Rawls by Samuel Freeman

by Harry on December 10, 2007

I admit that I wasn’t certain that Samuel Freeman’s book on Rawls would be terrific. Two reasons. First, it is very long, and I imagined that a good introductory text would be less than 462 pages long (514 incl gloassry and notes). Second, although I’m a huge admirer of Freeman as a philosopher, all his work that I’d previously read is aimed squarely at scholars; he works on exceedingly difficult questions, makes complicated arguments, and although the pay off is always, in my experience, more than worth the effort, I never expect undergraduates, for example, to be able to make that effort.

But Rawls (UK) is a triumph. A brilliantly careful, utterly transparent, account of Rawls’s thought and an admirable presentation of the state of the debates around Rawls’s work. The amazon reviewer who says “this is the one” gets it right. Forcing students to read Rawls is the right thing to do; but I shall never again force them to read him without providing Freeman’s text as indispensable help.

When I started reading it I was in the midst of a glut of work, and kept trying to put it down so I could get on with things, but couldn’t. It is, as it should be at this length, comprehensive — chapters on each of the two principles, on the OP, on the basic structure, and a wonderfully clear chapter on the importance of stability, and what it is that stability consists in. Then a chapter on Kantian constructivism, which really helped illuminate (for me, at least, but I have always been unsure about this) the relationship between the Dewey lecture and the later work, two chapters on political liberalism and one on the Law of Peoples. I guess the book is intended primarily as a companion in a comprehensive course on Rawls’s work — read all three main books, and Freeman’s so that the students can tell what is going on. But the first six chapters alone justify the (low) price of the book (so it is useable alongside A Theory of Justice or Justice as Fairness alone) and I can’t imagine teaching Rawls to undergraduates again without using it. Highly recommended.

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Rawls: highly recommended « Entertaining Research
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Crooked Timber » » Rawls as Archaeologist
12.12.07 at 8:11 pm



bob mcmanus 12.10.07 at 5:24 pm

Honest question,not meant as a criticism:Why don’t more competent informed people post reviews at Amazon? I certainly don’t depend on Amazon reviews, but I do find them useful. And I am often directed by a blogger to an Amazon book that has zero reviews.


bernarda 12.10.07 at 5:42 pm

I have “Theory of Justice” on my bookshelf, but I have only read bits and pieces about some chapters that interested me for some reason or another. Maybe I should attack the whole thing.


harry b 12.10.07 at 5:57 pm

Well, I took that as a challenge as well as a question, bob, so went ahead and added this review to the site. I don’t know why people don’t do it more. Why haven’t I added my reviews from here to amazon? Mainly because I haven’t thought of it. But I agree, its helpful, and I do, sometimes, rely on amazon reviews. (Though there are odities — have you seen the reviews of WKRP in Cincinatti?)


Robert Talisse 12.10.07 at 5:59 pm

For what it’s worth, I agree entirely with Harry here. Freeman’s book is now *the* secondary work on Rawls’s philosophy– no Rawls seminar should be conducted without it.


Pablo G. 12.10.07 at 6:18 pm

I aree, Harry. I have just finished teaching a class on Rawls’s A Theory of Justice, and I found Freeman’s book really helpful, especially in its discussion of the problem of stability and in its effort to elucidate the idea of a property owning democracy.


Ingrid 12.10.07 at 8:09 pm

I bought both the new Pogge and the Freeman books on Rawls, intending to read both of them, but so far I only am half-way the Pogge book, which I also found very good so far. Anybody out there who has read both and can make an informed comparison?


Brian 12.10.07 at 9:21 pm

I don’t know that I count as “informed”. In any case, if Amazon’s policy is as it once was, once you publish your review there it is their intellectual property. I can see a lot of people having a problem with that.


paul 12.10.07 at 11:00 pm

Harry, have you yet read Pogge’s new book on Rawls? I’d be interested to know how you (or anyone else) would compare the two. I haven’t read Freeman’s, but I have read Pogge’s, and I think the latter is superb. But then, I’ve always found Pogge to be more engaging and more suitably distanced from Rawlsian moral and political philosophy than Freeman.


Andrew 12.10.07 at 11:33 pm

Thank you for the heads up on this book. Coincidentally, I am slogging through A Theory of Justice even as we speak. A good companion volume would be of great use.


