’re talking ethnic wars.
Or maybe that “powerless in their own backyard” refers to… the incapacity to *prevent* massacres from even happening? Was that even possible? And again, should that not have been the responsibility of those who committed them, first of all?
Grozny was razed to the ground, talk about massacres there… It was probably even worse than Bosnia and Kosovo put together.
Yet no one raised any concerns to Putin because everyone accepts Putin has sovereignity over Chechenya.
Now, I’m not saying who’s right or wrong or what needed to be done, I am not interested in that because I hardly think it’s that simple – I just would like to know what the criteria for external intervention are here.
Turkey is (or had better be, for your own sakes!) on its way into the EU
Meaning?
If the citizens of European democracies do not feel a special geographical obligation to foster democracy even within historical Europe,
Rhetorics, rhetorics… that phrase also means nothing at all. Who’s not fostering democracy in Europe? How? What kind of instances are you thinking of? Are we talking the same real world here?
The last two US administrations may accuse each other of botching Haiti, but neither would dream of asserting that it’s someone else’s problem, because the Florida voters would punish anyone who made such an assertion.
What’s that got to do with anything discussed here? Apples to oranges. You can’t compare the US to the EU and you can’t compare Haiti to Kosovo.
But if the *very same situation* as took place in Kosovo had happened in “the US backyard”, I wonder, what exactly would have been expected of the US.
– I was going to mention Argentina, Chile, El Salvador, but that’d be too cruel really…
ginger 03.08.04 at 11:42 pm
The US feels it is getting very little help, so it wants very few restrictions.
It’s the opposite, and it’s always been so: the US wants very few restrictions, so it is more than glad to do the biggest share of the action, especially from a military point of view.
Which only makes sense for a superpower. It’s in the US’ own interests. It would be so naive to think otherwise.
– Incidentally, “very little help” is a bit dismissive, since the UK and several countries’ forces are still giving some not so irrelevant help in Iraq, Afghanistan, Kosovo, etc. and it’s been acknowledged by the US officials and there’s a lot of collaboration on the ground –
ginger 03.08.04 at 11:45 pm
… wake up folks, US-Europe bickering* is so 2003. Not that you’d know if you keep reading certain op-ed rhetorics, of course, they struck a vein, why not keep at it…
(*and looking at it from a non-US & non-European p.o.v., I gotta say it’s so funny)
Sebastian Holsclaw 03.09.04 at 8:40 am
Very little help is descriptive, I’m not being dismissive.
I have no idea what US interests in Kosovo you are talking about.
‘Powerless in their own backyard’ meant that when they wanted to do something about Croatia/Kosovo/Bosnia the Europeans were incapable of doing anything until the US stepped in.
I have no idea what you point on Yugoslavian sovereignty is. We don’t interfere with Russia because it is large more than because it has ‘control’ of Chechenya. It is the same reason why China is allowed to commit genocide in Tibet. Welcome to the real world.
The quote on inability to prevent massacres wasn’t from me, but it pretty clearly points to the Srebrenica massacres which took place under the watchful eye of the UN, even though they were specifically in place to provide ‘safe zones’.
“Whatever was going on, whatever the goals of intervention, even with the most justified aims and concerns – you can’t just invade a country like that by pretending it’s your own backyard when it’s not. You have to at least deal with that matter. And that takes time. You don’t want to go in and start bombing and come up with something worse than before. Right?”
Sure, but the European Community could not act at all without the US. They either didn’t have the capability or they didn’t have the political will or both. Without the US stepping in, there would still be genocidal acts in Kosovo. Actually that might not be true, Milosevic would have killed everyone he wanted to kill by now. The European response in ‘its own backyard’ was completely contingent on convincing the US to use its military.
ginger 03.09.04 at 10:54 am
Sebastian: the US is a superpower and has strategical interests everywhere, interests that areas do not get unsettled in ways that can affect other areas… All countries have those interests. The US more than anyone because it holds more power. Plus, the Balkans is and has always been a crucial area in many aspects, both geographically and politically and economically.
I can’t sum all that background up for you if you have no idea… No wonder you don’t get my point.
