In “yesterday’s global justice thread”:https://crookedtimber.org/2006/06/19/global-justice-taxing-inherited-social-resources/ , commenter Nicholas Weininger made the following comment, which raises a broader set of issues than were appropriate in that discussion, but which I think are worth responding to. Here’s Nicholas:
bq. Chris, I understand that you are framing your argument within the assumption that your arguers accept liberal egalitarianism, but it is still worth pointing out that some of us anti-egalitarians will see in your argument a rather nice slippery-slopish case for our side. To wit: once you start deciding that some things are “just luck” and that that implies it’s legitimate to forcibly redistribute them, there is nothing, however clearly it may be the product of choice and hard work, which is exempt from the depredations of the robbers with badges and good intentions. If liberal egalitarianism really does imply that “inherited social resources” should be taxed away, so much the worse for liberal egalitarianism!
It isn’t entirely clear to me what the central point of Nicholas’s objection is, but there seem to be three components (1) a complaint about “forcible redistribution”, (2) a worry about the indeterminacy of liberal egalitarian theories of distributive justice, and (3) a worry that literally everything might be up for redistribution if we press a radical line about what results from luck.
Taking those points in order:
(1) “Forcible redistribution”. This is a common move by those of a libertarian persuasion, but it is, I think, entirely unconvincing. The key point to focus on is this: that a theory of justice establishes what people are morally entitled to, and one of the jobs that the state has it to see to it that people’s entitlements are respected. I’m not sure what the details of Nicholas’s own theory of entitlement are, but let us suppose that, according to the terms of that theory, I am in possession of something that properly belongs to him, and that I refuse to relinquish that object when he ask for it. The officers of the libertarian state will the come along and forcibly remove that object from me and hand it over to its rightful owner. This forcible redistribution from me to him will generate no objection from libertarians, indeed they will insist that justice has been done. If some version of egalitarian liberalism is the correct view about distributive justice, then, just as with other theories, it may turn out that some people will have entitlements to holdings that are in the possession of others. In order to realize justice, agents of the state — “the robbers with badges and good intentions” — will use mechanisms like taxes to effect transfers such that people get what they are entitled to (and lose what they are not entitled to). In other words “forcible redistribution” can’t be an objection to a theory of distributive justice because we need a theory of distributive justice already in place to determine whether an act of “forcible redistribution” is morally objectionable.
(2) Indeterminacy. Other things being equal, it is highly desirable that a theory of justice be highly determinate concerning who is entitled to what. But it would be madness to say that we should always prefer a more to a less determinate theory. The principle “everything belongs to Chris Bertram” is highly determinate, but its substantive injustice is also manifest. The fact that many libertarian theories of entitlement are highly determinate about who has property rights in what is indeed a virtue, but it is not a virtue that should override all others. Liberal egalitarians can, theoretically at least, achieve a similar degree of determinacy themselves by designing public systems of rules, knowable in advance, which give rise to approximations to the distributive outcomes that they think are demanded by substantive justice. (I should note, though, that I’ve recently come to think that there are severe limitations to the strategy of embedding preferred distributive outcomes in procedures.)
(3) Luck. (I’m not exactly sure whether this point was Nicholas’s intention.) One worry that is often expressed about “luck egalitarianism” is that everything, including the constitutive facts about the self that are the basis for things like hard work and choice, may turn out to be just a matter of luck. First, a caveat: I don’t think this objection applies straightforwardly to the point I made yesterday. True, I claimed that the fact that what comes to us from past generation comes, as it were, as “manna from heaven” opens the possibility that it might be taxed legitimately. But I did not say, contrary to what Nicholas has me saying that it “should be taxed away”. I admitted the luck egalitarian intuition as a reason permitting taxation, but I didn’t commit to LE as the master principle of distributive justice (and don’t, for that reason, think of myself as a luck egalitarian). There may be other principles which compete with LE-considerations and against which they have to be balanced (in fact I think there are). (Pretentious Latinism alert: conversation with Jimmy Doyle establishes that this means that I think LE provides pro tanto reasons.)
With that caveat noted, it there merit in this objection to luck egalitarianism? I think that depends on whether LE has to make use of ideas of responsibility as they feature in philosophical and scientific theories on the matter, or whether it can make do with the ideas about agency, causation and responsibility that are part of our everyday judgements about people (an extension of which is the core of legal reasoning about such matters). I think that the emphasis that LE puts on choice rather presupposes a commonsensical view of freedom and responsibility. If we came to reject that view, in favour of a radical scepticism about freedom, say, then I think we would have to reject LE too. Having said that, I think it open to LE to make all kinds of judgements about degrees of responsibility, to regard as an unlucky circumstance certain facts about an individuals personality, and so on. But the core view, I think, rests on ideas about choice and responsibility that are not in dispute between libertarians and egalitarian liberals.