Tom Hurka 12.11.07 at 12:12 am

Does Freeman think there’s anything Rawls wasn’t right about?


Dan Kervick 12.11.07 at 12:20 am

I studied Rawls’s Theory of Justice for a good month as an undergraduate, but made it all the way through graduate school to my Philosophy PhD without reading so much as a single sentence of Rawls. Nor do I recall him coming up in any classes. Granted, I clearly wasn’t pursuing a study of political philosophy, although I have read quite a bit of it since then. But for those of you who think Rawls is an interesting and important philosopher, could you please write a few sentences on why that is? I’m not trying to be snarky. I just really don’t know what it is that drives the interest. ToJ made no lasting impression on me, and the scattered various ideas I can remember – the original position, veil of ignorance, reflective equilibrium – don’t seem to have had any lasting impact on my thinking. Frankly, it all just seemed rather bland and uninspired at the time, even from a technical, logical point of view, and detached from most of the topics that make the study of human beings interesting.


hmm 12.11.07 at 12:37 am

Dan: do you find any questions in moral or political philosophy interesting? That is a starting point. Some people can’t really get exercised by debates like “Is a talking cat really a cat?”, but it takes all sorts to make a philosophy department.


John M 12.11.07 at 1:31 am

in response to dan (12.):

Without being well versed on Rawls myself, I’d give the unintentionally snarky reply that it’s because everyone else reads Rawls. Philosophies of liberalism don’t generally make any lasting impressions on me so much either, but they sure do fit easily with American political culture.

He lays out nicely lots of ideal scenarios for argumentation that are nice stamps for the liberal free speech ideal.

I may be doing disservice to Rawls (again, I’m no Rawls scholar at all) by implying that he promotes liberal philosophy and pragmatic reason without attention to the critical turn or theories of ideology, but that very blindness makes for a perfect philosophy to turn to for the promotion of the liberal political ideal.


harry b 12.11.07 at 1:55 am

John M — no, that sounds intentionally snarky.

Tom — Freeman offers a very sympathetic reading of Rawls (as you guessed). This is handy for two reasons. First, as John M above might want to consider, figuring out how to criticise Rawls (or any serious thinker) well requires a pretty thorough understanding of their theory – thinking your way into the theory is a precondition for doing this (for most of us). Freeman’s book helps a lot. Second, and more idiosyncratically, I think it will help me as a teacher. When teaching Rawls I spend a lot of time adopting his own views/sounding very sympathetic because I’m trying to get the students inside the theory. I’m hoping that by making this much easier for them Freeman’s text will make it easier for me to spend more time criticising Rawls in class.

Dan — I won’t answer your quesion now, but invite others to, and will try to work up a short post on it myself for the new year.


loren 12.11.07 at 4:22 am

I find Rawls interesting and important. He tries to reconcile liberty and equality in a principled way, rather than arguing in favour of one against the other. He tries to find a middle ground for ethical justification between realists and their critics. He tries to establish political philosophy as importantly distinct from moral philosophizing, rather than the former being a mere extension of the latter. He provides a rich elaboration of the idea of public reason.


zdenek v 12.11.07 at 7:31 am

In a very powerful way Rawls fleshes out Kant’s moral theory so that two huge and enduring problems in political philosophy can get an interesting solution :

1)equality and liberty can be persuasively reconciled within this framework

2) equally importantly, his conception of justice can be given a Kantian justification in a sense that the original position may be viewed as procedural interpretation of Kant’s conception of autonomy and the categorical imperative.


Chris Bertram 12.11.07 at 7:40 am

Well I must read it.

My current stance on Rawls is more negative than it’s been for a long time, and that’s largely because Annette Lareau’s book _Unequal Childhoods_ convinced me that the law-and-economics/rules-and-incentives conception of the social that Rawls works with is deeply inadequate. (Other aspects of Rawls still suit me just fine.) The reason this is funny, in the present context, is that Lareau is married to Freeman.


novakant 12.11.07 at 8:26 am

The reason this is funny, in the present context, is that Lareau is married to Freeman.

Imagine the dinner table discussions they must have …


Thom Brooks 12.11.07 at 11:15 am

Let me agree with much of what has been said: Freeman’s book is a true achievement. If only Rawls had written as clearly…


GreatZamfir 12.11.07 at 11:35 am

A bit in the same vein as (12.), I run to Rawls as a name once in a while, and he seems important. But every ‘shorthand’ version of his ideas gives the impression that he is the guy who wrote down a philosophically consistent version of mainstream American, or perhaps liberal western, political thought.

