The news that the EU Commission has recommended opening accession negotiations with Turkey can scarcely have come as a surprise. Over the past year, the Turkish government has made it clear that it will not let any of the longstanding obstacles – Cyprus, the role of the military, penal code reform – stand in the way of its case for admission. The remaining obstacle is the EU Summit in December. Based on the past behavior of the EU, the most likely outcome of the Summit is inglorious muddling through, with negotations opening subject to some sort of backdoor being left open for a withdrawal on the EU side. But the nature of the process is such that the moment to use the backdoor will probably never come. And by the time the negotation process is finished in 2015 or so, the EU (assuming it survives more immediate challenges like the constitution) will have moved beyond the point where a single-country veto is feasible.
The problem for the opponents of Turkish admission is that they are relying on a mixture of arguments that would work well in a standard political process, but not in the more rule-bound setting of the EU. The arguments that get popular backing are those based on racial and religious prejudice – Christian Europe and the claim that Turkey is not a European country. The arguments that can be avowed explicitly are those concerned with economic impacts. In general, racialist politics relies on a mixture of the two, with openly stated economic concerns allowing coded appeals to racism. But the EU process tends to push these things into separate components.
Leaving aside its evident historical falsity, the argument that Turkey is not part of Europe has already been lost. The EU rejected Morocco’s application for candidacy on this basis, but accepted Turkey’s.
As the debate over the EU Constitution showed, there is no way Europe is going to reclaim the mantle of Christendom. And while local politicians can ignore the geopolitical folly of rejecting Turkey on religious grounds, a summit meeting of EU heads of government cannot. So the best the opponents can do is raise as much trouble as possible over the economic problems of admitting Turkey.
The economic arguments are mostly weak. The biggest issue is that of labour mobility. Opponents raise the spectre of a European labour market flooded with unskilled Turkish workers. Given the precedent of the latest entrants, it’s likely that full labor mobility will be delayed for some time after accession. This is unfortunate, but probably a necessary political concession. But the idea of a permanent restriction on mobility, which has been floated, is both deplorable and unnecessary.
Because of the guest worker programs of the past, there’s already a significant degree of integration between the Turkish and EU labour markets. The best estimate of immigration arising from accession is 2.7 million people substantially less than the number of Turkish (and Turkish-descended) people already living and working in Europe. In addition, Turkey formed a customs union with the EU in 1995. Standard trade theory (the factor price equalisation theorem) says that free trade in goods evens out wages (for workers of a given skill level) even in the absence of factor mobility. If you add free movement of capital, the result is even stronger. Complete labor mobility would make little difference to thae actual outcome.
The other issue is the pressure on the EU budget associated with an additional poor country. A lot of this pressure arises from the workings of the Common Agricultural policy and the answer here is simple. The time between now and Turkey’s admission ought to be enough to kill off this relic once and for all. The CAP may have been useful as a force for European unity when there was very little else that could be called Common, but those days are long past. The CAP is a financial and environmental nightmare and an international disgrace. In the absence of the CAP, Turkey would get some EU money as regional assistance, but the likely amount would be of the order of 10 billion euro a year – a problem for finance departments, perhaps, but not a big economic issue.
The real problem, one that the EU needs to deal with sooner or later in any case, is that of maintaining national welfare systems in a system of common European citizenship. This problem is difficult in any case,and is made worse by the fact that most of the national systems are badly underfunded. Differences in the average income levels of member countries sharpen up some of the issues, and close off some possible solutions, but the problem needs to be addressed in any case.
{ 13 comments }
Sandriana 10.08.04 at 1:52 pm
I am having some real conflict over this issue. Living as I do in the Netherlands and in pretty much constant contact with Turkish people as individuals, I have no problem with the concept of Turkey in the EC. After all, so many Turks would not have come to the EC if they did not agree at least in some part with its ethos.
However, as a nation Turkey’s human rights record is atrocious. Also, joining the ommunity would mean not only that it would be another drain on member countries’ funds, and the borders of the EC would extend right up to Asia Minor and make the Community’s border contiguous with Kurdistan. Is that disputed territory also going to be part of the EC? And if so who decides, Turkey or The Kurds? And if Turkish Kurdistan why not Iraqi Kurdistan?