{ 49 comments }
abb1 06.20.06 at 6:31 am
I don’t know these LE theories – I’m just an IT guy – but I do understand Nicholas’s objections: the whole approach seems a bit too arbitrary, technocratic and (I’m sorry to say) arrogant.
Instead of arbitrary deciding who should own what, why not try to establish sensible rules of the marketplace: strong unions, high minimum wage (global minimum wage at this point), strict global antitrust laws, global anti-corruption laws, global environmental laws, etc. If you happen to succeed under these constraints – great, enjoy the fruits of your labor.
Of course redistribution via progressive taxation is a part of it too, but it’s more like a necessary evil than a mechanism of choice.
Alex Gregory 06.20.06 at 7:09 am
“The fact that many libertarian theories of entitlement are highly determinate about who has property rights in what is indeed a virtue,”
Let’s not forget that libertarian principles of rectification are notoriously difficult to apply. (for example, if someone stole land from your ancestors, how do we redistribute wealth now to rectify that past injustice). I simply don’t think its true that libertarians have a simple way to work these things out – at least when history is as full of injustices as it is.
Collin Farrelly had a nice post related to this.
I liked your point on forcible redistribution also.
Slocum 06.20.06 at 7:22 am
“…let us suppose that, according to the terms of that theory, I am in possession of something that properly belongs to him, and that I refuse to relinquish that object when he ask for it. The officers of the libertarian state will the come along and forcibly remove that object from me and hand it over to its rightful owner.”
But this breaks down badly with respect to social captial. Suppose, as an American, I am in possession of an outsized share of the world’s social capital. I live in a deeply rooted democracy where the rule of law is well-established, where I never have been (and very likely never will be) faced with the prospect of having to pay a bribe for an official favor, where I was able to start a business with no difficulty at all, and so on. What are my obligations with respect to somebody born in, say, Somalia, whose share of social capital in these forms is very meagre?
The main problem a redistributionist faces is that money and social captial are not perfect (or even imperfect) substitutes. You cannot tax my peronal stock of social capital–you can only tax my financial capital as a proxy. But if that financial capital cannot be converted to social capital by the hypothetical Somali on the receiving end (and the evidence is very strong that it cannot), then the case for redistribution has serious problems.
The information about the principles for organizing a high-social capital society are available for all to borrow free of charge without taxation and redistribution (as, for example, India and China have done to dramatic effect in the past two decades). But the actual implementation of these principles requires political and economic reform, not cash subsidies (which are likely to have no effect and may even exacerbate the problems).
anonymous 06.20.06 at 8:32 am
I don’t think “forcible redistribution” is entirely unconvincing. It is an important subtext for people like Rawls and Habermas that the thrust of their political theories is really supposed to answer the question “If we were all going to agree on rules and institutions to obey, what should they be?”, not “In what ways is it legitimate to coerce other people?” Rawls makes this point fairly explicit… I don’t have the citations handy, but in ToJ “ideal theory” is not supposed to cover cases where some people would simply refuse to cooperate without the threat of force.
This doesn’t mean that libertarians are correct, but forcible redistribution and liberal justifications for punishment more generally are interesting issues. (And I think it would be silly for liberal egalitarians to deny that, without a good liberal theory of punishment, jailing people for failing to pay taxes requires more explanation than jailing people for burglary or murder.)
Nicholas Weininger 06.20.06 at 9:14 am
Chris, thanks for your lengthy response! I didn’t realize my comment would provoke any such.
A few quick and incomplete points before I head off to work; I’ll expand a bit more later if time permits:
— It’s a quibble, but: you shouldn’t assume that your libertarian interlocutors believe in the “libertarian state”. I for one am an anarcho-capitalist.
— The point of the forcible redistribution thing is to highlight that some of us believe justice is an attribute of processes, not outcomes, and that from a process-based point of view any use of mass force is highly morally suspect per se and requires a strong and detailed justification. The methods of the state, on this view, are not morally neutral even if they are used to advance justice; they are possibly-necessary evils. In particular, if you’re going to justify taking something away from A at gunpoint and giving it to B, the burden of proof is on you to establish that B has a specific claim to the thing that is much stronger than A’s claim. In your theft example that’s easy. In the case of nebulous collective redistributive-“justice” claims it seems less so.