I would be willing to spend some time studying more details, starting perhaps with this book, but I get the impression I would not really be surprised in any way. People seem more impressed by Rawls’ way of writing down things they already believed more than by new ideas.

Am I missing something important here?


Matt 12.11.07 at 2:08 pm

_Imagine the dinner table discussions they must have …_

For the record, neither Lareau nor Freeman think that Lareau’s work contradicts Rawls’s in any deep or important way. (It clearly does, I think, show one way in which fair equality of opportunity might be harder to achieve than we otherwise might have thought, something Freeman is well aware of. How deep this problem is is perhaps where Chris’s disagreement comes in, though I’m not sure.) Of course authors are not deeply privilaged in deciding what the implications of their own works so the fact that Lareau doesn’t think her work is in any deep contradiction to Rawls doesn’t mean that it might not be so. But, that neither she nor Freeman think that it’s so ought to give us some reason to not think the two are in obvious contradiction.

On Pogge’s book, I’ll not comment on the substance since I’ve not read it, but it is worth noting that it’s not, strictly speaking, a _new_ book, but rather a translation (by Michelle Kosch) of a book he published in 1994 in German. As far as I can tell it’s not seriously changed from the German version though I can’t say that for sure.


Stephen Downes 12.11.07 at 3:05 pm

While I enjoyed reading Rawls, I would hardly agree that undergraduates should be forced to read him.

That said, I will on the strength of this review seek out Freeman’s introduction.

And in response to bob mcmanus, I think that most capable reviewers are also sensible enough to not simply pass their content into Amazon’s ownership for no good reason.


Chris Bertram 12.11.07 at 3:11 pm

I should write a long post on this Matt. Just briefly (and crudely) though….

I think that Lareau’s work made me think that just getting the rules and incentives right won’t do as much for either equality of opportunity or for equality as Rawlsians might have hoped.

This may be more of a problem for Pogge than it is for Freeman (or Rawls), because Pogge often writes as if rules+payoffs both explains social outcomes and enables determinate social engineering (and I think he’s wrong about social explanation and overconfident about social engineering).

But if rules+payoffs won’t deliver, it seems to me that Rawlsians face a stark choice. That choice involves (1) continuing to insist (on grounds of justice, rule of law etc.) that the state must limit itself to procedural methods in the pursuit of social justice, and therefore scaling back our ambition for how much we can achieve OR (2) accepting that there are cultural barriers to equality and waging war on them directly (with the risk of abandoning “neutrality” about the good).


Blake Emerson 12.11.07 at 3:44 pm

I’ve recently written a critique of Rawls from the perspective of racial justice:

“Rawls uses the notion of a “veil of ignorance” to describe the conditions for determining principles of justice. When we consider these conditions in light of our racially disparate reality, we find that the veil serves not as the instrument of justice, but as an instrument for the preservation of injustice. Rawls’ use of the veil therefore betrays political liberalism’s morally fatal ignorance of racial injustice. Political reasoning behind the veil necessarily yields color blind norms because it requires citizens deliberating over justice to ignore the question of race. As a consequence, Rawls’ mode of political reason is wholly unequipped to recognize the contemporary reality of racism, and conceive of justifiable norms for political redress…”

Read on at: http://radicalnegative.blogspot.com/2007/12/then-it-dawned-on-me-with-certain.html


Matt 12.11.07 at 3:44 pm

Thanks for the clarification, Chris- that’s very useful. I’m not sure what I think about the issue, but it’s obviously one that needs to be thought about very clearly and given more attention.