‘Powerless in their own backyard’ meant that when they wanted to do something about Croatia/Kosovo/Bosnia the Europeans were incapable of doing anything until the US stepped in.
Exactly, and that is largely a cliché, because it was the US themselves who wanted to be at the lead of the intervention there, because of those interests. So both the US and European members of NATO decided to intervene when it suited them, when they could, when inaction could no longer be justified, etc.
If only it was always so black-and-white as to be a matter of “so guys, when do we go in, and what have you been waiting for?”
You’ve got to look at the reasons why those massacres occurred. You’ve got to consider that situation, what it was about, how it developed. You can’t remove the primary responsibility from the direct players to attribute it to outsiders.
I have no idea what you point on Yugoslavian sovereignty is. We don’t interfere with Russia because it is large more than because it has ‘control’ of Chechenya. It is the same reason why China is allowed to commit genocide in Tibet. Welcome to the real world.
Exactly, you’ve made my point clearer for me. Russia is more powerful than Serbia back then, so we don’t dare touch it. Ditto for China. Sovereignity, AND bigger power.
Don’t you see, that also voids the moral AND practical premises on which one can indict those who are said to have been “powerless in their own backyard”?
The quote on inability to prevent massacres wasn’t from me, but it pretty clearly points to the Srebrenica massacres which took place under the watchful eye of the UN, even though they were specifically in place to provide ‘safe zones’.
I think that’s another cliché way to look at it, oversimplified really. WHY did those massacres occur in the first place? Because the UN was there but didn’t do enough? Or because those committing the atrocities had turned that ethnic war into a jungle of atrocities, indeed?
I’m not defending the UN or anyone, mind you, we all know how the UN is powerless and often chooses to be powerless. Plus, the UN is not a military force. But the point is, you’ve got to look at the primary responsibitlies, primary situation. And see what a terrible mess it was. A mess that was the doing of those who directly created. And for all the faults of the UN or NATO or whoever, it wasn’t their own direct making at all.
I don’t see how that can be ignored.
Sure, but the European Community could not act at all without the US. They either didn’t have the capability or they didn’t have the political will or both.
Back then, NATO counted more than the EU. And NATO included the US. Has it occurred to you that maybe, the US – government, services, authorities, policy-makers, etc., not opinionists or think-thank writers, mind you – didn’t intervene before because it didn’t want to, or couldn’t find the suitable ways to, or was waiting to see how the situation evolved within that sovereign country?
Without the US stepping in, there would still be genocidal acts in Kosovo.
Actually, the killing and refugee problems increased after intervention, and Kosovo is still a terrible mess, but anyway…
Actually that might not be true, Milosevic would have killed everyone he wanted to kill by now.
He wasn’t the only one doing the killing. Just like the Russians were not the only ones doing the killing in Grozny.
It’s both cases of full-blown, internal, ethnic conflicts, within sovereign countries, not one country against another.
It’s not easy in terms of international law, politics, strategy, to deal with such issues, even aside factors like power and interests.
By the way, what’s happening to Mugabe? Is he still there? That’s not even a big powerful country like China, right? So what’s up with that?
Sebastian Holsclaw 03.09.04 at 5:36 pm
“Exactly, and that is largely a cliché, because it was the US themselves who wanted to be at the lead of the intervention there, because of those interests. So both the US and European members of NATO decided to intervene when it suited them, when they could, when inaction could no longer be justified, etc.”
Completely wrong. The US was not particularly interested in going in to the Balkans for almost a year. If Europe had the capability and/or desire to go in, they had plenty of time. The US absolutely did not go rushing in.
Your response to my comments on China and Russia doesn’t make any sense. You say: “Don’t you see, that also voids the moral AND practical premises on which one can indict those who are said to have been “powerless in their own backyard”?”
No I don’t see that. The Balkans was not as powerful as China or Russia. The area was just about as weak as is possible. Europe could not or would not intervene EVEN IN THE EASY CASE.
I don’t know how you can be so misinformed about a well reported case like Srebrenica, but I suggest that Google is an excellent resource.