— The “well yes we *could* do it this way but there are practical reasons why we probably shouldn’t, at which I will now briefly wave my hand” thing is, to paraphrase you, a move I find entirely unconvincing. Making the claim that people have no right to X, and then saying “but we probably should let them have X anyway for now as far as I know”, is not likely to reassure those who deeply value their right to X.
Chris Bertram 06.20.06 at 9:39 am
Nicholas, thanks. Re your 2nd and 3rd points.
2. Rawlsians can say that they too think that justice is an attribute of processes (and I touched on this when discussing determinacy), hence their emphasis on the basic structure and pure procedural justice. I feel slightly embarassed at pointing this out, though, because I’ve become more sceptical than I used to be about the possibility of selecting processes with a view to their probable outcomes.
3. You write:
bq. Making the claim that people have no right to X, and then saying “but we probably should let them have X anyway for now as far as I knowâ€, is not likely to reassure those who deeply value their right to X.
But the claim was not that “people have no right to X” but rather than people have no _fundamental_ right to X, and that their right to X should be founded in something else. That needn’t, in practice, make their right to X less secure. Even if it did, you’d need an independent argument to establish their right to X.
Will Wilkinson 06.20.06 at 9:46 am
Chris, Nice post.
A point you touch on at the end about LE is important and underappreciated. Whenever LE comes up, I find myself baffled, explaining “there is this thing called compatibilism, which is, after all, the dominant view about agency, responsibility, etc. That you did not cause the Big Bang has nothing interesting to do with whether you are responsible for what you have done, or whether you deserve praise, blame, or the terms of your labor contract.”
To your first point… Though it is a tidy idea, I don’t think you can keep issues of distributive justice and coercion so cleanly separated. You can’t say “OK… We have printed on this piece of paper the principles of distributive justice, and who entitled to what according to those principles,” and then hand the paper to someone with an already constituted power to use coercion, but only to coercively redistribute according to the rules on the paper. Because how on earth does that work? The point is that the power to coerce is itself one of the things a theory of justice distributes. And it is a plain historical fact that people to whom coervice powers are granted tend to use them opportunistically, usually violating both the terms under which their coercive activities are legitimate, and the principles of entitlement for stuff. (If you think that, say, the Bush adminstration has enabled cronyism, corporate welfare, and war-profiteering, then all you need to see is that there is nothing at all special about the Bush adminstration.) If you care about equality of stuff, then you must care about equality of power, too–though there are lots of other good reasons beyond the distribution of stuff to care about the distribution of power.
abb1 06.20.06 at 10:02 am
What’s a “fundamental right“; is there some list of absolute fundamental rights somewhere? Where do I get a copy?
I thought all rights are based on a social contract, no?
Z 06.20.06 at 10:11 am
Once more, I feel refined discussions can obscure what to me is (at least theoretically) very simple. A just system is one agreed to by rational individual and satisfying the property that anyone is willing to accept any position in the arrangement produced by this system. Applying this very simple criteria to the question here studied produced a very simple outcome: if a community agrees democratically to compensate for “bad luck in social resources” then it is just only if those favoring the scheme are ready to be on the giving end, if it does not agree, it is just if those who don’t accept the redistributive scheme agree to occupy the position of those most clearly disadvantaged by lack of social resources. At least theoretically, I can’t possibly see where the disagreement is (especially since this approach needs absolutely no preconceived notions about anything). Entitlements, property rights, distributive schemes and the likes are social constructs, so I can’t see why would anyone try to devise the best definition of any of those; surely it is up to people to decide waht their prefer arrangement is.
In real examples approaching this theoretical setting, people tend to consider that bad luck in social resources should be compensated, but other arrangements are surely conceivable.
Eli Rabett 06.20.06 at 10:14 am
If luck is not an issue, why do we constantly hear about those who made a fortune losing it? Obviously luck plays an important role.
Chris Bertram 06.20.06 at 10:34 am
Will, I think your comment says something about the contrast between the way in which libertarians and (some) liberals view the state. For the latter the justification of (coercive) institutions (such as those selected at the 2nd and 3rd of Rawls’s 2 stages) centres on whether they promote the substantive ends of justice (as clarified by the prior principles). The (coercive) institutions in actual operation are not some separate agency, but rather “we the people” in action. And ideally they aren’t even coercive — they just help us to solve assurance problems.