aaron_m 12.11.07 at 5:22 pm

Liberal feminists have for some time noted the above choice that Rawlsians seem to be faced with, and I think have compellingly argued that we need at least some more of 2 (e.g. see Okin or Nussbaum) to make his theory of social justice work as a coherent liberalism. This is more of a problem for Rawls’ political liberalism than it is for what we find in a Theory of Justice, i.e. in terms of coherence. But it seems that Rawls himself might have in the end seen the question of how much equal treatment of individuals we should aim for as to some significant degree determined by existing practice within specific cultural contexts. As such limiting the pursuit of social justice to the public procedural realm need not be justified on the grounds that it is best at guaranteeing some universal standard of equal treatment between individuals. Rather it is justified on the grounds that such an approach to social justice is in accordance with a liberal political culture like that of the US (by the way what we get in both ToJ and PL seem to me to be a pretty poor jobs of interpretation if that is what they are supposed to be). If that is what Rawls is up to the issue Chris takes up becomes a non-problem in the sense that Rawls is not forced to make a choice. This is because the kinds cultural barriers to equal treatment noted simply do not rise to the status of a problem of justice within the existing political culture. Of course, not such a happy theoretical result from the perspective of most liberals I suspect.

I do think there is some strong evidence for accepting recent interpretations of Rawls as founding standards of social justice in existing practice, particularly in his The Laws of Peoples. There he argues that the central part of international justice is to secure conditions at the global scope that allow peoples to exercise pluralism about ‘the good political order,’ or in other words to have political orders in accordance with specific cultural contexts. This is what justice requires at the international level because this standard is what we find to be central within the existing international political culture. The upshot is that he ends up offering a principled defence of views on ‘the good political order’ where persons are “not regarded as free and equal citizens, nor as separate individuals deserving equal representation,” and instead “recognize when their moral duties and obligations accord with the people’s common good idea of justice” (Rawls LoP, 71). Not such a happy result for women.


josh 12.11.07 at 5:51 pm

On the question of why many think Rawls worth reading: I think that a lot has to do, not only with ToJ’s merits as a philosophical argument (which are, I think, significant), but its place in the history of political philosophy. I can think of several aspects of this (others who have commented here, who know Rawls’s work, its precursors and the subsequent literature far better than I, could no doubt do better. But here goes.):
1) Rawls pretty much single-handedly revived ambitious, systematic normative theorising about politics. I disagree with the notion that political theory/philosophy ‘died’ between 1945 (or 1914, or 1900, or whenever) and the publication of ToJ. But it is true that during that time one saw mainly reflections on the history of political thought (or reflections on politics which relied on the history of political thought), or analyses of the use of political concepts; there were very few attempts to work out normative principles or ideals in relation to which political arrangements could be judged and legitimated. Rawls changed all this. Even if one thinks that others — Dworkin, Nozick, Jerry Cohen — have done better, it’s hard to imagine them doing the work they did/have without ToJ.
2) Relatedly, Rawls improved the standards of philosophical argument in political theory. While he’s best known for a few easily-communicated (and thus seemingly simple) ideas – the veil of ignorance, the original position, the difference principle — ToJ is actually incredibly complex (and very, very long: it really does seek to be pretty comprehensive, and so far as I can tell, many people don’t really read the latter sections of the book). There are, in the words of one of Rawls’s acolytes, a lot of moving parts to the argument: you probably have to study it pretty closely to fully appreciate it (as I’m sure I don’t).
3)Rawls’s approach (as Loren suggested above) provided a way to think about the relationship between moral and political philosophy, which steered between the tendency to see the two as wholly separate and unrelated (thus de-moralising political thought, and leaving political theory normatively impoverished), and to see the two as wholly continuous. As I understand his project, Rawls was able to argue both that its appropriate to look to a moral theory as the basis for political legitimacy; and that, given the unique features of politics, one needs to work out a particular sort of normative theory for politics, which will be justified in a different way, and have a different content, than personal moralities. He wasn’t unique in this respect; but, again, he provided one of the fullest, best worked-out arguments for this approach.
4) Some commenters have faulted Rawls as merely providing philosophical window-dressing for American liberal platitudes (at least, I think this is a fair paraphrase of their charges). I’d say, instead, that he went beyond liberal intuitions to construct a genuinely philosophical justification for liberalism (though I do think that one can argue that Rawls’s arguments do start from broadly liberal moral assumptions — for instance, a concern for individual well-being, a suspicion of coercive authority, and a commitment to human equality. I think he provides some powerful arguments for why we’re right to care about these things, but there’s no denying that if you’re not already committed to all this, you probably won’t find his arguments very appealing.)
5) When Rawls came along, liberal theorists were largely caught between various versions of utilitarianism and Kantian, deontic morality, and were not fully comfortable with either; many appealed to rather vague notions of natural rights, without being able to provide any real philosophical justification for it. Rawls provided an alternative to utilitarianism and an innovative re-working of Kant, and revived thinking about politics in terms of social-contract theory. This has been tremendously fruitful, even if one thinks that this sort of approach isn’t, ultimately, the best.
6) Finaly, I think it’s quite arguable whether ToJ winds up pointing no further than a defense of freedom of speech and the platform of the (U.S.) Democratic Party. Actually,scratch that: I think that such a view’s just wrong. ToJ doesn’t aim to provide guidlines for policy; Rawls is working at a higher level of abstraction, and is (I think rightly) modest about how much guidance a theory such as his can give us in political practice. And there have been plausible arguments for justifying a number of different economic regimes through appeal to Rawls’s theory. But Rawls himself suggested that his theory pointed towards either a ‘property-owning democracy’ or ‘liberal socialism’ as just economic regimes; and both of these are well to the ‘left’of anything we’ve seen in the US (whether they’re to the left in the right way is another matter).
That said, Rawls’s version of liberalism is open to a lot of powerful and valid criticism (e.g. Hart’s critique of Rawls’s argument for the priority of the first over the second principle of justice). And one might think that Rawls’s whole approach to thinking (normatively) about politics is misguided. But I do think one needs to engage more deeply in Rawls’s arguments, and get a better grasp of what his approach is and why he adopted it, for one’s criticisms to have merit as argumentative points, rather than ‘irritable mental gestures’.
(I should perhaps just add that I’m not a Rawlsian myself, in either substance or approach. This may have something to do with the fact that I’m woefully ignorant of Rawls’s work. I’ll have to read Freeman’s book; thanks to Harry and co. for the recommendation.)
Sorry for the long posting.