There are so many problems with this: nevertheless, on balance I think the EC has taken the right position in opening negotiations. All of the issues that militate against Turkey becoming a member must to be discussed openly and rationally – this could just be the opening steps of a long-term rapprochement of Europe with the Islamic world. Lets the take the positive view.
Doug 10.08.04 at 1:55 pm
Shameless plug: Over at A Fistful of Euros, Turkish accession has been the topic du jour for quite a few jours now.
Try here, here, here, here, or here. For starters.
Matt 10.08.04 at 2:22 pm
Let me second going over to AFFOE and reading their posts, too. They’ve been very good. Also, along the lines of Sandriana I’d say that if I were the EU, I want to see a fully satisfactory (or at least close to that) resolution to the Kurdish sitution, w/ a solid understanding as to what will happen even if the Kurds in Iraq claim independence, and full language and social rights for the kurds, as well as a peaceful end to the tensions w/ Armenia and an end to the border blockade there. (I think the question of whether Turkey should appologize for something the Ottoman Empire did to Armenians is a distraction, but the present situation w/ Armenia should be improved before admission.)
Angry Moderate 10.08.04 at 2:25 pm
Montagu hits the important points in the short-term, but it seems to me the long-term implications are most important: in particular, where does Europe, and therefore the EU, stop? Bodies of water work well for the north, south, and west; but in the east the only logical stopping points were the western borders of Turkey and Russia (or the CIS if that entity coheres – and it won’t).
In the short-term none of the neighboring states meet EU standards or show an inclination to seriously try to, but if they do: how can one now reject Russia? Tell Russia that it is not European? If Russia reforms according to EU standards and asks for admission, it will have to be admitted (I think this is a good thing and will occur by 2050 or so – and very much hope to live to test this prediction).
And once Russia and Turkey, obviously the 3 Transcaucasian states can’t be turned down on principle. But why not Lebanon, with its long interaction with Europe and France in particular. Israel? Egypt? Are these less European in any fundamental way than Turkey? Algeria, which could be said in some rather tenuous way, to have been part of the EU from 1950 to 62 if we accept the claim that it was an integral part of France. Which brings us to Morocco, and their successful application c. 2100. Alas, I shan’t be around to be around to see that one, but promise everyone that I’ll be taunting Le Pen down in hades…
Slex 10.08.04 at 2:55 pm
“Standard trade theory (the factor price equalisation theorem) says that free trade in goods evens out wages (for workers of a given skill level) even in the absence of factor mobility. If you add free movement of capital, the result is even stronger. Complete labor mobility would make little difference to thae actual outcome.”
Standard trade theory – yes, however in the presence of labour mobility initial differences in wages between two regions may be exasperated because in the presence of labour supply constraint wages will be high in the better developed region thus making capital-owners relocate capital where wages are smaller. Once this constraint is removed and labour starts flowing from the depressed region to the prosperous region it may offset the incentive of the capital-owners to relocate because the upper pressure on wages in the prosperous region will be offset by the supply of labour and at the same time the market size will increase because the presence of new workers requires also an increase in some locally produced goods and services (e.g. housing, transport, etc.). The conclusion about factor price equlization is drawn under the assumption of constant returns to scale. The rate of return to capital is determined not only by the relation between capital and labour employed but also by the scale of production. The out-migration might shrink the size of the market in the depressed regions and make the situation even more difficult there.
As a citizen of an accession country, I personally favour the decision of EU to impose restrictions on labour mobility in EU. My home town was roughly with a population of 190 000 after the fall of the Berlin Wall and now it is approximately 150 000. And it is mainly young and (although to a lesser extent) educated people who decide to try their luck abroad. Of course, everybody should be free to move wherever he wants to, but for those like me, who have decided to stay, it makes things harder. Not everybody can emigrate in Western Europe or the USA after all. Someone must remain here.
Emigration has occured even in the presence of legal barriers to migration (and they are by no means the only ones) of course, but the removal of these barriers will make it even easier to migrate.