For libertarians, by contrast, coercive institutions are merely a necessary evil and entrusting them with tasks much beyond maintaining order is to invite predation.
So for the egalitarian liberal it isn’t that there’s justice over here and some institutions over there that we might use to achieve it (with the libertarian yelling “mind you don’t get burnt!”) The pursuit of justice is the central point of the institutions.
So I don’t think it is right to say, as you do that egalitarians want to keep issues about coercion and those about distributive justice tidily separated: they do care about equality of power (the coercive power belongs to us all) and about equality of stuff, and the two go together.
perianwyr 06.20.06 at 10:46 am
I would also point out that the beginning of raw coercion is the pursuit of basic physical security. It is the first legitimacy requested by any coercing party.
To somehow pretend that defense from “force and fraud” is a neutral prospect would be a bit strange, since it is that initial defensive competition that creates the problem in the first place and is thus equally unavoidable. If you are beset by bandits, the usual response is to find bandits of your own that steal less and with more predictable regularity. You are still at their mercy, and I must stress again that this is unavoidable.
mpowell 06.20.06 at 10:59 am
“they do care about equality of power (the coercive power belongs to us all)”
This line of argument seems to just completely miss Wilkinson’s point. Any account of justice that relies on institutions that have a significantly different character than the ones we have currently is highly suspect. There is nothing wrong with wanting to create institutions whose central purpose is pursuing justice and still noting that they will very inefficiently pursue those ends. To blithely claim that we collectively control their coercive power or that they are ‘we the people’ in action, is just dishonest. They are run by actual people.
And I also think you are still avoiding the point about forcible redistribution. One thing that is definitely true of a liberal state versus a libertarian state is that you live constrained by a much larger set of contracts that you did not ever agree to. Whereas I don’t think that this point is as important as the libertarians do, its still there: the liberal state is much larger and I do believe that state action always carries some bad with it.
asg 06.20.06 at 11:11 am
I thought all rights are based on a social contract, no?
Where do I get a copy?
harry b 06.20.06 at 11:13 am
Libertarians rely heavily on coercion – to enforce property rights. If you have rights to some piece of property then you have the right to prevent me from using it, so if I want and try to use it enforcing your right will require coercion (by the state, by you, by someone). Poperty rights distribute freedom to use things, and enforcing them can only be done with coercion or the threat of coercion. Egalitarians propose that social insttituions be designed so that this freedom is roughly equally distributed; liubertarians propose that it be highly unequally distributed; and the implication is that the less advantaged will be more subject to coercion.
All the points that libertarians make about the state being a corrupt agents are good, at least when made in an appropiately nuanced and contingent way, but they true of other agents too, and are true to a greater or lesser extent depending on the design of the state (or the agency in question). So, egalitarians should be very sensitive to these issues when actually proposing institutions; so should libertarians. But there is no “no coercion” view, and its not at all clear to me that egalitarians favour more coercion than libertarians (which is why libertarianism seems a bit misleadingly named to me).
Chris Bertram 06.20.06 at 11:14 am
To blithely claim that we collectively control their coercive power or that they are ‘we the people’ in action, is just dishonest. They are run by actual people.
1. Pls don’t accuse me of dishonesty.
2. Nothing in what I said should be taken as a denial of the obvious truth that any real-world institutions will be subject to all kinds of pathologies.
3. It is far from obviously true that
bq. One thing that is definitely true of a liberal state versus a libertarian state is that you live constrained by a much larger set of contracts that you did not ever agree to.
Poor people in a libertarian state may turn out to be very much constrained by contracts that they never agreed to: namely the contracts agreed between other people in that state.
Steve LaBonne 06.20.06 at 11:15 am
I always wonder where libertarians get their idealistic picture of what their libertarian paradise would look like. When I picture a society in which there is little if any state power, and property rights reign supreme, I see something like Europe around 900 CE…
Chris Bertram 06.20.06 at 11:18 am
Further to Harry’s comment #15 and my comment #16 (last point) a link to G.A.Cohen’s “Freedom and Money” (pdf)
http://tinyurl.com/m7k9n
asg 06.20.06 at 11:23 am
#17: Yep, those Viking raiders sure had a deal of respect for property rights.
abb1 06.20.06 at 11:44 am
But there is no “no coercion†view, and its not at all clear to me that egalitarians favour more coercion than libertarians…
Libertarian (anarcho-capitalist) concept is based on the assumption that a large majority of citizens are property owners and they will consent to a system of coercion designed to enforce property rights. I am not a proponent of anarcho-capitalist – for obvious reasons – but at least there is a plausible justification here, however naive.