Forcefed Rawls as a Youth 12.11.07 at 6:45 pm

Chris, I’m not sure that the choice is as stark as you make it out to be. You say Rawlsians must either limit itself to actions consistent with the “neutrality” of political liberalism/public reason/the reasonable (I’m not sure which terms is most applicable) OR their abandoning neutrality about the good. Now, maybe this is just because I’m not a Rawlsian, but it seems clear to me that there could be relevant non-state institutions that could take action in the “background culture.” In other words, Rawlsians could let the state remain as it is, but encourage elements of civil society to act to alleviate the relevant cultural barriers. Moreover, it doesn’t seem particularly effective to me to have the state be the relevant actor here, regardless. Or are there more specific state actions you think would be useful in this area?


Artclone 12.11.07 at 7:49 pm

G. A. Cohen’s critique of Rawls’ TOJ is pretty devastating. I recommend providing it to students along when reading TOJ.

Also: why do we need an introduction to Rawls in the first place? His writing seems pretty accessible to me.


tim quick 12.11.07 at 10:07 pm

Forget philosophical substance for the moment, there are historical or cultural reasons Rawls is so significant. He practically reintroduced political philosophy and substantive normative theorizing to the English speaking world – and did so in opposition to the hundred year long domination of utilitarianism. And, as he went along, he developed a philosophical framework (“wide reflective equilibrium”, “moral overlapping consensus”, etc.) that provided a model of how to do substantive philosophical inquiry in (god, forgive me) a postmodern, suitably metaphysically neutral framework. He, also, reintroduced the reading of history in a substantive way – training a whole generation of significant moral and political philosophers – to analytic philosophy. Moreover, he did so as part of a process of arguing for a redefining the history of English language philosophy since Hobbes in a way that counter the reading central to metaphysical/epistemological reading foisted on us by earlier analytic philosophers. Or so I’d argue.


Amit 12.12.07 at 2:31 am

re: 20

cf. the bit of nerd-humour according to which TOJ is the transcendental deduction of American liberalism (or, variously, the Labour Party in 1963, the New Deal, etc.)

(Yes, yes, the theory is meant to be metaphysically neutral – Rorty actually takes this into account in his version of the joke by saying “Suppose one grants that Rawls is not attempting a transcendental deduction of American liberalism…”)


Katherine 12.12.07 at 10:56 am

Artclone, do you have a name for that G A Cohen book? I’m seeing lots of “defence of Marx” style titles, but nothing specifically on Rawls. Thanks.


harry b 12.12.07 at 11:43 am

katherine – I’d guess he’s thinking of If You’re an Egalitarian, How Come You’re so Rich, which contains an excellent chapter (which makes the CB Lareau point, though in a different way) on the limits of pursuing justice through procedural methods. He also has an excellent but long paper (his Tanner lecture, so it must be free on the Tanner Lectures site) against the difference principle as an equality licensing principle (that’s imprecise, but I’m up early, and can’t render it more precise without more thought than I am capable of right now).