Migration is more dangerous for the accession countries than for “Old” Europe. However the cases of Bulgaria and Turkey may be different. Turkey is just too big and young people have a larger relative share in the country’s population so it should be easier to overcome the negative effects of outmigration and the shirinking market.
Scott McArthur 10.08.04 at 3:01 pm
Europes Eastern Expansion limits:
Turkey is the bottom right corner stone. Draw a straight line up from Turkeys eastern border and you get the Ukraine, Belarus and Russia as possible add ons.
That’s it that’s all.
Caucauses – out
Middle East -out
Mahgrheb – out
These three regions can have trade agreements or most favored nation agreements but not membership.
Seems clear to me.
Ray 10.08.04 at 3:27 pm
“Turkey is the bottom right corner stone. Draw a straight line up from Turkeys eastern border and you get the Ukraine, Belarus and Russia as possible add ons.”
Of course then you can say
‘Russia is the top right corner stone. Draw a straight line down from Russia’s eastern border…’
Jeremy Osner 10.08.04 at 3:47 pm
Huh? If you drew a line drew north from Turkey’s eastern border you would certainly encompass Georgia and Armenia.
dan 10.08.04 at 5:20 pm
Turkey is also important because it will give the US a big ally in EU meetings, something that the rest of the European countries do not want. The EU does not want Turkey in for a variety of reasons (one of which is US influence), but they’re going through the motions to give plausible deniability when Turkey doesn’t make it.
irry 10.08.04 at 5:58 pm
I studied this topic at university about 18 years ago.
The US is keen to keep Turkey on thier side originally for Cold War geostrategic considerations. Turkey wanted to be in the then EEC and lobbied the US to champion thier cause. The US has been pressing the EU to allow Turkish membership for roughly 25 years now. IMHO Turkey would not have been considered for accession negotiations without the efforts of the US.
Ironoically since 9/11 the US has been especially keen to keep Turkey on side rather than let it fall to the Islamic non-secular world. One of the problems is that Iraq is on Turkeys borders. Hence why I have always seen it as complete folly that we invaded Iraq and alienate potential Islamic allies inthe Middle East.
On a side issue Turkey is illustrative of the ways the West has historically had allegiances with Islamic states and continues to do so. Another case in point was the way the US administration virtualy bent over backwards to keep allegiances with Indonesia despite it being it being fully aware of Indonesian genocidal practices against those in East Timor.
Don Quijote 10.09.04 at 12:42 am
If Turkey becomes part of the EU, Syria, Lebanon & Iraq will be the next logical Middle Eastern Entrants (particularly if the Turkish integration is a success).
As for borders, IMHO the southern Border of Europe is the Sahara & not the Meditarenean, as the Sahara is far more challenging to cross from North to South than is the Med.
If the EU is successful, what we are likeky to see is a federation that covers all of western Europe(except England) all the way to Ukraine, all of North Africa and all of the ME to the Border of Iran.
Doug 10.10.04 at 2:59 pm
Here’s what I said back in June under the title “Finalité”:
How many members will the European Union have by, say, the year 2020?
With the latest round of enlargement not yet two months old, the exertions of the constitutional debate still straining the dedicated Europeanists, and prospective members largely a collection of the poor, the ill-governed and the recently-at-war, it would be reckless indeed to speculate about the who and when of future enlargements.
That’s exactly what blogs are for.
Having said as far back as 1994 that the EU would probably admit formerly communist countries when at least one of them could be a net contributor to the budget (Slovenia), I’m feeling good about this particular type of recklessness.
Under the fold, the EU’s path to 39 members (40 if Serbia and Montenegro divorce), along with the first European Parliament elections that I expect their citizens to be able to vote in.
The Little Balkan Expansion (2009)
Bulgaria
Croatia
Romania
The Ottoman Expansion (2014)
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Georgia
Macedonia
Serbia-Montenegro
Turkey
Last Call (2019)
Albania
Armenia
Azerbaijan
Belarus
Moldova
Ukraine
Fin.
Don Quijote 10.10.04 at 3:41 pm
to complete your list:
2025
Tunisia, Morroco, Algeria, Lebanon, Syria
2030
Lybia, Egypt, Jordan, Palestine
2035
Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Yemen
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