What is the basis of support for the concept of taking stuff from Norwegians – because they have no rights, no less – and giving it to the Somalians? This concept seems about as naive as anarcho-capitalism but much more arbitrary.
Chris Bertram 06.20.06 at 11:51 am
abb1, you know perfectly well that no-one said Norwegians have no rights. I’m sure there are other threads, elsewhere on this interwebs, where you could deploy your unique talents to better effect.
Brett Bellmore 06.20.06 at 12:09 pm
Of course, they said that the Norwegians had no rights to what was to be taken away from them. Such a profound difference!
Again I notice a stylistic difference between liberals and conservatives; Conservatives tend to justify their rights violations as somehow necessary, while liberals tend to define away whatever rights they plan to violate. I suppose it leaves you feeling less conflicted, but from the point of view of the person under the boot heel, the difference is hard to spot.
Chris Bertram 06.20.06 at 1:03 pm
Ah yes, the argument from heavy sarcasm.
Well two can play at that: I’m afraid I’m not as fortunate as you Brett, since I don’t have the gift of being guided by the natural light of reason to a determination of what people’s original rights are.
So where did the Norwegians come in? They came in because some liberals (Charles Beitz in fact) argue that nations do not have an exclusive property right to the natural resources that just happen to be under their feet. Oil, in the Norwegian case. Maybe you disagree Brett? Maybe you think that finders keepers is the rule we should employ for natural resources and that the Norwegians should be able to get the full value of the oil that they can sell on the market?
Fine. But it would be nice to hear some *arguments* for that rule. (One possible example of such an argument: that people would choose it from behind a veil of ignorance. ??)
BTW: the concrete proposal, that some of the income from the Norwegian oil be redistributed to nations less fortunate in their natural resource endowment, is not best rendered by writing of “the person under the boot heel”, a way of talking that comes straight from the taxation=slavery/Feminazi school of rhetoric.
Rob 06.20.06 at 1:05 pm
Just like I had no right to anything anyone else appropriated from the commons, I suppose.
Maria 06.20.06 at 1:10 pm
I don’t know if questions about the feasibility of an arrangement should go hand in hand with its desirability. I tend to sympathize with the idea that people have no intrinsic claim to the institutional setting they were born to, but I honestly cannot see how this could be redistributed.
mpowell 06.20.06 at 1:19 pm
Chris- I think the objection I have is where you draw the contrast:
“For libertarians, by contrast, coercive institutions are merely a necessary evil and entrusting them with tasks much beyond maintaining order is to invite predation.”
I don’t think you have to be a libertarian to think state institutions are a necessary evil. The contrast is in concluding that we can’t afford to trust them with anything at all. So I feel like this setence is misleading due to its unfair grouping of two different ideas. I’m confused as to how you can acknowledge the shortcomings of real-world institutions, but then claim there is no weight to any forced redistribution argument.
I’m not interested in setting up a libertarian state. But I am intereted in a discussion of what a liberal state should be like when one recognizes as factor to be taken under consideration the limitations of these institutions. I don’t want to accuse you of anything, Chris, but I do feel like there may be a bait and switch going on.
Sebastian Holsclaw 06.20.06 at 1:27 pm
“But it would be nice to hear some arguments for that rule.(One possible example of such an argument: that people would choose it from behind a veil of ignorance. ??)”
This is really an odd request. You are asking for arguments in support of axiomatic principles. The philosophical differences between libertarians and liberals are at the axiomatic level. Libertarians believe that from behind the veil of ignorance people would choose to be less restricted by governments, liberals believe they would choose more security provided by governments. It isn’t testable because you can’t ever put people behind the veil of ignorance.
james 06.20.06 at 1:33 pm
From the information provided it seems that global justice / liberal state does not recognize property rights as a fundamental right. Is this a correct interpretation?
Chris Bertram 06.20.06 at 1:52 pm
james:
Well, the right to personal property is among Rawls’s basic liberties. So there’s a sense in which it is true to say that some, and maybe all egalitarian liberals include some property rights as basic in the sense that any just state must recognize and protect those rights.
But, they’re not morally basic, since they are themselves justified in terms of further underlying reasons.
And they aren’t necessarily very extensive: the right to own something like an oil well isn’t among the basic liberties that any just state must recognize.
And they may not include all the Hohfeldian incidents: so the state might have to recognize your ownership of some object in terms of your right to use it, give it, sell it, destroy it, but maybe not your right to bequeath it.
norwegian libertarian 06.20.06 at 2:02 pm
De lukt liberalere tar min olje… FRA MIN KULDE, DØDESHENDER!!!