“It’s both cases of full-blown, internal, ethnic conflicts, within sovereign countries, not one country against another.”
Yeah, and you clearly aren’t willing to admit that it had quite a bit to do with a combination of Milosevic’s incitement and Europe’s indifference. For you everything is about the US and how the US should be doing something. Fine, then let us do something and get out of our way.
And as for Mugabe, France and most particularly Chirac is protecting him. The US doesn’t see the need to defy Europe when our strategic interests are not in play. Once again you want the US to fix everything. This illustrates my point, not yours. International problems don’t typically get fixed by Europe. The US isn’t getting involved against Mugabe therefore the killings continue. That supports my thesis, it doesn’t help you at all.
ginger 03.09.04 at 8:25 pm
Ok, I’m “completely wrong” then, Sebastian. Just because you can’t see that the fact that Serbia was not as powerful as China has nothing to do with how “easy” or hard it was to “go in”.
That “go in” presumes military intervention, right?
Now, the EU has no European Union Army, right?
And back then, NATO still counted something as military alliance, right?
And who’s at the head of NATO?
If you don’t see the role the US interests played there, Sebastian, I can’t help you. We’re talking different planets, apparently.
I’m talking of the wider strategy and intervention in that area, not Srebrenica itself. I’m not disagreeing with statements of fact on what occurred. Merely with interpretations taking the moral high ground on what-could-have-been-done while a) overlooking responsibilities from those directly responsible for the massacres and b) ignoring those wider strategies, factors, and the blatant difficulties of any intervention into an area seized by ethnic conflict.
The fact that China and Russia are more powerful is not relevant to how much more “difficult” it’d be to “go in” – it’s relevant to the fact no one has any INTEREST in going in.
The difficulty in all cases would still be there, intrinsic to the nature of ethnic conflicts.
It’s the motivations for intervention, or lack of it, that change.
Yeah, and you clearly aren’t willing to admit that it had quite a bit to do with a combination of Milosevic’s incitement and Europe’s indifference.
Riiight, now turn me into a Milosevic apologist while you’re at it…
For you everything is about the US and how the US should be doing something.
No, you got it all wrong. I’m not a kneejerk antiamerican, unless you want to picture me as one, be my guest. All I said was, the US was not disinterested in what was going on in the Balkans, and did not merely “go in” after Europe had shown it was “powerless in their own backyard”. That’s a naive reading, because the US were very much following what was going on since the start of that ethnic conflict, and were also playing a role in aiding different factions at different times.
It’s clichéd, and also contradictory, to see the US in this story as the indifferent bystander, who only comes in dragged by the shirt by the petulant euros who can’t solve their own “backyard” problems. The US did not want anyone to “go in” if it wasn’t them leading the effort on their own terms. Which is understandable after all.
And no, this does not excuse the European countries who also played their roles into the Balkans conflicts, since their origins, not by belated intervention or indifference to massacres. It goes back a long, long way.
So I’m not taking an anti-US or pro-Euro position at all, Sebastian, understand that.
I’m pointing out it was all a lot more complicated than “powerless in the backyard”.
And as for Mugabe, France and most particularly Chirac is protecting him.
Oh, ok…
The US doesn’t see the need to defy Europe when our strategic interests are not in play.
Interesting… I hadn’t heard this reduced version, well it sure makes it all simpler, doesn’t it?
Once again you want the US to fix everything.
Nope.
I am addressing your points, not “the US”. I wasn’t even thinking the US should intervene against Mugabe. It could be the UK, for instance. But no matter who takes action, what kind of action do you envisage? And isn’t it belated already? And why do you seem to be more cynically accepting of the difficulties/lack of interests/lack of strategies about Mugabe, than about the belated intervention by *all* in the Balkans?
By what kind of standard one can judge powerlessness, or choices not to intervene?
International problems don’t typically get fixed by Europe.
No, indeed. Did I say otherwise?
The US isn’t getting involved against Mugabe therefore the killings continue.
Not necessarily a causal relation. They killings continue because there’s people killing. No one decreed the US should be the policemen of the world, I certainly don’t think so. Not necessarily?
But Europe should?
What’s the standard, in other words?
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