Katherine 12.12.07 at 12:19 pm

Thanks Harry. I’ve had Anarchy, State and Utopia on my bookshelf for a while, so I figure it’s about time I peruse a decent range of differing views.


dm 12.12.07 at 3:18 pm

Cohen also has a book manuscript titled something like Saving Justice from Constructivism (although the tentative title seems to change periodically) which is not yet published but which he’s been teaching at seminars and previewing in talks for a while now. I’ve read parts of it, and that is where Cohen’s criticism of Rawls gets its most extensive elaboration.


anon 12.12.07 at 3:32 pm

I will act on Harry’s enthusiastic review and read Freeman’s book over the holidays.

If it is the case, as no 23 Matt states, that
Pogge’s book is a translation from a work first published in 1994 then OUP are acting shady by not informing about that on their otherwise informative page here http://www.oup.com/uk/catalogue/ci=9780195136371 . Obviously, much has happened in the Rawls research since 1994 so despite the initial merits of the book it is bound to be lacking in some relevant regards, in comparison with the book by Freeman.


Greg 12.12.07 at 9:17 pm

re: 37

I thought Cohen’s book was an elabouration of his 2003 P&PA article ‘Facts and Principles,’ which is more of an argument against the method of reflective equilibrium than against ToJ.

Someone familiar with one of the manuscripts floating around out there care to correct me?


Oran Moked 12.13.07 at 1:35 am

‘Facts and Principles’ (or a version thereof) is as far as I recall an early chapter in the book, and the issues it addresses are indeed primarily methodological rather than substantive. But the bulk of the book engages directly with Rawls’s substantive positions on distributive justice. (I should add, though, that the methodological and substantive concerns are not unrelated: the remainder of the book rests to some extent on the argument of ‘Facts and Principles’.)


John Oberdiek 12.13.07 at 2:39 am

G. A. Cohen’s forthcoming book from Harvard is _Rescuing Justice and Equality_, and it includes chapters deriving from his Tanner lecture on incentives, his paper criticizing the Pareto principle, his paper criticizing Rawls’s exclusive focus on the basic structure, as well as from the “Facts and Principles” paper, but it also includes four other chapters plus an appendix in which he replies to critics. It is sure to give Rawlsians a lot to think — and worry! — about in the years to come.


Tom Hurka 12.13.07 at 3:05 am

Re #32:

The ‘hundred year long domination of utilitarianism’? Nonsense. Hardly any significant moral philosophers between 1900 and 1950 were utilitarians. Rashdall, McTaggart, Moore, Joseph and others were ideal consequentialists (aka perfectionists); Prichard, Ross, Carritt, Broad, and Ewing were non-Kantian deontologists. Utilitarianism itself was widely taken to be decisively refuted.

And I personally think normative ethics and political philosophy were coming back anyway, independently of Rawls: there was already a revival going on before TOJ (Feinberg, Singer, etc.). He gave them a boost, obviously, but ‘practically reintroduced political philosophy and substantive normative theorizing’ is a gross exaggeration.


Thom Brooks 12.13.07 at 2:39 pm

Re: 43

This is certainly true, although the case may be understated: even before 1900, the British Idealists —no friends of utilitarianism— were dominant (at least in the UK) (Green, Bradley, Bosanquet). So Hurka is certainly right, but perhaps even more so…


Amit 12.13.07 at 11:32 pm

my earlier comment referred to greatzamfir’s , which used to be #20 and is now #22.


Dan Butt 12.14.07 at 10:12 am

Re: 38

This is from the preface of the Pogge book:

“This book was originally published in German as John Rawls (Munich: Beck Verlag, 1994)… I am deeply grateful to Michelle Kosch, who has produced an outstanding translation. Taking advantage… [of a stay at ANU] I have worked through this translation carefully and, with much help from Rekha Nath, Ling Tong, Leif Wenar and Andrew Williams, updated and revised a great deal. Any discrepancies with the German text, for better or for worse, are my own responsibility.”

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