Neel Krishnaswami 06.20.06 at 2:04 pm
Sebastian, that’s not true. I’ve never seen Rawlsian arguments persuade libertarians, and I’ve never seen a natural-rights argument persuade a liberal. However, I have seen both libertarians and liberals change their mind because of empirical evidence like economic statistics.
This suggests to me that axioms are in practice tested, probably some analogue of George Moore’s “Here is a hand. Here is another.” argument against philosophical skepticism — that is, if your axioms lead you to a wildly dumb result, you should change your axioms.
Slocum 06.20.06 at 2:23 pm
So where did the Norwegians come in? They came in because some liberals (Charles Beitz in fact) argue that nations do not have an exclusive property right to the natural resources that just happen to be under their feet. Oil, in the Norwegian case. Maybe you disagree Brett? Maybe you think that finders keepers is the rule we should employ for natural resources and that the Norwegians should be able to get the full value of the oil that they can sell on the market?
Fine. But it would be nice to hear some arguments for that rule. (One possible example of such an argument: that people would choose it from behind a veil of ignorance. ??)
Ah, well, I would certainly choose that from behind a veil of ignorance, since I would much prefer to take the chance of being born in a country without oil reserves as compared to a world with a global confiscation-and-redistribution scheme. It’s not a close call — especially given that it’s far from clear that oil resources actually are a blessing (Google ‘the curse of oil’).
Rob 06.20.06 at 4:26 pm
“The philosophical differences between libertarians and liberals are at the axiomatic level.”
“From the information provided it seems that global justice / liberal state does not recognize property rights as a fundamental right.”
Disagreements between liberals and libertarians are not, I think, at the level of axiom: they concern the scope of property rights. No liberal worth the name believes that there isn’t something important protected by property rights of some sort: privacy, the ability to plan and construct a life, and bare survival, amongst other things. The difference lies in how far liberals think those justifications extend. Harry’s point about libertarians relying on the state to enforce their property rights is highly apposite here. All systems of property rights are coercive, since they involve denying some people the right to do things with some physical objects. Libertarians think, clearly wrongly in my view, that the justification for coercive interference with people’s freedom through systems of property includes denying them any property rights at all, should they, for whatever reason, not be successful in the market. Liberals, however, think that denying people property rights is clearly, in a situation of relative abundance, unjustified. Libertarians, in response to that, better have some answer more convincing than the retreat to bare assertion implied by the idea that their view of property rights is axiomatic, and indeed, Nozick’s somewhat odd interpretation of Locke is supposed to supply that. As for the idea that libertarians think that their system of property rights would be chosen under the veil of ignorance, Nozick’s fulminations about the way it treats what he claims are just property rights I think put paid to that.
Jason 06.20.06 at 5:01 pm
#2: Excellent blog entry from Mr. Farrelly. Thank you.
The central problem with entitlement-based libertarianism is that it’s insufficiently libertarian, particularly when contrasted against the original meaning of the term associated with the European anarchist Left. This property-rights and self-ownership fetish is more appropriately described as “propertarian,” and well-known difficulties present themselves when we move from ownership of my flesh and bones to irrevocable Lockean rights over a parcel of land (say).
Generic “redistributionist” liberalism takes personal liberty more seriously precisely because it concerns itself with effective liberty rather than formal liberty. It essentially says our life ought to be determined largely by personal choices rather than arbitrary, uncontrollable circumstances. Libertarians of a Nozickian/natural rights orientation will tend to argue their free-market regime practically instantiates this important value, but their committment is, in fact, secondary. What matters to them first and foremost is property, even inspite of the fact they have been unable to generate a convincing argument for what has been called a “fundamental right to X.” Nozick spends one or two pages destroying the Lockean view, and then dismisses his own objections. So-called “left-libertarianism” and “no bullshit Marxism” has admirably seized upon this gaping hole (contrary to what Wilkinson’s boss, T. Palmer, would have us believe).
#31 writes: This suggests to me that axioms are in practice tested, probably some analogue of George Moore’s “Here is a hand. Here is another.†argument against philosophical skepticism—that is, if your axioms lead you to a wildly dumb result, you should change your axioms.
The trouble with this is that people predisposed to certain view (say natural rights) are likely to find vindication in the free-market. Notice how libertarians, contrary to the growing scientific consensus, stubbornly resist the evidence in favor of anthropogenic climate change. Global warming serves as an excellent case study. It took Michael Shermer (mentioned in a post by J. Quiggin here on CT), formerly an anarcho-capitalist, quite some time to be persuaded on the evidence. Ronald Bailey, the science correspondent for _Reason_, recently admitted the evidence for AGW was convincing, but I’ll bet the warming is a convenient truth for him. Or, if it’s an inconvenient truth he will probably say it’s too late for the government to intervene, or that government will get regulation all wrong, as it invariably does, and we should prefer market failure to government failure.
Wilkinson writes: And it is a plain historical fact that people to whom coervice powers are granted tend to use them opportunistically, usually violating both the terms under which their coercive activities are legitimate, and the principles of entitlement for stuff…. If you care about equality of stuff, then you must care about equality of power, too—though there are lots of other good reasons beyond the distribution of stuff to care about the distribution of power.
This is an important point, but I fail to see how it applies to the “redistributionist” liberal state any more than the “minimal” libertarian state (or especially a situtation of anarcho-capitalism). At least the liberal democratic state is not an unaccountable private power. Sandel of course emphasizes this point, I believe, in _D&itsD_, occasionally summoning Jefferson, who notes the importance of preventing private entites to rival the power of accountable government. Of course we need more than a benevolent democratic state committed to equality. We need civic culture, engagement, information — and the economic resources that are precondition for such political activity. Libertarianism does a poor job fostering these values.
Brett Bellmore 06.20.06 at 5:14 pm
“Fine. But it would be nice to hear some arguments for that rule.”
From a purely pragmatic standpoint, (Which is the only worthwhile standpoint in a world where you can’t get “ought” from “is”.) property rights have been a fabulously successful mechanism for wealth creation, for just about everybody who has the fortune to live in a country where they’re relatively respected.
Resources that remain unfound, and in the ground, aren’t worth squat to anybody. And the motivation for looking for them, and digging them up, is that you get to keep them. Take away that motivation, and they stay in the ground, and we stay poor.
Further, when somebody proposes to rob Peter to pay Paul, the smart man realizes that when Peter is tapped out, they’ll get around to robbing Tom, Dick, and Harry, too. And thus has the wisdom to oppose robbing Peter to begin with.
I’m not Paul, so I see the wisdom in defending Peter BEFORE you get around to me. Clear?
Neel Krishnaswami 06.20.06 at 6:32 pm
34: The trouble with this is that people predisposed to certain view (say natural rights) are likely to find vindication in the free-market. Notice how libertarians, contrary to the growing scientific consensus, stubbornly resist the evidence in favor of anthropogenic climate change.
This is true, and likewise left-liberals hem and haw when faced with the evidence against the minimum wage. Of course people resist evidence that would require us to change our fundamental beliefs — our fundamental beliefs profoundly shape who we are as people.
But: evidence does persuade, however slowly, and in my experience it’s the ONLY thing that ever does. I’ve never met a libertarian who was ever persuaded by deep green rhetoric, nor have I ever seen a libertarian peroration on freedom of association convince a left-liberal to reject the minimum wage. But I have seen actual scientific evidence convince libertarians to support carbon taxes, and likewise for liberals change their minds and agree that a negative income tax is better for the poor than a minimum wage.
harry b 06.20.06 at 7:11 pm
But brett, you’ve precisely not given an argument for there being fundamental property rights (of any kind, let alone of the kind that libertarians favour), just an argument that insofar as wealth creation matters some reasonably secure and transparent legal structure which allows people to benefit from their contributions is desirable. Sure, most of us agree with that; but it is consistent with a good deal of forcible redistribution of income and wealth, not only in theory but in practice, as long as that redistribution is carried out in a reasonably efficient and non-arbitrary manner, and marginal tax rates don’t inhibit production.
Brett Bellmore 06.20.06 at 8:06 pm
As somebody who doesn’t believe in getting ought from is, I don’t believe fundamental rights exist in any objective sense. Rather, I believe that rights are a human construct, which depending on how they fit or clash with human nature and our objective circumstances, either work to promote human ends, or work against them.
And, as I say, property rights are a fabulously successful construct, with such a long and sterling record of success, that it takes stronger reasons than any I’ve heard here to justify setting them aside.
Sure, compromising these principles doesn’t have to cause immediate disaster. But given the profound effects a higher rate of growth can have on long term wealth, compromising them CAN be considered a slow motion disaster.
Russell L. Carter 06.20.06 at 10:07 pm
“And, as I say, property rights are a fabulously successful construct, with such a long and sterling record of success …”
c.f. #17, and from #16:
“Poor people in a libertarian state may turn out to be very much constrained by contracts that they never agreed to: namely the contracts agreed between other people in that state.”
What exactly does a “long and sterling record of success” mean? Please provide a particular place and time in history which you deem an example of the “sterling record of success”. We can then examine your assertion on the merits.
Harald Korneliussen 06.21.06 at 2:11 am
I take issue with the “forcible” redistribution part. There’s a difference between forcing someone with violence, and forcing someone only using means the enforced party must concede that you are entitled to. For instance, I can refuse to cooperate, trade, and associate with a certain person. If many people do that, this person suffers economically. At one point, he might accept a fine, or a tax, in return for calling off the boycott.
So taxation, redistributive or not, need not imply illegitimate force (“robbers with badges”) or even the violent force which most people thing are legitimate. The problem, as I see it, is that both anti-egalitarian “libertarians” and liberal egalitarianism don’t understand why this difference matters.
Neel Krishnaswami 06.21.06 at 2:22 am
Actually…I imagine many liberal egalitarians would deny that you have a blanket right to refuse to cooperate, trade or associate with other people. For instance, if you are an employer you will pay heavy fines for systematically refusing to hire women or blacks. Laws enforcing racial hiring quotas are sketchy under a classical liberal understanding, since they violate freedom of association. But under an egalitarian POV, you have legitimate freedom of association only insofar as you don’t use it to reinforce patterns of oppression in society.
Chris Bertram 06.21.06 at 3:28 am
Brett Bellmore:
Resources that remain unfound, and in the ground, aren’t worth squat to anybody. And the motivation for looking for them, and digging them up, is that you get to keep them. Take away that motivation, and they stay in the ground, and we stay poor.
Sorry, but this is a bit of fatuous nonsense.
The motivation is not “that you get to keep them”, it is that you get to use them in productive activity, and, thereby, perhaps to make a profit. If there is a common right in land and natural resources, then those who want extraction rights can pay a fee to the commons or royalties on what they extract in return for doing so. Funds thereby raised could be used to finance measures like a universal basic income. On a purely national scale this kind of idea isn’t especially radical: see for example the citizen’s dividend in Alaska. The idea that such resources might properly belong to humankind as a whole and not specially to the peoples who happen to be living in the right places is more radical, but the Alaskan example alone is enough to refute Bellmore’s point.
(Of course, this kind of idea isn’t an especially left or liberal one: Henry George or the early Herbert Spencer were proponents.)
Jason 06.21.06 at 2:54 pm
Some of the most invigorating and exciting political philosophy I have ever read was Herbert Spencer’s original comments on land ownership in _Social Statics_ (taken out of later editions).
I don’t know how to code it: http://oll.libertyfund.org/Texts/LFBooks/Spencer0236/SocialStatics/HTMLs/0331_Pt03_Part2.html#LF-BK0331pt02ch06“
norwegian libertarian 06.21.06 at 8:07 pm
Når frihet lyst fredløs, bare Nordmenn er fri!
eweininger 06.21.06 at 9:20 pm
Nicholas Weininger? Who’s he?
Harald Korneliussen 06.22.06 at 4:34 am
Neel Krishnaswami, remember that both racism and anti-racism can be enforced with legitimate, non-violent means. So, racial discrimination is formally illegal here. Violence is not really needed to ban it. It’s just that if you are racist in this way, we sanction you by refusing to trade with you, equivalient to a fine, or refusing to have anything to do with you, equivalient to jail. Before you laugh at this, consider that the vast majority of criminals here (Norway) are simply called in for their trial and imprisonment. They show up.
The right to hire whoever you want is not unconditional, it can be signed away. We implicitly do that here, through our legal system. I could never figure what libertarians would have against this, or unions, or prohibition for that matter. As I see it, there’s nothing wrong with the non-violent part of state power.
(btw, the “norwegian libertarian” says “when freedom is outlawed, only norwegians are free” with a little strange grammar)
norwegian libertarian 06.22.06 at 6:24 am
Grammatikk er en liberaler konstruerer. De hater oss for vår elk.
Harald Korneliussen 06.22.06 at 9:10 am
“Grammar is a liberal construction. They hate us for our moose”? Really, I’d like to know what translator you are using :-)
engels and "RALPH" The Wonder Llama 06.22.06 at 9:40 am
The Norwegian libertarians responsible for comments #30, #44 and #47 have just been sacked.
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